This intriguing and provocative book begins by presenting Webster's “Adams and Jefferson” address as “a concise statement of the central truths of persuasion” (1), a work showing that “true eloquence results not merely in words or speeches but in action” (3). Kochin focuses on political and scientific communities as two examples of the “common” structures through which speakers and writers persuade and are persuaded (5). His aim is to understand the role of the art of rhetoric in mobilizing knowledge (12). Character is central because “virtually all of our knowledge about actions and facts is mediated by our judgment … of those who communicate with us,” particularly judgments of their actions (14). Speakers persuade with “things,” concrete illustrations and specific factual claims. “Nothing” concerns how speech sustains human relations when we face challenges to our beliefs, and “Art” analyzes how rhetoric offers limited but significant assistance in clarifying things (13). Kochin dismisses argument and appeals to emotions, emphasizing instead the centrality of illustration and example; when inference becomes necessary, the audience should be doing it. Emotion is treated as a “junk category” that lumps together unrelated rhetorical devices (15); instead, it is “things” that arouse passions.
The role of character is illustrated by the web of trust that constitutes science, requiring deference to authority in order to build on what has been discovered, and acceptance of such things binds the community of, say, particle physics together. Kochin writes: “To change our beliefs is to change who and what we trust” (23), a challenge to the notion of rational argumentation free of appeals to feeling or character. Character emerges in action, illustrated by On the Crown in which Demosthenes argues that he alone saw what action was required in the circumstances. Simultaneously, however, the speaker must remain one of the people, illustrated by the ability of patrician Franklin Roosevelt to speak to Americans as his peers or “friends.” Carter, Gore, and Reagan illustrate unsuccessful and successful efforts to project character; George Washington exemplifies political self-invention (42).
Kochin's dictum, “To show character, show an action; to show an action, tell a story” (56), is illustrated from the political careers of Richard M. Daley, John Glenn, and Eisenhower. Character, as inferred from past action, is a predictor of future action, illustrated again by Demosthenes. In explaining that rhetoric is not just about sharing ideas but also about sharing things, he refers to Michael McGee's view that options are collectively constituted, not just collectively known. Rhetoric is the effort to form and narrow options, to move audiences from seeing possibilities to mobilizing them to act on a few salient alternatives (82). Rhetoric is about things constituted and then communicated. Kochin asserts that one inspires anger by presenting things that make us angry, pity by presenting things that are pitiable. In other words, “the emotions take place in the audience,” in the words of playwright David Mamet (84), illustrated by the impact of Reagan's simple words, “These are the boys of Pointe du Hoc, these are the men who climbed these cliffs,” in commemorating the fortieth anniversary of D-Day. Scientists persuade through figures, numbers, and illustrations—hard data; so did General George Patton in his speech to the troops! That kind of evidence is linked to enargeia, bringing before the eyes through detailed description, illustrated by the anecdotes and names that conclude Menachem Begin's 1981 speech that made him prime minister. As the author notes, it takes a lot of work to make things speak for themselves.
The alternative to not saying anything in a situation that seems to call for speech is to speak and say nothing, the “nothing” that maintains community. Eisenhower is described as a master of saying nothing to back up a policy of doing nothing, that is, avoiding action that would provoke the use of nuclear weapons, a policy required in the complicated circumstances of the Cold War (113). One member of Congress is described as “a master of binds, links, ties, and memories” (115). “The power of reason to persuade must somehow be tempered by human relations, if speech is to be kept within its humane bounds” (118), that is, what we say must be modified to take account of relationships and to preserve them.
Kochin compares the art of rhetoric to the process by which furniture is stripped and then polished to reveal the “natural” grain. He cites Quintilian's view of art as requiring “us to be active, to conceal the work we do to make the truth credible so as to move others to act on it” (127). To understand the power of rhetoric, the right place to start is with the art of clarification (128), an art he contrasts to views of rhetoric as crafting all-powerful speeches or as mere adornment. What follows is a detailed analysis of Gorgias's views in On What Is Not and Encomium of Helen compared to Plato's views in Gorgias. The result is a dismissal of the “sauce view of rhetoric” and an espousal of the view that rhetoric cannot be separated from the substance of governing; moreover, it is indispensable for governing many. Leaders sell themselves by the measures they propose; hence, as Peggy Noonan claimed, great speeches come from great policy, also illustrated by Ted Sorenson's influence through speechwriting in the Cuban missile crisis. Why do some politicians fail to integrate speeches and policy? They do not understand that the most effective style is language that presents clearly a proposed course of action, giving the audience the sense that the speaker has mastered the reasons for action and why the reasons that favor this policy outweigh those for alternatives. Sophistry, then, can be understood as an ethical choice, a choice of lives, not a choice of words.
In his conclusion, Kochin contrasts “an art of persuasive communication that aims to present things clearly and … a defensive art whose aim is to disparage the authority of speech and thereby preserve the existing fabric of human relations from the corrosive power of things. By the latter art the speaker tries to draw attention to himself or herself; to seduce” (152). Gorgias is the theorist of this second, defensive art. The principal part of the other art is the arrangement and presentation of reasons and facts relevant to the action being urged, of calling attention to them in ways that make them salient. “Clarity is thus the principal supplement that the conscious art of rhetoric offers to natural eloquence” (156).
In the postscript on how to analyze a speech he offers a critique of Moshe Dayan's 1956 eulogy of Roy Rotenberg as a speech whose purpose was to persuade the audience to close its ears to other speeches, the voices of peace, a message made more salient by Dayan's personal history.
