The contributions to this collected volume seek to address Hegel’s use of ‘Realität’ from a multitude of complementary and conflicting perspectives, successfully strengthening the dialogue between German- and English-language Hegel research. The opening contributions deal with ‘Realität’ in so far as Hegel’s ‘idealism’ implies a continuity or break between the logical and the real. Whereas Koch and Illetterati defend a continuous complementarity of the logical and the ‘Realphilosophie’, Orsini and Ficara argue for their deeper unity, whereas Heidemann insists on their fundamental heterogeneity. The subsequent contributions address narrower related topics: the connection between the Phenomenology and Science of Logic (Schüz), Hegel’s relation to other thinkers, past and present (Krijnen, Heckenroth, Lücke), the a priori/a posteriori distinction (Aragüés, Dunphy) and the Philosophy of Spirit (Martin, de Laurentiis, Siani, Plevrakis).

A. F. Koch holds that ‘Realität’ is neither ignored nor left behind by Hegel, but is rather a further development of presuppositionless logical space the Science of Logic undertakes at its start and continues into nature in the medium of spatio-temporal multiplicity (22–25). Hegel’s philosophy is thus driven by the effort to undermine the distinction between realism and idealism whilst preserving the reality of the finite (25). He concludes by pointing out that the apparent distinction between the logical and the real is the result of Kantian presuppositions about the (Euclidean) nature of physics—in contrast to Hegel’s implicit ‘anticipation’ of the relational concepts of space and time from the theory of relativity (26).

Illetterati offers an insightful account of contemporary ‘naturalist’ interpretations of Hegel (from, e.g., Beiser, Gardner, Stone, Giladi; 216–21), and offers his own alternative. He argues that Hegel’s own concept of ‘nature’, as the ‘correlative’ of externality (232) and not simply ‘the other’ of the idea (225–26), must be thought of as the basis for a non-standard kind of ‘critical’ or ‘non-naturalist naturalism’, which approaches a single ‘reality’ from the perspective of either logic, nature or spirit, where the difference depends on whether externality dominates or is dominated by the conceptual (229–30). Illetterati’s otherwise compelling account of nature’s externality concludes with a suggestive though opaque call for the ‘decolonization’ (Entkolonialisierung) of nature from the reductionism of natural sciences (232).

By contrast, Heidemann maintains that Hegel fails to resolve the opposition between reality and logic; and the threat that he might ‘crush the world’ is thwarted. Heidemann’s intervention has the merit of being grounded on a detailed historical overview of the problem of ‘idealism’ from Leibniz to Kant (31–33). He ultimately finds that Hegel’s only option for overcoming Kantian conceptual dualism is to argue for the ontological valence of a non-discursive concept (40), and since Hegel’s ‘theory of the judgement’ fails at providing such a concept (43–44), Heidemann concludes by favouring a non-psychological reconstruction of Kant’s transcendental philosophy (42). The examination of Hegel’s purported failure is most likely too limited to convince anyone already persuaded by Hegel’s critique of Kant, but the reconstruction of the dilemma facing them is remarkably clear.

At the other extreme, Orsini’s contribution insists even more than Koch on the impossibility of abstracting the concept of ‘reality’ from Hegel’s immanent systematic development. So much so that he even considers the common moniker for the philosophies of Nature and Spirit as ‘Realphilosophie’ misleading, in so far as it suggests an opposition to logic (67–70). Orsini’s argument thus (with outstanding thoroughness and breadth, considering the limited space) recounts the main features of Hegel’s ‘pure speculative logic’ (49), in order to explain the ‘objectivity’ of thought which undermines the distinction between Hegel’s idealism and any kind of ‘materialism’ or ‘realism’, seeking instead to carry out a ‘permanent critique of positivism […] subjectivism […] and nihilism’ (52). Contra Koch, ‘Realität’ cannot then be extra-logical even in the sense of being the ‘complement’ to logic in space and time (69–70), or much less Heidemann’s externality (57, n. 10). His interpretation takes ‘Realität’ as a form of logical self-differentiation making conceptuality explicit, even in its natural and spiritual modes (63–64).

Ficara argues that Hegel’s account of the medieval controversy about universals can be taken as a relevant contribution for contemporary formal logic by suspending the contradictory opposition between nominalism and realism. The universal is real, but only by being instantiated in individuals which are able to ‘express it’, and in this sense, it is dialectical (103). The ‘real’ is thus said to equate to both the universal and das Logische, which would appear to include the reality of their contradiction as the very passage from universal to ‘individual’ (104–106). Like Orsini, Ficara is thus a staunch advocate of the strongest possible kind of continuity between the real and logic. Her embrace of the contradictory nature of Hegel’s Science of Logic (101–103) distinguishes it from Koch’s dismissal of Priest (18).

Schüz grapples with the end of the Phenomenology and its significance for the beginning of the Science of Logic. ‘Absolute Knowledge’ is problematic because it is no longer just another form of consciousness (contra Fulda), but it is not yet a scientific thought-determination from the Science of Logic either (contra Houlgate) (127–28). Instead, Schüz argues that ‘absolute knowledge is still a form of consciousness in a minimal sense’ (128), by which the reconciliation of realism and idealism, as the different ‘attitudes’ of consciousness and self-consciousness, is sought (115–16). On this basis, he addresses the debate between the transcendental/metaphysical interpretations of Hegel’s Science of Logic and takes issue with the approaches of Pippin and Houlgate (124–27).

Krijnen and Heckenroth contextualize Hegel’s talk of Realität with the medieval inheritance of early modern conceptions (Descartes and Leibniz, respectively) of realitas (77–80, 146–52). Krijnen further contrasts the post-Kantian tradition of idealism (opposed to ‘realism’), with the contemporary analytical ‘realism debate’, concerned with different kinds of realism/anti-realism (73–74). Regrettably, the clarification of Hegel’s own meaning is only briefly directly addressed (81), fading somewhat in the following (nevertheless first-rate) broad strokes account of the aim of the Phenomenology (82–85), the structure of the Science of Logic (85–90) and the transition to the Realphilosophie (90–95). Heckenroth provides a close reading of the logical development from ‘Realität’ and ‘Negation’ towards ‘Etwas’ as an immanent critique of Leibniz’s concept of reality as epitome of realities and the perfect ground of all possibility (146). Heckenroth convincingly argues that Hegel’s critique of Leibniz hinges on the contradictory status of a purported unlimited affirmation, with the result that an account of determination must involve the entwinement of affirmation and negativity, which is ‘preserved and maintained’ rather than avoided (155).

Lücke offers a very interesting argument seeking to address some of the weaknesses of ‘pragmatic’ interpretations of Hegel by recovering some of their metaphysical Aristotelian roots. Stekeler-Weithofer’s and Pippin’s propositional approaches are deemed, despite themselves, too reliant on a correspondence theory of truth (292–96). By contrast, McDowell’s identity theory of truth appears more likely to render a coherent Hegelian theory of propositional judgement (297), if it is able to take on the Aristotelian metaphysics of the ‘concrete universal’ as the genus-form of objects (303–309). Lücke’s otherwise quite diligent and compelling argument is nevertheless unclear as to the source of his concern about Hegel’s ‘post-truth’/‘post-factual’ character (292–93, 295), which he unsurprisingly rejects (310).

Although they largely agree on the role of empirical science for the ‘Realphilosophie’, Aragüés rejects the applicability of the a priori/a posteriori distinction to the relationship between logic and ‘Realphilosophie’, while Dunphy defends it. Aragüés offers a staunchly idealist interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy, where the apriorism of the idea is defended over and against any seeming ‘correspondence’ of the conceptual and the real (179–82). His rejection of the a priori/a posteriori distinction and (like Orsini) of the very term ‘Realphilosophie’ (165) springs not from an argument for continuity, but rather for a radical contrast between idealist logic/metaphysics and non-metaphysical philosophical sciences (182). Consistently (but controversially), Aragüés concludes by arguing for the ‘evident’ (springt vor Augen) continuity with Fichte’s conception of idealism (177), such that the relationship between idea and nature appears ‘similar’ to the relationship between ‘Ich’ and ‘nicht-Ich’ in Fichte’s 1794 philosophy (188–89).

Dunphy likewise grants empirical science a significant role for the ‘Realphilosophie’, but because he takes on a contemporary notion of metaphysics that may be empirically informed (193–96). There is no issue calling the Science of Logic and Realphilosophie a priori and a posteriori, if the latter’s metaphysical claims may nevertheless rely on a posteriori knowledge provided by natural sciences (192), contra Houlgate and Stone’s apriorism (204). However, Dunphy’s examination of the case of ‘universal gravitation’ (204–205) seems particularly unhelpful, since it is far from evident that Hegel would not think it possible to deduce ‘universal gravitation’ a priori (21.339–44, 12.143–47), following Kant’s lead (AA: 4.468–70).

Martin’s dizzying contribution seeks to show that ‘life and spirit are […] essentially planetary in nature’ (243). The question of life’s ‘reality’ is made radically concrete by arguing that Hegel’s account of animal life implies a specific requirement for a planet, able to mediate free-moving life and the astronomical solar source of energy (241–46), which is grounded on the logical character of objective chemical processes mediating life and mechanics (238–39). The planet thus conditions the real development of rational, freely self-moving and self-determining life, including spirit, without falling into mechanistic reductionism (248). Martin’s account admirably walks a fine line by drawing out original and compelling conclusions from thorough and textually grounded premises. The significance of this topic becomes all the more pressing with Martin’s conclusion that Hegel nevertheless failed to foresee the possible tension between spirit’s activity and its planetary conditions (249–50).

De Laurentiis offers an Aristotelian reconstruction of Hegel’s ‘Anthropology’ by focusing on the way the soul’s first two faculties, ‘sentience’ (Empfindung) and ‘feeling’ (Gefühl) take up the conceptual resources from inorganic nature in order to execute ‘inorganic nature’s self-sublation into organicity’ (255). De Laurentiis’s emphasis on the continuity of the ‘quivering’ and ‘vibrating’ capacity of both inorganic matter and its subsequent idealization and somatization by living beings is particularly insightful (260–64) and concludes with an interpretation of Hegel’s account of the possible ‘maladies of the soul’ (Seelenkrankheiten) (265–69). Siani seeks to vindicate the ‘fundamental role the emotional dimension plays in Hegel’s philosophy as a whole’ (273), despite his apparent dismissal of it and favouring of rationality. His reconstruction of Hegel’s ‘Psychology’ argues for the inherence and irreducibility of emotions for the development of spirit, implied in the requirement to step back from and think through the emotions which mediate between nature and spirit (281–83), which Siani takes to establish a link to Dewey’s pragmatism (283–89). It is only regrettable then, that these two essays do not engage in a more explicit dialogue about the differences between pragmatist and Aristotelian versions of psychic non-dualism.

Volume editor Plevrakis’s own contribution brings the collection to a close by offering a very thorough argument-reconstructive analysis of §553 from the Encyclopaedia about the ‘real’ character of Hegel’s ‘Absolute Spirit’. The text is contextualized with the rest of the Philosophy of Spirit (317–28), as well as the logical categories of necessity, Sache and activity (328–40). Plevrakis thus argues for a non-theological interpretation of absolute spirit (contra Oehl; 341), which appears as a rational activity which makes itself actual in its freedom through the very ‘reality’ which conditions it. Art, religion and philosophy are free activities carried out by free actual subjects, and which do not lose their freedom despite the necessity of such real instantiations (332–34). Instead, the moments of absolute spirit appear as open-ended and self-updating engagement with their reality (338).

The overall excellent contributions to this volume thus offer not just a wide-ranging look at Hegel’s different uses of ‘Realität’, but are also very helpful for exploring the systematic tensions which arise in Hegel’s philosophy therefrom and the contemporary debates dealing with them.