In this very clearly written book, the author’s focus is on an important aspect of debates about the problem of evil. They are usually conducted as if the problem in question challenges only classical theism. The author disagrees. According to him, the problem challenges atheists as well as other types of non-theists, such as pantheists, axiarchists, and followers of Eastern religious traditions. A global philosophical-religious perspective not confined to traditional Western monotheism led the author to a broader approach to the problem of evil.
It must be said that the title (The Problem of Evil for Atheists) refers to only part of the book and does not allow the prospective reader to perceive the richness of the author’s reflections. Not only does the part of the book concern atheists, but the book also aims to show that supernaturalists, including theists, have advantages over naturalists, including atheists, in trying to respond to the problem of evil. Moreover, as I will try to show, this reference to supernaturalism can also pave the way for new reflections on how specifically theological content can lead one to deal with the problem, perhaps not only theoretically but also experientially and practically.
Chapter 1 is devoted to the problem of evil as a challenge to traditional theists. The author appropriately refers to a well-known seminal 1955 article by J. L. Mackie. In reflecting on this, the author usefully identifies three elements of the problem: ‘(i) God; (ii) evil; (iii) an allegedly conflicting relationship between (i) and (ii)’ (p. 11). Virtually all formulations of the problem of evil consist of (i)–(iii). Thus, the author plans to consider each of the three elements as ‘a variable’ and notes that by assigning different values to each variable, different formulations of the problem will emerge.
While chapter 1 offers insightful distinctions that help the reader to figure out a kind of taxonomy of the problem from the point of view of (ii)–(iii), in chapter 2 the author focuses on the values that can be attributed to (i). In this way, it is possible to shed light on the versions of the problem of evil that can be held beyond the traditional theistic framework.
Really interestingly, the reader is led to see that the problem at issue can be seen as a version of a more general problem, which the author calls ‘the problem of axiological expectation mismatch’. It consists in the mismatch between
(a) ‘it is expected that the world has property p’
and
(b) ‘the world does not have property p’ (p. 42).
Clearly, (a) expresses expectations one has about the actual world, while (b) expresses the result of observing the world as it actually is. Not surprisingly, the problem of evil can be seen as a more specific version, in which the conflict is between
(a') ‘it is expected that there is no evil in the actual world’
and
(b') ‘there is evil in the actual world’ (p. 41).
Given this scheme, the problem of evil cannot be seen as having arisen only for traditional theists. This is a very important point for the author to make, given that the book as a whole argues precisely that the problem of evil does not challenge only traditional theists.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the problem of evil for pantheists. It can be said that the author takes on three tasks that characterize his analyses of all the alternatives to traditional theism that he examines. In the chapter under consideration, task 1 is to show that the problem of evil challenges pantheists; task 2 is to argue that there are responses that pantheists can offer to the problem; task 3 is to show that theistic responses are preferable to pantheistic ones. Let me just comment on how the author accomplishes task 1. As he says, the problem of evil arises when there is a discrepancy between the expectation derived from the view that the world comes from a wholly good God and the observation that the world in question contains evil. The author mentions Michael Levine, who argues that this discrepancy does not arise for pantheists because they do not believe in a wholly good God who is expected to eliminate evil. The author then proposes his own version of the problem of evil, which he calls the ‘divinity problem of evil’ (see p. 64). This problem shows a discrepancy between the view that the world is divine and the view that the world contains a significant amount of evil. Again, the author mentions Levine, according to whom the divine can have evil aspects, and yet – so the author argues – ‘the all-inclusive unity cannot be divine if it is entirely evil or includes too much evil in quality or quantity’ (p. 66). If too much evil is included in the all-encompassing unity, then the above discrepancy arises, and the view that the divinity problem of evil challenges pantheists seems justified.
Chapter 4 focuses on ‘the problem of evil for axiarchists’. Axiarchists are thinkers who believe that ‘the world exists because it is better that it be actualized than that it not be actualized; that is, the existence of the world is ethically required’ (p. 91). Again, the author takes on tasks 1–3. First, he shows that there really is a version of the problem of evil for axiarchists. On the one hand, axiarchism implies only good things in the world, and then the expectation arises that reality should only be good; on the other hand, observation tells us that the world contains many instances of evil. This leads to the problem of axiological expectation mismatch. With regard to tasks 2–3, the author offers a detailed and informative list of four possible responses to the problem of evil that both traditional theists and axiarchists might prima facie offer, whether or not they actually focus on and discuss all of them. In doing so, the author can also show that since most of the responses are available to theism and not to axiarchism, the former has advantages over the latter.
In the first four chapters the author has focused on the problem of evil for traditional theists, pantheists and axiarchists. Chapter 5 begins the second part of the book, which is devoted to offering ‘a more expansive version of the problem of evil’ that also arises for atheists and other non-theists. The author calls this version the ‘problem of systemic evil’, where evil is ‘systemic’ because it arises from the whole biological system, with all forms of pain and suffering realized through the process of natural selection and evolution. The conflict between (i) and (ii), when systemic evil is attributed to the latter, can therefore be seen as fundamental, since systemic evil is the basis of all instances of evil.
Chapter 6 is devoted to showing that the problem of systemic evil challenges those who see that their optimistic views of reality are inconsistent with their observation of reality. Four versions of ‘modest optimism’ are considered. The most modest is that ‘overall and fundamentally, the environment in which we exist is not bad’ (p. 142). The author adopts this version of modest optimism because it can be more widely accepted than the other forms he proposes. Why is that? Because those who adopt it confine themselves to considering the (relatively local) environment in which they exist and not, less modestly, the world in general; because they claim that the environment to which they refer is not bad rather than, less modestly, that it is good; finally, because they say that this applies overall and fundamentally rather than, less modestly, to everything that is found in our world.
Although I find the author’s proposals on systemic evil and optimism of great interest, it seems to me that problems arise when he refers to the ‘observation of the very environment in which we live’ (p. 143). The observation in question – he says – may lead one to adopt pessimism rather than the modest optimism under consideration here. If this is true, then it is the observation of one’s environment that gives rise to one’s worldview. But this conflicts with the author’s suggestion that observation makes one aware that there is evil in the world, whereas expectation, which stems from one’s worldview – for example theism or atheism – makes one an optimist or not. It is because of one’s commitment to atheism or theism that one has certain expectations, whereas observation of one’s environment leads one to believe that there is a certain amount of evil that either conflicts or does not conflict with one’s worldview.
In chapter 7, the author focuses on the challenge that the problem of systemic evil poses to all modest optimists. The author notes that optimism has an ‘emotional element’, not just a ‘propositional’ one. He coins the ‘existential gratitude thesis’, which consists of saying that ‘it is appropriate that we feel pleased and grateful for our existence in the environment in which we live’ (p. 160). Both traditional theists and atheists/non-theists can hold such a thesis. And since ‘most traditional theists and most atheists/non-theists are modest optimists … the problem of evil … is a problem for nearly everyone’ (p. 169), which is precisely one of the book’s central theses.
As I said above, another central thesis is that traditional theists enjoy advantages over atheists/non-theists, and the author devotes chapter 8 to this thesis. He offers an intriguing series of scenarios, the combination of which effectively shows that the problem at hand is more challenging for atheists/non-theists than for traditional theists.
I find it particularly interesting that the author seems to open the way for further discussion of supernatural resources and how they can help one respond to the problem of evil. If the resources of theists are indeed supernatural, unexpected results may indeed emerge. Not only theism – the view that there is an all-powerful, all-good God who created everything – but also specific revelations may become of interest. These revelations may lead us to believe that God can allow human beings to have a relationship with him, and may inspire them to the point where they do not limit themselves to offering good theoretical responses to the problem of evil. Believers may also become able to deal practically with any kind of evil, including the horrendous evil dealt with by Marylin McCord Adams. Many people throughout history have witnessed this possibility, even giving up their lives in the face of violence and persecution, which are clearly forms of (systemic) evil. After all, unlike the views of atheists/non-theists, theistic views are part of specific revelations. Christians, Jews, Muslims would not see themselves as merely ‘theists’. In this sense, it is not enough simply to consider theism as an alternative to atheism/non-theism. That is why I think that the author’s reference to the supernatural resources available to theists opens the way for further fruitful reflection on how these resources might lead one to offer a response to the problem of systemic evil.
I find that the third and last part of the book (chapters 9–10) somehow intercepts my view. The author shifts to the Eastern tradition, more specifically the medieval Japanese tradition. He finds that this tradition is characterized by a version of the problem of axiological expectation mismatch, which is also a version of the problem of systemic evil. He calls it ‘the problem of impermanence’. The world and life are impermanent, that is, they are transient and fragile.
The author examines four responses to the problem of impermanence that emerge from the Japanese tradition. He calls them ‘hermitism’, ‘hedonism’, ‘indifferentism’ and ‘trascendentalism’. All these responses do not aim to be mere theoretical solutions to the problem. On the contrary, the thinkers whose reflections are considered offer practical advice on how to respond to the problem and flourish. The author provides a clear assessment of all the responses in question and argues that only transcendentalism, which is the only response that implies supernaturalism, is potentially successful (see p. 230).
I think this book has successfully argued for the view that the problem of evil is not unique to traditional theists and that when it comes to offering responses, traditional theists, who typically embrace supernaturalism, have an advantage over atheists/non-theists, who typically embrace naturalism. I also think that the author’s reflections, while focusing on Eastern religious traditions and their practical responses to the problem, may open the way to considering traditional theism not only in terms of theoretical arguments, but more specifically in terms of practical advice that can come from specific revelations.
Of course, all the sophisticated reflections provided should be of interest first and foremost to scholars in the field. However, in view of the high level of clarity displayed by the author, it is possible to say that this book is highly recommended not only for scholars who need to focus on the latest research on the subject, but also for students and even ordinary people who are interested in an accurate and transparent presentation of what is a perennial problem for all human beings, not just philosophers.
