Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2004
Despite the much-discussed court cases in the 1970s that permitted some sibling-to-sibling kidney donations from minors,1 principles that can guide parental, medical, or judicial decisionmaking are neither clearly articulated nor uncontroversial.
Despite the much-discussed court cases in the 1970s that permitted some sibling-to-sibling kidney donations from minors,1
Fost N. Children as renal donors. New England Journal of Medicine 1977;296(7):363–7.
Like nontherapeutic research, organ donation is not undertaken for the benefit of the donor. Thus the best-interest standard, which has become the gold standard for decisionmaking for children in other contexts,2
Griffith DB. The best interests standard: a comparison of the state's parens patriae authority and judicial oversight in best interests determinations for children and incompetent patients. Issues in Law and Medicine 1991:3:283–338.
Yet, lives can be saved by organ transplants, and cadaver organs are in short supply. Currently, kidney donations are rarely if ever needed from a minor, because adult organs can be used or dialysis can sustain life until a donor is found (Andrew Bremm, M.D., personal communication). Liver donation, however, cannot be postponed in the same way. There is no treatment analogous to dialysis that can buy time and sustain vital functions until an appropriate organ becomes available, and deterioration of the child's condition can be rapid. “[T]iming for liver transplantation is of utmost importance to ensure a successful outcome… .”3
Esquivel C. Children's Liver Association for Support Services, 1999. Available at: http://www.classkids.org/library/childtx.htm.
Parents can be donors, because innovative surgical techniques have been developed that require only a portion of a healthy liver.4
Rosenthal P. Children's Liver Association for Support Services, 1999. Available at: http://www.classkids.org/library/lrlt.htm.
Not all parents or other relatives are potential donors, however. If the adult suffers from hepatitis, heart disease, hypertension, diabetes, or a number of other fairly common medical conditions, then that person is ruled out as a donor.5
See note 4, Rosenthal 1999.
Although liver donation is fairly safe, with donor survival 100% and complications rare,6
See note 4, Rosenthal 1999.
As medical technology advances, ethical questions need to be reexamined. The possibility of living related liver donation presents a good test case to reopen the issue of organ donations from minors. Should donations from minor siblings be allowed?
I address this question in two parts: (1) May parents consent to something that is not in the child's best interest? and (2) what should be required for a child's informed and voluntary assent?
It is at best a convoluted and perhaps disingenuous argument to say, as the courts have said, that it is in the best interest of a minor to sacrifice a healthy kidney. Granted that there may be psychological and practical benefits to having a sibling survive into adulthood and some increase in self-esteem for the child who is a successful donor, it is still a stretch of ordinary meaning to say that undergoing major surgery with no therapeutic benefit to oneself is in one's own “best interest.”
There are other serious criticisms of the best-interest standard, as well. It is inherently vague and difficult to determine. Often there is bitter disagreement about what constitutes a child's best interest, so the matter is decided more by determining who the legitimate decisionmaker is rather than by any objective standard.
The strength of the best-interest standard is that it directs attention to the welfare of the child and, for example, in the case of custody decisions, serves as a safeguard against the child being treated as a piece of property to be awarded to the “winning” parent. Applied to parental decisionmaking, however, it imposes excessive restrictions on a family. It requires that the well-being of the individual child in the sense of his self-regarding interest be the only consideration. It offers no guidelines for resolving situations where the best interest of one child conflicts with that of another in the same family. It also requires surrendering legitimate parental interests to those of children.
Nicholson cited a case that illustrates the tensions that can exist in trying to fulfill the interests of all parties.7
Nicholson RH. In the family's best interests. Hastings Center Report 1997;27(1):4.
Are these parents being selfish? Are they bad parents? What should guide their decision, given that the best interests of all cannot be served? Clearly, the best-interest standard is not much help here.
Lainie Friedman Ross criticized the best-interest standard because it disregards the nature of intimate families and denies the right of parents to decide for the welfare of the whole family, which is not necessarily the same as the best interest of any one child. She qualified her position, claiming that this right of parents holds only in the content of intimacy.8
Friedman Ross L. Children, Families, and Health Care Decision Making. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1998.
Unfortunately, not all families are intimate, and there are insurmountable practical difficulties in affirming a necessary link between intimacy and the scope of parental discretion in decisionmaking. Is a family relationship intimate simply by self-description? Can divorced parents be said to be in an intimate family relationship with each other and their children? Can parents have an intimate relationship with one sibling but not with another?
In addition to parental consent, child assent to organ donation is also required.9
American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics. Informed consent, parental permission, and assent in pediatric practice. Pediatrics 95:314–7.
Frader J. Ethical issues in pediatric organ transplantation. In: Cassidy R, Fleischman A, eds. Pediatric Ethics: From Principles to Practice. Amsterdam: Harwood; 1996.
In the 1970s cases, the courts appealed to a second principle intertwined with the best-interest standard. In some cases, the decisive factor lay in the nature of the relationship between the donor and the recipient sibling. In Curran v. Bosze, the court cited three factors that determine whether the best interest of the child is met, the third of which was that “there must be an existing, close relationship between the donor and recipient.”11
Griner RW. Live organ donations between siblings and the best interest standard: time for stricter judicial intervention. Georgia State Law Review 1994;10(9):589–613.
According to the court's reasoning, when a close relationship exists between siblings, it can be assumed that donation will be of psychological benefit to the donor.12
See note 11, Griner 1994.
Curran WJ. Beyond the best interests of a child: bone marrow transplantation among half-siblings. New England Journal of Medicine 1991;324(25):1818–9.
At the time when donation was medically feasible only for twins, it seemed safe to assume an intimate relationship between them. Now that nontwin matches are successful, it seems reasonable that the nature of the relationship play a central role in determining conditions for morally acceptable donation. To ask or expect someone to donate a vital organ to someone who is actually or virtually a stranger goes beyond the normal limits of altruism, even for adults.
On the other hand, we may ask if a close family relationship changes the moral landscape. For adults, we can ask if such relationships create special obligations. For children, we may want to phrase the question not in terms of obligations, for children are and should be exempt from many duties that are required of adults. We can ask instead if a close relationship between siblings would be relevant to the acceptability of donation from a minor because it is an indication of the voluntariness of the donor child's assent.
There is a presumption that it is natural and appropriate to put oneself at risk or suffer serious discomfort to benefit a family member. But we must be cautious about building a moral argument on this basis. A blood or genetic relationship cannot be considered either necessary or sufficient to justify a minor's organ donation. One might have a very strong desire to donate to an adopted brother or sister with whom one shares a home and with whom one has built up an intimate relationship, just as husbands and wives are sometimes moved to donate a kidney to the other. Thus, blood relationship is not necessary to establishing the kind of close relationship that would be relevant to the acceptability of donation.
Neither is blood relationship a sufficient criterion, for a long-lost sibling or biological parent who suddenly enters one's life may exert very little claim on the emotions that lead to altruism.
It should be noted, also, that the strength of both emotional and moral claims of close family membership is culturally determined. In some societies, for example, one can always count on even distant and relatively unknown relatives to share food and resources when one is in need. The concept of family is extended broadly, and the family serves a wide spectrum of individual needs that are met in other societies by more formal, impersonal social structures such as social welfare programs.
Writing within the context of contemporary Western society, the philosopher Jane English asked in a much discussed article: What do grown children owe their parents?14
English J. What do grown children owe their parents? In: O'Neill O, Ruddick W, eds. Having Children: New York: Oxford University Press; 1979.
A similar argument can be made about siblings. Siblings do not owe each other anything, and this is why organ donation, if it is to take place at all, must be voluntary on the child's part. But the closeness of a relationship may lead one to desire to help the other, even at considerable cost to oneself, and the nature of the relationship provides a guide to deciding when it is truly voluntary and may be allowed.
There is at present no definitive understanding of the psychosocial response of well children to their siblings with chronic illness.15
Bluebond-Langner M. In the Shadow of Illness: Parents and Siblings of the Chronically Ill Child. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 1996.
In Little Women, for example, we see the central character, Jo, devoting all her time and energy to ministering to her sister Beth through Beth's final illness. The author, having lived through a similar experience in her own life, comments that “Jo, living in the darkened room … learned to feel how deep and tender a place she [Beth] filled in all hearts.”16
Alcott LM. Little Women. New York: Random House; 1987.
With this kind of example in mind, it should not be too difficult to devise some measure of the emotional closeness of sibling relationships. One might assess the quality of everyday interactions: How much time do the siblings spend together? Is the well sibling protective of the ill child? Does the well child seem to enjoy helping to care for the ill child or try to avoid being with him or her? Are there spontaneous expressions of empathy, or are there many unresolved issues of jealousy and bids for attention?
Surely, psychologists can assess the nature of the sibling relationship as well as the competence of the child to understand the risks and benefits of being a donor. Indeed, some have suggested that “enhanced consent procedures” used to ensure minors' understanding of treatment decisions may result in children actually being better informed than more adult parents,17
Redding RE. Children's competence to provide informed consent for mental health treatment. Washington and Lee Law Review 1993;50:695–751.
There are several possible objections to my argument that warrant discussion. It has been argued that, because there is no duty for an adult to donate organs, then there is no justification to subject a child to organ donation when no definitive, nonspeculative benefit to the donor can be shown.18
See note 11, Griner 1994.
However, there are several safeguards in place. Child assent is required because parental consent without child assent would amount to requiring of a child a degree of altruism that we do not ever require of adults. However, before child assent is considered, parental consent is required. The child's assent is always premised on the condition of prior parental consent. Child assent then requires that two conditions be met: understanding and voluntariness.
Evidence is mounting that minors are competent to understand and make essentially the same medical decisions that adults make.19
Brock D. Children's competence for health care decision-making. In: Kopleman L, Moskop J, eds. Children and Health Care: Moral and Social Issues. Dordrecht: Kluwer; 1989.
For young children or those with mental disabilities who cannot be shown to have understanding of what organ donation entails, parental consent and a close relationship with a dying sibling would not be sufficient to allow liver donation. They would, in effect, be ruled out as donors. I would leave open the possibility of having different guidelines for less-demanding procedures such as blood or bone-marrow donation.
Another possible objection might be that allowing sibling donation based on the quality of the relationship may open the door to allowing donation to nonsiblings. It is true that, as unrelated adult donors become more common, our acceptance of nonsibling minor donors may increase. If it is the case that a cousin or a friend shares a close siblinglike relationship with a child and the child volunteers, then organ donation might indeed be acceptable. There is still the requirement for parental consent as a safeguard against the exploitation of children as organ donors.
Two conditions must be met to give moral justification for a minor's liver donation to a sibling. First, parents must give consent, as in any other medical decision for minors. I have argued that parents may consent to organ donation, even though it is not in the (very) best interest of the donor child.
The second condition is that the child must give assent. The child's understanding must be determined in the usual ways, and further, I have argued, the child's voluntariness may be judged in relation to the quality of the sibling relationship. Whereas there is no obligation to offer to donate, assent may be considered valid if the child has understanding and shares a close relationship with the ill sibling.