In this comprehensive study, Jacob Shamir and Khalil Shikaki examine the significant role of public opinion in determining the outcomes of Palestinian–Israeli peace negotiations between 2000 and 2006. The book offers a rich and detailed study of this critical six-year period, during which Ehud Barak and Yasir ʿArafat sought—unsuccessfully—to settle the outstanding disputes between Palestine and Israel. More important, however, Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion offers an authoritative account of the ways in which public opinion responded to and structured the negotiations of elites.
The book is ambitious in scope. It makes a solid theoretical contribution to conflict-resolution literature by focusing on the role of public opinion in two-level games (i.e., negotiations at the domestic and international levels). Not only do elites shape the nature of negotiations but also they are constrained by the domestic preferences of the citizens they represent. Empirically, this book is a tour de force, providing a masterful accumulation of public opinion data and outlining the salient issues pertaining to the ongoing dispute. The data emerges from an impressive research project: the Joint Israeli–Palestinian Poll. The Joint Israeli–Palestinian Poll was administered to both publics between 2000 and 2006. Notably, it contains a reconciliation scale and a final status index. These two measures tell us the degree to which both publics are willing to embrace a two-state solution.
With impeccable detail, Shamir and Shikaki trace the role of public opinion during the major events surrounding the peace process. Too often, only one side of this conflict is blamed for not accepting the position of the other. Yet, at the Camp David talks of 2000, the authors tell us, both publics were not supportive of the necessary compromises their leaders had to make in order to achieve peace. Furthermore, the leaderships had done very little to prepare their publics for the sacrifices that would be necessary to reach a two-state solution. With little public backing, and the fear of making irreversible deals on such thorny issues as the future of Jerusalem, Camp David failed. As the book shows, only 41 percent of the Israeli public embraced the idea of a Palestinian state on 90 percent of the land in the West Bank. In fact, 56 percent of Israelis believed that this was too much of a compromise. On the Palestinian side, an almost equal percentage (only 43%) accepted the idea of a Palestinian state on 96 percent of the West Bank. In other words, Israelis felt that 90 percent of the West Bank was too generous, while Palestinians felt that 96 percent of the West Bank was insufficient. Divisions were greater on thornier issues such as Jerusalem. On the issue of Jerusalem, equal percentages of both publics—57 percent—rejected the various proposals for joint rule of Jerusalem. In fact, both publics believed their leaders were making too many compromises on issues relating to security, Jerusalem, settlements, and borders.
The book demonstrates the ways in which leaders on both sides used public opinion to justify their positions. Both Barak and ʿArafat felt pressure not to compromise too greatly at the negotiating table given the relative dissatisfaction of their publics with the compromises that would have been necessary to reach a deal. These strategies backfired, as the Camp David talks broke down. In the aftermath of the talks, both publics moved to the right of the political spectrum, the second initifada unfolded, and elections in Palestine and Israel brought to power leaders who were uninterested either in pushing the peace process further or in moving public opinion toward a reconciliatory framework. Hardened positions on the right of the political spectrum ensued, along with a belief that peace was no longer possible.
Anyone interested in what Palestinians and Israelis think about the peace process must read this book. Too often, the peace-building strategy in the Arab world has been based on bilateral treaties between Israel and its neighbors, without the full support of citizens. Shamir and Shikaki's work dramatizes the limitations of this strategy, showing that successful peace agreements require the support and legitimacy of populations. This book emphasizes the constraints of leaders (even autocratic ones) when confronted with publics that do not support the unilateral decisions of their leaderships—especially when brokering unpopular peace treaties. Thus, both Shamir and Shikaki remind us of the importance of public opinion as both a constraint and an opportunity to push the peace process forward.
While much of the book focuses on how leaders are constrained by public opinion, more could have been said about the ways in which leaders shape public opinion. What role did leaders such as ʿArafat and Barak play in hardening public opinion in the aftermath of Camp David? Furthermore, what role did leaders play in trying to win over public opinion in the “other” camp? If public opinion matters, then one would have expected that both leaders would have done more to signal to the “other” population the merits and benefits of peace. The lack of such a strategy suggests either that the strategizing itself was short sighted or perhaps that the leaderships themselves were half-heartedly committed to peace, and public opinion merely reflected that lack of commitment.
Nonetheless, Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion will be influential for years to come; students, policymakers, and those who monitor the Palestinian–Israeli conflict are encouraged to read it. Shamir and Shikaki nuance our understanding not only of the black and white oppositional categories of “us” and “them” but also of the actual events, advances, and setbacks involved in the Palestinian–Israeli peace negotiations from 2000 to 2006. The book illustrates the turbulence in public opinion across time, showing that public opinion matters for both populations and must be factored into any lasting peace equation.
