Socrates' conversation with the slave boy in the Meno might be the second most familiar scene in Plato's dramatic corpus. Bending over and drawing diagonals in the sand, Socrates purports to show that the boy knows geometrical principles that he could not have learned during his life. Thus, human souls must be reincarnated and learning must be recollected. Few readers have found the demonstration altogether convincing. The question is how seriously to take it.
In her very interesting reading of the Meno, Roslyn Weiss does not take it seriously at all. According to Weiss, Socrates believes that moral knowledge is not merely difficult but impossible. To achieve it, someone would have to step outside the cave, outside the realm of opinion, and thus stand to other human beings as we stand to the “foals and calves whose good we seek to secure.” This kind of perspective is available only to the gods.
However, if knowledge of one's own ignorance is insufficient for moral guidance, and moral knowledge is out of reach, what use is there in seeking it? True opinions about virtue are obtainable. Socrates clearly has such beliefs: one ought to be more concerned about one's soul than about one's body, and a wrong committed against someone never justifies a wrong committed in return. These are true opinions if they correspond to what one would know about morality if such knowledge were possible.
Since it is not possible, Socrates cannot verify his or anyone's opinions by comparing them with the truth; he can do so only by a process of elimination. This is the function of his characteristic elenchus. His opinions must be true or very close to true because they bear up under relentless questioning; all contrary opinions wither under examination. Still, this method of elenchus can never succeed in replacing opinions with knowledge; it can only indicate which opinions are more or less likely. Nonetheless, Socrates wants to know, and so labors, unsuccessfully, to focus on what virtue is.
Meno challenges Socrates on this point by producing a version of a well-known paradox: a man cannot look for what he already knows, because he has it; he cannot look for what he doesn't know because he doesn't know what to look for. The theory of recollection is introduced to resolve this paradox. Recollection means precisely going from a state in which we both know and don't know something to one in which we simply know. We may not know what we are looking for yet, but we will recognize it when we see it. The slave boy story supports the recollection thesis.
However, it is not clear how the recollection thesis fits with Weiss's account of Socratic moral inquiry. Accordingly, she treats it as a farce. The theory of recollection is not a “Socratic or Platonic dogma,” but a “sloppily and hastily assembled” Pythagorean jumble. Socrates is not helping the boy remember geometry, he is feeding him the answers. Worse still, Socrates employs the elenchus in a situation where it is clearly not helpful. For geometry “resembles all other mathēmata, including the crafts.” In the latter, there are clear standards of excellence. If the cobbler knows his business, the shoes will fit. Finally, what Socrates says about the slave boy does not apply to him at all.
Instead, it applies to Meno. Since Weiss thinks so little of the myth and the demonstration, she must interpret them as a Socratic stratagem. However, the stratagem is so deceptive, she must then defend Socrates against the charge of sophism. It turns out that these devices are part of Socrates' efforts to reform Meno, who is a sophist in the genuine and unflattering sense. Socrates fails to get Meno to consider what virtue is. He tries to show Meno how the elenchus works. In doing so, he makes virtue seem like geometry, like the teachable thing that the sophists need it to be. Socrates is running a con, but it is a con intended to make Meno a better person.
All this is a strong and plausible reading of the dialogue, but I have some reservations. Weiss is definitely right to emphasize the Socratic distinction between knowledge and true opinion, but I do not think this transfers well onto that distinction between the mathēmata and ethics. When she says that the Meno is “the only Platonic dialogue that celebrates the practical worth of true opinion, equating its practical effectiveness with that of knowledge,” she is apparently overlooking the Crito. There Socrates likens expert opinions about virtue to those of doctors and physical trainers, in contrast to popular opinion. Having just denied knowledge of anything in his apology, what else but opinion does Socrates have to go on in the Crito? Yet he trusted that opinion enough to obey it even in the face of certain death.
In the Gorgias, Socrates explains that political science is to the soul what gymnastics and medicine are to the body. In the exchange with Anytus in the Meno, there is general agreement about which Athenians were virtuous, and when their children turned out badly everyone knows it. True knowledge of virtue may indeed be unobtainable, but it is not clear that this is much different from other arts and sciences with practical applications.
In most human beings, true opinions about virtue (adultery is wrong) coincide with false ones (adultery with her would be very good). We call someone virtuous when he follows the one but not the other. As Weiss says, Socrates seems to have achieved a kind of moral perfection precisely because he wants more than true opinions about virtue. This, for Plato, was the problem of Socrates. For this to work, something must underlie moral opinion that is in itself knowable, even if we cannot come to know it. The object of knowledge must generate resonance in the soul, and this resonance explains the strength of those opinions in Socrates. That is the chief service of the theory of forms.
It must likewise be true that something in the human soul is capable of recognizing those objects of knowledge, however dimly. The capacity for recognizing and responding to ideas, for example, of justice and beauty must already be present in the soul for moral philosophy to be possible. That is the function of the myth of rebirth and recollection.
That myth, like other Platonic myths and the forms, is presented only as a model. The truth is not necessarily this, but it is something like this. To be sure, geometry is teachable in a way that virtue is not because the obstacles to true opinion are much stronger in the latter case. Weiss persuades me that the slave boy story is designed to be attractive to Meno, who wants virtue to be teachable. I think she is too hard on the story. Even if Socrates feeds the boy, it shows that he is by nature capable of digestion. She is also too hard on Meno. He may be no budding genius, but he is a much better person than Anytus. Socrates is accordingly gentle with the former. He makes a mortal enemy of the latter.
