Japan's crisis management capabilities have been put to the test numerous times in recent years. Drawing worldwide attention, the powerful earthquake and resulting Tsunami of 11 March 2011 caused extensive damage to the Tōhoku coastal region and triggered the nuclear crisis at the Fukushima reactor complex. The disaster stirred domestic and international interest in the country's response and ability to handle complex and hazardous situations. Other events, such as the ongoing financial crisis, the growing tensions surrounding North Korea's nuclear and missile developments, and the 2010 collision between a Chinese fishing trawler and a Japanese Coast Guard's ship near the Senkaku islands have also stimulated debates about the country's crisis management.

Presenting a variety of case studies, this special issue of the Japanese Journal of Political Science explores and analyzes key debates, problems, and reform efforts in Japan's crisis management approach. The contributions illustrate the complexities inherent in crisis management and the need for continuous attention to Japan's reform efforts of governmental institutions as well as the roles played by the various actors involved in crisis response. The issue is based on an expert workshop held at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, in October 2011. The workshop was made possible by generous grants from the German Research Foundation's ‘Risk and East Asia’ Research Training Group, the Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach-Stiftung, as well as the University of Duisburg-Essen's ‘Change of Contemporary Societies’ Main Research Area. We are very grateful for their support. We furthermore thank the anonymous reviewers for valuable feedback on all the papers.

The introduction has three objectives. In the first part, we provide a general definition of the terms ‘crisis’ and ‘crisis management’ and survey important international trends relevant to the topic. We argue that the challenges in crisis management are growing, as the world is becoming more interdependent, technological systems are increasingly complex, and the media is relying more on real-time reporting. The article's second part identifies six key themes in the Japanese debates on crisis management. We demonstrate that the country has carried out notable reforms and improvements in its crisis management approach over the past three decades. As some aspects nevertheless continue to attract criticism, Japan is bound to keep exploring changes in its system. By surveying recurrent themes in the debate, our article seeks to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the strengths, weaknesses, and reform efforts in Japanese crisis management, a topic that remains understudied. The third part provides an overview of the special issue, drawing some general conclusions about Japanese crisis management and highlighting areas for future investigation.

Crisis management and contemporary challenges

Crises confront organizations, communities, and governments with extraordinary challenges to their operation, competence, responsiveness, and resilience. In general, a crisis can be defined as a situation in which a community of people perceives ‘a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions’ (Boin et al., Reference Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern and Sundelius2005: 2). Typical features of crises thus include the occurrence of surprising and unanticipated events, a threat to something valuable (like people, assets, or reputation), a disruption of routine decision-making, as well as trade-offs and dilemmas being faced under time pressure and insufficient information. Crises can be classified as either natural (such as an earthquake or hurricane) or man-made, with a further distinction made between intentional man-made crises (such as an act of terrorism) and those that are unintentional (such as a nuclear plant accident) (Schoff, Reference Schoff2004: 29).

The term ‘crisis management’ is commonly associated with the organizational and political response during the most critical and precarious phase following the onset of a crisis. However, specialists agree that crisis management goes beyond the immediate response to include prior risk management and preparation as well as recovery and reflection afterwards (Rosenthal et al., Reference Rosenthal, Boin, Comfort, Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort2001: 15). Hideyo Kurata for example defines crisis management as a ‘system by which one prepares for the worst, exerts all possible efforts to prevent it from happening, and – when it does occur – by which one seeks to minimize damage and move forward with recovery’ (Kurata, Reference Kurata2001: 12). In line with this definition, four phases constituting a crisis management cycle can be distinguished: (1) prevention and mitigation, (2) preparedness, (3) response, and (4) recovery and learning (Tanifuji, Reference Tanifuji2000; Haddow et al., Reference Haddow, Bullock and Coppola2011).

Each of the four phases of crisis management involves different tasks and challenges. The first phase (prevention and mitigation) implies a risk management strategy involving the recognition and evaluation of threatening signals and the avoidance or reduction of vulnerabilities faced by the organization or community of people. It includes, for example, such measures as building houses on higher ground if there is a risk of floods, or introducing special construction codes for earthquake-prone areas. The challenge for political or societal leaders in this phase is to remain alert to new developments and to engage in continuous discussions with various specialists.

Secondly, preparedness implies the prior clarification of various actors’ responsibilities and the development of plans and resources that can be utilized in case a crisis occurs. For example, a community may establish an emergency operations plan, including evacuation procedures, that take into consideration special needs populations such as the elderly. Having such plans in place saves valuable response time during a crisis, even if some adaptation and improvisation may be required to fit the particular circumstances. For both the first and second phase, case studies on various countries demonstrate that public leaders tend to settle for suboptimal efforts, as crisis prevention and preparedness measures not only compete for budget allocations with seemingly more urgent policy tasks but they are also ‘non-events’ that draw little media attention (Boin and Hart, Reference Boin and Hart2003: 546).

Thirdly, the response phase following the onset of a crisis involves assessing the situation, prioritizing, considering trade-offs, managing lines of communication and command, and coordinating the response to minimize damage. It is commonly assumed that this phase necessitates a decisive leader who takes quick, top-down decisions and oversees the implementation by various actors (Katō and Ōta, Reference Haddow, Bullock and Coppola2010: 19). While leadership is certainly important as people look for direction and guidance during a crisis, decision-making should not be too exclusive. As Arjen Boin et al. remark, those in leading positions are ‘not necessarily the most competent persons to deal with a crisis’ (Boin et al., Reference Haddow, Bullock and Coppola2005: 54). Moreover, the implementation of response measures may be complicated by a lack of prior consultation with relevant actors. Apart from balancing top-down decision-making and consultation, one of the most significant challenges for leaders in this phase is the dissemination of timely and accurate information to the media amid prevailing confusion and uncertainty. If leaders are hesitant to release information, they risk public criticism about being secretive and concealing uncomfortable truths. On the other hand, quickly releasing information that turns out to be inaccurate will cast doubts about the leadership's ability to take charge and keep track of events.

Fourthly, the recovery and learning phase involves restoring a sense of normalcy among affected community members, dealing with questions of accountability and responsibility, and drawing lessons to reduce future vulnerability through mitigation and preparedness measures. It is commonly assumed that crises catalyze innovation and reform, for example in policy content and in institutions. According to this view, crises function as inflection points or punctuated equilibria that loosen up constraints and enable critical re-examinations of habits and assumptions (Samuels, Reference Samuels2012). However, a number of crisis management specialists challenge this argument. An incumbent leader's primary goal is to resolve the immediate crisis situation and shift back to a sense of normalcy, a goal often at odds with sweeping reform efforts (Boin et al., Reference Haddow, Bullock and Coppola2005: 131). Moreover, the process of learning and self-reflection is impeded by organizational inertia, bureaucratic and societal veto players, and the tendency by involved actors to blame others when facing questions of responsibility and accountability. In that sense, Richard Samuels maintains that ‘crisis management is normal politics by other means’, with actors continuing to pursue their self-interests despite the extraordinary circumstances (Samuels, Reference Samuels2012).Footnote ¹

The challenges for crisis management inherent in these four phases are compounded by a number of contemporary international trends. As sociologist Ulrich Beck famously pointed out, scientific and technological progress has paradoxically been accompanied by new vulnerability and risk to contemporary society (Beck, Reference Beck1999).Footnote ² Crises have thus emerged that combine elements of old threats, such as natural disasters, with new risks stemming from complex technical systems. The Fukushima nuclear crisis is a case in point, as the earthquake and resulting Tsunami caused the loss of electricity and hence cooling for the reactor blocs.

Furthermore, global interdependencies in economic, political, and societal spheres mean that crises increasingly transcend borders (Lagadec, Reference Lagadec, Rodriguez, Quarantelli and Dynes2006: 489). For example, the recent economic crisis demonstrates that financial problems in one part of the world reverberate around the globe and entail the risk of contagion. At the same time, globalization may complicate individual countries’ crisis responses. As Ulrich Beck stresses, the growing interconnectedness challenges the territoriality and sovereignty of states, reducing their ability to act unilaterally or independently (Jarvis, Reference Jarvis2007: 26).

Finally, with the advances in information technology, real-time reporting is becoming more common in the news media and among individuals using internet text messaging services such as ‘Twitter’. As a result, governmental and societal leaders are under severe time pressure to communicate their account of the crisis and announce measures to minimize damage. The demand for swift communication thus implies leaders have less time to formulate a crisis response, even whilst the complexities resulting from globalization and technological progress have grown.

To summarize, the challenges and dilemmas inherent in crisis management are amplified by international trends in modern society. As crises by definition contain elements of surprise and uncertainty, it is difficult for leaders to emerge from a crisis unscathed. Given the many trade-offs faced by those in leadership positions, crisis management clearly has no ‘gold standard’, even if certain policy measures or institutional setups may help leaders respond more quickly and effectively. Case studies on numerous countries have identified failures and inadequacies in crisis management (Farazmand, Reference Farazmand2009: 399). The goal of this special issue is therefore to utilize case studies as a way to analyze and trace characteristics in Japan's crisis management approach.

Japan's crisis management: debate and reform efforts

Located in the so-called typhoon belt and on the Pacific ‘ring of fire’ with a consistently high level of seismic and volcanic activity, Japan has been subject to many natural disasters throughout its history. The country has taken various measures in the mitigation, preparedness, and management of such disasters, passing the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act in 1961, for example.Footnote ³ The act clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the municipalities, prefectures, and the national government when faced with a natural disaster and defines measures on prevention and emergency planning (Nakabayashi, Reference Nakabayashi2010: 76).

At the governmental level, a more comprehensive notion of crisis management comprising both natural and man-made risks and threats only emerged in the 1980s, following the 1983 shoot down of a Korean Airline's flight by a Soviet interceptor, as discussed below. In the following part, we analyze the debates on Japan's crisis management and reform efforts since then. Rather than providing a comprehensive overview of all developments, we highlight prominent themes and trace reform efforts. Our main – though not exclusive – focus is on the central government's response system, as national crises first and foremost fix the spotlight on elected representatives and governmental institutions. We argue that six partially overlapping themes can be identified in the Japanese debate on crisis management: (1) the issue of political leadership and sectionalism in the bureaucracy, the most prominent theme; (2) the need for an information and communication strategy; (3) the flexible integration of volunteer efforts; (4) the use of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) in domestic and international crises; (5) the importance of local government- and community-led contributions; and (6) the risks of delayed or inept decision-making caused by Japan's fluid political party system. We demonstrate that Japan appears to have successfully addressed some of these issues (such as the incorporation of volunteers), while other themes continue to be controversial (such as the issue of political leadership). The analysis furthermore illustrates that Japan's debate and reform efforts comprise aspects related to all four phases of the crisis management cycle introduced above.

Overview of case studies

In light of the above introduction and historical survey of key issues, the five contributions in this special issue examine and assess a number of recent Japanese crisis management endeavors. The case studies have been chosen to cover a range of different crises, including for example the 3/11 triple disaster, the current financial crisis, the Okinawa base dispute, and crises in foreign countries requiring Japan to dispatch troops for support. The contributions expose challenges and shed light on the prevalent themes and reform efforts in Japan's crisis management approach. Furthermore, they examine the roles and contributions of different actors, such as political leaders, bureaucrats, civil society actors, or businesses. This section provides an overview of the contributions and summarizes key findings.

In his article, Ellis Krauss offers a systematic comparison of the LDP's and DPJ's crisis management approach by analyzing three sets of cases under LDP- and DPJ-led governments. The six crises under scrutiny are the Okinawa base issues in 1995 and 2009, the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands dispute in 2008 and 2010, as well as the 1995 Kobe and 2011 Tōhoku earthquake disasters, with the DPJ replacing the LDP as ruling party in 2009. Krauss demonstrates that despite long-term governing experience, the LDP did not develop a sophisticated crisis management mode, handling only one crisis relatively well. The DPJ's record appears equally poor, although Krauss gives some credit to the party's immediate response to the Tōhoku earthquake (but not the nuclear disaster) thanks to institutional reforms implemented after the Kobe experience. The comparison reveals the LDP and the DPJ have different advantages and disadvantages when facing crises as the party in power. The LDP is well connected with all major actors and stakeholders (bureaucracy, local governments, business sector etc.) in the political arena, facilitating the quick exchange of information and expert opinion. However, these tight networks and linkages create strong dependencies that constrain the party's political leeway. LDP-style politics moreover has generated few prime ministers with strong leadership capabilities. The DPJ on the other hand lacks strong personal ties and networks, thus having fewer communication channels at its disposal but enjoying more freedom to pursue new policies. The party's move to centralize power in the cabinet at the expense of the distrusted bureaucracy has left it vulnerable, though. Having proclaimed the primacy of political leadership, the DPJ was unable to draw extensively on bureaucratic expertise during crises and to deflect responsibility afterwards by blaming crisis management failures on others. Finally, Krauss identifies recurrent issues and general structural problems in Japan's crisis management mode, pointing for example to constant communication failures between the government, administrative bodies, and the public. He emphasizes the lack of an institution able to authoritatively navigate through crises, judging past reforms to strengthen the cabinet's and prime minister's roles as insufficient in this regard. To date, Japanese crisis management is dominated by informal communication and ad-hoc arrangements, irrespective of the party in power.

The second article by Katsumi Ishizuka analyzes the Self Defense Forces’ (SDF) engagement in three types of international crisis management endeavors, namely United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, and disaster relief. Ishizuka examines Japan's capabilities for contributing to each type of mission by comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the SDF's engagement in each operational area. He furthermore explains why and how the country should expand its contributions to international crisis management efforts in the future. The article illustrates that of the three types of SDF operations, overseas disaster relief is the least controversial issue domestically due to the humanitarian, non-interventionist character of such missions. In terms of personnel numbers, the largest SDF dispatch abroad has in fact fallen into this category thus far, although domestic relief deployments have been even more extensive (in particular the responce to the Tōhoku earthquake). Given the non-combat character of international disaster relief operations, the SDF's engagement is comparable to the relief offered by other countries. By contrast, the constitutionality of Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping and counter-terrorism missions is more contentious to the Japanese public. Furthermore, the numerous legal strings attached to these operations pose challenges to their effectiveness. Whereas peacekeeping efforts have enjoyed a growing level of public backing over the past two decades, the SDF's engagement in the US-led ‘war on terror’ was politically disputed and accompanied by significant public opposition, leading to the mission's termination under the DPJ government in 2010. In his article, Ishizuka demonstrates that the SDF's ability to respond to any of the above-mentioned crisis situations is limited not by a lack of skills, expertise, or professionalism, but rather by constitutional constraints rooted in Article 9. He criticizes the missing political will to deal with the revision of the ‘peace clause’ as well as the lack of initiative to develop a grand vision of Japan's engagement in coping with international crises. Without facing up to these challenges, Japan will hardly be able to position itself as an important international crisis manager in the future.

Saori Katada's article analyzes Japan's response to the global financial crisis (GFC) following the Lehman Shock in 2008. According to Katada, ‘financial crisis fatigue’ – accrued through the experience of two decades of economic recession – impeded the effective management of the crisis at the domestic level. She demonstrates how Japan's fiscal policy responses to past financial crises left only limited leeway for policy-makers to effectively deal with the economic turmoil that followed the GFC. Furthermore, disagreement about specific crisis management measures within the LDP as well as the change of government in 2009 resulted in an incoherent and piecemeal crisis management approach. In the midst of the crisis, the LDP and DPJ each pursued their own policy priorities, seeking to profit politically from specific measures. Whereas the LDP saw an opportunity to use fiscal stimulus packages to its political advantage, the DPJ was keen to make good on its election promise of increasing social and welfare benefits. Japan's economic crisis ridden banks, corporations, and consumers on the other hand hardly responded to the government's economic incentives (including the country's largest postwar economic stimulus package). Japan's effort to pursue a leadership role in financial crisis management on the regional and global levels by using extra-budgetary funds also failed to promote economic recovery at home. Katada's article finds that financial crisis fatigue had different effects on the political, economic, and psychological levels. While the government was restricted in its policy choices mainly by resource constraints, societal actors from banks and businesses to consumers did not respond to the fiscal stimulus measures. Based on their defensive learning from past crisis, they remained hesitant to borrow, invest, and spend money, and thereby further undermined Japan's economic recovery.

The last two articles deal with the Fukushima nuclear disaster, albeit from different angles. Tomohito Shinoda scrutinizes and evaluates the involvement of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) or kantei in managing the nuclear incident during the first days of the unfolding disaster. He begins with the observation that according to crisis management ‘wisdom’, crises should be dealt with at the level closest to which they occur and higher authorities should only be involved if this level fails to manage the situation. The article then examines to what extent the PMO's interference made a negative or positive contribution to managing the nuclear emergency on the ground. The analysis breaks down the first week of the crisis into seven separate management events and reveals a mixed record of the PMO's involvement. Only in two cases did the kantei's interference lead to a stabilization or improvement of the situation on the Fukushima plant's site. First, when members of the PMO and Kan rejected what appeared as a TEPCO request for total withdrawal of all workers from the nuclear facility, and, second, when a special assistant of Prime Minister Kan organized the water injection into unit 4 of the reactor by coordinating the work of the SDF, the Police Agency, and the Fire and Disaster Management Agency at the joint TEPCO-PMO headquarters. In all other cases, Kan's and the kantei's involvement either did not make a difference or even worsened the situation at the Fukushima facility. Shinoda concludes that the events confirm common wisdom: political decision-makers should leave crisis management to the level closest to crisis occurrence and only join in when that level cannot cope with particular issues and problems. This is an important lesson learned from the Fukushima nuclear disaster, and it has been listed among the recommendations on nuclear disaster countermeasures by the newly established Nuclear Regulatory Authority.

Daniel Aldrich in his article also deals with the Fukushima nuclear disaster but focuses on the local level, scrutinizing the response of nuclear power plant host communities and their neighboring localities. Aldrich's study reveals that host communities continue to be supportive of nuclear energy and willing to accommodate facilities, while nearby localities are increasingly opposed to nuclear power generation. Although host communities and their neighbors are similarly exposed to the risk of a nuclear catastrophe, it is only the former localities that have benefited extensively from their hosting of power plants. The vast economic rewards (jobs, tax revenues, subsidies etc.) received by host communities serve as powerful incentives for the continuation of their pro-nuclear attitude. Aldrich observes that in debates within these communities, the Fukushima incident was framed as a normal accident based on engineering failures. By contrast, neighboring communities perceived the event as a profound wake-up call, exposing nuclear risks. Aldrich's research demonstrates that the process of learning from the nuclear crisis is heavily influenced by the political economy of local level entities. However, only the political leaders of host communities have a big say in the restarting of nuclear facilities. National-level decision-making and general civil society attitudes towards nuclear power are thus not the only factors determining the lessons drawn from the accident. In making these observations, Aldrich's article addresses problematic issues in the ‘recovery and learning’ phase of the crisis management cycle introduced above. Deep reflection and reform after crisis may be complicated by the presence of influential political actors and stakeholders who benefit from sticking to business as usual.

The case studies in this special issue illustrate the numerous, multifaceted challenges that Japan faces in its crisis management today. The contributors take up several of the points raised in the first part of this article, thereby revealing the persistence of certain themes in the current debate. Five particularly salient issues can be identified: Firstly, despite various reform efforts, Japan still faces a lack of political leadership during times of crises as well as a core institution or ‘command and control tower’ overseeing the response. Secondly, there seems to be a severe lack of institutionalized channels of communication and professional information exchange networks between key actors, impeding the effectiveness of crisis management operations. Japan's political leaders clearly need to address these two issues further during the ‘recovery and learning’ phase following crises. Thirdly, the change of governing party appears to impede consistent and uniform approaches to particular crisis management issues. Both LDP and DPJ seem to pursue short-sighted policies based on opportunism and each party's own narrow interests, rather than relying on a more comprehensive vision for crisis management. Fourthly, policy-makers have to recognize that implementing policy changes and reforms after a crisis may run counter to the interests of key stakeholders and thus face resistance. Fifthly, building a reputation as an effective domestic or international crisis manager comes at a price. Significant financial resources and political will is required to enhance capabilities for both domestic crises and international contributions and missions, including SDF deployment abroad. Given Japan's currently dire state of public finances and the range of policy challenges, such investments will not come easily.

While the contributions in this issue cover only a limited number of cases, they expose Japan's need to confront and adapt to the growing complexities of domestic and international crisis management. Perhaps the greatest challenges for Japan and its leaders is to ensure risk and crisis management discussions are held openly and without taboos. The collusive ties between politicians, bureaucrats and big businesses have bred blind spots in debates thus far. For instance, the ‘nuclear safety myth’ that had for decades proclaimed atomic energy production to be safe and reliable mitigated against a sober risk assessment, the enforcement of strict safety standards for power plants, and comprehensive accident preparation. On the first anniversary of the Tōhoku earthquake, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda publicly admitted that the government, business, experts and academia had all been ‘under the spell of the safety myth’ and thus preparations for crisis scenarios had been ‘inadequate’ (Noda, Reference Noda2012). In the financial area, similar collusive ties may explain Japan's ineffective and slow response to the banking crisis in the 1990s (Amyx, Reference Amyx2004). While the close network relations between business and political sector contributed to Japan's economic success story for decades after World War II, they now act as a restraint on the country's ability to implement long overdue reforms. Thus, Japan must find ways to encourage open debates that address risks and crisis scenarios regardless of current stakeholders and their interests.

About the authors

Kerstin Lukner is a post-doctoral research fellow with the Chair of East Asian Politics at the Institute of East Asian Studies/University of Duisburg-Essen and also a member of the research and training group ‘Risk and East Asia’, funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). Having studied Japanese Studies and Political Science at Bochum, Nanzan, Tokyo and Bonn University, she received her Ph.D. in 2006. In addition to several articles, she has authored one book on Japan's Role in the United Nations: Basis for a Permanent Seat on the Security Council? and co-edited one volume entitled Armed for Peace? The United Nations in the Contradictory Contexts of State Sovereignty and the Quest for Worldwide Disarmament (both in German). One of her current research projects focuses on the governance of pandemic risks in East Asia.

Alexandra Sakaki is a research fellow in the Asia division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in Berlin. She holds the Robert Bosch Foundation's Senior Fellowship on the topic ‘Japan in the international system’. Having studied East Asian Studies and International Relations at Princeton University (USA) and at the University of Cambridge (UK), she received her doctorate in political science at the University of Trier (Germany). She is the author of the monograph Germany and Japan as Regional Actors: Evaluating Change and Continuity after the Cold War (Routledge, 2013) as well as numerous scholarly articles. Previously, she held a post-doctoral position in the research and training group ‘Risk and East Asia’ at the University of Duisburg-Essen.