The Sea in Russian Strategy brings together scholars of naval and maritime theory along with naval commanders who have operated in the strategic environment at the focus of the study. This edited volume tracks the evolution of Russian naval and maritime power in the post-Soviet era, while reaching back to Peter the Great at the beginning of the eighteenth century to highlight historical and cultural continuities throughout Russian history. A major strength of the book is the consistent focus on the importance of strategic empathy—understanding how an adversary or ally conceptualizes their interests and crafts strategy according to their unique cultural and historical experience. Andrew Lambert states in the introduction that, “Understanding the sea’s importance to Moscow, the role it plays in Russian thinking, and the specificities of Russian concepts is crucial to shaping good Russia-related policy—whether it be deterrence, defence, or even dialogue” (20). Indeed, the authors go a step beyond, helping their readers understand the Russian perspective on sea power to also providing insights into how Russian strategic leaders understand the liberal west’s approach to sea power. Key to Russian military strategy is recognizing the links between “operational-level concepts, and strategic operations with political objectives” (100).

Published in the early aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the chapter authors position their analyses in the context of ongoing great power competition. Vice Admiral Sir Clive Johnstone, former commander of NATO Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), notes the changing nature of the Russian threat during his career and advises against succumbing to mirror imaging focused on Russian firepower from the sea. Instead, he sees a geo-economic competition over resources. Contributors uniformly note some principles related to the sea in Russian strategy. They agree that Russia has no specific “navy strategy” akin to western navies’ domain specific approaches. Instead, they argue that the Russian navy supports a broader military strategy. This includes the protection and prioritization of the submarine force as the guarantor of Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent and focusing on increasing the quantity of ships capable of launching cruise missiles directed at land-based targets.

Another theme across the chapters is the ideological nature of great power competition and the impact of ideology on military power. Sir Geoffrey Till points out that “conventional sea power theorists present the illiberal nature of the state as a great source of weakness for Russia’s maritime aspirations” (60). He attributes the nature of Russian military professionalism, renowned for its lack of initiative and innovation, to the prevalence of ideological factors. He notes, too, that illiberal Russia throughout its history and undemocratic states such as Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany and imperial Japan have fielded formidable navies and experienced military success (63).

In addition to offering a historical perspective on Russian sea power, the book also addresses Russia’s current operational concepts. Michael Kofman lays out four principal missions for the navy: defense of critical infrastructure against long-range strikes from the sea, the conduct of long-range strikes against the enemy’s critical infrastructure, strategic nuclear deterrence through the maintenance of a sea-based second-strike capability, and the conduct of naval diplomacy through the projection of naval power (95). Kofman also mines Russia’s strategic documents to break down its regional and theater priorities, placing the Atlantic and Arctic at the top with the Pacific and Indian theaters as second tier priorities. Kofman’s analysis of Russian military doctrine finds the navy elevated above the other services due to its role in protecting the strategic nuclear deterrent placed in the submarine force (106). Kofman also notes that the navy’s role in non-nuclear deterrence is crucial in the management of escalation in a regional conflict.

There is also agreement across the chapters that Russia’s maritime interests are growing within a multi-dimensional grand strategy. Naval power is characterized as a tool to achieve broader political objectives, as well as Russian interests in the commercial maritime domain. Vice Admiral Johnstone offers a commander’s perspective with his analysis of the changed threat environment. He challenges his readers to consider, “Is it possible to prepare to fight an adversary, or train to do so, without understanding the foundation of their capability and world view?” (81). He recommends thinking through the escalation ladder that may ensue as Russia employs an area denial strategy in defense of Russian territory while imposing costs on adversaries’ critical infrastructure to deter attacks on the Russian homeland.

Overall, the experts in this volume assert that Russia’s maritime interests are growing along with an ambitious ship building program to achieve them (163). However, they also alert readers to the limits that sanctions and an illiberal political system pose. The ends-means gap results in a much-diminished naval aviation program and the absence of large combat ships and carriers in the naval buildup. Richard Connolly contributes a detailed analysis of Russia’s sea power-related industrial base to include the inefficiencies of its ship construction program in comparison to the output of American and Chinese shipyards. Dmitry Gorenburg concludes that the Russian Navy is a green water force “with a primary focus on protecting its coastline and the naval component of its strategic deterrent” (168). But financial limitations will likely reduce the ambitious scale of the effort and limit the prospect of Russia fielding “a serious expeditionary force for at least 15 years” (192).

The Sea in Russian Strategy offers fresh perspectives while reinforcing its message throughout that ideological great power competition is a staple of Russian history. Readers cannot help but be left with the understanding that the pursuit of Russian strategic interests will not mirror the operational concepts, doctrine, or grand strategic approach of western democracies. Understanding “what is special to Russia” (54), its enduring strategic interests and global and regional priorities, along with its maritime interests and operational concepts for achieving them is fundamental to crafting strategy to counter Russian power and influence.