Writing about the future course of any country is a perilous task, as one cannot predict with certainty what lies ahead. Thus, in the post–Lehman Brothers world of 2009, the title of Kenneth B. Pyle's book may appear misplaced. Posting the worst growth since the end of World War II, Japan is now weathering a severe economic depression; the country seems to be sinking, not rising. But when this book was written, Japan was being led by a competent and charismatic leader who was striving to transform the country. Enjoying the fruits of the longest period of continuous economic growth in postwar Japanese history, it was apparent Japan had finally emerged from the so-called lost decade of the 1990s. The Japan of the twenty-first century had not only regained its self-confidence in the traditional areas of business and trade, but more stunningly, it also had adopted a more robust stance on national security issues. Although the recent global economic downturn has undeniably hurt the Japanese economy, it is important to remember that this time, Japan is not alone. More importantly, the economic crisis has not affected Japan's support for a more proactive approach to foreign policy, as attested by strong public support for sending Japanese naval warships to the coast of Somalia. Therefore, Pyle's latest book still serves as a useful compass in gauging Japan's future direction as a prominent player in international politics.
Unlike many recent books dealing with Japanese foreign policy, Pyle's book is grounded in solid historical research. In the span of eleven chapters, he examines the gradual yet significant transition that has taken place in Japan, whereby a country that was reluctant to make any significant contribution to global politics beyond its trademark checkbook diplomacy became a country that sent troops (on a noncombat mission) to Iraq in support of the U.S.–Japan alliance. Until recently, the paradox was undeniable: Despite being an economic giant, Japan was a dwarf in terms of global and national security. With this in mind, the first chapter outlines Pyle's general premise in explaining the historical legacy of Japanese foreign policy, borrowing Leopold von Ranke's famous phrase “der Primat der Aussenpolitik” (the primacy of foreign policy). Like the Prussian state, Pyle argues, the modern Japanese state was shaped by outside influences and by its adaptations to these external challenges. In other words, “the successive changes in the structure and nature of order in East Asia are what have given direction to the course of modern Japan's history” (p. 32). The next chapter defines Japan's national foreign policy style, which Pyle describes as based in the logic of Realpolitik. According to Pyle, “Japan's international behavior has been marked by its pragmatic, often opportunistic pursuit of power” (p. 45).
Once the general framework of analysis has been presented, the following four chapters trace Japan's diplomacy toward achieving first-rate nation status, from the opening of Japan in the mid-nineteenth century through the Meiji, Taisho, and wartime Showa periods, to the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Throughout, the theme of pursuit of power and prestige that Pyle sees as the primary instincts behind prewar Japanese foreign policy appears again and again.
Chapter 7 begins Pyle's discussion of the postwar period, when Japan reentered international society under the guidance of the United States. This chapter also details the formulation of the so-called Yoshida Doctrine, which formed the basis of Japan's postwar grand strategy, nicely leading into the core of the book, chapter 8, which examines the Yoshida Doctrine in action. With economic realism as the new guiding principle of postwar Japan, the country experienced tremendous growth, and, despite the setbacks of the 1970s during the oil shocks, Japan was able to roar back during the 1980s as a prosperous and booming nation, commanding nearly 17 percent of the global gross domestic product. But, as Pyle notes, this was not without repercussions. Japan was increasingly viewed by the United States as a free-rider and an economic threat, leading to trade friction and Japan bashing. Japan was increasingly viewed as a nation lacking any “moral direction” and the capacity to adhere to “universally accepted principles” (p. 269). Japan needed to pull its own weight in terms of global contribution, Pyle argues. It was Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro who set out to transform Japan's “pragmatic, opportunistic and reactive pattern” of policies (p. 272). Pyle points out that Nakasone was the postwar point of transition for Japan; under his leadership, Japan took the initiative in establishing its own objectives and principles, paving the way for Japan to gain a more activist cast in its foreign policy.
Chapter 9, which examines the post–Cold War interval, sets the stage for Japan's third transition, as the nation was unable to react to the sudden and massive changes in the international environment. According to Pyle, the end of the bipolar international system “fundamentally disoriented Japanese grand strategy and domestic political economy” (p. 270), in stark contrast to the United States, which saw its wealth and power surge. The 1990s also witnessed the erosion of Japanese-style capitalism; Japan's traditional policies encountered severe challenges as Japan struggled to adapt. Pyle sees this as the critical moment when the Yoshida Doctrine began to unravel. Japan's gross inability to deal effectively with the Gulf War, Pyle argues, caused turmoil to spread to the area of domestic politics, culminating in the collapse of the 1955 system. Pyle claims—and this is the book's key argument—that domestic disarray in conjunction with a new and uncertain environment in Asia forced a reconsideration of the traditional Yoshida strategy.
The final two chapters deal with the rise of China and the prospect of a new East Asian order. These are the chapters Pyle would most likely revise in a new edition of the book. As Pyle discusses, Sino-Japanese relations were strained under Koizumi Junichiro. In the Abe Shintaro and Fukuda Yasuo cabinets, and particularly Fukuda's, relations improved considerably, although China's regional ambitions and its massive military modernization program may have severe repercussions in the future. The Chinese leadership was keenly aware that the Beijing Olympics were not an opportune time for bad neighborly relations, and Prime Minister Aso Taro reciprocated the amicable atmosphere despite the recent row over poisoned Chinese food imports.
In the final chapter, Pyle touches on Japanese–Korean relations, postulates the possibility of the United States as a balancer in a multipolar Asia, and offers his views on the future of the U.S.–Japan alliance. With a new administration in Washington and Japan's Liberal Democratic Party very possibly on its way out of power, Pyle may soon want to expand the concluding chapter.
“Japan is on a threshold of a new era” (p. 374) is the main point Pyle wanted to convey in his book, and in support of that thesis, he has provided a solid historical background showing how Japanese diplomacy has evolved over the past 150 years. His command of not only postwar but also prewar Japanese foreign relations is refreshing in light of the vast amounts of shoddy scholarship that has been published on the subject. But the strength of the book lies not only in Pyle's ability to utilize both English- and Japanese-language materials, but also in his personal proximity to Japanese experts, which affords him great familiarity with the academic and policy debates within Japan. Moreover, he cites many conservative Japanese scholars, such as Nagai Yonosuke, Kosaka Masataka, Watanabe Akio and Nakanishi Hiroshi, just to mention a few, who are often disregarded in American scholarship in favor of liberals such as Maruyama Masao. Considering that the pro-American conservatives of the realist tradition now lead in shaping Japanese public opinion, it can be said that this book provides a mainstream view of Japanese foreign policy minus one crucial point. In regard to Pyle's core argument that Japan has departed from the Yoshida Doctrine, there is still no consensus. Although I concur with Pyle's conclusion and would not hesitate to include myself in his camp, many prominent scholars in Japan, such as Iokibe Makoto, would disagree. Of course, time will eventually allow us to determine what has actually become of the doctrine.
The formulation of foreign policy is a complex process, and some may feel that Pyle places too much emphasis on external influences. All too often, domestic politics plays a crucial role in determining foreign policy, and many other factors need to be considered as well. Pyle also could have devoted more space to examining the diplomacy of Mutsu Minemitsu and Komura Jutaro, as they were instrumental in formulating the key guiding principles of prewar Japanese foreign policy. But these are small criticisms, and in no way detract from this important work, which is a must-read for all of those who are interested in Japanese foreign policy as well as U.S.–Japan relations. I would recommend it to the Japanese audience as well, and will be looking forward to a Japanese translation.
