Can the leadership of Saudi Arabia steer the country's economy to a viable postoil era? This question anchors Tim Niblock's review of economic planning and performance in the kingdom. To assess strides toward an economy less dependent on oil revenue, he examines four areas of performance: creation, maintenance, and improvement of physical and social infrastructure; development of sectors that possess comparative advantage in the global economy; provision of employment opportunities to Saudi citizens that match education and training with international standards of labor productivity; and cultivation of a private sector able to compete in open markets with minimal support from tariffs and subsidies.
Three theoretical lenses frame Niblock's estimate for the trajectory of Saudi Arabia's political economy. One lens centers on the degree to which the state is involved in the economy in terms of three ideal types: the minimal state, state-aided capitalism (typical of contemporary Western economies), and state-sponsored capitalism (typical of latecomers to economic development, such as East Asia). The second theoretical lens pertains to relationships between economic policymakers and the private sector. Those relationships range from a predatory state, where power holders exploit positions to milk the private sector, to embedded autonomy characteristic of the developmental state. The third theoretical lens relates to the rentier-state. Niblock acknowledges the debatable value of the rentier-state model and suggests strategies for escaping the supposed constraints imposed by the rentier condition.
The body of the book falls into two sections. The first section examines government efforts to develop the economy in three chronological stages. For each stage, Niblock summarizes government revenues and foreign assets, development strategy, the implementation of policies, GDP patterns (growth and shifting contributions of different sectors), the role of the private sector, and patterns in employment. The first stage (1962–70) began with Prince Faysal's consolidation of power. He presided over the framing of laws to govern property and labor and the creation of administrative capacity to oversee economic development. The second stage (1970–85) encompasses three five-year plans. In addition to tracing well-known fluctuations in oil prices and revenues, the author highlights the limitations of a planning vision that amounts to a list of projects as opposed to the subsequent stage's attempt to integrate elements of the plans. The third stage (1985–2000) corresponds to a period of erratic oil revenues and a shift in planning strategy that gave more emphasis to the private sector and put caps on government expenditure. In that stage, quintennial plans took advantage of newly formed infrastructure and focused on diversifying, raising productivity, and providing incentives for the private sector to expand. Efforts to wean the economy from dependence on foreign labor did not bear fruit because of its low cost, docility, and mobility compared to Saudi workers.
The book's second section focuses on very recent steps to make the country competitive in the global economy. Monica Malik surveyed twenty-four businessmen in 1999 to pinpoint areas where the government needed to improve if private sector initiatives are to flourish. The survey revealed frustration with insufficient water, sewage, and electricity infrastructure for industrial zones as well as deficiencies in telecommunications and rail transport. Other problem areas included insurance and financial systems, bureaucratic hurdles impeding new enterprises, and low educational standards.
Niblock's assessment of economic reform from 2000 to 2006 offers glimmers of hope that the government has the vision and will to reshape conditions for economic development, primarily because of a shift in emphasis from the state to foreign and private-sector investors. That shift had several causes: business leaders had the ear of Crown Prince Abdullah, the prolonged fiscal squeeze since 1986 dented expectations that the government would possess sufficient oil revenues to take the lead in investment, and the restless political mood of the 1990s arising from unemployment and declining living standards pressed leaders to try new development strategies. The international climate in the 1990s, reflected in the Washington Consensus and the World Trade Organization, buttressed voices seeking a higher degree of foreign and private investment. The new orientation was evident in the plan for 2000 to 2004, which called for the private sector to provide 70 percent of investment, with a heavy emphasis on human-resource (education and training) development.
The final chapter offers a provisional assessment of reforms since 2000, concluding that Saudi Arabia's hybrid economy now possesses islands of efficiency, primarily in the petrochemical industry, in a sea of inefficient private and state-run enterprises. Changes owed much to the requirements for accession to the World Trade Organization, especially overhauling legal and regulatory frameworks to bring them into conformity with international standards. By 2005, it was easier to establish and run a business although still more difficult than in other Gulf Cooperation Council states. Whether the government can convert islands of efficiency into an economic landmass is a question that Niblock wisely leaves open, rejecting the breezy pessimism of Saudi Arabia's critics.
He considers the most difficult challenge to lie in the development of human resources. Although the best schools and universities adhere to cosmopolitan standards and turn out highly trained graduates, the norm is rote learning, lax standards, and emphasis on religious subjects. Unless the kingdom copes with political and social resistance to transforming education, it will remain dependent on large numbers of expatriate workers, Saudis will be unemployed or employed in subsidized jobs, and the passage to the postoil era will be tumultuous. To smooth the way to a more efficient and competitive labor market, Niblock proposes a new social contract between state and citizen that mitigates the impact of spells of unemployment and lower wages.
Given the salience of political considerations in economic matters, Niblock might have offered some glimpses of policy options, or debates over policy, to accompany the abundant charts and statistics. Overall, this compact volume is a model of clarity in laying out its assumptions and presenting the data, without glossing over the hazards of relying on official statistics. The writing is brisk and refreshingly free of jargon. In terms of the core message, the depiction of distinctive phases of economic planning and policy refutes simplistic accounts that portray Saudi Arabia as stagnant. This book most certainly belongs on library shelves and on the reading lists of courses dealing with the contemporary Middle East.
