Homelessness continues to be one of the most visible social problems of our time. Tent encampments have sprung up in urban parks, on city streets, and in other public places.Footnote 1 Some American cities have declared a state of emergency due to the growth of homeless encampments.Footnote 2 And these are just some of the most visible examples. Many unhoused persons experience a more hidden form of homelessness.Footnote 3 Some stay on friends’ couches or sleep in motels.Footnote 4 Others are confined to detention centers, are treated in hospitals, or sleep in their cars.Footnote 5
For centuries, governments have attempted to address homelessness through a combination of social assistance and coercion – an approach that continues today.Footnote 6 Yet homelessness remains ubiquitous in major US and Canadian cities.Footnote 7 Interrelatedly, many cities are facing a growing housing crisis.Footnote 8 Scholars, lawyers, governments, and the public are all taking notice. For instance, in a 2019 poll, roughly 95 percent of Los Angeles residents ranked homelessness as the most pressing issue for the city (lack of affordable housing came in a close second).Footnote 9
Homelessness matters to those experiencing it, to their friends and family, and to the wider community. Compared to the general population, unhoused persons have a lower life expectancy, are disproportionately subject to physical and sexual violence, and are more likely to have mental health problems and substance use issues.Footnote 10 Members of certain communities – such as Indigenous persons, racialized persons, immigrants, members of the LGBTQ community, and veterans – are overrepresented in unhoused populations.Footnote 11
The effects of homelessness extend beyond those without access to housing. In addition to tent encampments, feces, garbage, and syringes have accumulated in the public spaces of certain cities with a high population of unhoused persons.Footnote 12 In other cities where homelessness is prevalent, polls reveal that a significant portion of residents report that they feel unsafe.Footnote 13 Homelessness can also decrease a city’s tourism and lower its revenue.Footnote 14 Some elections are won or lost according to how a city plans to respond to homelessness and improve residents’ quality of life.Footnote 15 Local governments continue to struggle with how to regulate their parks, streets, beaches, and squares so that everyone can use these public spaces on equal terms.Footnote 16
The State has regulated homelessness and public property in various ways. Historically, vagrancy laws governed public property and homelessness until courts began to strike them down as unconstitutionally vague.Footnote 17 Vagrancy statutes were largely replaced by narrowly tailored municipal ordinances (or bylaws) that continue to regulate homelessness and public property.Footnote 18 These ordinances became popular in the United States following the Broken Windows Theory’s emergence in the 1980s.Footnote 19 The Broken Windows Theory posits that cities must tackle low-level incivilities (e.g., public urination, panhandling, littering) to prevent more serious crime and disorder.Footnote 20 Canadian and American police forces adopted Broken Windows policing strategies and enforced municipal ordinances harshly.Footnote 21 These ordinances prohibit individuals from alleviating their most basic needs on public property.Footnote 22 For instance, they proscribe acts such as sleeping on public property, urban camping, public urination and defecation, and more.Footnote 23
Scholars challenge the legitimacy of laws that govern public property on different grounds. Some contend that cities are not just regulating public property, but rather, criminalizing and punishing the condition of homelessness.Footnote 24 According to this argument, since unhoused persons must alleviate their basic needs but have no default private place to do so, laws that regulate public property criminalize unhoused persons’ survival.Footnote 25 Others argue that laws that govern public property are counterproductive and create a vicious cycle of criminalization, punishment, and homelessness.Footnote 26 Scholars also point out that these laws are enforced disparately against people experiencing homelessness and other marginalized persons.Footnote 27
Others defend the legitimacy of laws that regulate public property. They contend that these laws are necessary to maintain order and preserve public property’s shared use for all.Footnote 28 They posit that public spaces such as streets and sidewalks must be free from tents and other obstructions to ensure the efficient flow of traffic.Footnote 29 And they note that these laws also help maintain a city’s attractiveness, economic vitality, and tourism.Footnote 30
Courts, scholars, lawyers, and civil society organizations are increasingly confronted with this tension between homelessness and the regulation of public property. Attorneys have challenged the constitutionality of laws that govern public property. They argue that these laws are vague, overbroad, discriminatory, violate fundamental rights, impose cruel and unusual punishments, and more.Footnote 31 Although some of these claims have succeeded, most have failed.Footnote 32 Interrelatedly, scholars and civil libertarians have claimed that the Constitution provides a positive right to housing; an argument that courts have rejected.Footnote 33
Legal theorists, for their part, continue to deepen our understanding of homelessness, access to housing, and the regulation of public space. Some examine how homelessness undermines interests such as freedom, political equality, and full citizenship.Footnote 34 Others’ empirical work demonstrates how the police disparately enforce laws that govern public property against unhoused persons.Footnote 35 Certain scholars explore homelessness as a discrete legal condition that results in distinct disadvantages: legal powerlessness, vulnerability, and second-class citizenship.Footnote 36
The intersection between homelessness and the regulation of public property also touches on fundamental criminal law principles and doctrines. Courts analyze whether unhoused persons had no choice but to alleviate their needs on public property and break the law, such that it is unconstitutional to convict and punish them.Footnote 37 Judges assess whether some law unconstitutionally criminalizes the status of homelessness, or rather, constitutionally prohibits some unlawful act.Footnote 38 Judicial decisions examine whether it is cruel and unusual to criminalize unhoused persons’ basic human acts or impose certain punishments.Footnote 39
These criminal law principles and doctrines, though, are inextricably linked to deeper philosophical concepts: the freedom or absence of choice, the distinction between status and acts, and the scope of the State’s power to criminalize and punish. When asking whether an unhoused person had a free choice to sleep on public property, one must consider deeper moral questions: When is a choice free, and furthermore, what is freedom?Footnote 40 When considering whether unhoused persons’ conduct is involuntary, one may draw on the intersecting fields of psychology, philosophy, and physiology – disciplines that raise further questions about human agency and free will.Footnote 41 When evaluating whether a law prohibits an act or criminalizes one’s status, one must inquire into the connection between a person’s capacity, choices, and character, and the extent to which individuals control them.Footnote 42 Finally, when assessing whether cities can legitimately prohibit and punish conduct, it leads to broader questions about the breadth of State power, the limits of criminalization, and the legitimacy of punishment.Footnote 43
The regulation of public property also requires courts to theorize about constitutional rights. When defendants attack the constitutionality of laws that govern public property, courts must answer complex questions about the meaning, purpose, and scope of these constitutional rights. For instance, does panhandling or sleeping on public property constitute expressive conduct that is protected by the First Amendment?Footnote 44 Do urban camping bans violate the fundamental right to travel?Footnote 45 Do laws that govern public property discriminate against people experiencing homelessness as a suspect class?Footnote 46 To answer these questions, judges must first consider the meaning of “expressive conduct,” evaluate the moral underpinnings of the fundamental right to travel, and consider the notion of political equality. These questions and answers force one to think hard about the interests and values that underlie constitutional rights – such as freedom, equality, and dignity – and their interrelationship.Footnote 47
There is more. The intersection between homelessness and laws that govern public property raises broader questions about the nature of rights, the separation of powers, and the role of public institutions in a democracy. Judges analyze whether laws that govern public property respect constitutional rights. As part of their reasoning, they must interpret whether constitutional rights are negative in nature and merely protect individuals against State interference, or rather, are positive in nature and impose affirmative duties on the State to provide access to housing.Footnote 48 These inquiries require judges to assess their role in a constitutional democracy, their institutional competence, and their relationship with other branches of government.Footnote 49
For all these reasons, the intersection between homelessness and the regulation of public property matters. So too do legal decisions that attempt to reconcile unhoused persons’ fundamental interests with the need to regulate public space. These judicial decisions ultimately dictate where unhoused persons can be, what they can do, and the legal risks associated with living their lives. Moreover, the impact of these decisions spill over into other jurisdictions. When a court decides that some city’s municipal ordinance is unconstitutional, a neighboring city may repeal a similar provision.Footnote 50 Conversely, when judges uphold the constitutionality of some law that regulates public property, other cities may follow suit and enact similar offenses. Like homelessness, the regulation of public property remains a complex and enduring issue.
It may seem that scholars have already approached the relationship between homelessness and laws that govern public property from every angle: historical,Footnote 51 empirical,Footnote 52 philosophical,Footnote 53 and constitutional.Footnote 54 Each of these approaches has contributed invaluably to our understanding. Yet despite these contributions, we still lack an overarching theory of how the State can treat unhoused persons with equal concern and respect.Footnote 55 We also lack a broader account of the State’s duties related to homelessness, public property, and the laws that govern its use.
I.1 Overview of This Book and Its Arguments
This book sets out a theory of the State’s duties related to homelessness and public property. It argues that the republican theory of freedom and government (or republicanism) provides new insight into homelessness and laws that govern public property.Footnote 56 Republicanism also offers a theoretical foundation for why the State has certain obligations related to homelessness and public property. Furthermore, republican theories of freedom and government underpin this book’s concrete proposals that aim to help achieve that end.
I.1.1 Republicanism and Domination
A brief overview of republicanism is necessary before setting out this book’s overarching arguments. The republican theory of freedom (or liberty, the terms are used interchangeably) emerged during the era of the Roman republic.Footnote 57 Republican theorists construe freedom as nondomination.Footnote 58 The term “domination” implies that an individual is vulnerable to unilateral threats of interference by others.Footnote 59 Individuals enjoy republican freedom when others wield no such unilateral power to interfere with them; they suffer domination when others wield that power.Footnote 60
The republican theory of liberty is typically contrasted with both positive and negative theories of freedom.Footnote 61 The positive theory of liberty conceptualizes freedom as self-actualization.Footnote 62 Individuals enjoy positive liberty when they reach their potential or attain their higher selves.Footnote 63 Positive freedom is concerned with the existence of psychological obstacles – and the lack of access to resources – that affect self-mastery.Footnote 64 The negative theory of liberty, on the other hand, conceptualizes freedom as noninterference.Footnote 65 Individuals enjoy negative freedom when they do not experience actual interference by others.Footnote 66
Republican freedom is broader than its negative counterpart. Negative liberty theory posits that concrete obstructions are necessary to undermine freedom.Footnote 67 Republicanism, in contrast, recognizes that individuals are unfree if they experience domination without interference.Footnote 68 More specifically, domination without interference undermines freedom because a person may limit their own liberty to avoid obstructions by others.Footnote 69 A dominated person may abandon their preferences, relinquish their authenticity, or become deferential to others to escape such hinderances.Footnote 70 Republicanism acknowledges that individuals lack freedom if they must adopt such coping mechanisms.Footnote 71 In the republican tradition, domination is typically exemplified by the relationship between master and slave.Footnote 72 Yet while negative liberty theory leads to the absurd conclusion that a slave is free if they suffer no concrete interference by their master, republicanism recognizes that the slave’s domination grounds their unfreedom.Footnote 73
Domination can exist in various forms.Footnote 74 Horizontal domination arises where individuals are subject to unilateral threats of interference by others.Footnote 75 Vertical domination takes place where individuals are vulnerable to a unilateral prospect of interference by the State.Footnote 76 And double domination occurs where individuals are exposed to horizontal and vertical forms of domination that can mutually reinforce one another.Footnote 77
I.1.2 Homelessness and Double Domination
This book demonstrates how unhoused persons experience double domination because they lack private property rights and are uniquely vulnerable to laws that govern public property.Footnote 78 As discussed in later chapters, unhoused persons face horizontal domination because they are constantly subject to others’ power of exclusion.Footnote 79 Private property rights confer a power to exclude others.Footnote 80 Individuals must obtain others’ permission to access their private property.Footnote 81 Yet this permission is also a precondition for individuals to do any act in that space.Footnote 82 Since unhoused persons lack private property rights, they continually depend on others’ permission to access private property and do any act in that space; they are consistently vulnerable to others’ exclusionary power.Footnote 83
This horizontal domination, in turn, accounts for why people experiencing homelessness face two additional forms of domination from laws that govern public property. First, others exert control over unhoused persons’ opportunities to obey laws that regulate public property.Footnote 84 Like everyone else, people experiencing homelessness must alleviate their needs.Footnote 85 They must shelter themselves, sleep, urinate, and defecate, and they cannot abstain from these acts.Footnote 86 Although various laws prohibit need-alleviating acts on public property, these acts are lawful on private property.Footnote 87 The problem is that unhoused persons must receive permission to access others’ private property to alleviate their needs and obey these laws.Footnote 88 Yet rightsholders and those authorized to act on their behalf – shelter employees, café owners, and others – have the power to exclude unhoused persons from their private property.Footnote 89 This refusal limits unhoused persons’ freedom to comply with laws that regulate public property. Rightsholders thus exert control over whether people experiencing homelessness can access private property, alleviate their needs behind closed doors, and ultimately, obey the law.Footnote 90
Second, unlike others, unhoused persons must sacrifice their basic interests to obey laws that regulate public property; a concept referred to as “nonegalitarian trade-offs.”Footnote 91 In some contexts, unhoused persons must stay in a homeless shelter to comply with laws that prohibit sleeping or camping on public property. Yet shelters may be dangerous, overcrowded, or unsanitary.Footnote 92 If unhoused persons wish to obey laws that regulate public property and avoid coercion, they must sacrifice their basic interests – such as liberty, security, privacy, and dignity – as the cost of compliance.Footnote 93
Nonegalitarian trade-offs subject unhoused persons to both horizontal and vertical domination.Footnote 94 They face horizontal domination when they must sleep in a shelter to obey laws that prohibit sleeping in public or urban camping, yet risk harm, violence, or theft by others in these spaces.Footnote 95 They are vulnerable to unilateral threats of interference by others in such contexts. But unhoused persons also experience vertical domination if they refuse to sacrifice their interests to obey the law.Footnote 96 Unhoused persons are exposed to coercion by the State if they decline to stay in a shelter, alleviate their needs in public, and risk arrest or punishment because they violate laws that govern public property.Footnote 97
I.1.3 Nonegalitarian Coercion and Punitive Entrenchment
Why do others control unhoused persons’ opportunities to obey laws that govern public property? Furthermore, why do these laws result in nonegalitarian sacrifices for people experiencing homelessness? This book argues that two interrelated realities explain why laws that regulate public property subject unhoused persons to double domination: nonegalitarian coercion and punitive entrenchment. Each are examined in turn.
I.1.3.1 Nonegalitarian Coercion
Nonegalitarian coercion implies that the State has a greater capacity to regulate and police unhoused persons compared to people with access to housing.Footnote 98 People experiencing homelessness are exposed to nonegalitarian coercion because the State has more power to prohibit need-alleviating acts that occur on public property than on private property. The distinct roles of private and public property account for this disparity.
Consider private property first. A private property right grants the rightsholder the power to determine who uses a thing and how they use it.Footnote 99 By conferring a power to exclude others, private property rights secure a sphere of individual freedom and autonomy.Footnote 100 These rights protect fundamental interests, such as privacy, security, liberty, and personhood.Footnote 101 A private property right secures these interests because it creates a barrier between the individual and the public sphere.Footnote 102 Private and public law confer legal rights that protect these fundamental interests. The tort of trespass prohibits individuals from entering others’ land or interfering with their property.Footnote 103 Constitutional criminal procedure, for its part, generally requires police officers to obtain a warrant to enter or search a person’s home.Footnote 104
Public property – meaning open-access spaces that are managed by the State – fulfils a different role.Footnote 105 Parks, squares, streets, beaches, and sidewalks are examples of public property.Footnote 106 Various communal activities characteristically occur on public property: sports and recreation, spontaneous interactions between strangers, commerce, democratic protest, travel, and more.Footnote 107 The State can regulate public property to protect its unique role and value within society.Footnote 108 Courts have recognized that cities can proscribe acts such as public defecation, urban camping, and sleeping on sidewalks for various reasons.Footnote 109 Justifications for regulating public property include public sanitation, efficiency, solving coordination problems, and promoting the aesthetic value of public space.Footnote 110
The unique role of public property – and the justifications for regulating its use – underpin the three reasons why the State has more power to prohibit need-alleviating acts that occur in public than in private.Footnote 111 These same reasons, in turn, account for the State’s greater power to regulate unhoused persons compared to people with access to housing.
First, some justifications for regulating public property cannot apply to private property.Footnote 112 The State may prohibit urban camping to solve coordination problems, promote the efficiency of public ways, and increase the aesthetic value of public spaces.Footnote 113 But these same rationales cannot justify a law that regulates how individuals shelter themselves or sleep within their homes.Footnote 114 The State cannot prohibit need-alleviating acts within one’s home based on justifications that apply to public property but cannot apply to private property.Footnote 115 This partly explains why the State has more power to regulate how people sleep, shelter themselves, and alleviate their needs in public than in private.
Second, certain justifications for regulating need-alleviating acts on public property disappear when individuals alleviate their needs in private.Footnote 116 The State may prohibit acts such as public urination or public defecation because it is unsanitary and raises public health concerns.Footnote 117 But these concerns vanish when individuals do these acts in the bathrooms within their homes.Footnote 118 For this reason, the State can more justifiably prohibit need-alleviating acts that occur on public property versus on private property.
Third, a home’s physical and legal protections limit the State’s capacity to regulate how people alleviate their needs in private.Footnote 119 Constitutional norms bar officers from entering homes without a warrant to police how individuals sleep, rest, and perform their bodily functions.Footnote 120 Furthermore, even if a compelling State interest could justify such laws, it would be outweighed by individuals’ interests in privacy, liberty, and dignity within their homes.Footnote 121 Together, these three reasons show why the State has more power to regulate need-alleviating acts that occur on public property than on private property, and to regulate unhoused persons more generally.
Police officers also enjoy more discretionary power to enforce laws that govern public property against unhoused persons. Compared to people with access to housing, unhoused persons are more vulnerable to police surveillance because they spend more time on public property.Footnote 122 Furthermore, although the police can lawfully patrol public property where unhoused persons tend to congregate, constitutional norms prohibit them from patrolling private property more intrusively, which explains why those with access to housing enjoy greater protection against police coercion.Footnote 123 And constitutional law recognizes that individuals’ privacy is less protected on public property than on private property – a reality that skews against those who lack access to housing.Footnote 124 People experiencing homelessness are thus more vulnerable to routine exercises of police discretion; a type of vertical domination discussed in later chapters.Footnote 125
I.1.3.2 Punitive Entrenchment
Punitive entrenchment also subjects unhoused persons to double domination. The term “punitive entrenchment” implies that the State enmeshes people in homelessness through harsh punishments and collateral consequences associated with laws that govern public property.Footnote 126 These punishments and consequences include incarceration, expensive fines, additional fees, and surcharges – all of which decrease unhoused persons’ opportunities to access housing.Footnote 127 Financial penalties reduce their capacity to pay for their rent, utilities, medication, and other basic needs.Footnote 128
The consequences of unpaid criminal justice debts exacerbate punitive entrenchment.Footnote 129 These consequences include a criminal record, driver’s license suspension, civil asset forfeiture, adverse credit rating, social support ineligibility, and more.Footnote 130 The collateral consequences of unpaid criminal justice debt hinder access to housing in various ways. Landlords may refuse to lease apartments to individuals with a criminal record.Footnote 131 Driver’s license suspensions bar various types of employment, such as operating a taxi, working as a delivery person, or participating in the gig economy.Footnote 132 These suspensions limit individuals’ capacities to drive to work, especially in cities that lack adequate public transportation.Footnote 133 Banks are reluctant to offer loans or credit cards to individuals with bad credit ratings.Footnote 134 And individuals who live in extreme poverty may be forced to pay their criminal justice debts at the expense of their rent.
Punitive entrenchment is problematic for other reasons. People who are enmeshed in homelessness will continue to suffer nonegalitarian coercion from laws that govern public property; they will continue to experience domination.Footnote 135 Punitive entrenchment also creates a vicious cycle. Individuals who become enmeshed in homelessness are more likely to alleviate their needs on public property, violate laws that govern public property, and be punished in ways that limit their access to housing.Footnote 136
I.1.4 Republicanism and Fiduciary Theories of Legal Authority
Republicanism is not only a theory of freedom; it is also a theory of government. The republican theory of freedom shows how unhoused persons suffer domination from laws that govern public property. It also demonstrates why nonegalitarian coercion and punitive entrenchment produce that domination. The republican theory of government, on the other hand, is a political theory positing that self-rule is necessary for political liberty.Footnote 137 Republican theorists draw analogies between the individual as a physical body and the State as a body politic comprised of its community members.Footnote 138 In the same way as an individual enjoys liberty only when they are free from domination, the polity is free only when its will is not subject to external control.Footnote 139 A free state implies that the population can participate in government, shape its laws, and control its actions, such that the will of the State reflects the will of the people.Footnote 140 Individual freedom is a precondition for political freedom, and vice versa.Footnote 141
Yet even self-ruling polities can suffer vertical domination in various forms. Power can corrupt public officials.Footnote 142 They may exercise their discretion abusively or arbitrarily.Footnote 143 They may act in their own self-interest rather than for the common good of the community.Footnote 144 They may attempt to circumvent legal and political safeguards that protect individuals against abusive State action. Or the State may not provide such safeguards in the first place. There are other risks. A tyranny of the majority can occur within democracies, such that laws and policies which stem from majoritarian will disregard the rights and interests of the political minority. Majoritarian laws and policies may also authorize horizontal domination or fail to protect individuals against it. Even when individuals can vote and participate in public office, the State may subject them to these other forms of vertical domination.
One of republicanism’s tenets is that the State and individuals are in a fiduciary relationship with one another – a bond that gives rise to the State’s overarching fiduciary duty to counteract domination.Footnote 145 A fiduciary relationship involves two parties: the trustee (or fiduciary) and the beneficiary.Footnote 146 In these relationships, the trustee is unilaterally empowered to act on the beneficiary’s behalf.Footnote 147 Trustees tend to have expertise, powers, skills, or capacities that beneficiaries lack.Footnote 148 Beneficiaries, for their part, are dependent upon trustees and their above-mentioned qualities.Footnote 149
In fiduciary relationships, the beneficiary is unilaterally vulnerable to the trustee’s power.Footnote 150 The trustee can exploit the beneficiary for private gain or for other opportunistic reasons. Beneficiaries are thus vulnerable to domination.Footnote 151 To counteract this domination, the law imposes a duty of loyalty on the fiduciary, who must act in the beneficiary’s best interests.Footnote 152
Although some fiduciary relationships form through express or implied agreement, consent is not necessary to form them.Footnote 153 A fiduciary relationship can form given the beneficiary’s unilateral vulnerability to the fiduciary’s power.Footnote 154 For instance, doctors have a fiduciary duty to act in an unconscious patient’s best interests, even though the patient could not validly consent to treatment given their incapacity.Footnote 155
Fiduciary relationships also exist in various public law contexts. The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed that the State is in a fiduciary relationship with Indigenous peoples.Footnote 156 The relationship arises sui generis due to colonialism and its legacy.Footnote 157 The State has a fiduciary duty to consult with Indigenous peoples and accommodate them in matters that affect their interests.Footnote 158 US public trust doctrine recognizes that the State holds certain natural resources – such as navigable waters, shorelines, and public lands – in trust for the public.Footnote 159 The doctrine prohibits the alienation and privatization of these forms of common property.Footnote 160 Canadian and US law acknowledge that the State holds public property in trust for the population – a duty that dates to the Roman republic.Footnote 161 As part of its duty, the State must maintain the shared value of spaces such as parks, streets, and squares for the general public.
Two characteristics underpin the public law fiduciary relationships described above – characteristics that also underpin the State’s fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property. First, the fiduciary relationship between the State and individuals is formed without consent.Footnote 162 Second, the State’s fiduciary relationship with the polity exists to counteract both vertical and horizontal domination.Footnote 163 The State’s fiduciary relationship with Indigenous persons in Canada aims to neutralize vertical domination, which flows from the State’s unilateral discretionary control over their interests.Footnote 164 The public trust doctrine prevents horizontal domination. It bars individuals from amassing common property – such as waterbeds and shorelines – that would place others who wish to use that property in a state of dependency vis-à-vis the rightsholder.Footnote 165 The State’s fiduciary guardianship over public property in Canada and the United States also neutralizes horizontal domination. The State controls and regulates public property so that people can freely travel and do things outside of their homes without being subject to others’ power of exclusion.Footnote 166
These three public law fiduciary duties discussed above flow from the fiduciary relationship between the State and individuals that is central to republicanism.Footnote 167 As part of that relationship, the State has an overarching fiduciary duty to counteract horizontal and vertical forms of domination, the fulfilment of which promotes political equality.Footnote 168
The State’s fiduciary relationship with the population is justified on two principal grounds. First, the Government and the people are in a fiduciary relationship because individuals are unilaterally vulnerable to State power.Footnote 169 Public officials can exercise public powers that individuals lack, such as powers of taxation, legislation, adjudication, criminalization, and punishment.Footnote 170 Individuals’ vulnerability to these public powers – and their incapacity to exercise such powers reciprocally – renders them susceptible to domination by the State.Footnote 171 Furthermore, the exercise of such public powers can result in laws, policies, and decisions that produce or authorize horizontal domination.Footnote 172 These forms of vulnerability result in a fiduciary relationship between the Government and the people.Footnote 173 And this relationship gives rise to the State’s overarching duty to counteract domination and exercise its public power in the people’s best interests.Footnote 174
Second, the fiduciary relationship between the Government and the people is justified by the fact that the State derives its power from individuals.Footnote 175 Individuals delegate power to public institutions and their officials through the democratic process.Footnote 176 Given this delegation of power, public officials must act in the people’s best interests and counteract domination.Footnote 177 This account also explains why Indigenous persons are subject to a unique form of vertical domination, notably, due to colonialism and the State depriving Indigenous peoples of their full power of self-government.
These three contexts in public law – the duty to consult and accommodate Indigenous peoples, the US public trust doctrine, and the State’s guardianship of public property – flow from the State’s fiduciary relationship with the people. Each of these contexts imposes distinct obligations on the State. But these are not the only duties in public law that flow from the State’s fiduciary relationship with individuals. As discussed below, the State also has specific fiduciary obligations related to homelessness and public property.
I.1.5 The State’s Fiduciary Duties Related to Homelessness and Public Property
The State’s fiduciary relationship with the population – and its overarching fiduciary duty to counteract domination – gives rise to three interrelated fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property. First, the State must end homelessness and ensure that individuals enjoy access to housing. Second, the State has a fiduciary duty to safeguard public property’s shared value and secure liberty in the public sphere. Third, the State must legitimize coercion and punishment associated with laws that regulate public property. Such laws treat unhoused persons with greater concern and respect when the State increasingly fulfils its three fiduciary duties associated with homelessness and public property. These fiduciary duties stem from the State’s failure to accommodate unhoused persons within two systems of mutual coercion that the State creates to secure liberty: the private property system and laws that govern public property. The State’s fiduciary duties aim to counteract the domination that unhoused persons experience because they are not accommodated within these systems of mutual coercion.
The State’s three fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property can be described as follows. First, the State has a fiduciary duty to end homelessness and treat unhoused persons with equal respect, such that individuals enjoy access to housing. The justification for this duty can be summarized as follows. The State creates a system of private property rights to secure freedom between individuals and fulfil its overarching fiduciary duty to counteract domination.Footnote 178 But the State fails to accommodate unhoused persons within a market-based private property system, which subjects them to domination.Footnote 179 Without private property rights, unhoused persons are uniquely vulnerable to others’ power of exclusion and to laws that govern public property.Footnote 180 The State’s fiduciary duty to end homelessness and ensure access to housing aims to counteract these forms of domination.Footnote 181 And this first fiduciary duty provides a novel basis for a right to housing.
Second, the State has a fiduciary duty to protect public property’s shared value and secure freedom in the public sphere, meaning outside of one’s home. This duty is justified by the following considerations. The State provides a system of public property so that individuals can travel and do things outside of their homes without being subject to others’ power of exclusion.Footnote 182
The State regulates public property so that individuals can use public space on equal terms and respect each other’s liberty in open-access spaces.Footnote 183 In the same way as the State establishes a private property system to secure freedom in the private sphere, it provides a public property system to secure freedom in the public sphere.Footnote 184 The State must fulfil this second fiduciary duty to counteract domination outside of one’s home. However, the State fails to accommodate unhoused persons within its system of laws that govern public property, which results in domination.Footnote 185
Third, the State has a fiduciary duty to legitimize coercion and punishment associated with laws that govern public property. The State must fulfil this third fiduciary duty to ensure that it regulates public property in a manner that does not constitute vertical domination and does not entrench individuals in homelessness. The State increasingly fulfils this duty when coercion and punishment associated with laws that govern public property are increasingly legitimate.
Coercion is more legitimate when individuals enjoy the undominated choice to obey these laws.Footnote 186 Freedom to comply with the law helps ensure that coercion respects human agency and that the duty to obey the law is imposed more fairly.Footnote 187 Punishment, for its part, is more legitimate when it is consistent with its two principal justifications: retributivism and consequentialism.Footnote 188 Beyond the freedom to obey the law, the State must satisfy two other requirements to legitimize the punishment associated with laws that govern public property: proportionality and instrumental rationality (the latter means that punishment is a logical means to achieve its end).Footnote 189 Together, these two constraints ensure that punishment neither entrenches individuals in homelessness nor subjects individuals to vertical domination.Footnote 190
The concluding parts of this book highlight the connection between the State’s fulfilment of its three fiduciary duties. By ending homelessness and treating unhoused persons with equal respect, the State can better fulfil its other fiduciary duties. When individuals have access to housing, the State can regulate public property more effectively and protect its shared value because individuals have an alternative to alleviating their needs on public property. Furthermore, because individuals have such an alternative, coercion and punishment associated with laws that govern public property are more legitimate. The State better fulfils its fiduciary duty to end homelessness and safeguard public property’s value when its punishments respect proportionality and instrumental rationality requirements, and ultimately, do not entrench individuals in homelessness. The State abdicates its overarching fiduciary duty to counteract domination when it does not fulfil one (or many) of these specific fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property.
This book’s final chapter provides a framework for how the State can better fulfil these fiduciary obligations. Building on existing empirical research, the final chapter offers a set of concrete proposals for how the State can attempt to end homelessness and treat unhoused persons with equal respect, maintain public property’s shared value, and legitimize laws that govern public property.
I.2 Summary of Chapters
The structure of this book is as follows. Chapter 1 sets out the historical and contemporary regulation of public property. It details the rise and fall of vagrancy statutes, and the increased use of municipal ordinances to regulate homelessness in Canadian and US cities. It provides an overview of the types of ordinances that govern individuals’ need-alleviating acts, such as laws that proscribe urban camping, sleeping on public property, public urination, and more. This first chapter concludes with an overview of homelessness, including its risk factors, prevalence, and consequences, as well as the overrepresentation of individuals from certain communities within the unhoused population.
Chapter 2 explores the main constitutional challenges to laws that govern public property in Canada and the United States. These laws have been attacked on the grounds that they: (1) are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, (2) violate the right to equal protection, (3) breach the fundamental right to travel, and (4) impose cruel and unusual punishments. This chapter analyzes the successes and failures of these claims. It also explores the reasons why courts have rejected a positive right to housing.
Chapter 3 examines the relationship between property and two conceptions of liberty: positive and negative. It canvasses the existing scholarship on how housing protects positive freedom (meaning liberty as self-actualization) and negative freedom (meaning liberty as noninterference). It shows how laws that govern public property undermine both forms of freedom.
Chapter 4 introduces the republican theory of liberty. It demonstrates why republicanism offers new insight into both homelessness and the regulation of public property in ways that positive and negative theories of freedom do not. It sets out why laws that govern public property subject unhoused persons to two forms of domination. Namely, others exert control over unhoused persons’ opportunities to obey these laws, and unhoused persons must make nonegalitarian sacrifices to abide by them. This fourth chapter elucidates why unhoused persons lack liberty in all its forms: positive, negative, and republican. Its concluding parts highlight why unhoused persons’ unfreedom undermines their political equality.
Chapter 5 argues that unhoused persons are vulnerable to nonegalitarian coercion, meaning that the State has greater power to regulate and police unhoused persons compared to people with access to housing. Its opening parts distinguish between the roles of private and public property. It then demonstrates why the State has more power to regulate and police need-alleviating conduct that occurs on public property than on private property. It explains how laws that govern public property operate differently for people with and without access to housing. Ultimately, this chapter shows why unhoused persons face domination that people with access to housing do not.
Chapter 6 discusses punitive entrenchment. It describes how fines, fees, surcharges, and incarceration enmesh individuals in the condition of homelessness, where they suffer nonegalitarian coercion. It explains how the consequences of criminal justice debt – such as criminal records and driver’s license suspensions – worsen punitive entrenchment. It explores why punitive entrenchment is inconsistent with the two principal justifications for punishment: retributivism and consequentialism.
Chapter 7 discusses the State’s overarching fiduciary duty to counteract domination, and its three specific fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property. It begins by introducing the republican theory of government and shows why the State is in a fiduciary relationship with the population. It explains why the State has an overarching fiduciary obligation to secure liberty in the private and public spheres. It explores why the State creates a system of private property rights and regulates public property to achieve that end. Yet unhoused persons face domination because the State does not accommodate them within these systems of mutual coercion. This chapter demonstrates why the State has three fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property which aim to counteract that domination. First, the State must end homelessness and treat unhoused persons with equal respect, which provides a novel justification for the right to housing. Second, the State must maintain public property’s shared value and secure liberty in the public sphere. Third, the State must legitimize laws that govern public property.
Chapter 8 defends the State’s three fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property. It demonstrates why other ameliorative and coercive mechanisms that address homelessness either fail to reduce domination or exacerbate it. These mechanisms include increased shelter spaces, zoning proposals, concentration strategies, and dispersal tactics. It also shows why encampments cannot constitute a complete justification, meaning that unhoused persons cannot permanently and unconditionally appropriate public property when they lack access to housing. However, in certain circumstances, encampments can be temporarily and partially justifiable where individuals lack access to housing and to other adequate alternatives and when the benefits of encampments outweigh their burdens. The fact that unhoused persons cannot justifiably establish permanent encampments to eliminate domination underpins a State duty to ensure access to housing.
Chapter 9 concludes this book. It offers concrete proposals for how the State may better fulfil its three fiduciary duties. It demonstrates how the State’s duty to end homelessness is comprised of three elements: addressing the risk factors associated with homelessness, ensuring access to housing, and providing inclusive emergency and interim resources for individuals who become unhoused. It provides an overview of mechanisms that may help reduce homelessness and treat individuals with equal respect. Chapter 9 explores various mechanisms that may help prevent and rectify punitive entrenchment, such as avoiding incarceration, implementing graduated economic sanctions (or day fines), embracing collateral consequence minimalism, and ensuring criminal justice debt absolution.
Together, these chapters illuminate the important relationship between homelessness, liberty, and property. Republicanism is the thread that ties these different concepts together. It is the foundation of this book and its concrete proposals that aim to counteract domination, and ultimately, treat unhoused persons with greater concern and respect.
