It would be a pleasure to recommend this book by one of our craft's most distinguished practitioners. We have all benefited enormously from Eric Jones's studies in English agricultural history in the first age of industrialization, his thought-provoking essay on why Europe entered the epoch of modern economic growth before other civilizations, and his less-well-known but equally outstanding investigations into the economic history of Australia and the western Pacific. For his scholarship and teaching our discipline owes him a permanent debt of gratitude. The same cannot be said of the present farrago of unsupported assertion, superficial readings, popular psychology and sociology, mischaracterization of opposing points of view, and disorganized composition. One comes to it with hope and anticipation; one departs disappointed and saddened by the unmistakable signs of a great man's mistake.
The book proposes that recent breakthroughs in telecommunications and their globalizing consequences have lowered barriers that until recently defended indigenous cultures and civilizations in the non-European world from the full onslaught of modern modes of living. No longer protected by distance and prohibitive cost of transmitting images of more attractive western life styles, the “maladaptive practices” and nonutilitarian values of traditional cultures are being selected out by competition in an ever-widening marketplace of ideas. That competition is resisted by dead-enders among indigenous elites manning the crumbling barriers to cultural competition, assisted by postmodernist fellow-travelers lodged in departments of English, literature, anthropology, and, sadly, history. Resistance is nevertheless futile. The strong shall inherit the earth; Europa über alles.
The trope of cultural competition requires us to assess the logical status of culture as an analytical category, however. What precisely do we mean by culture? Is it something fixed and definitive, or is it malleable? What are its boundaries? Can its elements be explained as endogenous adjustments to an environment? The first four chapters are given over to inconclusive discussion of these issues. It is hard to know what to make of it other than that “there must be something out there.” The argument from cultural competition nevertheless requires demonstrating that European institutions are ex ante superior to those of other cultures. Jones presumes this must be true because Europe and its cultural offshoots industrialized first. This passes muster as post hoc ergo propter hoc, but as we learned in high school, that reasoning is vulnerable to what econometricians call the identification problem. Without a model of how things happen it is hard to defend any assertion inferring cause from effect, even more so when neither effect nor cause is well defined. That model is nowhere to be found in this book. There follow chapters on immigration (arguing that immigrants tend to adopt the cultures into which they settle), consideration of the East Asian miracle (arguing that the miracle depends on the degree of adoption of European institutional forms and values), a rambling discourse on how much Western culture has changed since the author's youth, a rant on cultural protectionism in arts and entertainment, and the obligatory encomium to the market. As a species of the now flourishing genus Darwinismus socialis, the book will surely find readers among speed-reading executives on flights from Los Angeles to Shanghai and Singapore. Its usefulness to future historians lies in its status as a source in the intellectual history of the turn of the twentieth century.
Does the broad hypothesis of inevitable Western cultural dominance hold up? Natural experiments in this sphere are rare: the surprisingly successful assimilation of Celtic peoples in Iberia and Gaul to Latin civilization in the three or four centuries following the Roman conquest supports the main proposition; the aborted American Occupation of Iraq does not. As is well known, in the latter an indigenous government was disbanded to make room for a market-friendly regime whose birth was to be aided by midwives recruited from the American Enterprise Institute and other right-thinking nurseries of the higher misinformation in the belief that in the market-place of ideas free markets (if not freedom of speech and political association) win every time because they deliver more stuff to more people in less time. One is permitted a degree of doubt. The problem with the free-market creed is the kind of stuff that markets deliver. As Robert Frank (Falling Behind: How Rising Inequality Harms the Middle Classes, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007) has persuasively argued, much of the stuff we want is positional; we want things that help our children to be above average, and we want that status for ourselves on any number of other axes. The desire for relatively high rank is not uniquely western, as it no doubt originated in selective pressures present during the evolutionary prehistory of mankind. If so, the economic problem is not simply a conflict over the use and distribution of scarce resources, it manifests itself in a competition for rank that cannot be relieved by increasing the supply of goods per person. With respect to positional scarcity, it is not obvious that western culture has an edge on other civilizations; to judge from the lack of down time for most middle class American families struggling to keep up with the Joneses, it may actually be at a disadvantage relative to cultures that have evolved other means of managing social competition. The issues addressed by this book are important and urgent. They deserve more serious treatment.
