Hussein Tahiri's The Structure of Kurdish Society and the Struggle for a Kurdish State sets out to explain the Kurds' failure to achieve a Kurdish state. What has prevented the Kurds, often described as the world's largest stateless nation, from achieving statehood in even a limited portion of Kurdish-inhabited territory in which they are the majority?
Although well aware of important external factors necessarily involved when considering such an issue, Tahiri concentrates on internal Kurdish society and politics. He attempts to isolate Kurdish tribalism as the single most important explanation: the segmented tribal structure of Kurdish society prevented the Kurds from uniting in the pursuit of a Kurdish state, given that Turkish, Arab, and Persian central governments could always rally fellow Kurdish traditional tribal rivals of any Kurdish tribes in revolt. In the “balance of power” world of tribal politics, the success of one tribe leading a revolt necessarily entailed the relative decline of its traditional tribal rivals. Kurdish tribal leaders have thus consistently refused to sacrifice their relative standing at the altar of Kurdish nationalism. Instead, they chose to help central governments against their fellow Kurdish tribes, only to lead their own revolt later, which would in turn be suppressed with the help of the previously revolting tribes. Because Kurdish tribes generally possessed the only organized fighting manpower and financial resources readily available to Kurdish nationalist movements, tribal leaders such as Mullah Mustafa Barzani typically became the leaders of Kurdish revolts. Even the short-lived Kurdish Republic of 1946 (in Iranian Kurdistan), which was led by a religious figure, had to rely on Kurdish tribal notables for most of its material support, thus automatically alienating both competing tribes and much of a Kurdish peasantry eager to be free of their tribal landlords. Thus Tahiri argues that “as long as a tribal legacy is the underlying structure of Kurdish society, the Kurds would not be able to form a Kurdish state on their own initiative” (p. 309).
Tahiri considers the shortcomings of Kurdish leaders to have also played a key role in the failure to achieve Kurdish statehood. His description of the errors, lack of confidence, and often galling political naïveté of many historic Kurdish leaders forms perhaps the most compelling parts of the book. Particularly shocking is the Kurdish leadership in Iran's never-ending willingness to trust in offers of clemency or negotiation from successive governments in Teheran, from Ismaʾil Simko in the 1920s and Ghazi Muhammad in 1946 to Abdurahman Ghassemlou in 1989 and Sadigh Sharafkandi in 1992. In all four cases, offers to negotiate terms of Kurdish autonomy were ruses ending in the leaders' assassinations by Iranian agents. In the case of Ghazi Muhammad, an Iranian general's personal promise of clemency in return for peaceful surrender of the Republic of Kurdistan ended in the public hanging of Muhammad and other leaders of the fledgling republic. This outcome was particularly shocking given that Muhammad had ordered his republic's troops to stand down at a time when they might well have defeated a weak advancing Iranian army.
Tahiri provides rich historical detail, and his extensive interviews with various Kurdish leaders and intellectuals (mostly conducted in 1997 in Turkey and Iraq) make the work an invaluable contribution to Kurdish studies. His chapters on the Kurdistan Republic of 1946 and ongoing Iraqi Kurdish divisions greatly enhance our understanding of intra-Kurdish conflict. To his credit, Tahiri displays no discernable bias or political axe to grind—he unflinchingly and dispassionately discusses both state repression of the Kurds and the weaknesses and errors of various Kurdish movements and leaders. Despite his clear writing style, however, the level of detail and complexity may prove somewhat dizzying to someone not already a bit familiar with the Kurdish issue.
Tahiri's claim to provide an explanation for the Kurds' failure to achieve a Kurdish state goes too far, however. Such a claim requires some kind of comparison, greater attention to multicausation, and a more theoretical approach to the subject matter in general. If tribalism prevented Kurdish nationalists from uniting and European powers from taking Kurdish nationalists seriously as they drew up the modern Middle East's boundaries, were many Arab societies not also tribal in nature (witness Arab Iraq today)? If one looks closely enough at any nationalist movement, one will see plenty of divisions and internal violence. At least in his concluding chapter, Tahiri should have made some attempt to comparatively weigh his causal variables against other cases. In fact, in both the Middle East and Africa, plenty of very tribal societies achieved statehood (effective statehood is another matter, however). Perhaps the Kurds lacked the diplomatically skilled elite that the Arabs had around World War I? Perhaps the British and French foreign services had many more Gertrude Bell Arabists than Colonel Noel Kurdologists?
Tahiri also at times appears to conflate realpolitik with tribalism: “Controlling resources in order to retain their economic superiority over their rivals has been very important to Kurdish political parties. Their tribal ancestors fought over agricultural land and pastoral resources” (p. 276); “buoyed by its military and political success, the PKK [Kurdistan Workers Party] leader, Abdullah Ojalan, came to show disregard for other Kurdish political parties. He, like traditional Kurdish tribal leaders, could not see anyone else, except himself” (p. 232). One wonders what political movement does not try to maintain its superiority over rivals. The concept of tribalism should not serve as simply the antithesis to liberalism; like the PKK, a great many illiberal but nontribal movements exist in the world. The book needs some accounting of what proportion of different Kurdish societies retain tribal identifications today. The Iraqi Kurdistan Referendum Movement and a number of spontaneous protests in other parts of Kurdistan seem to indicate a general Kurdish population that is much less tribal and more Pan-Kurdish than much of its leadership.
The chapters on the PKK in fact represent a missed opportunity for Tahiri. The most significant Kurdish nationalist challenge to the Turkish state since before World War II was a nontribal Marxist-Leninist movement, and its emergence and strategies required more attention (e.g., despite being nontribal, the PKK exploited tribal rivalries in Turkish Kurdistan and in some cases positioned itself as a mediator between tribes). The chapters on the PKK come across as weaker than the rest of the book, with too much space devoted to quoting various statements from Ocalan and other PKK leaders and not enough “big-picture” analysis. In the case of a group that makes as many contradictory statements as the PKK (indeed, even before his capture, one had to wonder if Ocalan suffered from multiple personality disorder), citing the organization's statements too much can lead to obfuscation rather than enlightenment.
Despite these shortcomings, Tahiri has done a fine job explaining the extent of historical tribal divisions among Kurdish leaders, and both his research and command of the complexities of Kurdish history are impressive additions to the field of Kurdish studies.
