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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2004
Although Indonesia is the most populous Muslim-majority society in the world, Western historiography has downplayed the role of Islamic actors and ideals in the development of the country's nationalism. Echoing earlier Dutch accounts, most historians present Indonesian nationalism as a product of the joint efforts of expatriate students in Holland and Dutch-educated elites in the East Indies. Both groups, the conventional narrative goes, promoted secular notions of ethnicity, language, and territory, at first creating regional ethno-nationalisms (Javanese, Sundanese, Minangkabau, etc.) rather than an encompassing Indonesian form. Under the twin influence of Dutch schooling and colonial subjugation, the elite proponents of these ethno-nationalisms eventually fused their varied ambitions into a single nationalist project. Islam, however, never became more than a background accessory to the larger whole.
Although Indonesia is the most populous Muslim-majority society in the world, Western historiography has downplayed the role of Islamic actors and ideals in the development of the country's nationalism. Echoing earlier Dutch accounts, most historians present Indonesian nationalism as a product of the joint efforts of expatriate students in Holland and Dutch-educated elites in the East Indies. Both groups, the conventional narrative goes, promoted secular notions of ethnicity, language, and territory, at first creating regional ethno-nationalisms (Javanese, Sundanese, Minangkabau, etc.) rather than an encompassing Indonesian form. Under the twin influence of Dutch schooling and colonial subjugation, the elite proponents of these ethno-nationalisms eventually fused their varied ambitions into a single nationalist project. Islam, however, never became more than a background accessory to the larger whole.
A revision of a doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Sydney in 2000, Michael Francis Laffan's new book takes aim squarely at this established narrative. The author seeks to “evaluate the place of Islam in early Indonesian nationalism” (p. 2) and, in so doing, move Islam from nationalism's margins to its center. Laffan's thesis is that although some variants of Indonesian nationalism did indeed evolve from regional secular nationalisms, in the course of their fusion some of the most important foregrounded Islam as the “underlying mechanisms of commonality” (p. 166) and the requisite basis for a future state.
As he explains in the book's Introduction, Laffan is not interested in providing a new theory of nationalism, Islamic or otherwise. Islamic Nationhood makes few references to recent discussions of religion and secular nationalism, with the notable exception of Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991 [1983]). A towering presence in Indonesian studies, Anderson's account of Indonesian nationalism incorporates conventional biases by ignoring the role of Muslims while over-emphasizing that of Dutch-educated “creole intellectuals.” Anthropologists of Indonesian Islam have long taken exception to Anderson's model, pointing out that Muslim preachers and pilgrims were central to the nationalist movement. Laffan makes passing reference to these studies (p. 9) but does not otherwise engage their critiques or adopt their bottom-up approach to Islamic nationalism.
Rather than offering a new theory or a local history of nationalism, then, Laffan seeks to “test Andersonian theory” (p. 9) by adopting Anderson's analytic framework but replacing Islamic pilgrimage and print capitalism for Anderson's secularist entities. Laffan's argument is that “Indonesian nationhood had deeper roots in an Islamic ecumenism within archipelagic Southeast Asia made more tangible through contact with both other Muslims beyond that world and non-Muslims within it” (p. 3). The primary characters in Laffan's story, then, are the Muslim scholars and students “who moved back and forth across the Indian Ocean to institute Islamic reform” (p. 3). In so doing, he demonstrates, they prepared the way for an Islamic imagining of the Indonesian ecumene.
Whereas his theoretical perspective is not new, the historical materials Laffan amasses to explore the world of late colonial Muslims are original, detailed, and masterfully analyzed. Focusing his account on Jawa (Muslims from archipelagic Southeast Asia) from the mid-19th century to the 1920s, Laffan shows that the earliest ideals of Jawa ecumenism were formed not in secularist nationalist circuits, but through pilgrimage and study in the Hijaz. In the course of their travels, the Jawa forged new identities, drawing on the ambiguous experience of encountering a global community of believers while also being made aware of their subordinate status relative to their Arab fellows. As conflict in the Hijaz escalated at the end of the 19th century, a growing number of Jawa left Arabia for Cairo. There, Laffan shows, the Jawa were exposed to ideas of Islamic reform and nationhood entirely unlike anything they had heard in Mecca and Medina. They later carried these ideas of Islamic nationhood back to the Indies. In the second decade of the 20th century, an alliance of Sumatran “new group” reformists (kaum muda) and Javanese revivalists drew on these same Cairene models to forge a mass movement, one that replaced earlier ethno-nationalisms with an Islamic and Pan-Indonesian construct.
Though still a powerful force in Indonesia, “old group” (kaum tua) traditionalists, such as those who came together to create the Nahdlatul Ulema in 1926, figure little in Laffan's account. When discussed at all, the traditionalists are portrayed as adopting “the weapons of modernity,” such as “schools, newspapers, and associations” (p. 235), in response to the needling attacks of reformists, not also as a result of developments in their own communities. Laffan also mentions Indonesia's once rich traditions of mysticism and Islamic secularism only in passing. This is perhaps understandable in light of the author's professed interest in juxtaposing reformist pilgrimage with Anderson's secularist model. However, having demonstrated so convincingly the roots of Indonesian nationalism in Islamic reform, the author's brief mention at the end of the book of “the ultimate failure” (p. 238) of reformists to outflank their secularist rivals and establish an Islamic state seems anomalous. Readers who are not already familiar with Indonesian history get few clues as to how Islamic nationalists endowed with such rich social resources failed to prevail.
No author can do everything, and in focusing on the role of reformists in the forging of Indonesian nationhood Laffan provides an impressive corrective to mainstream histories. Densely detailed yet engagingly written, this study's superb insights into the experiences of Jawa pilgrims in an age of European colonialism establish the book as required reading for all students of Southeast Asian Islam. It will also appeal to students of Muslim politics interested in the unfinished dialogue of Islam and nationalism.