The author intends by “empire of the Raj” the Indian subimperial sphere in the western Indian Ocean. His account is an administrative/diplomatic history of the demarcation of authority over this sphere of influence. The interested parties are the Government of Bombay; the viceroy in Calcutta, supervised by the India Office; and the Foreign and Colonial Offices in Whitehall. This book is very much an imperial history, illuminating the role of the Raj in this region and only a minor addition to general histories of East Africa and the Middle East in this period. Blyth writes clearly, and his revised thesis is scholarly and well organized. It is not, however, a book for undergraduates looking for a guide to the imperial and Indian history of this region, although scholars might wish to pursue its references. Several archives in London (Oriental and India Office Collection, British Library, National Archives at Kew, even the House of Lords) and the National Archives of India in New Delhi were consulted. An impressively wide range of secondary sources is used to serve the very technical and specialist focus of this author.
A good example of this is the treatment of Persia before 1890 as a footnote to the “Great Game” with Russia. A characteristic quotation from George Nathaniel Curzon preserves the imperial mindset: beyond India's sea and land frontiers extended “a glacis of varying breadth and dimension. We do not want to occupy it, but also we cannot afford to see it occupied by our foes” (p. 25). Yet the chapter on Persia and the Persian Gulf shows that imperial interests eventually predominated over Indian ones. A similar tale is told of the consular arrangement at Zanzibar: an Indian agency was taken over by the Foreign Office (FO). Here, there was an initial involvement because of the abolitionist remit of the FO, although this was to cease after the Sultan of Zanzibar ended the slave trade. The Bombay “forward policy” of the 1860s and early 1870s was subimperial and annexationist, following earlier intervention in dynastic politics in 1870, but it stopped. The Omani dynasty, which ruled Zanzibar and Muscat, needed subsidizing. The fiscal wrangling between the treasury, which accepted the Muscat subsidy, and India meant India continued to pay for many years, although the consulate at Zanzibar was transferred in 1883 through the efforts of the acting consul, John Kirk. His role in the “scramble for Africa” is known; this story is not.
Somaliland became involved after the 1890s. It had been part of the Indian sphere from the time of the occupation of Aden (1839). “Fortress Aden,” a hub of naval strategy, was dependent on the Somali coast for its meat supplies. Aden was underpinned not only by the government of India during this period but also by Indian settlement and capital. The opening of the Suez Canal and the accompanying upsurge of imperial rivalry was complicated by Egypt's own drive to the Somali coast. The Red Sea coast and the Horn of Africa became unstable. The result was that the Somali coast was transferred to imperial control only in 1898, but Aden remained an Indian dependency until the imminent threat of losing India forced the British to accept it into the empire of Whitehall in 1937.
Despite the thrust of his title, Blyth shows how little force there was in the “empire of the Raj” and how constrained it was by Whitehall imperatives and not the needs of its subjects, findings which pace those who argue that colonial states must represent the latter. The government of India (and still more the Secretary of State and India Office in London) was a poor servant of the Indian people and their diasporas. The East African story is a good example retold here. The Indians were the dominant settler community numerically before World War I. Sir Harry Johnson saw East Africa as the “America of the Hindu.” White settlers opposed this. Indian forces won the East Africa campaign but not the peace. M. A. Desai, a leading Indian politician in Kenya, first suggested to the duke of Devonshire that African interests should be preeminent (p. 125). Devonshire took the cue. However, “native paramountcy” (p. 127) in 1923 did not undermine white privilege, Indian government objections to anti-Indian discrimination notwithstanding. In every case, imperial interests won out. Consider Iraq, where there was also an Indian colonization scheme mooted (p. 136). The Middle East stayed outside the Raj after 1918, despite viceregal ambitions. Long historical ties were sundered. There is no doubt where real power lay, despite Blyth's story of “departmentalism” and interdepartmental wrangling.
Flagrant examples occur of policy positions shifting after a change in post—and not only in Curzon's case. Not even the rise of responsible government in India during the interwar period quite dented the pattern, although it did allow the viceroy the useful alibi of needing to consult the local assemblies in India. Equating administrative division with subimperialism is exaggerated, although Blyth has added footnotes to Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians. After centuries of trade, migration, and cultural contact (which are what excite me about the area), the western Indian Ocean and its hinterland became part of Britain's moment in the Middle East because India was always subordinated to British interests.
