It has been suggested that relatively little work has been done to bring the disciplines of international relations and Middle East politics together. This new book by Raymond Hinnebusch represents a striking success in doing just that. Throughout his text, Hinnebusch combines a detailed and nuanced understanding of the history and politics of the region with an analytical focus derived from the academic discipline of international relations. The book both argues for and embodies an approach to the study of the Middle East that avoids the pitfalls of regional exceptionalism, instead inserting the politics of the Middle East into the broader framework of contemporary international relations approaches.
In his introduction, Hinnebusch argues for the necessity to adopt a multilayered approach to the international relations of the Middle East. Neorealism, he says, fails to offer a comprehensive explanation of the political dynamics of the region; therefore, other perspectives must be taken into account. It is around these approaches that the book is constructed. Thus, structuralism offers insights into the evolution of the regional state system and, in particular, its domination by the Western “core” in a classic core–periphery relationship, while constructivism helps us to understand the contestation between suprastate identities and state sovereignty. Pluralism impels us to disaggregate the state and challenges the realist assumption of states as cohesive units—this being particularly apt in the Middle East, where states have been, and continue to be, permeable and fragmented. Finally, Hinnebusch argues that realism does have a role, if limited, in explaining state behavior once war becomes pervasive and state elites follow raison d'êtat. Hinnebusch elaborates on all of this in a series of subsequent chapters, which reflect his theoretical concerns while being grounded in a rich store of empirical material.
A key concern for Hinnebusch is the dependent nature of states in the Middle East, which has dramatic implications for the nature of political life in the region. In a telling discussion of the 1973 oil crisis, he argues that the opportunity for a significant realignment of power relations between Arab states and the West was lost, as the combination of Egypt's restoration to Western allegiance under Sadat and Saudi Arabian reluctance to challenge its Western supporters had the effect instead of accelerating Western penetration of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, such that the ruling families of the oil monarchies became junior partners in a “global bourgeoisie,” politically demobilizing populations and increasing the security dependency of Gulf oil producers on the West. More recently, he argues, patterns in state consolidation since the 1980s have led to the sacrificing of pan-Arab to individual state interests. The leaders of more radical states have tempered their radicalism: where once they harnessed their economics to foreign policy, now they harness foreign policy to economics, trading “Western-friendly foreign policy for economic aid and investment” (p. 87). At the same time, the oil monarchies have become even more dependent on Western protection as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait made manifest. Hinnebusch's argument is compelling. However, if we add to it his earlier claim that there is no evidence that the increased strength of the Islamic movement leads to an “Islamisation” of foreign policy, then the question is raised as to where, and how, opposition to Western policies and actions in the Middle East will find expression.
This question leads inevitably to the questions of democracy and democratization. It is not surprising that Hinnebusch observes that, in the context of widespread co-optation or repression of political opposition, public opinion plays little direct role in the formulation of public policy. However, he points out that even limited democratization places pressure on elites to distance themselves from the West. One might reflect on events in Turkey in 2003 when a Turkish parliament dominated by the neo-Islamist Justice and Development party rejected U.S. overtures to support the then-proposed invasion of Iraq. More recent events have also illustrated the tension between Western (especially the American) policies of democracy promotion, which, if successful, are likely to empower only those forces opposed to other key aspects of Western policy in the Middle East (on, e.g., Israel/Palestine, the war in Iraq, and the “war” on terror).
Hinnebusch's text sets the 20th-century history of the Middle East within a broader context of the interplay of international, regional, national, and subnational factors and actors, taking in patterns of state formation, the rise and decline of pan-Arab nationalism, the antagonistic relationship between “radical” and “conservative” states, the impact of the cold war, the Arab–Israeli conflict, the impact of globalization, and much more along the way.
In his concluding paragraphs (written before the 2003 invasion of Iraq), Hinnebusch notes, as others have done, the contradictions inherent in the U.S. role in the Middle East. American hegemony, he suggests, far from increasing individual or collective security, is counterproductive to regional order. This is because the continued application of American force in the region is essential to maintain the status quo but, paradoxically, undermines its legitimacy. Unfortunately, as he also points out, “U.S. Middle East policy seldom takes the form of rational calculation of national interests” (p. 220). The clarity of analysis provided by this book would go a long way to supplying the basis for the construction of just such a set of policies for the region. It should be essential reading not merely for scholars and students of the Middle East and international relations, but for anyone interested in contemporary international politics.
