The American president is many things. He serves as the head of state, chief of his political party, manager of the national bureaucracy, commander of the armed forces, and even (to some at least) a moral leader of the country. But one of the most important roles of the president is legislative leader: setting the nation's policy agenda, proposing new bills, and steering key initiatives through Congress. The central nature of that role is evidenced by our tendency to think of past presidents in terms of their trademark policy proposals, be it Harry “Fair Deal” Truman or Ronald Reagan's “Reaganomics.”
As legislative leaders, presidents have a tremendous opportunity to shape the country's political, social, and economic life. At the same time, the role is usually their greatest source of consternation. For while the public expects the White House to lead the charge for new national policy, presidents have few constitutional tools at their disposal to do so effectively. They are usually forced to rely on small favors, indirect pressure, loyalty, and intangibles like an electoral mandate to get Congress to go along. The opportunities and pitfalls of legislative leadership have led more than one president to find truth in Lyndon Johnson's warning that “the presidency has made every man who occupied it, no matter how small, bigger than he was; and no matter how big, not big enough for its demands.”
The president's difficult but central role as legislator in chief is the focus of Matthew Beckmann's enjoyable new book, Pushing the Agenda. In this smartly written and extensively researched study, Beckmann suggests that entirely too much attention is given to the high-stakes, last-minute lobbying done by presidents to get their cherished bills through the House and Senate. Such lobbying does matter at times, of course, and it makes for exciting politics. But “as memorable as moments like these are,” Beckmann writes, “they capture only a limited slice of national lawmaking, a small fraction of presidential-congressional interactions” (p. 126).
Two types of presidential lobbying strategies are influential, not one, argues Beckmann. The late-stage “vote-centered” strategy is what gets the most public notice: hurried phone calls to pivotal lawmakers, backroom deals with legislators willing to bargain for their votes, and other efforts to “grow the vote” for a bill. The second occurs well before Congress votes on a proposal. This early-stage “agenda-centered” lobbying involves “mobilizing leading allies” in the legislature to put those proposals to a vote, while at the same time “deterring leading opponents” who might offer a popular alternative.
Beckmann incorporates these two strategies into a formal model of presidential bargaining outlined in the book's second chapter. He presents the model clearly and carefully such that those not well versed in spatial models can follow his reasoning. To be sure, critics of formal modeling may question the necessity of a method to justify theoretically (and in more than 40 pages) what Beckmann himself notes is a well-documented fact of presidential politics (p. 53). But the model is certainly appropriate for a theory that combines legislator and presidential preferences across an abstract policy space.
Any theoretical model of presidential lobbying, formal or otherwise, faces a serious methodological challenge. White House lobbying usually happens behind the scenes, involving only a handful of elite political players; so how can it be measured accurately? To my mind, there is no better way to capture such interpersonal politics than by interviewing political actors. This Beckmann did. Taking as a case study President George W. Bush's signature tax-cut initiative of 2001, he conducted a series of interviews with Senate and presidential staff to determine who the Bush White House lobbied on behalf of the tax cut and whether that lobbying made a difference. Not content to e-mail a questionnaire or talk to a small group of people, the author personally interviewed staff from more than 50 congressional offices and “more than a dozen” current and former White House aides—a truly impressive undertaking.
The results, presented in Chapter 3, are quite convincing. Not only did early-stage lobbying by the executive branch occur on the president's tax proposal, but as his model predicts, it also focused specifically on leading supporters and opponents in the Senate, as well as on pivotal voters. Beckmann can do no more than roughly approximate the tax-policy status quo and leaders' preferences on taxes before the bill's enactment, both part of his theoretical model, and his use of post hoc interviews to determine whether Bush's lobbying actually influenced the final vote is potentially problematic. Nonetheless, his findings in this case are remarkable.
In Chapter 4, Beckmann seeks to test the validity of his model across multiple cases and presidents going back to 1953. Since interviews are impossible for such a task, he instead draws upon accounts of the legislative process from the journal Congressional Quarterly to find patterns of presidential lobbying that correspond with his model's predictions. The chapter's statistical analyses support his claim that presidential lobbying matters: It is closely associated not just with winning a “key” vote on the measure (i.e., a vote that Congressional Quarterly considers significant) but also with getting a vote in the first place.
Analyzing the data differently in Chapter 5, Beckmann provides evidence that White House lobbying increases the odds of a change in policy toward the president's preferred direction—more so, in fact, than it improves the chances of getting Congress to schedule a vote. In fact, he shows that obtaining a “key vote” on a measure makes enactment of that measure into law less likely. Not only does this mean that scholarly studies understate the legislative influence of the White House by looking only at vote outcomes; it also shows that presidents should avoid public battles in Congress altogether if they actually want to shape national policy.
The findings in Chapters 4 and 5, based on an extraordinary amount of data collection and coding, are compelling. I found particularly intriguing Beckmann's charts illustrating how White House lobbying mattered in both the most and least “activist-friendly” Congresses: the 89th (1965–66), a heavily Democratic Congress that followed Johnson's massive 1964 presidential victory, and the 94th (1975–76), in which a nonelected President Gerald Ford faced a post-Watergate Democratic House and Senate. Presidents, it seems, can influence congressional action no matter how hostile the larger political environment may be.
Not all of the data and measures Beckmann uses in these two chapters are ideal. He is not the only scholar to draw from the well-regarded Congressional Quarterly to capture hard-to-observe leadership activity (see, e.g., Barbara Sinclair's [1998] Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking.) But I was left wondering whether the journal's accounts of presidential lobbying are consistently accurate and thorough over time, especially as reporting styles and reader expectations have changed since the 1950s. Also, while the author includes a measure of the president's political capital, since that may affect his ability to influence Congress, the measure he uses—a function of presidential approval ratings and economic conditions (p. 139)—may capture only haphazardly how members of Congress view the president's political stature and influence on any given legislative proposal. And although Beckmann controls for a host of factors to account for the prospect that presidents lobby only for things that they expect will pass (p. 112), it still seems possible that such selectivity happens on individual initiatives for reasons that cannot be measured in the aggregate.
More significantly, the author fails to account for Congress itself as an important source of the president's legislative agenda. As Charles O. Jones (The Presidency in a Separated System, 2005) has documented, significant laws often have their genesis in bills considered by previous Congresses. A good deal of the foundation for presidential success on a proposal may thus be established well before the president begins the lobbying that Beckmann believes is so influential. Leaders in Congress can also take considerable initiative in determining what can pass into law and what a bill's substance may be, even if presidents ultimately take the credit. It is interesting that Beckmann opens Chapter 2 with the example of Johnson signing Medicare into law in 1965—a law that owed its passage and core features to the inspired leadership of Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills (as documented in Julian Zelizer's [2000] Taxing America).
None of these critiques are, to my mind, remotely fatal to Beckmann's excellent study, however. Pushing the Agenda is an important and thought-provoking book that greatly expands our understanding of presidential influence. It is a reminder that the US Congress is under no constitutional obligation to consider any of the president's pro posals, and it offers strong evidence that the White House must lobby early and often to get what it wants. Ultimately, Beckmann has made a persuasive case that while presidents may not be as strong as the public believes, they are not quite as weak as political scientists think they are either.
