Brownfield Blues
The worlds of steel in Europe’s heart refused to die with a whimper. When, in December 1978, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing announced a third ‘steel plan’ axing 22,000 jobs in the industry – 6,500 of which in the Longwy basin – the people of Lorraine decided that they had seen enough. ‘Traditionally slow to anger’, they flashed an SOS signal from atop a slagheap and set out to defend their livelihoods against the overwhelming force of globalised competition and secular stagnation.Footnote 1 In mid-January, 80,000 people demonstrated in Metz, Lorraine’s regional prefecture, and the General Confederation of Labor kept the public informed through a ‘pirate radio station’ quickly set up to rally French workers.Footnote 2 By the end of January, the strikes turned violent. The French Democratic Confederation of Labor, another large national trade union centre, began with ‘uncharacteristic determination’ to endorse the ‘legitimate violence of the workers’.Footnote 3
While the protests were spreading to Paris, one of the era’s largest multinational mining conglomerates, Alcan Aluminum, purchased a Ludwgishafen aluminium mill from a struggling competitor. The timing was poor. Three years after the Canadian company acquired the Ludwigshafen plant, its cheap energy contract – a relic of West Germany’s subsidised energy production and the promotional prices offered in the 1960s to accelerate the expansion of nuclear capacity – expired.Footnote 4 Where other German aluminium smelters paid about four pfennig per kilowatt-hour, Alcan Ludwigshafen was now stuck with energy costs of 6.77 Pfg/kWh, or 38 per cent of total production costs.Footnote 5 The effects of this price spike were immediate: while Ludwigshafen had recorded profits of DM3.9 million in 1981, a year later it was DM9.3 million in the red.Footnote 6 Throughout 1982, desperate negotiations between Alcan’s board, a workers’ committee, as well as local, regional and national governments and the energy behemoth RWE led nowhere. When management announced that the first layoffs were imminent in late January 1983, Ludwigshafen followed Longwy’s example, and its steelworkers occupied the plant to stave off the irreversible shutdown of the mill’s electrolytic furnaces.Footnote 7 Unlike in Longwy, however, Ludwigshafen’s workers were successful, at least for the moment. A last-minute agreement between the state and federal governments promised DM8 million to prevent the closure of the mill, securing the continued employment of its 330 workers.Footnote 8
This article homes in on the European Commission’s reaction to these two specific episodes to probe the implementation of neoliberalism in the European Community (EC), focusing in particular on the differential application of the EC’s state aid doctrine in the 1980s.Footnote 9 On the one hand, the Commission’s efforts to recoup the aid paid to Alcan Aluminum’s Ludwigshafen plant – and thereby ensure its closure – heralded the beginning of what is sometimes perceived as an austerity-driven strand of neoliberalism epitomised by the European project’s response to the Great Recession. While the EU’s handling of the Eurozone crisis was, in many respects, socio-economically punishing, recent research points to the co-existence of austerity with a newly invigorated ‘investor state’ in certain member countries, and has outlined how post-2008 state aid regulations have pushed national development banks to support European regional development programmes and green investment.Footnote 10 In this vein, the construction of the European Development Pole (EDP) at the tri state border connecting France, Belgium and Luxembourg offers an early developmentalist antipode to the politics of austerity that characterise the Commission’s approach to Alcan Ludwigshafen, highlighting the degree to which the European project constitutes what historian Laurent Warlouzet describes as a ‘mix’ of different capitalisms.Footnote 11
By illuminating the inchoate, ‘syncretic’ and contested implementation of neoliberalism suggested by these two case studies, this article contributes to important recent research at the intersection of the historiographies of capitalism, development and European integration.Footnote 12 More specifically, it suggests that the vocabulary of syncretism, partiality, and mixes that is now used to characterise the European project's relationship to neoliberalism could be fruitfully enhanced by a more precise terminology that takes seriously the EU’s unique political–economic composition, which is defined by a complex pastiche of supranational, national and local interdependencies and jurisdictions. Analytically, this means that in addition to studying the proliferation of national neoliberalisms across the EU’s member states and the polities stitched into the wider geography of Europe as defined in the introduction to this special issue, it remains desirable to develop alternative conceptual frameworks that allow us to situate the European project within the longer history of global capitalism and development as a construct that paralleled, rather than constituted a pillar of, the political consolidation of neoliberalism.Footnote 13
The concept of ‘Eurocapitalism’ presents one such alternative. Eurocapitalism uses the emphasis on competition policy and state aid at the heart of an important strand of political–economic research on the EU to demonstrate the fundamental differences between the Commission’s approach to regulating competition and that of the world’s most consequential implementation of a neoliberal competition or anti-trust policy: Chicago school neoliberalism, which became the dominant judicial doctrine in the United States beginning in the mid- to late 1970s.Footnote 14 Whereas American anti-trust law has, since the 1890 Sherman Act, operated through private litigation and in general courts, Eurocapitalist competition policy was developed and implemented through the Commission, the executive institution of the EC. For one, this has meant that changes in economic thinking, such as a Chicago school neoliberalism centred on ‘consumer welfare’ and a lenient approach to monopolisation, could filter into judicial practice much more quickly in the United States than in Europe.Footnote 15 Because Commission policies are the result of a negotiated compromise, moreover, final decisions emerge from political and ideological contestation among a wide range of interests, only some of which could be described as neoliberal.Footnote 16
The ‘Atlantic divide in anti-trust’ that has resulted from such divergent practices is central to understanding the European project as a unique political–economic construct, one that deserves its own proper noun, Eurocapitalism, rather than slotting into widely used frameworks such as ‘Third Way’ neoliberalism or ordoliberalism.Footnote 17 To use the term Eurocapitalism, in other words, is to recognise that the European project contains a catalogue of capitalisms, as Warlouzet suggests, and that developing a new vocabulary for the combination of these capitalisms leaves us with something that cannot be reduced to a variant of neoliberalism. More than negatively define the political economy of the European project in terms of what it is not, and beyond listing the many capitalisms sutured into its fabric, a Eurocapitalist framework offers a positive way to conceptualise the European Union (EU) as a new entity on the world’s geoeconomic stage, one that reconciles the dichotomy between generous state intervention in the Chiers valley and neoliberal austerity on the west bank of the Rhine.
Tracing the creation of the European Development Pole, to this extent, offers a fruitful window into the contestations at the heart of Eurocapitalism, demonstrating the degree to which Eurocapitalism has long been a multifaceted technocratic development project that differed significantly from the neoliberal obsession with austerity, inequality and the ‘encasement’ of markets, rather than their guidance.Footnote 18 While the post-war United States circumscribed its developmental state to a narrow focus on military technology and computing, the EC’s approach maintained a broader horizon and was organised in a different fashion: it was not ‘hidden’ in decentralised agencies – even if it remained an untransparent, undemocratic, and ‘androcentric’ order – but guided by a bureaucracy that longed to represent itself as the world’s ‘moral authority’ in areas ranging from environmental protection to women’s rights.Footnote 19 The concept of Eurocapitalism, in other words, describes the European project as a self-mythologising, Brussels-guided developmental assemblage that contains, as the contributions to this special issue demonstrate, several varieties of neoliberalism that ultimately combine to become more than the sum of their parts.Footnote 20 Whereas neoliberalism sought to encase the market from democracy in an effort to redistribute private, untaxed wealth starkly upward, Eurocapitalism, for all its important democratic deficits, ultimately maintained a more encompassing vision of state intervention for regional development. The Commission’s guidance on state aid has been one of its most effective tools for doing so.
As such, juxtaposing the struggle over Alcan Ludwigshafen with the creation of the EDP against the backdrop of neoliberal ‘mutations’ and their alternatives provides important insights into the functioning of Eurocapitalism as distinct from any one form of neoliberalism.Footnote 21 It illustrates the disparate visions for the European project’s future that Commissioners, member state politicians and workers pitted against one another. Some, such as the much vaunted Commission President Jacques Delors and the skilled industrial labourers threatened by the closure of ‘sunset industries’, attempted to safeguard the world of steel with the help of the state.Footnote 22 Others, like Catherine Day, a young Irish civil servant who was responsible for state aid in the cabinet of Competition Commissioner Peter Sutherland and who would go on to become Secretary-General of the European Commission in 2005, attempted to squeeze competitiveness and growth out of intense competition by prohibiting any kind of state aid. Member state politicians, meanwhile, displayed a wide spectrum of commitments. The Alcan plant would not have received a last-minute subsidy had it not been located in German Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s constituency and required funding just before a consequential election, while local politicians in the Chiers valley were collaborating to ensure the ‘economic and physical regeneration’, as an OECD report put it, of their slowly etiolating heartlands.Footnote 23 What resulted from such contestations and contingencies, this article suggests, was Eurocapitalism.
To trace the development of Eurocapitalism as a unique political-economic construct, I draw on two main archival collections. First, the papers of the Federal Chancellery offer insights into the German government’s attempts to save the Ludwigshafen aluminium mill. The correspondence between the various national ministries and European institutions involved in the Alcan saga illuminates the fraught and contentious implementation of the Commission’s more stringent state aid regime. Correspondence is also central to uncovering Eurocapitalism’s more developmentalist mode. More specifically, the Peter Sutherland papers held at the Historical Archives of the EU in Florence shed light on the contests over the EDP that raged within the Commission at this important juncture. In combination with a close reading of relevant Commission legislation and some supplemental material drawn from the National Archives of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the correspondence contained in the archives of the Federal Chancellery and the Peter Sutherland papers ultimately provide a lush meadow of material through which to demonstrate the value of a Eurocapitalist lens.
Competing Visions of European Competition
Precisely because Alcan Ludwigshafen was the smallest of West Germany’s aluminium plants in the early 1980s, the furore and confusion surrounding the Commission’s decision to consider the DM8 million in state aid illegal and demand its repayment offers a useful window into the nature of the Eurocapitalist competition regime in the context of the Single Market Programme, which emphasised the stricter enforcement of competition policies.Footnote 24 On the one hand, it conveys the militancy of Peter Sutherland’s Competition cabinet, and the extraordinary supranational political powers the Commission wielded in its quest to ‘equalise’ markets before they were to be completely integrated through the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. On the other hand, the Federal Republic’s response to the Commission’s ruling is valuable for understanding how West Germany, which had supposedly imprinted its ordoliberal vision on the EC since the Community’s birth in 1958, understood this Eurocapitalist competition regime. By unearthing the legal stand-off between the Commission and West Germany, the closure of Alcan Ludwigshafen underscores how vehement the clash between the judicial systems of the EC and those of its member states could be, highlighting the variations in the interpretation and implementation of neoliberal austerity policies across the EC.Footnote 25
After avoiding uncomfortable confrontations with member states fighting the dislocations of the ‘long’ 1970s by dispensing state aid, the Commission during Frans Andriessen (1981–4) and Peter Sutherland’s (1985–9) tenures as Competition Commissioners began to rethink the harm caused by subsidies. As a result, the number of cases in which the Commission prohibited state aid surged twelvefold during Andriessen’s tenure compared to that of his predecessor, Luxembourg’s former Deputy Prime Minister Raymond Vouel.Footnote 26 Andriessen and Vouel held drastically different political opinions, which informed their respective approaches to competition law. Vouel had been a member of the Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party (LSAP), and the coalition government he had belonged to before becoming Competition Commissioner oversaw the introduction of the 40-hour (instead of a 48-hour) work week and longer holidays. Meanwhile, Andriessen joined the Commission after his resignation from the centre-right Van Agt Cabinet, which had governed the Netherlands from 1977 until 1981. Unable to push through a spate of austerity measures that went beyond the Cabinet’s planned budget cuts, the lawyer and businessman decided to quit, causing a minor crisis that prompted Queen Juliana to cut short a vacation in Austria. Eight months later, Andriessen was nominated to the post of European Commissioner for Competition and Parliamentary Affairs.
Reflecting the divergent aims Vouel and Andriessen geared their competition policies towards, the first half of the 1980s saw the Art. 93.2 EEC (Art. 108.2 TFEU) procedure that allows Directorate-General IV, which provides the administrative backbone to the political work of the Competition Commissioner and is now called DG COMP, to ‘abolish or modify’ market-distorting aids employed about 400 times. At the same time, the Commission began to systematically require the recovery of aids ‘incompatible’ with the common and soon single market, ten years after the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had given it the power to do so in 1973.Footnote 27 Whereas the ‘shock of the global’ had combined with Vouel’s Social Democratic outlook to allow considerable state intervention in national economies to stem growing unemployment and incentivise technological innovation, Andriessen believed that such leniency represented an existential threat to the functioning of the common market.
It was unfortunate, then, that the Ludwigshafen aluminium mill’s relatively cheap energy contract with the Pfalzwerke and RWE ran out on 30 September 1982.Footnote 28 The stricter framework resulting from Eurocapitalist competition policy’s changing aims – from securing competitiveness and employment in the 1970s to attempts at ‘relaunching’ Europe and the completion of the internal market in the 1980s and 1990s – meant that any aid it received would be subject to intense scrutiny.Footnote 29 Neither was the aluminium industry immune to the marketisation and financialisation that kicked into high gear in the 1980s. Under strong pressure from the Commission, the London Metal Exchange relinquished its system of stable price lists negotiated by cartels in favour of a futures market for aluminium contracts, introducing enormous volatility into a market that had been relatively steady for decades.Footnote 30
But such broader concerns were far from Helmut Kohl’s mind when, after months of heated negotiations and the workers’ occupation of the aluminium mill, he decided to greenlight a DM8 million rescue package as ‘interim aid’ (Überbrückungshilfe) to halt the irreparable shutdown of Alcan Ludwigshafen’s hydrolytic ovens.Footnote 31 Although the German government had not notified the aid to the Commission – a serious breach of Art. 93.3 EEC – DG IV found out immediately. On 7 March 1983, a few days after the aid package was signed, the Commission inquired whether the press reports were true: had Kohl really promised DM8 million to Germany’s smallest aluminium mill without notifying the guardian of the treaties?Footnote 32
West Germany, the Commission and the Struggle over Alcan Ludwigshafen
At the height of summer, just before the slow month of August in which European civil servants fled Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg in droves, representatives of the Rhineland-Palatinate notified the Commission of the aid to Alcan Ludwigshafen. While the Commission accepted the letter as a formal notification as demanded by Art. 93.3 EEC, it had several questions regarding the nature, scope and implementation of the endeavour.Footnote 33 What form would the aid take? Had it already been disbursed, either in full or in part? And what were the company's plans for arriving at a ‘viable concept’? Once the Commission received answers to these questions, the 30-day deadline to reach a decision on whether to open an Art. 92 or 93 EEC procedure against the West German government would begin.Footnote 34
Officials at the Federal Ministry for Economics (BMWi) answered the Commission’s inquiry on 9 September 1983. The aid would be provided in the form of grants, and the first of two tranches had in fact already been paid out on 9 June, well before the aid was notified to the Commission.Footnote 35 In response to the Commission’s questions regarding the Ludwigshafen mill’s restructuring plans, the BMWi pointed out that Alcan had refocused production on high-value products such as extrusion billets and a special type of cast alloy. It had also increased the plant’s output to 70,000 tons per year through the use of cold metal, lowering energy costs from more than 16 kWh/kg of aluminium to a little over 14 kWh/kg, in the process turning Alcan Ludwigshafen into what the federal government considered a paragon of efficiency in Germany’s aluminium industry.Footnote 36 While the Commission would only officially develop guidelines for restructuring companies facing difficulties in 1994, these guidelines were based on ‘years of case practice’, and justifying state aid, even if the sums amounted to as little as DM8 million, required strict adherence to the Commission’s rules.Footnote 37
If one prong of the BMWi’s argument centred on proving that this was in fact a potentially permissible restructuring aid and not an illegal maintenance aid, the other questioned the rationale for the Commission’s emphasis on capacity reduction. Whereas the Commission had identified overproduction in the aluminium sector, the BMWi countered that there had really been a net deficit of 277,000 tons in West Germany’s domestic aluminium production; in the EC as a whole, the shortfall approached 834,000 tons, and no further mills were planned.Footnote 38 Nevertheless, the BMWi and the German Chancellery were well aware that their response to the Commission’s queries was in no way ‘unassailable’. Since the Commission understood the ‘political importance of the matter’, however, the federal government was confident that the Commission would ultimately grant the aid, if, perhaps, ‘only after an official examination procedure and subject to certain conditions’.Footnote 39
The German officials miscalculated. They had failed to appreciate the vehemence of DG IV’s rapid turn towards a more stringent enforcement of state aid cases under the austerity-driven Andriessen. To underscore that it meant business, the Commission published a communication on the notification obligation in late November 1983, in which it announced its decision to ‘use all measures at its disposal to ensure that Member States’ obligations under Article 93(3) are fulfilled’. This included requiring that member states ‘recover aid granted illegally from recipients’ – a prerogative, the notification matter-of-factly reminded its readers in various national governments, bestowed on it by the ECJ in 1973.Footnote 40
As if to accentuate its newfound zeal, Richard Burke, the European Commissioner for Interinstitutional Relations and Administration, sent Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher a letter to announce that the Commission was opening the Art. 93.2 EEC procedure, by which it could ‘abolish or modify’ aid it deemed incompatible with the common market, against the West German government within twenty-four hours of publishing the notification.Footnote 41 Burke explained that the Commission was aware of Alcan’s efforts to weather the 80-per cent surge in electricity costs the mill was suddenly faced with by restructuring its operations, but that DG IV nevertheless considered the DM8 million an illegal ‘production aid’, since the grant extended the company a lifeline through which it could artificially survive for another year. Finally, the fact that Alcan had already received the first tranche of DM4 million was in breach of the notification requirement spelt out in Art. 93.3 EEC, and the Commission was authorised to demand that the sum be repaid. Needless to say, it added, the second tranche must under no circumstances be paid out.Footnote 42
Taken by surprise, West German officials cast about for answers and immediately began to point their fingers at jealous neighbours. The BMWi singled out the Netherlands as the most likely informer. After subsidising aluminium huts and being subjected to the Commission’s state aid procedures themselves, the Lowlanders had ‘apparently pressed the Commission for equal treatment’. Meanwhile, the second tranche had by now been disbursed, and although West German officials remained sceptical of the Commission’s resolve to demand that Alcan repay the DM8 million in aid, the BMWi collaborated with the Chancellery, the Foreign Ministry and the Rhineland-Palatinate to craft a watertight argument in favour of the subsidy.Footnote 43
The arguments that German officials constructed for granting state aid to Alcan Ludwigshafen paint a telling picture of their perception of the Eurocapitalist competition regime during a period of institutional change. In their initial efforts to sway Andriessen and DG IV, the bureaucrats built out the geoeconomic and aid-specific arguments they had adumbrated in their initial letter to the Commission. Demand for aluminium was steadily rising around the world against a backdrop of insufficient production, they explained, casting doubt on the sagacity of the Commission’s desired capacity reductions and its claims regarding structural overproduction. Seen in this light, it would only benefit third-country producers to let alcan Ludwigshafen shutter its gates. Finally, since the Ludwigshafen mill’s electricity costs were higher than those of its competitor with the second highest costs even after the subsidy, the officials argued that the interim aid would ‘not result in any distortion of competition’.Footnote 44
To emphasise that this was an interim and not a production aid, the federal government’s response foregrounded the plant’s restructuring efforts. Not only had it lowered electricity consumption through ‘technological improvements’ that would save DM4.2 million a year, but it also refocused its strategy towards crafting higher quality goods, successfully increasing its annual production value by DM14 million. In addition, Alcan Ludwigshafen began using a more efficient cold rolling process that would increase production from 46,000 tons to 70,000 tons and yield a cost reduction of DM3 million.Footnote 45 While these savings ultimately far eclipsed the value of the grant the aluminium hut had received, they would not suffice to make it profitable. Compared to September 1982 – the last month in which the mill had obtained electricity at the cheaper rate – Alcan Ludwigshafen’s new cost structure revealed a monthly shortfall of DM7.5 million between March and August of 1983.Footnote 46 Besides, whether or not the mill became profitable was irrelevant: the aid had already violated the notification requirement spelled out in Art. 93.3 EEC and could be voided on this basis alone. But in the final decision that Sutherland, who had by now replaced Andriessen as Competition Commissioner, sent to Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg after two years of political manoeuvring during which the aluminium hut managed to renegotiate an ‘acceptable’ electricity agreement effective until the end of March 1986, it became clear that failing to notify the aid was the least of West Germany’s concerns.Footnote 47
For one, the Commission found that the subsidy constituted an illegal ‘rescue aid’, and not a potentially permissible interim restructuring aid.Footnote 48 More important was the fact that about 70 per cent of the Ludwigshafen mill's 70,000-ton primary aluminium capacity went to other member states, thereby distorting the common market according to Art. 92.1 EEC.Footnote 49 What was more, the Commission noted that many of the structural improvements to the plant that West German officials had pointed to, such as the use of cold metal, had been implemented prior to the increase in electricity costs and had thus clearly not sufficed to save the plant.Footnote 50 Nor was the federal government’s geoeconomic argument that letting Alcan Ludwigshafen go bankrupt would benefit third-country producers ‘sound’. The Community’s capacity utilisation in the primary aluminium sector stood at 91.5 per cent in 1983, meaning that it had about 179,000 tons to spare – a figure that far surpassed the 46,000-ton capacity the Ludwigshafen aluminium mill boasted that year.Footnote 51 Given this overwhelming evidence, the Commission determined that the aid fell afoul of Articles 92 and 93.3 EEC and instructed the Federal Republic to demand repayment within two months.
Stuck in the lenient state aid regime of the 1970s, German officials refused to believe that the Commission would treat Alcan Ludwigshafen with the stringency West Germans had long demanded for the Community as a whole.Footnote 52 Protesting the decision to Commissioner Sutherland, Federal Minister of Economics Martin Bangemann appealed to the Irishman’s heart by painting a vivid picture of workers heroically struggling against the closure of the plant. In the process, Bangemann revealed that the aid granted to the aluminium mill had indeed been a rescue one, since ‘reclaiming this grant would again put these jobs at risk because the Alcan plant would likely revert to its previous plans to close it’.Footnote 53 The Economics Minister claimed to understand the ‘obligations that result from the Commission's state aid decisions’, and tried to assuage the guardian of the European treaties by pointing to a contemporaneous case in which the federal government would ‘immediately’ open the recovery procedure.Footnote 54 Saving jobs, however, had come to rank well below the restoration of ‘discipline’ in the field of state aid on Sutherland and Day’s agenda.Footnote 55
While the Federal Government attempted to move Sutherland’s heart, the Rhineland-Palatinate simply declared that it ‘did not agree with the decision and in particular refuses repayment in light of the protection of legitimate expectations’ (Vertrauensschutz) foreseen by West German law.Footnote 56 Because Alcan Ludwigshafen could reasonably expect its governments to understand prevailing Community laws on state aid before disbursing such grants, the aluminium mill was protected from demands for repayment, in particular since ‘Community law does not contain any provisions for the recovery of unjustly granted aid’, leaving the specifics of recovery to member state competition authorities.Footnote 57 The idea of Vertrauensschutz soon became a sponge that soaked up the concerns plaguing German officials, and Bangemann quickly informed the Commission that there was nothing the German government could do to claim repayment, since the Ludwigshafen plant was protected by Vertrauensschutz.Footnote 58 But Sutherland was unmoved. In June 1986, ‘the Sheriff’, as Jacques Delors privately referred to the Irishman, reiterated that West Germany had broken the law and that it must demand repayment from Alcan immediately.Footnote 59 Sutherland also squeezed the sponge of Vertrauensschutz hard by pointing to a January 1986 decision by the ECJ that had refuted Belgian appeals to a similar concept, further crystallising the Commission’s position on the necessity of demanding repayment.Footnote 60
Curiously, the BMWi and the Chancellery continued to interpret Sutherland's warnings to mean that the Commission would look the other way.Footnote 61 After all, Wolfgang Schäuble, then Head of the Chancellery, averred, the Commission's ‘dogged insistence on quick repayment’ did not ‘do the spirit of Europe any favours’.Footnote 62 Preparing for a meeting with Jacques Delors, Helmut Kohl’s notes moreover centred on convincing the Commission not to demand repayment because it represented a potential point of attack in the run-up to the 1987 West German federal elections.Footnote 63 The aid had, after all, been granted in Kohl's constituency, a fact that was not lost on journalists and Social Democratic Party politicians at the time.Footnote 64
By the spring of 1987, the Commission’s patience dried up, a process that was accelerated by the Single Market Programme’s imperative to decelerate and carefully guide the disbursement of state aid. On 1 April, it filed a claim with the ECJ in which it accused the West German government of failing to demand repayment.Footnote 65 Foreshadowing Koen Lenaerts's infamous contention that there was simply ‘no nucleus of sovereignty that the Member State can invoke, as such, against the Community’, the Commission’s legal representative explained that ‘no Member State can invoke national provisions, practices, or situations that allegedly preclude the carrying out of Community obligations to justify breaches of contract’.Footnote 66 Because the aid had not been notified, moreover, invoking the protections provided by Vertrauensschutz was futile: upon examining the aid, a negative decision by the Commission was ‘always’ on the cards.Footnote 67 Besides, if the West German argument had any substance, demands for repayment would always break against the rock of Vertrauensschutz and similar national legislation in other member states as soon as the recipient had spent the aid. This would hamstring the supranational application of EC law and was certain to rile the ECJ.Footnote 68
Still, the West German government refused to yield, even though the Ludwigshafen aluminium plant had already closed. After firing 160 employees in January 1986, Alcan’s board decided to shutter the entire operation a month later. In March, the last electrolytic furnaces were wound down, and by September the plant was supposed to be nothing more than a scrapheap.Footnote 69 Finally, the German government’s fighting spirit evaporated.Footnote 70 It submitted a tortuous legal exegesis centred on the importance of Vertrauensschutz to the ECJ, which prompted the Commission to issue a sharp rebuttal.Footnote 71 Notably, the Commission suggested that West German attempts at interpreting what was in the Community's ‘public interest’ with respect to state aids represented a ‘blatant violation’ of Art. 5 EEC, which demanded that member states ‘abstain from any measures likely to jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty’.Footnote 72 Only the Commission was allowed to interpret what was and was not in the interest of the Community, and the attempt by West Germany to offer its own interpretation was illegal.
Unsurprisingly, the ECJ ultimately decided in favour of the Commission on 2 February 1989. While the Alcan saga would drag on for another eight years, workers at the Ludwigshafen steel mill parted ways.Footnote 73 Eighteen apprentices were able to finish their education at a neighbouring firm, Giulini, while the fifteen employees over the age of fifty-five received a ‘social plan’ that would see them through to retirement. The eighty Turkish colleagues in their forties, as well as several Germans in that age bracket, received ‘generous’ settlements, in return for which Alcan would not have to provide them with a social plan, ultimately saving the Canadian conglomerate a fortune over the following decades.Footnote 74
The case of Alcan Ludwigshafen epitomises the sort of neoliberal austerity that some scholars have long ascribed to the European project. ‘Discipline’ had to be preserved – or rather, created.Footnote 75 Euthanising inefficient companies kept alive only by the generosity of their respective member states was certainly no taboo in this new environment.Footnote 76 But Eurocapitalist competition policy was a contested political field that, while influenced most directly by the Commissioner for Competition and DG IV, was nevertheless subject to a negotiated compromise within the College of Commissioners. At the tri state border joining Belgium, France and Luxembourg, this led to a future very different from the scrapheap the Commission created in Ludwigshafen.
Enfants de Longwy: Constructing the EDP
If the Ludwigshafen mill’s fate illustrated one possible future for those who inhabited the European world of steel, the EDP constructed by local governments in France, Belgium and Luxembourg in 1985 broached a different set of possibilities. After the Chiers valley’s steel industry had been dismantled in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a 500-hectare brownfield remained in the centre of a triangle delineated by Longwy (France), Aubange (Belgium) and Rodange (Luxembourg). The industrial ruins soon began to exercise the imaginations of local politicians, in whose minds the wreckage became a canvas that was eventually transformed into the Parc international d'activité des trois frontieres (PIA), the ‘heart’ of the European Development Pole.Footnote 77 Not only would companies settling in the area benefit from generous subsidies, but they could also make use of a slew of additional enticements, such as the skilled labour force supplied by a new Collège Européen de Technologie, and customs-free storage in the Magasins Francs for up to five years.Footnote 78
Just as the Alcan case demonstrates the extent to which the 1980s marked the Commission's reorientation towards greater stringency in the field of state aid, the example of the EDP shows how the decade witnessed the expansion of the European project’s developmental apparatus, emphasising the usefulness of adopting a framework such as Eurocapitalism to describe the political economy of this unique geoeconomic entity. For one, the policy of fostering ‘European champions’ introduced in the 1970s by ‘legendary’ Commissioner for Industrial Affairs and Energy Étienne Davignon spilled over into the first half of the 1980s.Footnote 79 On the Belgian diplomat’s initiative, the Commission formed an alliance with a dozen European electronics corporations in an effort to motivate industry leaders to collaborate on the European Strategic Programme for Research and Development, also known as ESPRIT.Footnote 80 In addition, what was known as ‘European Industrial Collaboration’ led to important Community projects such as the JET fusion research facility, while a host of separate intergovernmental consortia in this period gave rise to the European Space Agency (ESA) and the European Patent Office, as well as to the Ariane rocket programme, the Tornado fighter plane and Airbus.Footnote 81 In fact, the United Kingdom’s contributions to ESA exceeded the funding it allocated to NATO in the late 1970s.Footnote 82 Beyond suggesting the coterminous construction of policies of austerity and development, industrial projects of this scale belie the supposed novelty of today’s ‘geo-dirigiste turn’, pointing to incremental changes and a certain degree of continuity in the European project’s developmentalist mode.Footnote 83
In addition to the quest for greater technological innovativeness, the mid-1980s marked an important moment in the expansion of the EC’s larger regional funding mechanisms. Following Italian and British pressure, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was established in 1975 after a two-year delay caused by the 1973 oil crisis.Footnote 84 Initially modest in size, the ERDF upon its creation accounted for five per cent, or ECU1.4 billion, of the EEC budget and was meant to assist the European project’s less fortunate regions.Footnote 85 French wariness and a lack of enthusiasm on the part of West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher meant that a decade later the ERDF still only amounted to just under ECU2.4 billion per year.Footnote 86
With the accession of Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986, however, the Structural Funds, including the ERDF and the European Social Fund (ESF), were combined into a ‘cohesion policy’ and furnished with vastly expanded financial resources. Lurching towards his dream of constructing a ‘social Europe’, Jacques Delors, former Minister of Finance in Pierre Mauroy’s French Socialist Party and the EC executive body’s formidable president between 1985 and 1995, oversaw the allocation of ECU60.3 billion to cohesion policies between 1989 and 1993, as part of what became known as the Delors I package.Footnote 87 The period often identified with a distinct shift towards more stringent austerity policies in the field of state aid ultimately marked a significant expansion of the European project’s developmental ambitions as well.
It was out of this political–economic environment that the EDP was born. Although the project had been a national initiative, the Commission soon claimed its success, painting a heroic picture of the Community as saviour. ‘Hit by crisis in the 1960s’, a dramatic write-up by the Commission recounts, ‘thousands of jobs were lost provoking a major exodus that reduced the area to an industrial wasteland’. Until, that is, the ‘EU-funded Common Action Programme of the EDP (1985-95) resulted in the development of an international activities park, a cross-border venture capital company [sic.] and more than 6,000 jobs.’Footnote 88 That most of the companies settling in the area were Japanese and Korean technological and industrial behemoths that threatened the already uncompetitive ‘European champions’ that Commissioners such as Étienne Davignon had sought to rear is a less prominent part of the Commission’s narrative.Footnote 89
While it may at an initial glance have appeared as though the protestors at the Longwy steelworks faced prospects bleaker than those stared down by the workers occupying Alcan Ludwigshafen, the French government proved more creative than the juridically oriented German officials in envisioning a new future for a fading region and its dying industry.Footnote 90 While it would take seven years of haemorrhaging livelihoods and ageing populations for local governments to sputter into action, the plan concocted by a handful of French, Belgian, and Luxembourgish communities in 1985 was promising. It was also desperately needed. Of the 300,000 inhabitants of the Longwy–Aubange–Rodange triangle, 25,000 lost their jobs in the steel industry in the decade after 1974.Footnote 91 In Longwy, the number of employees tumbled by 23 per cent. The strong emigratory pressures these closures engendered disproportionately affected younger generations. Between 1975 and 1982, the hard-hit French districts lost 16 per cent of residents between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine, as well as a quarter of their children aged fourteen or younger.Footnote 92
In the two other corners of the triangle the situation was slightly less troublesome. While the former steel areas in Belgium witnessed a 10-per cent decline in employment between 1976 and 1982, only a remarkable seven jobs were eliminated over the following two years. Overall, the total population of the former Belgian steel area suffered a mild contraction of about 1.5 per cent.Footnote 93 At 0.7 per cent, that figure was even lower in Luxembourg’s ‘southern development region’. Here, the total number of jobs actually increased by 6.5 per cent between 1970 and 1981, a trend ‘accounted for entirely by female employment’, in particular in the service sector; male employment in the same period fell by four per cent.Footnote 94 As the world of steel began to fade from Western Europe’s memory, the search for alternative futures began.
On 19 July 1985, the three governments signed one such future into tentative existence. Encompassing a small area with a 20-km radius on the French, Belgian and Luxembourgish borders, the EDP would consist of a PIA benefitting from a ‘high level of investment subsidies (40%), a duty free status, and no internal border restrictions’.Footnote 95 The aim was to create 8,000 industrial jobs within ten years, of which 5,500 were to be located in France, 1,500 in Belgium and 1,000 in Luxembourg.Footnote 96 A ‘European college of technology’ would rear a new type of technically skilled pan-European industrial labourer to populate the factories and businesses that would, it was hoped, settle in the Pole and the ‘welcome relief’ (bol d'oxygène) that was the Parc.Footnote 97 In this minute, 4.08-km2 core of the EDP, investment subsidies would peak and borders disappear, planting a special industrial-economic zone in the heart of Europe and offering local steel workers and former artisans a new livelihood.Footnote 98
This, at least, was how the three governments envisioned their scheme. It was a ‘zone’, to be sure, but not the Friedmannian ideal of one.Footnote 99 Rather, the EDP was a Eurocapitalist zone patching together market-oriented paeans to free trade and tariff rebates with substantial government investment in a reskilled labour force and industrial improvement. At the Commission’s headquarters in the Berlaymont in Brussels, the EDP conjured up doomsday scenarios in the minds of Peter Sutherland, Catherine Day and Manfred Caspari, the Director-General of DG IV. Rather than view the plan primarily as a means to restore the shattered bowl of European steel with the lacquer of jobs and technical training, they considered it in terms of numbers, levels and threats. Viewed through the lens of net grant equivalents (NGEs), what the three governments demanded endangered the cohesion of the future single market, despite the fact that, as Caspari put it, the ‘socio-economic situation seems to be not too serious’.Footnote 100 To DG IV, it looked as though the threat of distorting the common market was greater than the benefit of a few new jobs.
Seeing like the Commission
Not too far from either Longwy or Ludwigshafen, the successive Competition Cabinets of former Dutch finance minister Frans Andriessen and of Peter Sutherland, who had previously served as Ireland’s attorney general, viewed the corroding worlds of the ‘central regions’ through a lens different from those used by local steelworkers and politicians.Footnote 101 The ‘dingy, desperate mill town’, as a Canadian magazine pictured Longwy in 1979, and Chancellor Helmut Kohl's constituency in the Rhineland-Palatinate were stripped of their physicality by technocrats in the European Commission’s DG IV.Footnote 102 Workers, strikes and wages – all these became the material accoutrements of lives fathomed through one of a few sacred numbers of which Catherine Day, a young European civil servant in DG IV, became the guardian in the mid-1980s.Footnote 103 The number Day protected in the realm of state aid was the ‘NGE’ that a project stood to receive, as long as it did not run afoul of the EEC Treaty’s state aid provisions spelt out in Articles 92–94 (Arts. 107–109 TFEU). NGEs define the maximum share of an investment in a venture that may be provided as aid by a member state government. When historians and political scientists point to the ‘neoliberalisation’ of the European project that began in the 1980s, the Commission’s increasingly restrictive interpretation of the Treaty’s state aid provisions serves as a common point of departure.Footnote 104
On 24 February 1986, the governments of France, Belgium and Luxembourg signed an agreement to formalise the Joint Declaration and Programme of Action for a European Development Pole (Déclaration Commune et Programme d'Action pour un Pole Européen de Développement) that had given initial shape to the idea of the EDP.Footnote 105 With all the dejection Day could squeeze into the formulaic prose of a Commission memorandum, she informed Sutherland that she ‘suppose[d] we must now consider this package as formally notified and set about formulating our opinion’. Day was ‘seriously concerned’ about multiple features of National Programmes of Community Interest such as the EDP.Footnote 106 For one, establishing what amounted to a special economic zone – even if it was a ‘very small’ one – in the heart of Europe represented ‘yet another breach in our attempt to restrict aid in the centre’.Footnote 107 This was a problem of immense ‘political significance’, as it pitted the EC’s regional aid system against the industrial priorities of member states like France, whose influence in the Commission was enhanced by the outsized presence of Jacques Delors. To Day’s mind, it was ‘bad enough to have had to accept Lorraine and Nord Pas de Calais’. Now, DG IV was confronted with yet another French attempt to increase aid levels in the country’s north. Was there even ‘any point in having cumulation ceilings etc.’ given such widespread profligacy?Footnote 108
High aid ceilings, expressed in NGEs, were anathema to Day. The three governments dreamed of ceilings reaching 40 per cent NGE, which meant that two fifths of the new investment in the area could be funded by generous states.Footnote 109 To Day, this level was ‘unacceptably high’, in particular given the EDP's central location and the French government's history of negotiating exceptions to regional aid policies.Footnote 110 Day reasoned that allowing 40 per cent in the heart of Europe meant that it would become necessary to offer 100 per cent in the periphery to facilitate a level playing field.Footnote 111 Under then current ERDF regulations, the national aid ceiling for France was 22 per cent NGE, comprised of a base level of 20 per cent and a 2 per cent derogation for steel regions. Luxembourg’s ceiling lay at 20 per cent NGE, while that of Belgium’s southern region had in 1982 been reduced from 20 to 15 per cent NGE following a Commission decision on Belgian assisted areas.Footnote 112 To reach 40 per cent NGE, the governments did not foresee an increase in permissible national aid levels, but rather the ability to ‘cumulate’ national and ERDF aids above the 25 per cent limit foreseen in the cumulation rules.Footnote 113 This meant that ‘both the value and rate of the aid requested’ eclipsed permissible ERDF ceilings.Footnote 114
After the three governments responded to the Commission’s March 1986 request for further information on the scheme in June of that year, discussions between several Cabinets and Directorates-General unfolded in the low light of Day’s despondency.Footnote 115 Day let it be known that she did ‘not like this kind of proposal’, as the Commission was already ‘presiding over a proliferation of special measures in the centre’.Footnote 116 Not only were the aid ceilings too high and the location inopportune, but as Manfred Caspari, the German head of DG IV pointed out, the situation in none of the three countries seemed to ‘be sufficiently unfavourable compared with other areas in Europe’ to warrant an aid level of 40 per cent NGE.Footnote 117
The two measurements the Commission used for assessing whether a region fell under Art. 92.3(c) EEC, which could provide a derogation for ‘aids intended to facilitate the development of certain activities or of certain economic regions’, were unemployment and GDP per head, generally indexed to the averages obtained in the twelve member states.Footnote 118 Luxembourg’s GDP index was 123 in 1983, for instance, and thus well above the Community average, although this figure was distorted by the fact that the entire country was a ‘level III region’, meaning a single district in the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics used by the Commission. In other words, although the situation in the southwest of the country was worse than elsewhere, the Grand Duchy’s minute size ensured that regional differences became statistically invisible.Footnote 119 Meanwhile, the unemployment indices in the Belgian level-III regions of Arlon and Virton stood at 71 and 96 (1981, Belgium = 100), respectively, while the former’s income per head index in 1982 was 88 and the latter’s 84. This told Caspari that here, too, the ‘socio-economic situation seems to be not too serious’. In the Longwy basin, finally, the GDP per head index showed 96 compared to France as a whole, a figure well above the threshold of 79 that DG IV used when deciding whether to grant a derogation in line with Art. 92.3(c).Footnote 120
By peering through a simplistic statistical lens that largely ignored any future trajectories or qualitative criteria such as type of employment, the prevalence of mental or physical illnesses associated with industrial decline, or educational attainment, DG IV ultimately recommended that cumulation of national and Community aids up to a single level of 25 per cent NGE be permitted.Footnote 121 In fact, this figure was the minimum the Commission was able to authorise because of a surfeit of individual and sectoral frameworks that obtained in different countries. If, Day admitted, national aid levels were maintained and cumulation with the ERDF allowed, the permissible NGE figures would be 34 per cent for France, 30 per cent for Luxembourg and roughly 22 per cent for Belgium.Footnote 122 Knowing this, she nevertheless counselled that Sutherland present the Commission with the current situation (20 per cent in France and Luxembourg, 15 per cent in Belgium), and to ‘say that in recognition of the interest (from a European view) which the Pole presents you are willing to go as far as 25% nge [sic.] as a special gesture’.Footnote 123 The gesture, which was supposed to be ‘as empty as possible’, clashed with the views held by other Commissioners.Footnote 124 Jacques Delors, for instance, insisted on an NGE of 40 per cent. Directorate-General XVI (Regional Policy) and Alois Pfeiffer, a trade unionist and now Commissioner for Economic Affairs and Employment, suggested 30 per cent NGE as a reasonable compromise.Footnote 125
In their communication to the Commission, Sutherland and Pfeiffer ultimately recommended that it reject the proposal in its present form. Given the ‘original, European nature’ of the scheme, however, they invited the three governments to resubmit their proposal with two significant amendments. First, Sutherland and Pfeiffer agreed that an aid level of 40 per cent NGE in the heart of Europe would ‘distort competition’, but suggested that a lower level would be acceptable. In practice, this meant dropping the proposed NGE ceiling to 30 per cent, as Pfeiffer had recommended.Footnote 126 Second, the deadline of ten years seemed ‘arbitrary’. Instead, this ‘exceptional arrangement’ should be tied to the number of jobs it sought to create – that is, 8,000, of which 5,500 in France, 1,500 in Belgium and 1,000 in Luxembourg. Because this entailed the possibility that the scheme would continue indefinitely, the Commission set a no less arbitrary period of five years before it would reevaluate the situation. All other features of the EDP, including the establishment of a special customs arrangement, a European technical college, investments in infrastructure, and a ‘joint services centre’ at the heart of the Parc were welcome.Footnote 127
While Day continued to insist that no derogations were ‘justified’, she begrudgingly recognised the ‘“political” nature of this case’, and in November 1986 the Commission decided to greenlight the EDP after the three governments had resubmitted a proposal that conformed to Sutherland and Pfeiffer's compromise solution.Footnote 128 Between 1986 and 1990, the ERDF would contribute about ECU90 million to projects in the Pole, subsidising half of the 30 per cent NGE states could offer upstart and expanding businesses in the area as aid.Footnote 129 Combined with new roads, increased opportunities for gaining a technical education, and the regional abolition of borders and certain customs duties, these incentives were intended to transform the rusting world of steel into a competitive industrial hub able to weather the shock of the global.Footnote 130
Day had been right that ‘much will be made in the Commission of the “European” character of the proposal’.Footnote 131 To committed federalists like Sutherland, competition and beautifully undistorted markets had never been the crux of the European project to begin with.Footnote 132 Certainly, creating competitive markets in preparation for Maastricht was a central reason behind Sutherland’s ‘stringent’ enforcement regime. But this had never been the sole aim of Eurocapitalist competition policy as he understood it.Footnote 133 To the contrary, an uncompromising stance on competition would only frustrate efforts at creating a United States of Europe, and was, in any case, impossible to maintain against the myriad visions for Europe that floated around the offices of the Berlaymont, let alone those of the Court, the Parliament, the European Central Bank and the member state bureaucracies. As such, the EDP further demonstrates the diversity of socio-economic aims and practices in the European project, offering a useful window into the nature of Eurocapitalism and its unique competition regime.Footnote 134 The developmentalist compromise that birthed the EDP marked a departure from the austerity demonstrated by decisions such as those on Alcan Ludwigshafen. In addition, the struggles surrounding the EDP foregrounded the degree to which EC competition law constituted an administrative political project whose aims have long been fiercely contested within the Commission, as well as between member states and local and regional governments. By hammering out a compromise, the three governments and the Commission clarified the negotiated balance between competitiveness, employment and competition at the heart of Eurocapitalism. As Jacques Delors pointed out, the EDP was a ‘miniature laboratory of Europe’.Footnote 135
Conclusion
In the first eight years of its existence, the EDP failed to reach its employment goals, although there was considerable national disparity. In the French section, only 28 per cent of the desired industrial jobs were created by 1993, while the Luxembourgish side of the EDP fell just short of its aims, creating a respectable 954 out of 1,000 expected livelihoods. At 78 per cent, Belgium lay in between these two extremes.Footnote 136 Cooperation among the three national programmes also had tangible limits. When the Japanese electronics multinational TDK attempted to settle in the Luxembourgish slice of the Parc, it was told that there was insufficient space and instead erected a plant in Bascharage, on the edge of the Pole, even though the Belgian and French sections of the EDP's heart both contained sufficiently large vacant lots.Footnote 137 That many of the companies settling in the area were the kind of Japanese and Korean high-tech firms European industrial policy had consistently failed to create moreover underscored the depths of Europe’s shock of the global and prevented ‘European champions’ from taking full advantage of the Pole.Footnote 138
To European Commissioner for Regional Policy Bruce Millan, the EDP nevertheless proved to be ‘a success on which we must build’, warranting a second five-year run from 1991 to 1995.Footnote 139 In 1993, a Declaration by the ‘Mayors and Burgomasters’ and a Joint Resolution by the National Authorities created the Agglomération transfrontalière du Pôle Européen de développement (Agglo-PED), which expanded the scope of the Pole to cover twenty-five municipalities and a total population of about 123,000.Footnote 140 At this juncture, the project also came under the auspices of the EU’s INTERREG programme, which supports cross-border initiatives between two or more member states and centres on infrastructural improvements and clearing brownfields, rather than on investment assistance.Footnote 141 After 1996, Agglo-PED, which by then was known as EUREGIO, received further funding through successive INTERREG programmes and expanded its focus to include urban development and environmental ‘attractiveness’.Footnote 142
In the Commission’s eyes, the transnational ‘European character’ of the EDP exonerated the three national governments.Footnote 143 By contrast, the Federal Republic’s last-minute rescue of Alcan Ludwigshafen had been illegal in several respects. Despite the steel mill’s minuscule size and the negligible effect of a DM8 million grant, the West German government had failed to notify an aid under Art. 93.3 EEC. Upon closer inspection, the aid moreover turned out to be ‘incompatible’ with the Community’s competition provisions, neither serving the ‘common European interest’ nor remedying ‘a serious disturbance of the economy of a Member State’ (Art. 92.3(b) EEC).Footnote 144
What the examples of Alcan Ludwigshafen’s forced closure and the creation of the EDP emphasise, then, is that neoliberal austerity and supranational developmentalism have long co-existed in the European project. Instead of stretching the language of ‘Third Ways’ thinner than necessary by equating the EU with the neoliberalism of figures such as Gerhard Schröder, Tony Blair or Bill Clinton, it would be analytically beneficial, this contribution has argued, to find a new language to describe this strange assemblage. At the same time, it has become desirable to move beyond demonstrating the existence of a complicated mix of capitalisms in the European project. The concept of Eurocapitalism offers one alternative. Precisely because examples of the neoliberal austerity that determined Alcan Ludwigshafen's closure as well as of the Brussels-guided disbursement of state aid facilitating the EDP can be multiplied and further diversified, it seems important to afford the EU its own proper noun. Ultimately, it is my hope that the concept of Eurocapitalism stimulates further debate on the historical political economy of the European project at a time of profound challenges and disruptions. Never has grappling with the possibilities and drawbacks of our institutions been more urgent than in the shadow of a deepening ‘polycrisis’.Footnote 145
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Grace Ballor and Mattia Ravano as well as two anonymous CEH reviewers for their generous and incisive comments, and to Nikolaos Papadogiannis for his editorial guidance. All errors are my own.
Marc Dorpema is a Research Excellence Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Toronto. Previously, he was a Postdoctoral Fellow at Harvard University, where this article was completed. His work has appeared in such journals as Modern Intellectual History, the European Review of History, Europe-Asia Studies, and the Journal of European Integration History. Marc received his PhD in History from New York University in 2025.
