In recent years the emotions have received growing interest in Classics and ancient philosophy (see e.g. L. Candiotto and O. Renaut [edd.], Emotions in Plato [2020] or D. Cairns et al. [edd.], Emotions through Time [2022]). L.'s monograph, based on her Ph.D. thesis, comes as a welcome addition to this field of research, especially as this is the first book-length study entirely dedicated to the role of shame (αἰδώς, αἰσχύνη) in Plato. The importance of shame in ancient Greek literature can hardly be overstated (cf. B. Williams, Shame and Necessity [1993]; D. Cairns, Αἰδώς [1993]; M. Jimenez, Aristotle on Shame [2021]). L.'s book shows: Plato is no exception. As formulated in the introduction, the purpose of the study, which takes a unitary perspective on Plato's oeuvre, is no less than ‘Platons Konzeption der Scham im Ganzen darzulegen’ (p. 6). In order to reach this ambitious goal, L. chooses four focal points for examination: Socratic elenchus (Chapter 1), shame and love (Chapter 2), shame and virtue (Chapter 3) as well as moral education and the city (Chapter 4).

In Plato's Earlier Dialectic (1941) R. Robinson famously contended that Socrates’ insincere, ironical way of conducting the elenchus in the early dialogues is unsuccessful with a view to its moral effect on the ‘victim’, causing them to feel anger and (a non-beneficial form of) shame. As a consequence, in his later works Plato would have gradually abandoned ironic communication and the depiction of elenchus. Since his claims predate modern research on emotions in antiquity by decades, Robinson is an easy target for L.'s first chapter. Yet the opposition helps her develop an argument that is clear, coherent and convincing: in contrast to the sophistic elenchus (whose goal is victory in the argument), Socratic elenchus aims for the truth and the interlocutor's benefit. The kind of shame (both for one's ignorance and for one's lifestyle) Socratic elenchus provokes is ‘eigentlich ein Spezifikum’ insofar as it is ‘in erster Linie nach innen gerichtet’, rather than being directed towards and dependent upon the opinion of others (p. 46, cf. p. 40). If some of Socrates’ interlocutors experience anger and an outward-directed form of shame (‘schlechte Scham’), this is not due to the method but to the lack of dialectic virtues on the part of the interlocutors: ‘Nur mit dem idealen Gesprächspartner, der über Wissen, Wohlwollen und Freimütigkeit verfügt, kann Sokrates eine ideale Prüfung durchführen’ (p. 50). From this point of view Robinson's principal mistake was to uncritically accept the disapproval of Socratic elenchus voiced by unsuitable interlocutors.

Along the lines of her previous claims, in Chapter 2 L. argues that in Plato, similarly to Aeschines (cf. K. Döring, Hermes 112 [1984]), elenctic and erotic art are two sides of the same coin, both being based on goodwill (εὔνοια, ‘Wohlwollen’). Just as the elenchus, so Socratic love, too, has an ideal addressee. In a well-documented section (§2.2) L. shows that Plato's dialogues share the principal characteristics attributed to the ideal beloved – external and internal beauty, i.e. shame and restraint – with works of other Socratics. Plato departs from this traditional motif by establishing both features as fundamental characteristics of someone who is in search of the truth. For the lover, however, shame is a two-faced quality: on the one hand, it curbs physical desire; on the other, as with Hippothales in the Lysis, it can result in an unproductive timidity. A confrontation with other Socratic dialogues, analogous to the one conducted in §2.2, would have been helpful in this section. The chapter concludes with general remarks on the relation between love as a divine kind of madness and shame as reverence for the divine.

In Chapter 3 L. investigates the relationship between shame and virtue in the Apology, the Crito and the Gorgias. L.'s principal claim is that a contrast (anticipated in Chapter 1) between the crowd's social and outward-directed kind of shame and a new, inward-looking and moral kind of shame, promoted by Socrates, pervades these three dialogues as a leitmotif. Following D. Lyons (Philosophy 86 [2011]), L. believes that moralising and internalising shame is a lifelong project of Plato's (pp. 8, 13). While this may well be true, I am not fully convinced by L.'s argument for such a clear-cut distinction (§3.2). Although she warns against absolutising A.W.H. Adkins's (Merit and Responsibility [1960]) notion of ‘competitive virtues’, her description of the crowd's kind of shame heavily relies on an idea of traditional morality in these terms. Since the analysis is based exclusively on Platonic texts, it cannot answer the question whether there was such a thing as a relatively unified ‘concept’ or ‘definition’ of shame among ‘the crowd’ or whether creating this picture is a strategic move on Plato's part. At any rate, the strong claim that Plato's concept of shame is ‘revolutionär’ (p. 105, cf. pp. 17, 178) would, I believe, have required a more careful confrontation with non-philosophical literature. A highlight of the book is the subsequent interpretation of the Gorgias (§3.3–3.4), whose upshot is that the three elenchoi rely on both argument and shame. In the final discussion Socrates uses Callicles, the immoralist, to demonstrate that moral shame is natural to any human being, and thereby rehabilitates Polos’ and Gorgias’ feeling of shame.

The last chapter starts with a discussion of shame in the perspective of tripartition: according to L., the (common) allocation of shame to thymoeides – sometimes an ally, sometimes an opponent of reason – explains the ambivalent portrayal of shame by Plato. Since shame is ‘janus-faced’, developing the right kind of shame is ‘eines der wichtigsten Ziele der frühen sittlichen Erziehung’ (p. 141). L. is original (and correct, I think) in contending that, for Plato, shame is not entirely acquired by education, but based on an innate disposition: only what we are ashamed of is acquired. The two paragraphs on moral education in the Republic and the Laws (§4.2.2–3), however, are regrettably short, blurring differences between the two dialogues in the endeavour to prove the general importance of shame in Plato's project of moral education. This is problematic especially with a view to the much higher number of occurrences of the vocabulary and to the explicit discussion of shame in the Laws. The two final sections (§4.3–4) are dedicated to the relation between shame and each of the four cardinal virtues, and to its function in the city. Again, L. is right but too brief in arguing that for Plato shame is not a virtue but ‘doch wenigstens die Quelle der Tugend’ (p. 162) and a ‘conditio sine qua non für die Existenz der politischen Gemeinschaft’ (p. 164). The interesting question (cf. p. 172) to what extent the (moral, non-social) Socratic understanding of shame is implemented in Plato's political works – where social mechanisms are extremely important – would have deserved closer scrutiny.

Altogether, L.'s account is convincing, even though a stronger inclusion of non-philosophical literature as well as close readings of key passages would have helped substantiating some of her claims. Her examination offers further evidence, if any is needed, that simplistic conflict models of interpreting emotions in Plato (emotions vs reason) have had their day. Moreover, thanks to its intelligent structure, the book succeeds at providing a relatively complete overview of the role of shame in Plato (albeit not a sufficiently detailed treatment of its political implementation). It merits attention by any reader interested in the emotions in classical Greece. From a formal point of view, extensive quotations in the footnotes sometimes create an unattractive imbalance between main text and notes; also, the Greek text of quotations from ancient sources is not always provided.