The appellants were Iranian nationals whose asylum claims had been rejected by the Secretary of State and whose subsequent tribunal appeals had been unsuccessful. Both had become Christians and worshipped at the Tron Church, Glasgow, and both produced supporting evidence as to the genuineness of their faith from a number of individuals at the church; however, the lower tribunals did not believe that their conversions were genuine and refused both appeals. The appellants claimed a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Iran and the Secretary of State did not dispute that converts from Islam to Christianity did, in fact, face such a risk.
Before the Inner House, the crucial issue was that the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) judge had found both TF and MA to be lacking in credibility and, by implication therefore, that the FTT and the Upper Tribunal (UT) had chosen to dismiss the evidence of the minister and elders of the Tron Church as to the genuineness of the appellants’ conversions. The court said that it had no doubt that expert evidence – both opinion evidence and evidence of fact – was admissible and could be given by members of the church. There was a separate question as to the weight to be given to such evidence, and mere assertion was worthless; however, there was a certain type of expert evidence, based on personal observation or sensation on matters such as quality of workmanship or the artistic or literary merits of a work of art, that was difficult to substantiate in that way. As to how such evidence should be assessed, given that the witnesses had observed many people undertaking courses with a view to baptism and becoming members of the church, and had seen some succeed and some fail, they were able to assess individuals over time and to say that, in their opinion, based on their experience of this individual and many others, the individual in question was or appeared to be genuine. Though it was ultimately for the court or tribunal to make the final decision, it was admissible opinion evidence which was entitled to respect and the exercise should not start with any predisposition to reject the evidence because it did not fit in with some view formed as to the credibility of the appellant. The evidence should be considered on its merits and without any preconception – based upon an assessment of the individual appellants – that it was suspect or otherwise fell to be disregarded.
The Inner House disagreed with the conclusion of the UT that, in each case, there had been no error of law in the decision of the FTT and no lack of adequate reasoning. In the case of TF, the FTT judge had failed to grapple with the problem of there being independent evidence supporting the appellant's claim to have converted to Christianity and the fact that, if it was just a pretence, he managed to pull the wool over the eyes of those who were in the best position to assess his sincerity. The FTT and the UT had erred in law in both cases, had failed properly to take account of the independent evidence relating to the genuineness of the appellants’ conversions and had failed to give adequate reasons for disregarding that evidence. The two appeals were allowed, the decisions of the FTT and the UT were set aside, and the appeals against the decisions of the Secretary of State were remitted to a differently constituted FTT for a rehearing in each case. The issue of expenses was reserved. [Frank Cranmer]