US hegemony got you down? Read Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow and relax. Good-Bye Hegemony is a vigorous attack on the very concept of hegemony, its role in global politics, and the degree to which the US has been, is now and above all should be hegemonic. Both left and right have it all wrong: the US does not rule the world, nor should it. US hegemony was brief and was briefly welcomed for its contribution to the restoration of Western Europe, Japan, and the Pacific Rim. The very success of American hegemonic power in the early postwar decades made it “superfluous” thereafter (2).
The authors disaggregate the concept of hegemony and devote succeeding chapters to its component parts: power and influence in the global system, agenda setting, and custodial economic management. In none of these arenas does the US currently exercise the control associated with hegemony. A penultimate chapter is more prescriptive, urging on the US a policy of “sponsorship,” defined as power directed towards the “common interests of the community,” rather than hegemony (47). The primary objective throughout the book is to take on current IR theorists who “believe hegemony exists and is beneficial.” In a short paragraph the authors make their differences abundantly clear:
They believe hegemony exists and is beneficial; we do not. They emphasize the abiding value of the US military instrument to both security and nonsecurity issues; we do not. They ignore the variety of important ways in which the United States has violated the responsibilities and roles assigned to a hegemon. We highlight these departures and characterize the United States as constituting as much a threat to global order and stability as it is a possible pillar of its preservation. (22–23)
One contrast to US policies is the group of European countries taken singly or when they act in concert as the EU. As opposed to the American embrace of the use of force, European nations on the whole reject it as counterproductive; for them force is in fact, rather than just rhetorically, a last resort. They do not assume they have a prima facie right to lead the world, they believe in negotiation and compromise and, above all, unlike the US, they focus on long-term rather than short-term interests. “The EU,” Reich and Lebow write, “rarely resorts to bribes or threats, but seeks consensus by means of a process of compromise and persuasion that bemuses many Americans” (57). Or, as Victoria Nuland put it in the crisis over Ukraine, “Fuck the EU.”
Throughout, Reich and Lebow offer alternative narratives to the standard liberal/realist understanding of how the world works. In terms of agenda setting, for example, while most American analysts are convinced that globalization was an American-initiated and -controlled process, Reich and Lebow persuasively argue that on the contrary it was the European approach to “managed globalization, articulated and driven by European actors,” that eventually prevailed over the American commitment to a market-driven, largely unregulated structure (61 ff.). Similarly, the EU, against the concerted effort of the US, has initiated an international ban on landmines that may force even the US into compliance. This does not mean that Europe is more moral or less self-interested than the US; only that, in ways unacknowledged by American IR theorists, Europe has been able to exercise the agenda-setting power usually associated with hegemony.
The chapter on China is especially noteworthy. The authors reject the notion of foreordained, structural conflict between the US and China and instead offer a judicious assessment of China's goals and capacities, and in particular the role of China in stabilizing the global economic system:
In sum, heavy Chinese support for the dollar and the euro, unprecedented aid and investment in the Global South, timely intervention through capital infusions to support American banks, record investments overseas, the stabilization of currency exchange, and the incremental convertibility of the RMB have all been essential to preserving global economic stability since 2007. (128)
Nor have the Chinese undertaken these efforts in hopes of redesigning the global system, but rather, like Germany and Japan, out of a recognition of the “mutual advantages of preserving the existing system” (129).
In the changing international environment created by the influence of both Europe and China, the authors recommend that the US adopt a strategy of “sponsorship” rather than hegemony, making their argument through a comparison between the interventions in Libya and Iraq. Sponsorship entails “the endorsement, support, and enforcement of multilateral initiatives proposed by other state and non-state actors who receive wide international support and become codified in the protocols of supranational and global organizations” (139). Reich and Lebow's criticism of the invasion of Iraq is forceful and familiar. More surprising and less convincing is their positive assessment of American support for NATO's intervention in Libya.
The final chapter returns to the opening theme. The US is no longer a hegemon and no other country wants the job. Moreover, in direct contrast to the fears of both realists and liberals, the world in consequence is “not more disorderly, only more complex” (175). The next time you hear some politician or academic insist that America is exceptional and must lead the world, send them a copy of this book.
