In Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency Lea Ypi elaborates a cosmopolitan conception of global justice driven by what she terms an “activist” mode of political theory. The key feature of activist political theory, as Ypi emphasizes throughout in Marxist fashion, is its commitment not only to grasp the world in thought but also to reform it: “to capture not just how appropriate normative views emerge and are endorsed to criticize the world but also under what conditions they can be invoked to change it” (3). Ypi's main effort is accordingly to develop a cosmopolitan theory that is sensitive to real-world events and actual possibilities of “political transformation” (6).
Ypi situates this real-world approach within the statist-cosmopolitan debate on global egalitarianism. The key question of this debate is whether it is philosophically coherent to endorse egalitarianism domestically yet avoid it globally. Cosmopolitans hold that wherever economic ties exist to a degree that establishes significant interdependence, the demands of egalitarian distributive justice apply. Since in this century different societies are just as interdependent as are individuals within a single society, distributive justice requires egalitarianism in both contexts. Statists, in contrast, believe that the trigger for egalitarian justice is not economic but political. It is not economic ties but the fact that co-citizens share a distinct political relationship, as equal authors of and subjects to the same law that requires of them to reciprocally impose upon one another egalitarian distributive duties. These duties are more stringent than the distributive duties they have toward outsiders. These “associative relations,” as the global justice literature refers to them, are the reason why at the global level statists are not egalitarians but rather “sufficientarians,” only seeking to ensure that persons abroad do not suffer absolute deprivation, even if they do suffer from relative deprivation.
Ypi argues throughout the book that both statists and cosmopolitans misperceive the normative significance of the state and of the political associative relations that underlie it. Statists overestimate the significance of political relations to the exclusion of morally salient global economic ties that ought to trigger egalitarian concern. Cosmopolitans, emphasizing the moral arbitrariness of political membership, underestimate the significance of the state and the associative relations underlying it in realizing the cosmopolitan agenda itself.
The solution, Ypi contends, is a synthesis that she labels “statist cosmopolitanism”—a position that insists on extending the scope of egalitarian justice beyond the state, but that avoids utopian irrelevance by utilizing the state and political membership rather than casting them aside entirely. First, the state's coercive power is necessary to make cosmopolitan projects feasible. Second, the state's capacity for instilling a sense of justice in its citizens through civic education that speaks to the unique political experience of each society is necessary to make these projects sustainable over time. Cosmopolitans therefore need to distinguish clearly between the level of “principles,” at which the state has no independent place, and the level of “agency,” where the state is central. At the level of principles there are normative commitments that remain distinctly universalistic. At the level of agency there are particular political communities, which remain the most viable path for reform-minded social agents to bring about cosmopolitan progress. These agents—“citizens, civil associations, and political actors” (155)—represent for Ypi the “cosmopolitan avant-garde.”
Ypi's cosmopolitanism is “statist friendly” also in a more indirect way. Assuming that the statist sufficientarian commitment already has some degree of public purchase in affluent democracies, Ypi rightly notes that it is strategically useful for cosmopolitans to show how such a commitment must eventually lead to a more robust concern for global egalitarianism. If a causal link could be established between relative global deprivation and absolute deprivation, cosmopolitans could make the case for robust global egalitarianism without evoking the arbitrariness of political membership.
This is a brilliantly simple idea, which has received only limited attention in the global justice literature so far. However, the reader is left feeling that the idea should have been developed further. Thus, for instance, despite an original discussion of relative inequalities in state power, Ypi is unable to lend sufficient credence to her claim that (relative) bargaining-power inequalities manifested in international bodies such as the WTO causally lead to absolute inequality, and specifically to absolute deprivation in the form of extreme poverty (126). Admittedly, Ypi is explicit that her empirical discussions (for example of trade barriers and trade agreements) are conducted from a highly abstract theoretical perspective, and as such can only “begin to sketch the argument” (122). Yet without a further deepening of the argument, what is arguably Ypi's most novel claim cannot have the impact it deserves.
Despite this fact, Ypi's “activist” cosmopolitan account represents an important contribution. There are simply too few voices in the conversation on global justice that have been thinking in the strategic way that Ypi advances, one that is explicitly geared toward political change. In this crucial sense Ypi offers her readers a vital service.
At the same time, the book's pronounced activism has its drawbacks. Or, to be more precise, the main drawback is that Ypi spends too much philosophical energy on contextualizing this activism within the abstract debate on ideal and nonideal theory. The flaws of statist and cosmopolitan views, Ypi argues from the outset, “have a common source: they stem from the confusion between ideal and nonideal categories in investigating the place of normative principles and their relationship to political agency” (3). This claim constitutes a main thread of the book, yet I believe it is both problematic and unnecessary.
There are several examples for why this claim is problematic, but I will mention only two. First, the attempt to tie the statist-cosmopolitan debate to the ideal-nonideal debate forces Ypi to artificially expand the concept of “ideal theory,” so as to cover what are essentially empirical inquiries concerning the causes of extreme poverty. A second, related example for why this attempt is problematic is that it pushes Ypi to accuse both statists and cosmopolitans of neglecting the actual causes of poverty in favor of merely condemning extreme poverty as self-evidently wrong. Yet at least one notable cosmopolitan (Thomas Pogge) has dedicated much of his current philosophical writing precisely to arguing that affluent nations share causal responsibility for global extreme poverty, and his argument has not suffered from a lack of attention (both positive and negative). Finally, the tie between the methodological and the substantive debate is also unnecessary, because Ypi's activist cosmopolitanism is distinctive and important enough to stand on its own, and is independent of any methodological errors from which other positions may or may not suffer.
Despite these shortcomings, Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency makes for more than worthwhile reading. Readers who wish to familiarize themselves with the current state of play in the global justice debate will find what they seek here. Readers interested more specifically in new cosmopolitan ideas will find the foundations of an exciting cosmopolitan theory, laden with numerous subtle discussions of hitherto undertheorized arguments, and with an ambition ranging from the methodological to the substantive, from the relationship between Newtonian theory and astrophysical observation to Guernica and Picasso as a quintessential example of “avant-garde cosmopolitan agency.” All of these accompany a fresh activist approach to political theory that, the criticisms above notwithstanding, we would do well to learn from.
