John Milton Cooper Jr.'s biography of Woodrow Wilson and Lewis Gould's analysis of the presidency of William Howard Taft offer contrasting approaches to their respective subjects. Although Gould tries to show that Taft “was a creditable president,” he is less concerned with defending Taft's record than in showing that “the Taft years offer scholars a rich field for investigation into the issues and personalities of the age of reform” (xiii, 259). Gould wants to generate some interest in a chief executive relatively few scholars have studied. Cooper, on the other hand, pitches into a variety of well-established historiographic battlegrounds concerning Wilson's character, political thought, and policies. Although he is not uncritical of Wilson, Cooper clearly admires him, and much of the book reads as an attempt to refute interpretations of Wilson that Cooper thinks are wrong. Although neither book completely succeeds in its aims, both make for stimulating, informative reading.
The strengths and weaknesses of Gould's work emerge especially clearly in his treatment of Taft's complicated relationship with Theodore Roosevelt. Gould argues that by the early 1900s, when Taft served as Roosevelt's secretary of war, he developed private doubts about Roosevelt's political methods, appointments, and personality. Taft saw the president as “overemotional” and too freewheeling in his use of executive power (6). Roosevelt, for his part, at times suspected that Taft might be more conservative than he let on. To be sure, Gould notes, the two men did enjoy a “camaraderie” during Roosevelt's administration (6). However, once Taft became president himself and no longer had to defer to Roosevelt, “there was no basis of solid ideological agreement or political empathy to block a deterioration of relations” (6).
Taft's political ineptitude as president also contributed to his estrangement from Roosevelt. Thin-skinned and prone to nurture grievances, “Taft seems to have decided that he had no obligation to reach out to Roosevelt to forestall misunderstandings” (168). Taft also let himself get caught up in conservative political maneuvers against Roosevelt in New York that he could have easily avoided. More significantly, he failed to guard against his own Justice Department provoking Roosevelt in an antitrust suit against United States Steel. By late 1911, Taft's old ally had become his worst political enemy.
As Gould makes clear, the split between Taft and Roosevelt both reflected and contributed to a deep division in the Republican Party between progressive insurgents and the conservative party establishment. Because the latter faction dominated Congress, Taft, not unreasonably in Gould's view, opted to work chiefly with them to pass his legislative program. This first became evident in the negotiations that produced the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909. Progressives led by Robert La Follette denounced the bill, which was more protectionist than an earlier version passed by the House. Taft further infuriated them by calling the measure “the best tariff bill the Republican party ever passed” (62). At the same time, the Pinchot-Ballinger affair made Taft appear hostile to progressive conservation causes. Although Taft did manage to enact several pieces of legislation with some progressive support, he made little effort to conciliate his progressive Republican critics. By the summer of 1910 they were moving to embrace Roosevelt. Taft, angered at their rejection of his leadership, drew closer to his conservative supporters, like Nelson Aldrich. This dynamic widened the breach in the party as the 1910 congressional elections brought the Democrats back into power in the House of Representatives for the first time since 1894.
Gould makes a good argument that Taft's lack of political skill in dealing with these various episodes was rooted in the president's “judicial temperament” (xiii). Having served as a federal appeals court judge from 1892 to 1900, Taft approached presidential decision making as if he was a jurist trying a case. “He consulted few people,” Gould observes, “weighed his options in isolation, and rendered political judgments as he had once delivered verdicts” (xiii). This leadership style led him to ignore the political ramifications of his statements and actions and to refuse to indulge in the “image-making and spin” Roosevelt had made part of the presidency (74). It also made Taft extremely sensitive to criticism, as he seemed to assume that his decisions, like a court's verdict, would be followed rather than questioned. All of these characteristics made Taft a poor politician and left him ill-prepared to manage his relationship with Roosevelt or the widening rift in the Republican Party.
Gould's analysis pays relatively little attention to the substantive ideological differences that divided Republicans during Taft's presidency. He does not fully explain Taft's conservative ideology nor does he compare and contrast it with the outlook of Republican progressives or with the New Nationalism of Roosevelt. Gould's illustrations of Taft's conservatism do not reveal very much about the values and reasoning behind Taft's views. Left unexplained is why Taft saw Roosevelt's New Nationalism as full of “wild ideas” and “a threat” to “conservative institutions,” why he thought that some of Pinchot's conservation goals “verged on socialism,” and how he viewed the place of large-scale corporations in America's political-economy (116, 68).
Gould thus misses a chance to buttress his argument that scholars should pay more attention to Taft's presidency. Taft did much to move the Republican Party in a conservative direction, a development Gould rightly calls “one of the most persistent consequences” of Taft's presidency (214). Taft also made no less than six Supreme Court appointments, allowing him to play a large role “in making the high court an effective barrier to the economic and social change bubbling up within society during the first three decades of the twentieth century” (214). In short, Taft managed to imprint his brand of conservatism on to crucially important political and judicial institutions, with lasting effects. Had Gould provided a more detailed treatment of Taft's ideology, he would have strengthened an already excellent book and illuminated a topic of increasing interest to American political historians.
If Gould deals with a figure scholars have misguidedly bypassed, Cooper writes about one who has received extensive attention, to say the least. Cooper takes issue with three common images or interpretations of Wilson: that he was an idealistic, messianic crusader out to spread democracy around the globe; that he was a political opportunist and not a genuine progressive reformer; and that he was a cold, aloof academic unable to make human connections with others. Cooper is convincing in knocking down these caricatures of Wilson, but the portrait he puts in their place is blurry in some spots and incomplete in others.
Cooper has perhaps the easiest time countering the notion that Wilson was an unfeeling person. He compellingly presents Wilson as a well-rounded human being, not an “‘effete’ intellectual” (9). This is an important corrective to a popular misconception; but in making it, Cooper downplays some less attractive aspects of Wilson's complex personality, even as he acknowledges their existence. Emotionally intense, Wilson frequently personalized policy differences with others and appears to have harbored a vindictive streak beneath his usually calm and deliberative public image. Close observers of Wilson during his presidential years described him as “a good hater,” and he sometimes lost his self-control in public when dealing with political opponents or with those who questioned his policies. Indeed, the Wilson administration's extensive violations of civil liberties during World War I, which Cooper suggests came less from Wilson than from his cabinet officials, may have reflected the president's sensitivity to criticism more than anything else. There was a dark side to Wilson's character—a side that Cooper might have explored a bit more.
Cooper is understandably more comfortable discussing Wilson's diplomacy during World War I than the president's civil liberties record. He presents Wilson not as a crusading moralist, but as “one of the most careful, hardheaded, and sophisticated idealists of his time” (5). This outlook in part reflects Wilson's Presbyterian religious faith, which rejected the idea that any person could know the will of God. Incapable of thinking of himself as “a secular messiah,” Wilson did not approach World War I with the goal of imposing a new millennium of democracy around the world. Instead, Wilson aimed to achieve a “liberal, nonpunitive settlement” that would reconcile the belligerents and pave the way for a league of nations (417). Wary of unleashing nationalist revolts across Europe, he avoided using the term “self-determination” in his speeches and “eschewed too ready or too broad an application of the idea, maintaining escape hatches for the sake of peace and stability” (429). A “preference for dynamic processes over fixed terms” characterized much of Wilson's approach to peacemaking, an attitude hardly suited for someone who was supposedly a moralistic ideologue (497).
Although Cooper is convincing in his assertion that Wilson's peace program was not an expression of “starry-eyed idealism,” his discussion of it elides its problematic character (424). Determined to show that Wilson was not a crusader for democracy, Cooper glosses over the anti-German thrust of Wilson's war aims. From his early mediation efforts onward, the president's preferred peace terms always imposed immediate losses of one sort or another on the Germans, but not the Allies. At Paris, moreover, Wilson readily embraced measures aimed at weakening or punishing Germany, particularly in the areas of disarmament, the Polish border, and the Saarland. Cooper himself implicitly acknowledges that the president at times willingly took a hard line against the Germans, stating that Wilson “grasped” that to maintain peace, “the defeated must bow to their defeat” (498). Still, Wilson's idea of a durable peace envisioned all nations, including Germany, cooperating together in a new world order based on collective security. How could the president achieve this end while also treating the Germans as, in effect, arrested criminals? Cooper does not consider this key question.
The linchpin of Wilson's postwar international system, the League of Nations, also had problems. Certainly Wilson's explanation of the league's Covenant was full of contradictions. On the one hand, league members guaranteed each other's security and could concern themselves with war or the threat of war “anywhere in the world” (474). At the same time, however, according to Wilson, league members were under no legal obligation to use force against aggressors, the Monroe Doctrine was “not impaired” under the League of Nations, and “national sovereignty” would not be curtailed (479). Cooper does not offer much clarification of Wilson's confusing conception of the league nor does he explain why Wilson was uninterested in alternative ways to engage America in upholding Europe's postwar peace. Instead, he takes Wilson's explanations of the league at face value and focuses on the mistakes Wilson made in his struggle to get the Versailles Treaty ratified. This makes for a lively story, but it obscures the dilemmas and limitations inherent in Wilson's approach to international relations.
Cooper's analysis of Wilson's leadership of progressive reform is more compelling. To all appearances, Wilson was a conservative Democrat until late in his tenure at Princeton. Cooper emphasizes that Wilson always approved of a strong central government, however, and argues that he identified more with rural America and “the hardworking folk who lived there” than with the wealthy and prominent (107). Wilson's gradual emergence as a progressive from 1908 to 1911 was thus not simply an act of political opportunism, although Cooper concedes that opportunism played a role. As Wilson's progressivism developed, Cooper describes it as linking a liberal faith in competition and self making with a desire to rein in monopoly power and, by 1916, to have the federal government regulate the wages and working conditions of specific categories of workers. A bold leader on par with FDR and LBJ, Wilson, Cooper argues, put the Democratic Party firmly on the path to the New Deal of the 1930s.
Seeing Wilson as a leader who was “sensitive to economic, religious, and ethnic injustices,” Cooper has difficulty explaining Wilson's terrible record concerning racial discrimination and violence against African Americans (11). He rejects the idea that Wilson was simply a southern-bred white supremacist and insists that once he was president, Wilson “put any ethnic and religious prejudices he ever felt far behind him” (410). Nevertheless, he also describes Wilson as easily accepting the “customary racial inequalities and indignities of the time” and as unable to recognize African Americans “as fellow children of God” (411). Cooper suggests this failure to see racism as a sin may have stemmed from Wilson's Presbyterian aversion to “mixing religion in politics,” but this point seems a bit strained (411). In any case, Wilson embraced the racism of the period and actively reinforced it, marring not just his moral stature, as Cooper laments, but severely limiting his concept of democracy at home and abroad as well.
Overall, both of these books are, despite their flaws, well written, exhaustively researched, and clearly presented. Gould explains better than anyone else the political missteps of President Taft, and Cooper provides the most authoritative and thorough biography of Wilson since the multi-volume effort of Arthur Link. Both books are important additions to the study of the Progressive Era, especially Progressive Era politics.
