In Presidents on Political Ground: Leaders in Action and What They Face, longtime presidential scholar Bruce Miroff offers an approach to the presidency focused on the context in which presidents find themselves. His “target,” he explains at the outset, “is the all-too-common tendency to evaluate presidents without sufficient attention to context” (1). Using a military metaphor drawn from Machiavelli, Miroff seeks to identify and explore the terrain on which presidents must operate, terrain that both provides opportunities and limits action. The book devotes a chapter to each of five such “grounds”: media, political economy, coalition politics, domestic policymaking, and foreign policymaking. In each case, Miroff draws lessons and finds patterns among presidents of the modern era.
The examination of media focuses less on rhetoric, a widely studied subject of the presidency, than on “spectacle” more broadly understood as “impression management” (18). Here, Miroff argues that the ground has shifted considerably since the “golden age of presidential television” from roughly the Kennedy presidency through the Reagan presidency, when presidential spectacle was relatively easy to conjure and faced relatively few challenges. Even in the “golden age,” though, there was no guarantee that presidential attempts to fashion spectacle would succeed; Nixon's walk on a California beach was forced and ineffective. The rise of cable television and the Internet, as well as partisan polarization, have made it more difficult to sustain presidential spectacle since the late 1980s, Miroff notes. Aside from Kennedy and Reagan, who mastered media spectacle in the “golden age,” Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama are also examined in depth. Clinton offered “postmodern spectacle,” Bush saw spectacle turn against him by Iraq and Hurricane Katrina, and Obama is given the rather generous assessment that he failed at spectacle because he was too rational to focus on image and emotion. (An alternative possibility, of course, is that spectacle could not overcome substantive policy flaws.)
The next “ground” of presidential struggle to be considered is political economy. Here, Miroff concentrates on the opportunities and constraints faced by Democratic presidents since Franklin Roosevelt who have attempted to advance the cause of the little people against the “economic royalists.” In Miroff's account, the terrain on which these presidents operate is usually difficult, with business and its acolytes holding the upper hand. Consequently, liberals often find themselves frustrated by the compromises Democratic presidents have to make.
Coalition politics is a third important area of context. Although some scholars have thought of party coalitions as durable features in the political system, Miroff posits that “to the White House, the field of coalitions appears to be dynamic, contingent, and often perilous” (77). Presidents must try to manage interconnected coalitions at both the legislative and electoral levels, and are frequently looking to “poach” portions of the other party's coalition. They also often have to contend with “difficult partners,” most notably social movements that try to push sympathetic presidents farther and faster than the president feels comfortable going (e.g., the civil rights movement and John F. Kennedy). In this study, Miroff connects the discussion to Stephen Skowronek's notion of the development of coalitions in “political time.”
Domestic policy is “tough terrain,” on which presidents face numerous institutional, political, and even psychological obstacles, such as the phenomenon of “loss aversion” (the tendency of individuals “to fear losses more than to hope for gains,” 101). Looking closely at six cases from FDR onward, Miroff concludes that domestic policy achievements by presidents must be put into at least three categories, depending on their level of enthusiasm for the policy. Presidential domestic policy leadership can be seen through “entrepreneurial initiatives,” such as the Social Security Act and the No Child Left Behind Act; “policy responsiveness,” seen in the Wagner Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and “policy credit claiming,” such as Richard Nixon's environmental moves and Bill Clinton's crime bill. Not every domestic policy achievement is the same.
Finally, the ground for making foreign policy has grown more difficult since the consensus days of the early Cold War. Miroff sees foreign policy since the 1970s constrained by the dominance of two competing “pure party doctrines”: a Republican doctrine rooted in the principles of Barry Goldwater and a Democratic doctrine rooted in the views of George McGovern. At the same time, presidents are also driven by contingencies abroad and the requirements of national interest. Consequently, Miroff argues, presidents of both parties typically moderate somewhat their foreign policies—that is, deviate more from the pure party doctrine—the longer they are in office. Nevertheless, “under conditions of partisan polarization, American foreign policy will tend to veer in a different direction with each change in party control of the presidency” (157).
Overall, Presidents on Political Ground succeeds in finding a middle ground, so to speak, between an account emphasizing the president as an idiosyncratic individual (such as that offered by Richard Neustadt) and one emphasizing context deterministically. By Miroff's account, individual presidents and the decisions they make are important, but operate within a constrained environment that produces common patterns.
A more finely grained assessment might hold the discussions of spectacle, coalitions, and domestic policy to be the strongest. Each offers a complex analysis with many interesting elements. Particularly insightful are the distinction between rhetoric and “impression management,” the two-edged swords represented by friendly social movements, and the varying categories of presidential domestic policy achievement depending on the enthusiasm and activism of the president.
Though they contain many interesting points, the discussions of political economy and foreign policy do not seem as strong. In the analysis of the terrain of political economy, for example, Miroff does not grapple with the fact that recent Democratic presidents have had their own economic royalists to advance, ranging from Silicon Valley tycoons to George Soros. Moreover, if capitalism is “locked in” enough to frustrate Democratic voters who want more from Democratic presidents, it is no less true that the large administrative state is “locked in” enough to frustrate Republican voters and their presidents. There are also some difficulties in Miroff's account of the foreign-policymaking picture, as well as occasional lapses. To cite one example of the latter, the facts that came out later about the invasion of Grenada tended to make Reagan's case stronger, not weaker, including the discovery of a secret treaty between the Grenadan communist regime and the Soviets allowing Soviet bombers access to the 10,000-foot runway that the Grenadans were building.
For the most part, the book reads as five essays making distinct arguments that could stand alone. While this could be seen as a strength, it might have been beneficial for the author to have done more to knit together the five “grounds.” Looking forward, one of the hazards of analyzing the presidency is that, from time to time, the ground shifts. It will be interesting to observe whether and how the Trump presidency changes the terrain described by Miroff, and in what ways it either conforms to that terrain or is defeated by it.
