The Historical Context of the ’45

The prince arrived in Scotland asserting his father's “undoubted Right to the Throne of his Ancestors.” He had come to settle unfinished business. Jacobites had always regarded the Glorious Revolution of 1688–89 as unlawful.Footnote 7 Just as his father had done in 1743, the prince offered a free and full pardon for all treasons, rebellions, and offenses committed against his grandfather, his father, and himself.Footnote 8 His Whig opponents would be forgiven for their revolution if they would help him overturn it. The ’45 was the latest and, as it turned out, the last significant attempt to force a restoration of Stuart fortunes.Footnote 9 To succeed in such an enterprise was always going to be problematic. A restoration would require the Stuarts to mobilize their supporters in Scotland, England, and Ireland, but this would be difficult in light of the fact that Jacobitism had little in common in the three kingdoms other than a restoration.Footnote 10 The Stuarts also were heavily dependent upon military and financial backing from sympathetic continental powers. Continental support, in particular from France, provided much-needed political credibility.Footnote 11 However, as they were to discover to their cost, international support was subject to the vagaries of European diplomacy and national self-interest and therefore at times unreliable. Nevertheless, the Jacobites managed to initiate four military risings in Scotland despite their diplomatic, military, and logistical problems. A key factor in galvanizing their domestic support was the union with England in 1707, which gave Scottish Jacobitism a new impetus and allowed the Stuarts thereafter to act as the self-appointed guardians of Scottish nationalism and independence.Footnote 12 In a Scottish context, the union added nationalism to the dynastic, ideological, and cultural appeal of Jacobitism. In the minds of their Scottish supporters, Jacobitism became synonymous with anti-unionism, and anti-unionism was the prime motivating factor behind the attempted invasion of 1708 and the rising in 1715.Footnote 13 By the time John Erskine, Earl of Mar, who as Scottish secretary had been one of the main promoters and managers of the treaty of union, raised the Stuart standard at Braemar on 6 September 1715, the European political landscape had turned against the Stuarts. The Treaty of Utrecht signed in April 1713 brought the War of the Spanish Succession to a close, recognized the Hanoverian succession, and required the expulsion of the Stuart court from France.Footnote 14 The Hanoverian succession took place peacefully when George I succeeded Anne on 1 August 1714. Finally, the death of Louis XIV on 1 September 1715, long-time sponsor of the Stuarts, guaranteed that there would be no French support for the '15.Footnote 15

The failure of the Spanish-backed invasion of 1719 ushered in a period of prolonged political isolation and military inactivity. Jacobite fortunes were moribund, and the 1720s and 1730s have been described as “bleak years for the Stuart Cause.”Footnote 16 Political developments led to the withdrawal of the continental support they craved and needed. Their fortunes were eventually revived as a consequence of the breakdown in relations between Britain and France, initially over Britain's war with Spain in 1739, described as “the first British war to be fought, at least ostensibly, over colonial issues.”Footnote 17 The focus shifted to the continent when the War of the Austrian Succession broke out in 1740 between the Habsburgs on one side and Spain and Bavaria on the other. Britain and France took sides without going to war. Britain sponsored Austria while France sponsored Spain and Bavaria. A combination of sustained lobbying by Scots and English Jacobites and military reverses, notably at Dettingen in 1743, prompted France to prepare a cross-channel invasion for early 1744. Charles was invited to participate in what was to be regarded as a Jacobite rather than a French invasion, but following a series of storms in the channel, it was abandoned. France declared war on Britain on 20 March 1744. For almost a year, Charles tried in vain to persuade the French to revive their invasion plan or to provide even the moderate amount of help he believed would guarantee success. The conventional wisdom, to which the prince subscribed, insisted that French military and financial support and a rising among English Jacobites were necessary for the project to succeed. However, the French would not give support without a powerful incentive, and English Jacobites would not rise unless there was substantial French involvement. Furthermore, Scottish participation was qualified by their insistence that the prince was not to come without men, money and arms, and assurances from France of continued support.Footnote 18 Undaunted by his failure, he decided to undertake the expedition alone.Footnote 19 Charles gambled that by landing in the western Highlands of Scotland, he could raise enough support to begin his rising. Scottish successes would prompt the French into giving him support, and French support would encourage English Jacobites to rise. The combined force would finish the job.Footnote 20 The military events of that summer, in particular the defeat of British and allied forces at Fontenoy on 11 May, served to confirm his intentions to go to Scotland as soon as possible, before the window of opportunity closed.Footnote 21

Invasion or Consolidation

In Edinburgh, “buoyed up” by his success, the prince believed that speed was essential to capitalize on the momentum he had created and to exploit the disarray that had characterized the government response to his rising. He would have insisted on an invasion sooner but for his lack of men.Footnote 22 Following Prestonpans, hitherto surreptitious and limited papal support was augmented by more funds, particularly after Louis XV promised Pope Benedict XIV further French support for the prince.Footnote 23 The first tangible sign of French assistance arrived in mid-October in the person of Alexander Du Boyer, Marquis d’Eguilles, unofficial French envoy to the Jacobite court in Scotland. D’Eguilles landed at Montrose in one of three ships carrying arms, ammunition, and money. Lobbying by Jacobite exiles in France like George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal and pleas from James III had persuaded Louis to help. However, there were divisions among his advisors about strategy, and Louis had not yet made a decision on a definitive response. The d’Eguilles mission was designed to provide the intelligence that would help determine the French response. Despite the fact that the nature and extent of French support were still to be decided, the mission reinforced the prince's determination to invade.Footnote 24 Meanwhile, on 4 October, galvanized by the news of Prestonpans, Louis ordered preparations, as a contingency, for an expedition of 6,000 men to invade England as soon as news from Scotland was favorable.Footnote 25 On 14 October, France promised further assistance in the Treaty of Fontainebleau.Footnote 26

Charles had come to Scotland without French support and had gambled that military success would prompt Louis to act. It appeared that his gamble had paid off. That was certainly the impression he tried to convey to his council when he insisted that d’Eguilles’ presence demonstrated French commitment to the cause. Their own invasion would provide France with the necessary encouragement. He argued that a cross-channel invasion rather than a Scottish landing was the easiest and most likely for France to undertake. He sought to alleviate the fears of the council about the lack of consolidation by insisting that their northern army would control Scotland should France decide to land there.Footnote 27 Not only was the prince not waiting for French support, he had decided to march without further re inforcements from the north. Despite a recruitment drive, he did not expect significant numbers to be raised in time. Any further delays would weaken rather than strengthen his hand, as he was already running out of money and suffering from desertions brought on by inactivity.Footnote 28

With few exceptions, the council was unconvinced. Predominately Scottish, their goal of dissolving the union and restoring Scotland's independence, parliament, and dynasty appeared to be on the brink of realization. As masters of Scotland, they believed that it was necessary for them to tighten their grip on the country and wait for French help. As Donald Cameron of Lochiel, chief of Clan Cameron put it, “the prince had only to call the loyal Highlanders, summon the estates of the realm, and put together an army which could defend itself.”Footnote 29 The majority of the council therefore opposed an invasion of England and argued that it was necessary to remain in Scotland and consolidate the kingdom in order to defend it against the “English armies” they expected to be sent against them.Footnote 30 The council was confident that consolidation could be achieved and insisted that it took precedence over the prince's ambitions in England.Footnote 31 They needed to ensure that if an invasion took place, Scotland remained under their control. As things stood, they risked losing Scotland while they were in England. Their point was well made; government forces quickly reoccupied Edinburgh after the Jacobites left. Lochiel complained that the prince's “hasty” march into England was done without having taken the necessary measures to consolidate his authority in Scotland. This had a detrimental effect on Jacobite morale, support, and recruitment.Footnote 32 Controlling Scotland was regarded as the key to encouraging potential support, particularly in the Highlands.Footnote 33 John Roy Stuart, one of the few professional soldiers in the prince's army and the colonel of his own regiment, was a strong supporter of consolidation. He lamented the invasion as “unaccountable,” the “first great error committed,” and the most significant factor contributing to the failure of the rising. He claimed that his strongly expressed opposition to the invasion was the reason for his exclusion from the council, and he blamed Secretary John Murray of Broughton and Sir Thomas Sheridan as the chief architects of the scheme. Stuart's estimate that they could raise an army of 24,000 was overly optimistic, but they did manage to muster nearly 10,000 men at Falkirk under more straitened circumstances. The size of the force assembled at Falkirk was evidence to James Johnstone that the prince should have acted with greater patience and “remained in Scotland until his adherents had had time to come from the more distant provinces to Edinburgh to join him. With his control of Scotland established he could have gone in quest of glory in England.”Footnote 34 The point the council stressed was that by proclaiming the king, calling a parliament, and taking possession of Scotland, they could act as their circumstances required.Footnote 35

It has been argued that the “fortress Scotland” strategy was not a feasible option because it “took little account of the massive financial reserves of the British government or, of the blockading power of the Royal Navy.” For this reason, the invasion is regarded as the correct decision.Footnote 36 However, whatever choice they made, they would have to face the full force of the British army supported by the Royal Navy and backed by the fiscal might of the British government.Footnote 37 There was no easy option. The question to be decided at Edinburgh was which option gave them the best chance of success; none of the Scottish members of the council believed that it lay in an invasion. The Scots were incredulous: “How could he venture to confront the English armies, and attempt the conquest of England with four thousand five hundred Highlanders … the disproportion was monstrous.”Footnote 38 Key to success was France. Charles wanted French help in the form of an invasion of the south of England. His council wanted French aid directed toward securing Scotland. They were also unwilling to invade England in advance of any French landing in the south. Tactically, they preferred to wait for Field Marshal George Wade to come to Scotland, thus exposing the south of England to a French landing. They were also confident that if the French did not send immediate help, they could keep Scotland by means of a defensive war until a more favorable occasion arose. In a worst-case scenario, a military defeat in Scotland was something from which they believed they could recover; defeat in England would be catastrophic.Footnote 39 Their reluctance and caution were understandable. They were being asked to invade England with a small force and only the prince's word that they would receive French and English support, but nothing concrete. It was a policy that left them hostages to fortune. Lord George Murray's post-Culloden criticism of the prince that it was wrong to have begun the rising without positive assurances from France carried an implicit criticism of the prince's actions regarding the invasion. If it was wrong to have begun the rising without French assurances, it was surely wrong to have invaded England without them.Footnote 40

Confidence was crucial, and while the council never had confidence in the prince's invasion strategy, they had no such reservations about consolidating Scotland. It is important to remember that they believed it was possible and the best means to secure overall success. The prince had a six-week window of opportunity between his victory at Prestonpans and the arrival of Wade in Newcastle. This opportunity was wasted by inactivity. There was nothing to stop him from taking Inverness using the forces raised in the northeast. Indeed, the whole of Scotland had no British military presence except for Duncan Forbes of Culloden, Lord President of the Court of Session, and a handful of inept but loyal Highlanders in Inverness until John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudon, arrived on 10 October. Even then, Loudon's force was hardly impressive and had to be augmented by the raising of eighteen independent companies among loyalist clans in the north.Footnote 41 The significance of the role and influence of Forbes and Loudon and the damage they did in the north to the prince's cause were readily acknowledged by the Jacobites.Footnote 42 By holding Inverness, they made it difficult for the prince's supporters farther north to join him. The success of Forbes demonstrated the mistake the Jacobites made by not securing Inverness when they marched south to Edinburgh or after Prestonpans.Footnote 43 However, the British only held the town because the Jacobites made no effort to take it. When the prince retreated into the Highlands in 1746, Inverness fell without a shot being fired, but a great deal of time and effort, all of which he could hardly afford, was spent trying to capture Forbes and Loudon and dispersing the independent companies they had raised. The forts along the Great Glen could and should have been taken when at their most vulnerable. Forts George and Augustus would probably have fallen as easily as they did in February and March 1746, and although Fort William would have resisted, it too would have capitulated after a lengthy siege. It only survived in 1746 because it had been given time to prepare for a siege and because the Jacobites simply ran out of time. The Jacobite attempt to break the siege of Stirling Castle in January 1746 has been described as an “utter failure,” largely due to the incompetence and poor decision making of Mirabelle de Gordon, a Franco-Scottish engineer who had been given the responsibility of taking the castle.Footnote 44 However, Gordon's incompetence aside, they were distracted by the small affair of Falkirk and effectively ran out of time when Cumberland arrived in Edinburgh. The castle had been on the verge of capitulating due to the lack of provisions, and, bearing this in mind, it is more than likely that putting pressure on the garrison from the outset, as the council had urged at Edinburgh, would have starved it into submission. There is no reason to believe that a concerted effort by the Jacobites (without French help) during September and October 1745 would not have secured much of Scotland, the north and west in particular. It was a perfectly feasible option when considered in the light of events in the north in 1746. Stretched as they were and with declining resources, the Jacobite forces nevertheless displayed a remarkable capacity to successfully execute daring military engagements, including the skirmish at Keith in the northeast, their amphibious raid on Dornoch that finally dislodged Loudon, and Murray's raid into Perthshire. According to James Maxwell, who was a major in Lord Elcho's Life Guards, “This is without dispute the finest part of the prince's expedition, and what best deserves the attention of judicious readers.”Footnote 45 This was the option his supporters, “most distinguished by their superiority of genius, good sense, spirit and judgement,” recommended to the prince. John Roy Stuart claimed, had this policy been pursued, that they could have raised an army sufficient to deal with anything the government sent north to confront them, enough of an army to hold Scotland should France fail to send help.Footnote 46 As Falkirk demonstrated, they were more than capable of defeating a strong British force made up of regulars, on the right ground. However, it was a suggestion that the prince “did not appear to relish, having inherited entirely the sentiments of his ancestors, who had always had an absurd predilection and affection for the English nation.” The prince's obsession with reaching London had blinded him to the strategic necessity of securing what he had already taken.Footnote 47

The council's position at Edinburgh was entirely consistent with the position outlined in 1741 by a group of leading Scottish Jacobites known as the Association. The Association was made up of the Duke of Perth, Lord John Drummond, Lord Lovat, Donald Cameron of Lochiel, Lord Linton, later 5th Earl of Traquair, his brother, the Hon. John Stuart, Lochiel's brother-in-law Sir John Campbell of Auchenbreck, and William MacGregor.Footnote 48 Formed in 1739 as a consequence of the more favorable diplomatic climate, the Association claimed that the clans would provide 20,000 men ready to rise as soon as France provided them with arms. They were confident that with French help they would be able to “re-establish the authority of their legitimate King throughout the whole Kingdom of Scotland, and to sustain him there against the efforts of the partisans of Hanover.” Not only would they be able to seize and consolidate Scotland, but as a consequence would be able to “aid powerfully” in the recovery of England by helping the English to overthrow the Hanoverian regime, assuming as they did, that the English wanted to take such action.Footnote 49 Furthermore, despite the bitter and bloody experience of the ’45, neither side was willing to back down. If anything, the division over strategic goals became more entrenched. As plans for another attempt were circulated among exiles in France, the prince “dreamt only of a large scale invasion.”Footnote 50 He had no interest in repeating the ’45 but with French help intended a direct assault on England, similar to the one planned by France in 1744, on the assumption that if London fell, the rest of the country would follow.Footnote 51

Lochiel accused George Kelly and Sir Thomas Sheridan of influencing the prince against participation in what he regarded as more realistic initiatives like his own, which envisaged a small scale landing in the west of Scotland, raising the local clans, and securing the north of Scotland before marching south. The strategic castles of Stirling and Edinburgh would be taken along with southern Scotland, “before the government has brought its troops back from the Low Countries and is in a position to oppose our progress.” Lochiel intended to secure and consolidate Scotland before the government could react and attempt to retake it. The strategic mistakes of the ’45 would not be repeated, and, significantly, an invasion of England was not planned.Footnote 52

Lochiel was one of the signatories to a letter from a number of exiles who had taken part in the ’45, urging a Scottish solution on the prince, which was designed to counter his obsession with England. They insisted that despite the strength of support for the Stuarts in England, any suggestion of a restoration by parliamentary means was a “chimera” and that the prince “needs never expect that England will undertake any thing by itself or without a considerable foreign assistance.” Scotland, however, was ready to receive him with open arms, and the sufferings of the country called for immediate action and relief. Trying to secure a large-scale invasion involving substantial French support would occasion the type of delay they wanted to avoid. They were convinced that if the prince landed as he had in 1745, he would quickly have an army three times the strength of any he had before. They were sure that with only three or four thousand men, he would be “absolutely master of Scotland in a very short time.” The key question, as always, was what was to be done once they were masters of Scotland. This plan was clear that whatever ambitions the prince had with respect to England, if they were to be pursued, it was not to be at the expense of Scotland. Scotland could provide a “powerful diversion” that would “greatly facilitate” an invasion of England from France. This in turn would “render a less number of men sufficient to be sent to England” from Scotland. Thus, Scotland would continue to be held and the mistake of 1745 not repeated. In an effort to draw him away from his plan of a full frontal assault on England, they tempted him with the suggestion that if France could not send men to England, he could march a “sufficient army” into England to protect his supporters there who would join him. The aim here appears to have been to win over his support for their plan rather than a realistic offer of a subsequent invasion of England. Either way, Scotland would be held regardless of what happened in England. Their final point, suggesting that they were not remotely interested in the prince's plan, was that should he insist on pressing ahead with it, they were ready to undertake their own scheme with whatever support they could secure from France. Certain of success, they invited the prince to join them at some point or land in England as he saw fit.Footnote 53 The prince was urged to reject any suggestions that Scotland was incapable of doing him any further service or that even if it could, it would be disagreeable to his friends in England, presumably on the grounds that they wanted him to invade England directly from France. They argued that English Jacobites looked upon Scotland as the only sure card they had, in the absence of a foreign army, to begin their affair at home.Footnote 54

Thus, the strategic goals of leading Scottish Jacobites were entirely consistent before, during, and after the ’45. As far as they were concerned, Scotland was their primary objective. To liberate England from the Hanoverians would have been ideal, but it was clearly something they contemplated doing as allies of the English, not as invaders, a point forcibly made at Edinburgh. It was one thing for them to cast off the usurper's yoke, break the unlawful union, and restore their rightful king to the Scottish throne; it was quite another for them to attempt to impose their king upon the English. The chiefs insisted “that it was to make him king of Scotland that they had taken up arms … but that they had nothing to do with England.” They argued that there would be time enough to march into England when his supporters there called for him, but in the absence of such an invitation, they did not see it as their business.Footnote 55 At Manchester on the march south, council members expressed their conviction that they had no right to impose a king “upon the throne of England without their consent.” As far as the Scots were concerned, the lack of consent was sufficiently demonstrated by the absence of an English rising or indeed of any English support and encouragement worthy of the name.Footnote 56 Lochiel likewise saw the army's role as primarily defensive but ready to help the English shake off the “Usurper's yoke,” if required.Footnote 57 The Scots were not entirely opposed to an invasion, but an invasion could only be justified on the grounds that the English attempted a rising and asked for help. As Elcho pointed out at Derby, the “Scots had never thought of putting a King upon the English throne by themselves.”Footnote 58

Despite the lack of encouragement from England, council member Alexander Forbes, Lord Pitsligo, justified the invasion by arguing that they intended to deliver the English from a tyrannical regime, resembling the Whig justification for the Glorious Revolution. Forbes was representative of an ideological shift among some Scottish Jacobites who equated patriotism with limitations on monarchy. Forbes had been “persuaded” that the English would enthusiastically join them on the evidence of “some strong parliamentary speeches, and the general cry without doors against standing armies, arbitrary government, foreign dominions.”Footnote 59 His mistake was believing Jacobite propaganda, most recently used to encourage the French invasion of 1744, that Britain was ripe for revolution and ready to rise against the Hanoverian regime. He was guilty of assuming that the voices of political opposition in England were ready and willing to overthrow the Hanoverian regime and that all they lacked was the opportunity, which the prince provided by his invasion. However, the fact that dissatisfaction with the regime did not produce direct action against it “was in accordance with the general nature of early-modern English political activity.”Footnote 60 Forbes was not alone in making these assumptions.

Countering claims that their army was too small to attempt an invasion in the light of the large number of forces at the disposal of the government, the prince offered assurances that as soon as he marched into England, his supporters there would join him.Footnote 61 Close advisers like Sir Thomas Sheridan encouraged the prince by insisting that the situation in England was extremely favorable to an immediate invasion. Sheridan maintained that the presence of the prince at the “head of 5000 men would bring over a good part of the government troops to his side and persuade the English nobility to declare themselves.”Footnote 62 The prince had good reason to expect his English supporters would rally to the cause because of the active role they had played in encouraging a French invasion since 1740.Footnote 63 However, at this point, no contact had been made with English supporters, and the prince “pretended” to have received letters from many English lords, with assurances “that he would find them on the frontiers of England, under arms, ready to join him with a considerable corps of English.”Footnote 64 In reality, he had no such evidence, and his English supporters remained elusive as attempts to establish contact failed, primarily because he “didn’t even know where they were.”Footnote 65 He was unable when directly challenged at Derby to produce evidence of English support.Footnote 66 English Jacobites knew where he was but were conspicuous by their absence.Footnote 67 Their failure to join him was attributed by Whig contemporaries to the fact that while they drank the health of the pretender, cursed the king, and were constant enemies to the ministry at elections, they would “not willingly risk an inch of their Estates to serve the cause.”Footnote 68 In their own defense, English Jacobites could point to the fact that the conditions upon which they had always said they would rise, a substantial foreign invasion, had not been met.Footnote 69

It is a testimony to the prince's strength of personality and his authority at this time that he managed to persuade the council to act against its inclinations and near-unanimous advice. It is often suggested that the prince secured the decision by one vote. However, there is no evidence in any of the Jacobite sources to suggest that this was the case. As opinion within the council was overwhelmingly against an invasion, and the decision was taken against their advice, it seems unlikely that the prince would call for a vote he was likely to lose. The most likely scenario is that despite the opposition, the prince insisted on an invasion, and when the council realized that he could not be dissuaded, they acquiesced. This would explain the claim by James Maxwell that the council unanimously agreed to invade; their acquiescence was interpreted as unanimity.Footnote 70 Turning attention to an invasion strategy, the prince argued for a direct attack on Wade, who was just arriving at Newcastle and whose force would be tired and not yet organized. He was convinced that Wade's superiority in numbers would be offset by the low morale of government forces following defeats in Flanders and Cope's defeat at Prestonpans. Furthermore, the Marquis d’Eguilles could request the Dutch in Wade's army to leave under the terms of the Capitulation of Tournai.Footnote 71 He expressed dissatisfaction with an invasion via Carlisle because it would look as if he were avoiding Wade and reminded the council of the considerable political, military, and tactical advantages that would follow a victory over Wade. Newcastle and the rest of the north would fall to him; his supporters could have no greater encouragement to rally to the cause. Indeed, Newcastle could have fallen as easily as Inverness had Jacobites on both sides of the border acted with greater urgency. Securing Newcastle and the defeat of Wade would enhance the reputation of the army, sending fear and confusion through the country, particularly London. The plan made strategic sense and was not without precedent, as the Covenanters successfully demonstrated during the “Bishop's wars” in 1639–40. Aware of the success of the Covenanters, and seeking to create a financial crisis by cutting off London's supply of coal, Colonel Nathaniel Hooke had recommended taking Newcastle in his plan of military operations drawn up for the 1708 invasion.Footnote 72 Disregarding the benefits of commercial warfare, the council was in no mood for an early confrontation without having tested the waters in terms of English support, which the Carlisle route provided.Footnote 73 Fearful of the consequences of forcing the issue, the prince acquiesced in the council's wishes on the grounds that most of his officers favored the Carlisle road.Footnote 74

The outcome of the debates was a strategy that compromised the ambitions of both sides. While the prince regarded the expedition as an invasion with serious intent, his council “regarded the invasion as a reconnaissance in force to test opinion.”Footnote 75 The seriousness of the invasion was conditional upon the seriousness of English intentions. The council had made up its mind in Edinburgh. If there was no English rising, the invasion would be short-lived.Footnote 76 This was reflected not just in the cautious, tentative route chosen to avoid contact with the enemy but also in the number of occasions during their march south in which council members urged a retreat. At Carlisle, the nonappearance of English supporters prompted calls for a “defensive war” that could become offensive if and when circumstances were right.Footnote 77 At Manchester, where a retreat was again privately discussed at length by the principal officers, it was decided “to march to Derby, that so neither the French nor the English might have it to say, the army had not marched far enough into England to give the one encouragement to land and the other to join.”Footnote 78 Long before they reached Derby, it had already been determined that without tangible signs of support, the town would be the end of the road for the invasion. In light of the council debate at Edinburgh, neither the frequent discussions about retreating nor the decision to do so at Derby comes as a surprise. The only person who seemed surprised was the prince. The psychological impact of Edinburgh should not be underestimated. The prince was leading a group of men into England who believed they should not have been there. They were reluctant participants who believed they should have been securing and consolidating Scotland, who believed that the size of the army was too small for such a “rash” enterprise, that the liberation of England should begin with the English, and that so far the English had shown no sign whatsoever of a desire to be delivered from the grip of Hanoverian tyranny. They all believed that substantial French and English support was necessary for success, but they also believed that their move into England should have been as a consequence of an English rising and a French invasion, not in anticipation of both. Now, in the heart of England, surrounded and outnumbered, with no sign of English support and with the only French support they could definitely count on having landed in Scotland, the prince was unable when challenged to provide them with any evidence that the support he promised was coming. Unlike Edinburgh, the prince failed to persuade his council; they stood their ground and defied him. As far as they were concerned, it was time to leave.

Historians evaluating the decision have been too kind to the prince and critical of his council, Lord George Murray in particular. Was the decision a mistake? With the acknowledged benefit of hindsight, they generally conclude that it was, that the advice of Murray and the chiefs was “unsound,” and that by forcing a retreat they “threw away the best chance there had been of a restoration of the Stuarts.” While pressing on to London offered a realistic chance of success, retreating was a poor option that doomed the army because Murray and his allies could offer no realistic alternative strategy for upholding the cause in Scotland. Furthermore, they stand accused not only of evading the English but of evading the responsibility for the consequences of their decision and of blaming anyone but themselves. Consequently, it has been argued that as the whole operation was a gamble, “those who voted for it in Edinburgh should either have declared against it at the time or committed themselves in a do-or-die way.”Footnote 79

Yet none of those arguing for a retreat from Derby voted for an invasion in the first place, and all of them had declared against it in Edinburgh. Not only did they believe their decision was the correct one, but they would have made it sooner. As far as they were concerned, their mistake was invading not retreating.Footnote 80 Nor is there any evidence to suggest that they subsequently tried to evade responsibility for the decision. A month after Derby, the council complained about the prince's secrecy; he stopped calling council meetings and failed to consult with the chiefs. Instead, he relied on Secretary Murray, John Hay, and Irish officers such as John William O’Sullivan. Unhappy about the way decisions were being made and their exclusion from the process, the Scots wanted a greater say and demanded more frequent councils. Derby was their justification, as they argued that “Had not a Council determined the Retreat from Derby, what a Catastrophy must have followed in two or three days!”Footnote 81 Far from evading responsibility, the council took responsibility for the decision and remained totally convinced it had been the correct one. Nor were their chances of success as “realistic” as historians have claimed but dependent upon a set of variables, all or most of which needed to happen for the advance to succeed but none of which were likely.Footnote 82 Under such circumstances, they would continue to be hostages to fortune, which was hardly realistic. Even if the prince had succeeded in his dash for London and defeated whatever force was waiting for him outside the city, he would still have to face the combined armies of Cumberland and Wade. They were not going to surrender just because the prince reached London; there would be no bloodless coup but rather a bloody climax.Footnote 83 Contemporaries did not share the assumption of historians that had the prince taken London, the Hanoverian regime would have collapsed. As one Whig pointed out, should the prince emerge triumphant from his revolution, the House of Hanover would not “lay down their Pretensions, or depart from their right” but launch a counterrevolution.Footnote 84 At Derby, the prince was not so much within touching distance of London and the British Crown as within touching distance of a conflict in which his small force would be vastly outnumbered. His council understood this and did not believe they could emerge victorious. As far as they were concerned, they had offered a realistic alternative strategy to an invasion, and, prompted by the news of Lord John Drummond's arrival from France with men and arms, the retreat back to Scotland was a belated attempt to return to that strategy.

British Unionism versus Scottish Nationalism

The prince and the council divided over strategy because they were divided over the ultimate goal of the rising. The Scottish members of the council did not share Charles's determination for an invasion because they had a distinctly nationalist, Scottish agenda. They were content at that point to restore the Stuarts to their Scottish kingdom, restore their independence and parliament, and attempt to keep it with French help. They would contemplate an invasion of England only if the English requested help to overthrow the Hanoverians. However, for Charles, Scotland was never going to be enough. He declared himself strongly against his council's policy of consolidation “and said often that he would have the three kingdoms or nothing at all.”Footnote 85 He was accused of being obsessed with England and “appeared little flattered by the possession of the kingdom to which, nevertheless, the race of the Stuarts owed their birth and royalty.” He told d’Eguilles that in two months he would either be king of England or be totally ruined and urged Louis to help by landing in England as soon as possible.Footnote 86 He explained to his father that “as matters stand, I must either conquer or perish in a little while.”Footnote 87 This conquer or perish attitude left no room for the alternative of consolidating Scotland. There is nothing to suggest that the prince did not think consolidation was feasible. His opposition to it was not because it could not be done but because Scotland was not enough, and he was impatient to reach London. He was afraid that by delaying the invasion in order to secure Scotland, the opportunity to invade might be lost altogether. For Charles, it was Britain or bust, all or nothing and no middle way; everything would be gambled on an invasion. It was a policy entirely at odds with his council, but it was one that reflected the British and unionist ambitions of the Stuarts.

On the face of it, the prince had appeared to cement his nationalist credentials on 9 October when he declared that the pretended union of the kingdoms was over.Footnote 88 Dissolving the union was something he was expected to do and that his council had strongly advised.Footnote 89 In his manifesto issued the following day, the prince stated that his father could not possibly ratify the “pretended” union, “since he has had repeated remonstrances against it from each Kingdom,” and because its principle aim had been “the Exclusion of the Royal Family from their undoubted Right to the Crown.” Most revealing was his promise that “whatever may be hereafter devised for the joint benefit of both Nations, the King will most readily comply with and request of his Parliaments to establish.”Footnote 90 The promise was designed to revive their damaged constitutionalist credentials.Footnote 91 Jacobites had been accused of treachery by suddenly turning from “seemingly contented Subjection to open Rebellion,” without having tried to redress their grievances through constitutional means.Footnote 92 Furthermore, the prince had so far failed to fulfill his promise to reconvene the Scottish Parliament despite having been urged to do so as part of the plan to consolidate his authority within Scotland.Footnote 93 Moreover, dissolving by an arbitrary proclamation from Edinburgh a union that had been legally ratified by two free and lawfully constituted parliaments may have satisfied his small band of nationalist ideologues, but it played into the hands of his opponents. Dismissing the prince's promise, the Commission of the General Assembly maintained that Scotland could not expect “a free parliament from an armed force.” It insisted that he who bases his right to govern on hereditary and indefeasible right will not allow himself to be restrained by any limitation or have regard in government to anything other than his own will and pleasure.Footnote 94

The manifesto promise was also designed to facilitate Stuart unionist aspirations. The Stuarts took a pragmatic approach to constitutional arrangements between the kingdoms. James VII and II instructed his son James Francis Edward to keep the kingdoms separate for no other reason than that it was in the interests of the Crown to do so. There seems little reason to doubt that if it was considered to be in the true interest of the Crown to maintain an incorporating union between the kingdoms, they would have done so.Footnote 95 That self-interest was their motivation was evident in the fact that their principle objection to the treaty of 1707 was that it excluded them from the succession. They had no ideological, constitutional, or economic objections to union. Indeed, the family had impressive unionist credentials.Footnote 96 Furthermore, Stuart propaganda and repeated manifestos maintained that the “pretended” Hanoverian union had created a troubled, discordant, and divisive society that a Stuart restoration would unite. Thus, when James issued his manifesto prior to the French invasion attempt in 1744, he promised to redress the hardships that were the result of the union, without promising to dissolve it.Footnote 97 The prince did not offer a specific constitutional alternative to union because he did not have one. There is no evidence to suggest a return to the multikingdom monarchy that had previously existed under the Stuarts. It was universally acknowledged in the constitutional debates that preceded union that such an arrangement had not worked and had been detrimental to Scotland's political, economic, and religious interests.Footnote 98

In contrast, his Scottish supporters were prepared to cut through the constitutional niceties by breaking the link with England altogether and returning to the kind of arrangement that preexisted 1603. Scottish Jacobitism's continuing opposition to union was based on patriotism, not on political or economic exclusion. However, this was not an option for the prince. England was the jewel in the Stuart crown, and it made political, economic, and military sense to maintain the present arrangement of an incorporating union. The promise to comply with and establish whatever was devised for the joint benefit of both nations was designed to ensure that outcome. Charles perfectly understood, as one of his opponents pointed out, that “it is for the common benefit of both the British nations to stand united as they now are.”Footnote 99 The political and economic opportunities offered by Britain were bound to take precedence over a narrow nationalistic interest. Consequently, while his supporters invoked the memory of Kenneth, Wallace, and Bruce, the prince rejected suggestions of turning the rising into a national war by fomenting the “natural hatred and animosity which the Scotch have manifested on all occasions against the English.” His Scottish supporters argued that despite their inferiority in numbers, this spirit, which had enabled them to preserve their liberty against English encroachments for a thousand years before the union, would once again enable them to defend their kingdom.Footnote 100

Despite the anti-union rhetoric, it appears that their Whig opponents were unconvinced. As early as 1713, the Commission of the General Assembly warned that whatever the dangerous consequences of the union to their civil interests or the grievances of the church under it, to expect a remedy from the pretender was a “gross delusion, and a bait which we cannot think will catch any, but such as are very simple and credulous.” The commission insisted that there were no grounds to expect that the pretender would dissolve the union if he should come to the throne.Footnote 101 The following year, the author of an anonymous pamphlet warned Presbyterians against involvement in anti-union agitation on the grounds that it would further the Stuart agenda without actually ending the union. The pamphlet claimed that Jacobites were not so concerned about dissolving the union as they pretended to be and only hated it because it excluded the Stuarts from the succession. As far as the writer was concerned, they “would be willing to continue under the Union providing they could get back their Popish Pretender.”Footnote 102 Furthermore, while Whig anti-unionism was by no means dead, attitudes had changed. The hostility of 1706 and the immediate postunion period had been replaced by a more positive outlook. The days when Scottish politicians had wanted to end the union were over.Footnote 103 Indeed, there had been a “growing campaign within Scotland to ‘complete the union’ through further measures of anglicization.”Footnote 104 In 1735, Thistle, a journal organized by James Erskine of Grange as the mouthpiece of the Squadrone opposition, expressed the view that “by the Union the trade of England and the English colonies was opened to us: But this is a trifling advantage in comparison of another, that thereby we had communicated to us their inestimable constitution.”Footnote 105 Their Argathelian counterparts were similarly committed to the union. Ilay's management of Scotland, which began in 1725 after Roxburghe's dismissal, was said to have done much to accommodate Scotland to the union.Footnote 106 Not even the damaging political consequences of the Porteous Riot in 1736 could shake this commitment.Footnote 107

Current historiography inclines to the view that in the short term, up until the early 1730s, the impact of the union upon the economy was peripheral. On the one hand, the advocates of union in 1706 had been wildly optimistic about the economic benefits. The promised economic miracle had failed to materialize. Similarly, the gloomy predictions of the anti-unionists had also proved baseless; the economy was not in ruins, and, importantly, Scotland had not become a satellite economy of England. However, by 1745, Scotland had entered the period in which the benefits and opportunities afforded by the union had become more apparent. Increasing numbers of merchants and landowners were benefiting significantly through the growing transatlantic trade based around the Clyde and the export of linen, cattle, coal, and grain to expanding English and colonial markets.Footnote 108 Scotland's commercial sector had much to lose and “could not be certain that their interests lay in a violent change of dynasty.”Footnote 109 The commercial advantages of the union were a significant factor in the creation of militant anti-Jacobitism within Scotland.Footnote 110 Britain's commercial sector generally resisted the prince not just as Protestants but as businessmen aware of the disruption a prolonged civil war would make to their profits.Footnote 111 Trade and commerce had been a significant factor in the creation of the treaty in 1707 and would significantly influence any constitutional arrangement likely to be devised for the “joint benefit of both Nations.”Footnote 112

Even those Presbyterians still hostile to the union doubted the value of its dissolution. One group insisted that while the Pretender had “shown his inclination to dissolve the union,” there was no guarantee that either the English or the Scots would agree. They argued that Scotland was reaping “real advantages” by the union, and even those hostile to it might consider whether at this time its dissolution would not “in our present circumstances [be] a real injury even to Scotland.” That being the case, no worthy member of any society would sacrifice the general good of the nation for his or her own particular interest.Footnote 113

These sentiments were echoed within the Church of Scotland. Extolling the benefits of the revolution, union, and Protestant succession, Patrick Cumming declared Britain's happiness, which Scotland no doubt shared, to consist in being the “Empress of the sea, supreme in trade and commerce.”Footnote 114 Attacking Jacobite nationalism in a fast-day sermon, George Wishart of the Tron Church in Edinburgh referred to a certain kind of spirit that led people to prefer a whimsical and imaginary glory of their country to the most solid public advantages. This “whimsical country spirit” was evident in the rebels who preferred a race of tyrants to the “enjoyment of Liberty, Property, the free exercise of their religion and all those blessings which can make a nation happy.” Defending the union, Wishart claimed that the rebels were willing to exchange the “happy situation” and the substantial blessings of a free government for the “imaginary honour of their country,” the consequences of which would be to render the nation, slaves, and dependents of a foreign power.Footnote 115

It is worth noting that apart from the expectations of the prince's supporters, there was no anti-union agitation—no widespread desire or demand to go back to a multikingdom monarchy because there was little to recommend it to Scotland's elites or commercial sector. It was argued at the time that a due consideration of the commercial benefits of union by the rebels ought to have been sufficient for them not to embark upon their enterprise.Footnote 116 These were views that could not be ignored and, according to Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, accounted for the ambiguous terms of the manifesto. Reflecting on the affair, Clerk wrote that “however resolved the pretender and his son might be at first they were afterwards obliged to alter their schem & give out that the continuation of the union should be submitted to a parliament, but whether this was to be the parliament of Great Britain or not, was uncertain. The reason of this last resolution was, it seems, that the pretender & his followers discovered that the merchants in Scotland wou’d oppose the dissolution of the union as a schem that wou’d deprive them of the priviliedges in the West Indies & of free communication of Trade with England.”Footnote 117

Nor would it have escaped the prince's attention that should he succeed, his erstwhile allies would soon become rivals. Fears were expressed that the Stuarts would simply be in French pockets, to the detriment of British trade, but this was unlikely to happen.Footnote 118 They had not suffered so long in exile merely to serve as French puppets, no matter how great their sense of obligation. Britain and France were locked in a fierce commercial rivalry that a change of dynasty was not going to diminish. Indeed, the current conflict had a colonial dimension. In June 1745, British forces captured Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island, and in India the following year, the French took Madras from the British. Both were returned to their former owners by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. British commercial interests were too great to allow them to be subordinate to France; as it was pointed out, “Politic People cannot be ignorant, that a King pursuing the true interest of Britain, must still be an enemy of France.”Footnote 119 Aware of this, the prince knew that it did not make economic sense to weaken Britain's position by breaking up the union. France was also aware that its interests were better served by promoting a scenario that led to the dissolution of the union.Footnote 120 Upon his return to France in 1747, d’Eguilles presented a memorandum in which he claimed that a full-scale French expedition to Scotland had considerable benefits as a diversionary campaign until a peace treaty, currently under negotiation, was signed. An expedition had three possible outcomes. A British restoration of the Stuarts would result in an Anglo-French alliance and the possibility of France regaining territories lost since 1688. However, there was no reason why the particular global rivalry between England and France should not continue under the Stuarts, particularly if there was no Hanoverian threat and therefore no reason for the Stuarts to have such a close alliance with France. This raised the possibility of a renewed Anglo-Dutch alliance against France. A Scotland-only strategy had the benefit of perpetual Anglo-Scottish enmity and the opportunity of placing a French force permanently in Scotland. The downside was that at some point it might be politically expedient to support Hanoverian interests in England over those of Stuart Scotland. Furthermore, continued Stuart claims to the English throne might embroil France in a dynastic struggle she did not want to be part of. D’Eguilles preferred a republican settlement because it would remove any Stuart claim to the English throne and at the same time ensure a Franco-Scottish alliance that would not damage French interests.Footnote 121 For that reason, Scottish Jacobites saw France as an important ally in their push for independence. James Johnstone recalled that behind their desire to consolidate the kingdom was the hope that when it was done, France would not only help them to hold it but prevent the prince from pursuing “reunion with England.”Footnote 122

In terms of strategy, aims, and objectives, the Edinburgh council debates revealed a fatal division between the prince and his supporters. For the prince, the aim of the ’45 was the overthrow of the Hanoverian regime, not the union. His British and unionist ambitions and his obsession with England were completely at odds with those who believed that controlling and holding Scotland was an end in itself. Only the prince and the sycophants around him believed that an invasion at that point and under those conditions could succeed. By succumbing to his persuasive powers, the council acted against its own advice and embarked on an enterprise it did not believe in. They wanted to call a parliament, establish a government, and dissolve the union while militarily securing the kingdom sufficiently well enough to encourage foreign intervention. Not only did they not think an invasion feasible; they did not think it was justifiable. They were not in the business of exporting revolution. Consequently, when English support failed to materialize, any justification for their presence in England disappeared. Derby was considered a necessary albeit belated attempt to rectify their mistake and return to the policy of consolidation that in Edinburgh, at least, they had been fully persuaded was not just feasible but had offered the best chance of ultimate success. The council had offered a genuine and realistic alternative to invasion, but its greatest chance of success lay in its immediate implementation. They had a window of opportunity following Prestonpans, but it had been wasted preparing for and participating in an invasion. By the time they returned to Scotland, that window had all but closed. From the perspective of the prince, a judgment of the ’45 may indeed hinge in large part on the assessment of what would have happened had he marched on from Derby. For his Scottish council, it surely lay on an assessment of what might have happened had they consolidated their hold on Scotland. By participating, against their better judgment, in an impetuous invasion, they lost what appeared to them to be a realistic chance of securing their nationalist and patriotic ambitions. Furthermore, they were just as convinced that the prince's best chance of capturing the much-coveted crown of England lay in the successful implementation of their plan. By dismissing one kingdom, he lost all three. The future was British, but it was also Hanoverian. The crushing defeat of Culloden was followed by military occupation, retribution, and in the long term, a concerted effort to integrate the Highlands into British society. Ironically, the martial prowess of the Highlander, upon which the patriotic ambitions of Scottish Jacobites rested, was reborn as an integral part of the British army and played a significant role in subsequent British imperial expansion.