Thou hast been
As one in suff’ring all that suffers nothing,
A man that Fortune’s buffets and rewards
Hast ta’en with equal thanks; and blest are those
Whose blood and judgment are so well commeddled,
That they are not a pipe for Fortune’s finger
To sound what stop she please.
—Hamlet 3.2.65-71
Husserl distinguishes between reading with distinct judgments and reading with confused judgments. When we read with confused judgments, we are thinking ‘the author is making that kind of move’; but when we read with distinct judgments we are following the precise movement of the author’s thought.Footnote 1 Thoreau is concerned with the same distinction when he says that great poets need to be read astronomically rather than astrologically.Footnote 2 He understands what a demanding task reading with distinct judgments can be: “this only is reading, in a high sense … what we have to stand on tip-toe to read and devote our most alert and wakeful hours to.”Footnote 3
In this article, I show that when we read Republic 392c6-398b9 with distinct judgments, we find that it is one bad argument after another. But there is method in this madness. For example, Socrates argues that, because no one will perform well if they try to practise many arts, each person can practise no more than one art well (394e2-6). This little argument commits a false dilemma fallacy, because all the possibilities are not exhausted by the alternatives ‘one’ and ‘many’. But then at 397e1-2 we find the following formulation: “there is no twofold or manifold person among us, since everyone does one thing.” Though Thoreau might well be overstating the case when he claims, “The works of the great poets have never yet been read by mankind, for only great poets can read them,”Footnote 4 it does take a certain ear to hear that Plato is purposely acknowledging that false dilemma when he says “twofold.” As we proceed in our exegesis of these very demanding pages, we shall try to listen with sensitive ears.
I argue that Plato is not serious when he has Socrates deduce that poetry must be so monotonous in form as to be mostly narrative with just a little dialogue and that the only characters of a poem who can be allowed to participate in the poem’s dialogue are the characters who are good. I will demonstrate that not only is the argumentation purposely flawed, but that Plato also has Socrates purposely obfuscate a key distinction. Indeed he even has Socrates pretend to be confused by his own obfuscation.
Commentators on Plato generally tend to ignore the bad argumentation with which his work is replete, and focus more on the results of his arguments. But when we realize that this very intelligent man is making logical mistakes on purpose, we cannot relate to his results apart from the arguments that establish them. We need to think dialectically as we read, bearing in mind how individual points follow (or do not follow) from preceding points. We shall see that the failure to think backwards in this way is responsible for a great many of the logical mistakes that are made in our short section of the dialogue. Thus, part of what this section is trying to accomplish is to accentuate the importance of seeing how each new point of an argument is related to the points that have preceded it.
As we work our way through the hurly-burly of Plato’s arguments, we come to a passage in which Socrates tells us how people should not behave. As he describes stories that exhibit base behaviour, he is indicating that good behaviour is stoical indifference to one’s fortune whether good or bad (395d5-396e2). He does not deduce this claim from anything, but there is a very strong similarity between this claim and other undeduced claims, both before our section of the dialogue and after. That is, Plato develops a theme. He is using this literary device to show us how he really thinks we ought to act. At 381a3-4 a man of high character is said to be least disturbed by outside influence. At 387e6-7 a man of high character is described as being most indifferent merely to bad fortune. In our section of the dialogue, Plato now adds that one should also be indifferent to good fortune. This development is preserved after our section at 399a6-c1, where the nature of the music that guardians should hear is deduced from the need to express stoical indifference to both good fortune and bad. Thus, in addition to making points about proper argumentation, our section of the dialogue is endorsing being as stoical as possible: we should make the effort to take in stride whatever fortune sends our way.
These pages in the Republic therefore exemplify the playful use of the written word described at Phaedrus 275-276. There Socrates and Phaedrus distinguish between the living word, written with intelligence in the mind of the learner, and the written word that is merely an image of the living word (Phaedrus 276a5-9). What it means to lack the living word is demonstrated in the Meno by the slave’s superficial understanding of the fact that the way to double a square is to square the diagonal. After the slave has witnessed Socrates’ demonstration of a geometrical proof, Socrates observes, “those opinions have just been stirred up in him as in a dream; but if he were repeatedly asked these same questions in a variety of ways, you know he will in the end have as exact an understanding of them as anyone” (Meno 85c9-d1). To receive this living word into his soul—to have more than a dreamlike understanding of how the concepts involved are related to each other—the slave needs to do more than just repeat what he has been told. Hence the difficulty of the written word: it generally does not provide more than one way of approaching a problem. “Your readers will read many things without instruction and will therefore seem to know much, when they are for the most part ignorant” (Phaedrus 275a7-b1). When people who do not really see the underlying relationships act as if they have mastered the subject matter of the written word, “the written word always needs its father to help it; for it has no power to protect or help itself” (275e3-5). But, by forcing us to work our way through the thickets of his faulty argumentation, Plato gives us plenty of opportunity to become more deeply involved with the underlying issues and to discover his true concerns.
I. The Confusion Between the Three Styles of Narration and the Three Forms of Style and Narration
Having decided upon the proper content for the stories that are to be told to the future guardians as they grow up, Socrates begins our section of the dialogue by turning to the question of the proper style (lexis) for these stories (392c7-8). Adeimantus does not understand what Socrates means by ‘style’ (392c9-10), so Socrates explains that stories can be (1) simple narration, or (2) narration through imitation, or (3) a mixture of simple narration and narration through imitation (392d5-6). Narration through imitation occurs when a poet has his characters speak, for he thereby supposedly imitates their manner of speaking. When he does not employ any dialogue, we have simple narration (393a3-d2). A poem that contains nothing but imitative narration would be pure dialogue, and thus the two examples of pure imitative narration are tragedy and comedy (394b9-c2).
But at 396b10 Socrates will introduce two forms (eidos) of style (lexis) and narration that are different from the original two styles (lexis) of narration of 392d5-6. Just as the third style of narration was a mixture of the original two styles, Socrates will also introduce a third form of style and narration that is a mixture of these two new forms of style and narration (397d1-3). And just as Adeimantus indicated that he needed the meaning of the different styles of narration to be clarified for him (392c9-10), he also asks Socrates to explain the meaning of the different forms of style and narration (396c4). The good man’s form of style and narration will be in the mixed style of narration (i.e., it will have both simple narration and imitative narration), but there will be only a small portion of imitation in it (396e4-7). On the other hand, while the base man’s form of style and narration will also be in the mixed style of narration, it will be mostly imitation with just a little simple narration (397b2). Socrates asks which of three forms (mostly simple narration, mostly imitation, or a mixture of the two) should be admitted into their city (397d1-3).
Surely it is natural for Plato’s readers to feel that these forms of pure one way, pure the other way, or a mixture of the two ways are the original trichotomy of styles of narration (simple narration, imitative narration, or a mixture of these two styles).Footnote 5 Indeed, what is a combination of ‘simple narration with a little imitation’ and ‘imitation with a little simple narration’? It is a considerable amount of both simple narration and imitation. Is it really meaningful to say that a story that is, say, 60% simple and 40% imitative is a mixture of pure simple narration with a little imitation plus pure imitation with a little simple narration?Footnote 6 No, surely the only reason Plato has for introducing this second mixture (the mixture of the two forms of style and narration) is to confuse the superficial reader into thinking that he is still discussing the mixture in the original trichotomy (the mixture of the two styles of narration). In Book X he will have Socrates claim that they have excluded imitative poetry (one of the original two styles of narration) from their state altogether (595a1-5), when they have really excluded merely poetry that has too much imitation in it, i.e., he presents Socrates as having been fooled by his own obfuscation. Plato is calling upon us to do better than Socrates. We cannot allow ourselves to relate to the results of his arguments apart from the details that establish them; we are called upon to do a thorough analysis of the argument that they should exclude all poetry that has too much imitation in it. And then our close attention to the details of the arguments will lead us to discover Plato’s true concerns.
II. The Three Styles of Narration
A. The Argument that People Cannot Imitate Many Things Well (394e1-394e9)
Socrates begins his inquiry into the proper style of narration by asking whether they want their guardians to be good imitators (394e1-2). This question strikes a false note, because it is irrelevant to the task that he has proposed: Socrates is seeking to determine the style of the stories that should be told to the young guardians for the specific reason that the stories the young guardians hear will mold their characters (377b-c); we have been given no justification for investigating the actions in which they ought or ought not to engage.Footnote 7
i. The Basis for Rejecting the Idea that the Guardians Be Good Imitators
Socrates rejects the idea that the guardians should be good imitators on the grounds that they have already supposedly established that “each citizen could pursue only one practice well and not many, but, if he attempted many practices, dabbling in many things, he would fail to be of note in any of them” (394e2-6).Footnote 8 He is clearly referring back to the three reasons he gave for why specialization would be easier than having each individual do everything for himself.
Only the first of these three reasons seems applicable to his current claim: if one lets slip the crucial moment in any task, the work will come to naught because it will not wait upon the leisure of the workman (370b10-11). To avoid having his work come to naught, the worker supposedly “must treat it as his main occupation and not as an avocation” (370b8-c1).Footnote 9 (If one’s work comes to naught, then one would necessarily fail to be of note with respect to that activity.)
Socrates had only the two other reasons for why specialization would be easier: (1) people’s natures are not all alike—one person is naturally fitted for one task, and another for another (370b1-2); and (2) one does better when working at one task as opposed to working at many (370b4-5). (The point of the second reason seems to be that spending more time on an occupation yields greater expertise; thus [1] would have to do with nature and [2] would have to do with cultivation.) These considerations clearly do not preclude the possibility of a worker being of note in two occupations. (1) A Leonardo can have a broad enough genius to do well in many different types of work. (2) Leonardo might have been an even better painter if he had specialized in painting, but Lady with an Ermine is still good enough to make him noteworthy as a painter. Thus the only problem that could necessarily prevent one from being of note in different practices would be that of time constraints: one will fail to be of note because, if one lets slip the crucial moment in any task, the work will come to naught (370b7-8).
ii. The Failure of the Argument
While having two different main occupations would tend to cause conflicts to the extent that they require some tasks to be performed at certain times, surely Socrates is mistaken in implying that it is impossible to be successful in an avocation. Even as he brings up the idea of an avocation, he is indicating that all such activity is doomed to come to naught. The problem really lies in an assumption contained in the antecedent of the premise “if one lets slip the crucial moment in any task, the work will come to naught.” Not all tasks have crucial moments. For example, I have been writing this article in my spare time.
Initially, I was not sharp enough to catch the falsehood of 370b7-8, perhaps because Socrates prefaced it by saying that he took it to be obvious (370b7). I noticed the problem only because Socrates himself brought up the notion of an avocation (370b8-c1), and I then realized that he was implying that every single avocation must necessarily come to naught. It thus seems likely that Socrates purposely brought up the idea of an avocation to help the reader see the falsehood of his claim.
But even if it really were impossible to do an avocation successfully, Socrates’ position would still be untenable. At 397e4-8 he will say that the city they are developing is the only city in which workers limit themselves to no more than one occupation (in other cities the cobbler is not just a cobbler but also a pilot, and the farmer is not just a farmer but also a judge, etc.). Because Socrates is committed to the position that, in order to avoid having work come to naught, it must be the worker’s sole occupation (370b8-c1), it would necessarily follow that all the completed work in all the cities that have ever actually existed has come to naught.
There is a problem with Socrates’ wording of that to which they have previously agreed. When he says that they have agreed that a man can pursue well no more than one practice (epitêdeuma [394e3]), he is not merely saying that a man can pursue only one main occupation well. The meaning of epitêdeuma is more extensive than that of ‘occupation’, for at 395b8-c2 Socrates will appeal to the supposedly previously established principle that the guardians are to pursue no practice (epitêdeuein) that does not lead to good guardianship. Because he is, in that passage, envisioning the possibility of guardians pursuing those practices that do lead to good guardianship, and because all craftspeople—including guardians—are to pursue only one occupation, a practice must sometimes not be an occupation. (The only other possibility is that Socrates is simply contradicting himself here.) Thus the original position that they could not perform more than one occupation well is not as strong as Socrates’ new formulation that they could not perform even more than one practice well, and thus Socrates’ argument is not really grounded in what they had established earlier.
iii. An Obviously False Corollary
Socrates then deduces, as a corollary, the claim that a man cannot imitate many things as well as he can imitate one (394e8-9). The flaw in the original argument makes this corollary not necessarily true: imitating one thing need not be a main occupation (which, of course, it would not be). Imitation could be a successful avocation.
There is a second problem with this corollary. Let us call this new problem ‘Problem B’, and the problem that there would not necessarily be a time conflict ‘Problem A’. Plato was surely aware that imitating one thing could not possibly constitute a practice. Just as writing the letter ‘alpha’ would not be a different practice from writing the letter ‘beta’—both being a part of the general practice of writing—there could be a broad practice of imitation that includes imitating many individual things. Thus for the same reason that a person can write many different letters as well he can write one, it would be possible for a Jonathan Winters to imitate many things as well as he can imitate one. This ‘Problem B’ does not have to do with any problem in the argument from which the corollary is derived; it rather has to do with the fact that the result of that faulty argument might not be applicable to the particular case of imitating something, for that argument was only about the impossibility of performing two different practices well.
Surely very many first-time readers of the Republic have felt that Adeimantus is not really thinking when he agrees with Socrates that no one can imitate many things as well as he can imitate one. Adeimantus does not even consider the possibility that there might be a counter-example, let alone actually make the effort to try to find one.
B. The Argument that it is Impossible to Pursue a Practice and Imitate Many Things Well (395a1-395b6)
i. A Second Supposed Corollary but with a Caveat
Socrates claims that a second corollary follows a fortiori: “still less will anyone be able to pursue any worthy practice and also be an imitator who imitates many things” (395a1-2). The words “still less” show that Socrates is saying that, if imitating some one particular thing precludes pursuing other practices (which is the basis for the first corollary), it would hardly be possible to imitate many things and also pursue a practice. Note that Socrates is not thinking dialectically: in making this a fortiori move, he is not making the effort to consider how the reasoning that led to the first corollary would hold in this new case, he merely takes that reasoning as unproblematically holding in this new instance.
But then Socrates considers a reason that would be grounds for rejecting this second corollary. He says that this second corollary would hold provided that “the same man cannot practise well at the same time even the two forms of imitation that appear most nearly akin: the writing of tragedy and comedy” (395a3-5). This is ‘Problem B’: if there is a practice that is broad enough to include imitating more than one thing, then the problem of performing two practices at the same time might not arise.
ii. Socrates Obscures ‘Problem A’
Note that Socrates does not need to go to such broad forms of imitation as the writing of tragedy or comedy to establish his point. Even if no one has a genius broad enough to write both comedy and tragedy, if Jonathan Winters can practice an art merely as broad as that of imitating animals in general, then ‘Problem B’ would still defeat the preceding corollary.
When Socrates points out that those two forms of imitation are most nearly akin, he seems to be discouraging Adeimantus from looking for counter-examples, for they would have to be less nearly akin. Note also that it is by no means clear that writing comedy and writing tragedy are more nearly akin than are imitating a train whistle and imitating a squeaky door.
Socrates has just finished treating the imitation of one particular thing as constituting an entire practice, and now he is considering imitative arts as broad as the writing of comedy and the writing of tragedy. These have previously been identified as being imitative (394b9-c2), as Socrates proceeds to remind Adeimantus (395a5-6). Thus the critically engaged reader, who senses that there might be something wrong with the first corollary (i.e., the corollary that no one can imitate many things as well as he can imitate one), could be led to believe that the problem with that argument was merely that it presumed the practice of imitating something would not be a part of a practice with a greater extension (Problem B).Footnote 10 Indeed, Plato seems to be encouraging the reader to consider the possibility that perhaps Socrates is wrong here: perhaps writing comedy and writing tragedy are close enough that a Shakespeare could have a genius broad enough to include both. (Socrates is said to have argued for this exact possibility at Symposium 223d.Footnote 11) It is remarkable that Plato seems to be making things difficult for the critically engaged reader. Why would he want to make the reader work so hard to identify the original problem with his argument?
Socrates’ next move reemphasizes the importance of not being able to practice two activities at the same time, for he says that the same person cannot be a good rhapsode and a good actor at the same time (395a8). But he thus leaves open the possibility that someone could be good at these two different activities at different times (Problem A), thus cutting the ground out from under both corollaries—the second corollary merely being an a fortiori corollary of the first. The impossibility of performing the two crafts is relevant only if there is no reference to time conflict, but the impossibility of performing the two is true only when there is a time conflict (unless it also so happens to be the case that it is impossible for human talent to be broad enough to perform both activities well).
Socrates then drops the qualification about time as he cites a further set of examples: “Neither can the same men be actors for tragedies and comedies” (395a10-b1). Socrates’ point is now purely a point about the breadth of human talent, and the argument loses any necessity: how can Socrates and Adeimantus be sure that there are no such people? It might be that there are actors with such a broad genius but that Adeimantus and Socrates simply have not yet happened upon them. (I personally quite enjoy the way in which the generally tragic actor Richard Burton delivers Caliban’s comic line, “O ho, O ho! Would’t had been done!” [The Tempest 1.2.349].)
Socrates makes clear that the issue he has in mind has now become that everyone has a very limited natural forte as he concludes: “It appears to me that human nature has been divided up into smaller parts than this, so that it is incapable of imitating many things well, or of doing those things themselves of which the imitations are likenesses” (395b3-6).Footnote 12 But the fact that it appears to him that humans are incapable of imitating many things well does not mean that it is necessarily impossible. Indeed, we shall see that Socrates will shortly consider the possibility of just such an imitator coming to town (398a1-b8).
Even though this second corollary was an attempt to prove that no one can pursue a practice and also imitate many things well (395a1-2), Socrates has wound up merely trying to convince Adeimantus that human nature is too limited for a human being to be capable of imitating many things well; whether that human being happens to be pursuing a practice is no longer of significance).
C. What Young Guardians Should Not Imitate (395b8-396b9)
i. A New Argument Restricting what Guardians can be Clever at Imitating
Socrates’ argument seems to peter out at this point. He is no longer concerned with the issue of whether the guardians should be good imitators. He bases his argument on three new principles that have supposedly been previously established (395b8-c2). Only the first of these has actually been established: (1) the guardians are to be released from all other occupations. It has not been established that (2) they are to be craftsmen of civic liberty (eleutheria) (the need for guardians has been derived merely from the need to defend the city’s wealth and luxuries [373e9-374a2]). Nor has it been established that (3) they are to pursue no practice that does not lead to being such craftsmen.
This third claim (that every single practice that a guardian takes up must lead to being a better craftsmen of civic liberty) means that they would generally not be permitted to pursue hobbies of their own choosing. There is a great contrast between this extreme lack of liberty and Socrates’ new description of the guardians as craftsmen of civic liberty. They would fashion the city’s liberty by protecting it from its enemies, but they themselves would not even have the liberty to pursue an avocation of their own choosing. The irony seems to be intended.
On the basis of these three claims, Socrates concludes that the guardians should not imitate anything other than what would be appropriate for craftsmen of civic liberty (395c2-3). He proceeds to list examples of traits that they should imitate, from childhood up, that includes the trait of being free (395c4-5). But, because the guardians would be so extremely unfree, they should not imitate free men, for such imitation would have nothing to do with their lives as guardians. There is similarly no justification for the similar claim that they should be made to refrain from imitating anything unbecoming of a free man (395c5-7).
Socrates adds that they should not be clever at imitating anything else that is shameful (even if it is not unbecoming of a free man) (395c6-7). This is curious, for, while doing something unbecoming of a free man might not necessarily be shameful, surely all shameful things would necessarily be unbecoming of a freeman.
Note that Socrates does not exclude the possibility of the guardians imitating in an unclever way something that is unbecoming of a free man or something that is shameful—unclever imitation of shameful things will be allowed for at 396d3-e2.Footnote 13 It seems as if Plato makes the present unnecessary (for what is shameful would necessarily be unbecoming) reference to unclever imitation of shameful things for the sake of the correlation with that passage’s acceptance of merely playful imitation of the shameful.
ii. Concern for the Effect Upon the Guardians’ Character Rules out Imitating Women and Slaves
After justifying the list of traits that the guardians should imitate, from childhood up, by appealing to the principle that they should not imitate anything other than what would be appropriate actions for craftsmen of civic liberty (395c2-3), Socrates gives a new reason the guardians should neither participate in, nor be clever at, imitating shameful conduct: imitating unbecoming or shameful things would cause the reality of that which the guardians imitate to have an effect upon them (395c5-d1).Footnote 14 He backs up this claim by asking Adeimantus to confirm from his own experience that “imitations, if continued from early youth, settle into habits and become natural in [1] body, [2] speech, and [3] thought” (395d1-3).Footnote 15
Adeimantus agrees that he has observed this phenomenon, but let us stop and consider whether he is right. Surely, for example, actors would have a tendency, after they come home from work, (1) to gesture as they did when they presented their character on the stage, and (2) to speak as they spoke on stage. Actors have a tendency to stay ‘in character’. If an actor played the same part “from childhood up,” it does seem very likely that he would tend to develop corresponding habits of speech. (3) Bad thought forms could also become ingrained as they are imitated. For example, a terrorist might imitate other members of his group as they make hasty generalizations about their enemy, and thus develop a tendency to make hasty generalizations himself.
The first type of role that Socrates rejects because of the effect upon the guardians is that of “a woman, young or old, railing at her husband” (395d6-7). The reason he rejects such roles is simply that the guardians are men. An actor’s wife might indeed suffer if he were to play such a part from youth up. Such a pattern of behaviour could surely become second nature. But the fact that such imitation could become second nature if it is continued from early youth (395d1-3) is not enough to prove that the guardians should never play such a role (395c2-3). Socrates needs to establish that playing such a woman a few times—indeed, he needs to establish that playing it just once—could have a lasting effect upon the young guardians’ character. Thus we have another instance in which he is presenting us with a premise which is true but which is not strong enough to be relevant (the first such instance was at 394e8-395a5).
The guardians also should not imitate women with certain attitudes toward good and bad fortune (395d6-e2).Footnote 16 Socrates is anticipating what he will say about the proper attitudes that musical modes should represent. He will eventually admit only two modes: (1) a musical mode that represents meeting every blow of fortune with steadfast endurance; and (2) another that represents not being arrogant but being restrained and content with the outcome when things go well (399a5-c1). Here he does not want the guardians to imitate women (2) boasting of good fortune or (1) being full of grief or lamentation in the face of bad fortune (395d8-e2).Footnote 17 Socrates offers no justification for this claim; it seems as if it is not coming from anywhere. But we shall see that it follows from what Socrates represented as his first principle at 388e2-3: because a good person will have least need of others (387d11-e1), that good person would be least influenced by good or bad fortune. The fact that the characters whom the guardians would be imitating happen to be women would thus seem to be irrelevant. It tends to confuse the point: does the problem have to do with effeminacy (which Socrates emphasizes by pointing out that they are men) or with the way in which one ought to respond to good or bad fortune?Footnote 18
Note that both Socrates and Adeimantus are uncritically assuming that the guardians will be men. Beginning at 451b9, Socrates will argue that there should be women guardians.
Finally, a guardian should not imitate a woman who is sick, in love, or in labour (395e2-3). If we think dialectically—if we see how the reality of what is imitated has an effect upon the imitator’s character pertains to these cases—we can see that this conclusion does not follow. My imitation of a sick woman is not going to cause the reality of that which I am imitating (to use the formulation of 395c5-d1) to have an effect upon me: it will not make me sick. Imitating a woman in labour certainly will not make a male guardian be like a woman in labour. These two types of women are responding to specific physical conditions. If I do not have these (or similar) physical conditions, I will not have cause to act as they do. (On the other hand, imitating a woman in love could conceivably cause the reality of what is imitated to have an influence the character of a guardian.)
Socrates next rules out the guardians imitating slaves doing the offices of slaves (395e5). Because they would not, in later life, be doing the offices of slaves, how they portray slaves performing their offices would seem to have no more effect upon their character than how they portray women in labour. But there could conceivably still be some similarities. For example, I might carry my books the way in which a slave carries firewood. But then, why would that necessarily be negative? There seems to be prejudices against women and slaves underlying Socrates’ assertions. A reader who shares these prejudices would have a tendency to accept Socrates’ assertions uncritically.
iii. On Imitating Bad Men
Having dealt with the imitation of women and slaves, Socrates now turns to the imitation of bad men (395e7-396a2). The traits he rules out imitating are like those of women who rail at their husbands: these bad men talk each other down, abuse, and make fun of each other. Thus, as I suggested above, the fact that it is women who were being imitated is not of the essence. It is curious that Socrates should have presented it as if it were (395d6-e2).
Socrates did not give any reason why it is bad for women to rail at their husbands, but he does have a reason why it is bad for men: they are sinning against themselves and the others (396a1-2). Does this not seem to be a real idea, as opposed to the idea that the imitation of slaves doing the offices of slaves will ruin the guardians’ character? We ought to pay attention to real ideas. For one thing, this will make us sensitive to the reappearance of the idea. Indeed, this passage marks the beginning of a new thematic development which will next appear at 416e4-417a1 where Socrates will say that it would be impious for the guardians to sully the divine nature they have received from the gods by mixing it with mortal gold. That passage is in the midst of an argument which presupposes that the guardians’ nature is superior to the nature of other people. But, even though discerning readers would therefore not take that argument very seriously, they will now be on alert for other references to the idea that we can harm our own natures and that we are letting the divine down when we do so.
Socrates then adds, “They must not form the habit of imitating madmen in words or in deeds” (396a2-4). He has finally returned to making an explicit issue of developing habits, but he has dropped the specification that they practise these habits from early youth. That stipulation was too narrow to make the argument valid, and this new formulation is still too narrow, for in order to develop a habit, there must be at least some repetition. The guardians will not develop a habit of acting like madmen, if they imitate madmen merely a few times far apart. (If they prepare extensively to appear in Marat/Sade, on the other hand, it could be another story.) Therefore no reasons have been given that are strong enough to justify a complete ban on the imitation of madmen.
The next imitations to be rejected are those of men doing various kinds of manual labour (396a8-b2). Socrates gives no reason for this, but Adeimantus does so in his response: “How could they, when it is forbidden for them even to pay any attention to such things?” (396b2-4). The future guardians have not been forbidden to pay attention to manual labour: Socrates had first merely specified that each worker was to be prevented from pursuing two different main occupations at the same time (374b6-9); he then said that guardians should not pursue any practice that does not lead to being craftsmen of civic liberty (395b8-c2); and then finally he said that they should not be clever at imitating any such activity (395c2-3). He never said the guardians could not even pay attention to other activities. Not being allowed to pay attention to what people around them are doing would make the guardians very unfree indeed.
In his preceding sentence, Socrates said that the guardians must have knowledge of mad and bad people (396a4-5). Why should knowledge of mad and bad people be required but not knowledge of people who work with their hands? Surely Plato put these two claims in close proximity for the purpose of having his reader wonder what the difference might be.
It also seems clear that Adeimantus is failing to think critically as he continues to answer Socrates’ questions in the affirmative; he seems to want to agree with anything Socrates might say. We should do better than that.
iv. Ruling out Other Forms of Imitation
Socrates goes further yet, ruling out the imitation of horses neighing, bulls bellowing, rivers, the sea, thunder, and similar phenomena (396b5-7). Just as the reality of a woman in labour would have no effect upon a male actor, so too would the reality of what is imitated have no effect upon an imitator who imitates thunder, etc. Whinnying like a horse does not cause someone to be like a horse.Footnote 19 Socrates’ point is preposterous.Footnote 20 The uncritical Adeimantus agrees to this move as well. It is curious that he chooses to justify his agreement with a different reason; it is as if he recognizes the weakness of the case that Socrates has just made. The reason he gives is that the guardians should not be mad or liken themselves to madmen (396b8-9). But, while it does seem true that a good guardian could not be mad, that is irrelevant here, for it does not induce madness to imitate such sounds when one, for example, reads to children. Nor is it true that one would be imitating a madman: madmen might whinny like a horse, and the imitator of a horse might do the same, but the imitator of the horse would not be imitating the madman. Even if he were actually affected by the reality of that which he imitates (which was one of the original two bases for refraining from imitation at 395c5-d1, in addition to that of the guardians not being allowed to pursue practices that do not lead to being craftsmen of civic liberty), that would make him be like a horse, not like a madman.Footnote 21
Socrates has been pretending to follow the method proposed at Crito 48e5-49a2: “See if the beginning of the investigation satisfies you, and try to reply to my questions to the best of your belief.” But he is really mocking that method, switching principles and arriving at conclusions without reference to whatever principle is supposed to be driving the argument at that particular point. This is in marked contrast with the attitude of Republic 388e2-3, where Socrates says of stoical acceptance of whatever comes one’s way: “We must be governed by this until someone convinces us with a better reason.”
III. The Three Forms of Style and Narration
A. What a Good Person Would Imitate (396b10-396e7)
Socrates responds by changing the subject. He prefaces this move by saying to Adeimantus, “If, then, I understand your meaning” (396b10). This is curious, for Socrates’ new point has nothing to do with what Adeimantus has said about madmen or about anything else.
Socrates seems to be returning to the original issue of our section of the dialogue, for he now talks about the proper form (eidos) for the stories. But this is not really the original issue, for the form of a poem will not be identical to the style of a poem. Indeed it is here that Socrates begins to talk of the two forms of style (to use the formulation of 397b4). The fact that Socrates introduces this obfuscation by acting as if he were clarifying what has gone before further tends to make the reader feel that these new forms of style and narration would be the same as the original styles of narration. It is at this point that Adeimantus asks Socrates to clarify the meaning of the two forms of style and narration, just as he had asked for clarification of the two styles of narration back at 392c9-10.
Socrates begins his clarification by seeming to continue the mistake of 394e1-2 and talk of the form of story a good man should relate rather than the form of story that a young guardian should hear. Indeed, there is so little continuity with the beginning of our section of the dialogue that he talks of the story a good man in general should relate, rather than what a good guardian should relate. But, because he is merely explicating what he means by the form of the style, there is not yet any such mistake: he can use any example he wants to make this distinction.
He begins by saying that a good man would imitate both good men and bad men. He would have two different attitudes about imitating a good man, depending on whether the imitated good man was unwavering and sensible or whether he wavered (due to sickness, love, drunkenness or some other circumstance befalling him) (396c5-d3). While Socrates had earlier said the brave and sensible man is least disturbed and altered by external influences (381a3-4), that does not mean that this man will never become disturbed and altered. Socrates is thus suggesting that sickness, love, and drunkenness would be some of the circumstances that would lead the brave and sensible man to waver. (Notice that earlier Socrates did not let guardians imitate women who are sick or in love, and Socrates has now identified sickness and love as being among the circumstances that could possibly affect the good man. The other circumstance of 395e2-3, being in labour, understandably remains unmentioned.)
By the principle that the imitator is affected by the reality of that which he imitates (395c5-d1), it would seem that the good man should abstain from imitating good men at those times when they waver, but Socrates merely says that he will imitate him less willingly and more ashamedly than he will imitate the unwavering and sensible man (396d1-3).Footnote 22 For this point to follow from what has gone before, the positive effect of the underlying good character would need to outweigh the negative effect of the wavering. But the reference to being ashamed seems to indicate that the good man would be thinking in terms of how he would be judged (perhaps exclusively so).
As he imitates the wavering good man less willingly and more ashamedly, one would think that he would be totally unwilling and totally ashamed to imitate someone who is the opposite of a good man. But, no, on the rare occasions when this opposite does something good, the good man will willingly imitate him (396d3-e2).Footnote 23 The contrast with the willingness to imitate the good man who wavers suggests a lack of consistency. Which has the more important effect upon the guardian’s character, the underlying character of the person he imitates or the individual action that is imitated? What if the goodness of the action was very slight and the badness of the underlying character massive? On the other hand, the issue in the good man’s mind might merely be that it is not extremely shameful to imitate a base man when that base man happens to be doing something good.
Now, why would the good man imitate the base man on one of those rare occasions when the base man was doing something good? Why could he not merely narrate an account of Nixon establishing relations with China? Why would he want to imitate Nixon’s body and speech? It would not be for the narrator’s sake, but for the sake of the members of the audience. It would tend to bring the story to life for them. (The issue of the audience’s enjoyment will be briefly raised at 397d6-8.) Because it would have more impact upon them, it would have a greater tendency to cause base members of the audience to do good things. (Recall that the effect upon the audience—i.e., upon young guardians—was Socrates’ original concern.)
The good man is even said to be willing to imitate the base man when the base man does not do anything good. But, while the good man will earnestly imitate base people doing a good action, he will merely play at imitating these people when they are not doing anything good (396d3-e2). The reason he would be held back from serious imitation is simply that he would feel ashamed. We are told that this shame would be felt for two reasons: (1) he will not do a good job of imitating because he will be unpractised at imitating the base; and (2) he will not be able to tolerate molding and fitting himself into the shapes of the base (396d5-e1).Footnote 24 The first is easily understandable. If I know that I will not speak French with a good accent, I might well be too ashamed to throw myself into it. I will be at least somewhat guarded against ridicule, if it is understood that I am just playing around at speaking the language. (Such was Thrasymachus’ motivation when he said to Socrates, “I will nod or shake my head, and say ‘Hm?’ as we do to encourage an old woman telling a story” [350e2-4]. He did not want to be seen as a serious participant in the conversation, because he did not want to be made to blush anymore [see 350d2-3]. [Note that once again careful exegesis has led to the recognition of a preceding idea.]) The second reason is more difficult to understand. The reference to molding and fitting makes it sound as if it were once again an issue of picking up a habit of acting in base ways.Footnote 25 But Socrates is explicitly presenting it merely as an issue of shame—he has left behind any consideration of being influenced by the imitation. A homophobe might want to imitate homosexuals only playfully because he would be ashamed to be like a homosexual on the inside. For example, if the imitator were to mold and fit his character to the homosexual in a serious way and be swishy on the inside, that could be seen as being shameful in itself. It would be easy for a less than careful reader to confuse the true issue of the imitator feeling shame with the old issue of the imitation having a bad effect upon the imitator.
Even though he has lost sight of the earlier concern that the guardians pursue no practice that will not lead to being craftsmen of civic liberty, what Socrates says here is consistent with 395c3-7, where he gave that as the reason why guardians should not do shameful things or be clever at imitating them. We can now see that the reason why good people would not be clever at imitating bad people when they do not do anything good is that these good people will merely be imitating playfully; they will not be making an earnest effort to be good at it.Footnote 26 It is curious that Socrates should lose sight of the original concern and still maintain consistency with what he had said in his discussion of it. It is as if he is both rather forgetful and also extremely aware of the details of what has gone before—or rather that he is writing playfully and wants us to realize that something funny is going on.
Even though the earlier issue of becoming similar to the imitated people is not raised here, it would still be a real issue. Indeed, the danger seemed understated back at 395d1-3. Jack Palance would not have to imitate bad guys from early youth up in order to develop habits that become a second nature “in body, speech, and thought” (395d1-3). Even though Palance did not start acting until he was 29, he could still have been in danger of developing the habit of behaving like a villain. But, the fact remains that it takes some amount of time to develop a habit. Thus there would be no danger of imitation affecting the guardians’ character on those rare occasions when the bad person does something good (396d3-e2). But these considerations are irrelevant to the current argument, for what holds the good man back from imitating bad people doing bad things is merely said to be a sense of shame.
Socrates then observes that the good man’s stories would be in the style that combines narration with imitation, but he specifies that there would only be a small portion of imitation (396e4-7). This follows from what has been said before only if it is now presupposed that the stories will not be about good people doing good things; we have been given no reason it would be wrong to have a large amount of imitation of the good doing good. Imitation of the bad doing good would be rare (396d5), and imitation of the good doing bad would similarly be merely occasional (396d3). Imitation of the bad doing bad could conceivably be limited by the fact that a good man cannot tolerate doing such imitation seriously (396d7-e1). But we have been given no reason that would limit imitation of the good doing good. Adeimantus agrees with Socrates’ claim, but it seems clear that Plato wants his readers to see that the claim is without foundation.
Adeimantus agrees that such a speaker would use the original mixed style of pure narration and imitation but with the proviso that there be only a little imitation (396e9-10). He says that this is the type (tupos) such a speaker would use. The use of the general term tupos helps to obscure the fact he is referring to the form (eidos) of style and narration that such a speaker would use rather than the style of narration such a speaker would use.
B. What a Base Person Would Imitate (397a1-397b2)
We are told that the more base a speaker is, the more serious he will be when he imitates animal noises, or the sounds of nature or of machines, and that he will do these imitations in the presence of the many (397a1-4). Just as the good person’s lack of seriousness in imitating the base doing something bad is in contrast to this base speaker’s seriousness, the good speaker’s shame at imitating the base is in contrast to this base speaker’s willingness to perform imitation in the presence of the many.
There is no mention of the base speaker imitating people; Socrates is simply describing someone like Jonathan Winters imitating animals and inanimate objects. Perhaps this person would also imitate bad people, but there is no specific mention of it—Socrates does no more than say that everything will be imitated (397a2).Footnote 27 If it were a question of Jonathan Winters also imitating people, then there would be a danger of conflating his sort of imitation with the imitation that poets engage in when they write dialogue. (We are now in a discussion of the different forms of style and narration, and the danger is that we would tend to think in terms of original different styles of narration.) We shall see that Socrates will indeed conflate the two. (Note that he has already conflated the imitation of many things with the imitation of the playwright at 394e8-395a6.) When this happens we will bring negative feelings about the supposedly base Jonathan to poets who write dialogue. This will have the effect of begging the question of the baseness of those poets. At this point Socrates is begging the question of the baseness of our friend Jonathan.
One of the two reasons that prevented the good person from being good at imitating bad people is that shame made him hesitate to mold and fit himself to the shapes of the base. But there is no question of Jonathan Winters molding his nature to the cause of thunder when he imitates thunder. Nor is he trying to be like a cat when he imitates the sound of a cat fight; it is merely a question of him paying attention to the sounds that he is trying to reproduce. The only other reason a good man had for being ashamed of imitating bad men was that he would not be good at it (396d5-e1). Thus if Jonathan Winters happens to be a good imitator, this reason would not apply either. But then, what reason would Socrates have for saying that the more base this imitator is the less he will shrink from imitating everything (397a1-3)? Perhaps Socrates is relying upon his attempt to prove that people cannot imitate many things well. We have seen that this attempt was intended to fail, because of the possibility of a successful avocation (Problem A). The only remaining possibility that Socrates has suggested for someone not being good at imitating many things is Problem B: human genius seems to him personally to be too narrow to allow someone to be good at multiple imitations (395b3-6).Footnote 28
C. A New Trichotomy (397b1-397e2)
While the good speaker would speak in simple narration, with a small portion of imitation in a long discourse (396e7), it is the other way around for the base speaker: the base speaker will speak in the style (lexis) of mostly imitation, though there will perhaps be just a little simple narration (397b1-2). (At this point Socrates has conflated Jonathan Winters’ imitation with the imitation of the poet who writes dialogue.) Note that because both forms of speaking have simple narration and imitation; they both are of the mixed variety of the original trichotomy of styles of 392d5-6. The difference between them is simply that the good man’s form is mostly simple narration with just a little imitation, and the base man’s form is mostly imitation with just a little simple narration.
Socrates says that these are the forms (eidos) of style (lexis) of which he was speaking (397b4). He is clearly referring to the form of style and narration of the good man and the form of style and narration of the opposite type of man, of which Adeimantus requested clarification at 396c4. Thus the ostensible purpose of 396c4-397b4 seems to merely have been to clarify the meaning of ‘the forms of style and narration’.
After correctly observing that vocal sound effects and gestures with perhaps a little simple narration involve great variation in comparison to pure narration with just a little imitation, Socrates asks which of three types (tupos) (these two forms or a mixture of them) should be admitted into their city (397d1-3). Adeimantus, like a good little yes-man, replies that only the unmixed imitator of the good should be admitted (397d4-5). He does not seem to have even understood that Socrates said that good men will sometimes imitate bad men—both when the bad men happen to do good deeds and when they do not (396d3-e2). He seems rather to be swayed by the description of the imitator (who is a conflation of Jonathan Winters and the poet who writes dialogue) as being base.
Rather than correcting Adeimantus, Socrates merely objects that the mixed type is much more pleasing to boys and to their tutors and to people in general (397d6-8). At this point Socrates seems as if he himself might be confusing the mixed style with the mixed form of style and narration, for, while it is obvious that a mixture of dialogue and simple narration is more pleasing than mere simple narration, it is by no means obvious that a mixture of ‘simple narration with a little imitation’ and ‘imitation with a little simple narration’ is more pleasing than just having simple narration with a little imitation. (Come on, Jonathan, get on with the story! What happens next?) It is not so natural to read this passage as saying that boys, tutors, and people in general prefer a medium amount of imitation to just a little imitation.
Socrates then rejects the mixed form because it would not be fitting in their city in which there are no twofold or manifold men, since every man does one thing (397d10-e2). Note that all the previous issues are excluded from the consideration of which type would be superior, including the fact that students find the more imitative type to be more pleasing, the fact that imitation tends to have an effect upon the imitator, and the fact that it has been presupposed that the imitator is base. It all comes down to a consideration of aesthetic criteria: monotonous stories are somehow fitting for men who have just one occupation. The two go together: they are both stiff.Footnote 29 But in saying this, I find myself switching back to the first trichotomy, for it is not so obvious that narration with a small amount of imitation is necessarily stiff, as it would be if it were a question of having no dialogue whatsoever.
D. Ecce the Counter-example (398a1-398b8)
Socrates then considers the possibility of what he had been arguing to be impossible, a man coming to town with such a broad genius that he can imitate anything (398a1-4). Socrates continues the conflation of the Jonathon Winters type with the imitative poet, by saying that this great imitator brings along with him the poems, which he intends to present (398a2-4).Footnote 30
Socrates now claims that we would fall down and worship the imitator as a holy, wondrous, and delightful being (398a4-5). This seems quite strange, for Socrates had said that the more base the Jonathan Winters type of person was, the less he would shrink from imitating everything. What is base is the opposite of what is holy.
This Jonathan Winters type of person would not have the first of the two reasons for being ashamed that were given at 396d5-e1, for he imitates all things well. The other reason for being ashamed was not being able to tolerate molding and fitting himself into the shapes of the base. As we have seen, there could be no question of him molding and fitting himself into the shape of the source of mechanical or natural noises that he imitates; thus the only possible reason he could have for feeling shame would be when he happens to imitate base people. But the mere fact that Jonathan Winters might be a perfect imitator and therefore would have nothing about which to feel shame (except when he imitated base people) does not affect the fact that Socrates has described him as being base. If Socrates had merely said that people would fall down and worship this base creature, there might be some hope of retaining his position, but he says, “we would fall down and worship him” (398a4). Either he was wrong before or he is wrong now: Socrates could not possibly worship what he considers to be base.Footnote 31
Even though this person is described as “holy, wondrous, and delightful,” he will be forced to leave town! Rather than telling him the real reason (that they are too stiff for his sort of variety), the only explanation they will give him for running him out of town is “there is no man of that kind among us in our city, nor is it lawful for such a man to arise amongst us” (398a5-6).Footnote 32 But why could there be no such man in their city? Why must the master of imitation be a foreigner? He has to be a native of somewhere. If there were to arise in their city such a citizen, he would be assigned his natural work, which would be as broad as his genius. The impossibility of their city having such a marvelous imitator follows merely from the arguments we studied in the first two subsections of this article, i.e., from 392c6-394e9 and 395a3-b6, where Socrates failed in his two attempts to establish that people cannot imitate many things well. We saw that the claim at 394e8-9 that a man cannot imitate more than one thing as well as he can imitate one, did not follow from what had been said before: because imitating something would not be a main occupation, there is a possibility of successfully imitating different things as one practises one’s avocation in one’s spare time (Problem A). At 395b3-6 Socrates merely offered his personal opinion that “it appears to me that human nature has been divided up into smaller parts than this, so that it is incapable of imitating many things well, or of doing those thing themselves of which the imitations are likeness” (395b3-6) (Problem B). In imagining that a person with such a broad genius could come to town, he is imagining what would happen if his personal opinion happened to be false. The reason this genius must be a foreigner thus seems to have to do with the fact that Socrates was relying on his own experience in Athens; if the way things appear to him is false—if it were really possible for such an imitator to exist—it would be because what he thought to be impossible merely happened to be out of his ken.Footnote 33 Thus Plato seems to be implicitly acknowledging that there was no necessity behind Socrates’ position at 395b3-6.
One would think that the great value at which they evidently would esteem the perfect imitator would be of more weight than the mere fact that monotonous narrative (though with a little imitation) somehow goes with people who stick to just one occupation. Even if this aesthetic consideration were not so paltry, one would think that the religious criterion of respecting the holy would take precedence over merely aesthetic criteria.
But then Socrates gives a new reason for sending this imitator out of town: he claims that it would be for our own benefit (398a8-b1). Why would it be? All the considerations of how the imitator is affected by what he imitates are no longer relevant and there has been no discussion of a negative effect upon the audience—even though that was Socrates’ original concern.Footnote 34
Corresponding to this lack of continuity with anything that has been said thus far, Socrates seems to feel a need to appear to be coming from somewhere: he says the speaker should tell his tales in the patterns (tupos) that they prescribed in the beginning when they set out to educate their guardians (398b1-4). (Note that the Jonathan Winters’ type of imitation has been dropped and that Socrates is now entirely concerned with the imitative poet, who has been conflated with Jonathan since 397b1. Jonathan has served as a catalyst to bind baseness to poets who write dialogue and now goes the way of all catalysts.) But back at the beginning, the lesser stories were said to conform to the pattern (tupos) of the greater stories merely with respect to the stories’ content (377c7-d1); for example, the stories should tell the truth about the gods. But now the reason they are running this story-telling marvel out of town is simply because of his manner of speaking. Manner of speaking was not an issue before the little section of the dialogue that this article has been analyzing; indeed, Socrates began our section by saying that they are now done with the content of the stories (392c6). (He seems to be implicitly acknowledging the inconsistency when he now concludes his argument by saying that they have now set forth both what is to be said and how it is to be said [398b7-8].) Thus the patterns (tupos) of which they spoke at the beginning are not the same as the patterns (tupos) of which they are speaking now.
Thus, not only is Socrates merely pretending to argue from first principles, he is actually trying to cover up the fact that he is not doing so. When we find that he is thus emphasizing the importance of a theme that he has been in the process of developing, we should pay special attention.
IV. Conclusion
Plato seems to be fully aware that his argumentation is terrible. And even if we did not see what is wrong with his arguments, his conclusions would still seem very dubious. How could any argument possibly justify banning Aristophanes? It seems incredible that for so many centuries people have thought that Plato was seriously presenting such illogical arguments for such an unlikely idea.
Along the way Plato has presented us with some ideas that do seem to have some truth to them: arguments need to be based on first principles, and we should see how each step of an argument is derived from the argument’s first principle; actors such as Jack Palance might have the problem of being influenced by the bad characters they portray; and the genius that fits someone for a particular occupation might be more or less broad. Socrates has made an issue of all three of these points.
But he has also accepted the truth of two other points that have a ring of meaningfulness to them. (Theme 1) He unquestioningly accepts the truth of the premise that guardians should not imitate women boasting of good fortune or being full of grief and lamentation in the face of bad fortune (395d8-e2). When an Epictetus or a Shakespeare reads this passage, they will recognize the similarity with their own thought and underline it. (Theme 2) Socrates unquestioningly accepts the truth of the premise that men who talk each other down, abuse, and make fun of each other are sinning both against themselves and the other person (395e7-396a2). When a Jesus (judge not that you be not judged) or a Paul (Romans 2:1) comes across this passage they will take special note of it.
Plato seems genuinely concerned with both of these themes.
(Theme 1) A theme of not being overly dependent upon external circumstances is developed in the Republic.
(A) Socrates asks, “Is it not true that to be altered and moved by something else happens least to things that are in the best condition?” (380e3-4). In particular, he claimed that the brave and sensible man will be least altered by external influences (381a3-4).
(B) Socrates takes the following principle to be self-evidently true: “A good person is the person most self-sufficient for a good life and is distinguished from other people in having least need of anyone else” (387d11- e1). As the healthy state is the state that limits itself to its necessities [373d9-10], just people would correspondingly be the ones who have fewest felt needs. They would limit their desires to these bare necessities—it being impossible not to stand in need of less than that. And, because the good person would care about external goods only under the unusual circumstance that they are actually necessary for him, “he will make least lament and bear it most moderately when misfortune overtakes him” (387e6-7).
(C) The guardians are to think that lamenting over the loss of trifles, such as the loss of a beloved comrade, is unworthy behaviour (388d6-7).Footnote 35 Socrates says that this follows from what “our reasoning just now showed us” (388e2). Surely this is a reference back to 387d11-e1’s claim that good people have least need of others. But, contrary to what Socrates is claiming here, that principle was not a result of any reasoning; it was merely presented as being what “we say” (387d11). (There is no indication that he is deducing this from 381a3-4’s claim that the brave and sensible man will be least disturbed by outside influences, or by 380e3-4’s unsupported claim that things in good condition are least disturbed by outside influence.) It was a first principle, rather than a deduction from a first principle. Plato clearly intended us to see this mistake and realize that he is treating as axiomatic the idea that the good person is the person who is least dependent on others. Indeed, he could hardly emphasize its primacy more when he has Socrates go on to say, “We must put our faith in this principle until someone convinces us with a better reason” (388e2-3). Aristotle observes, “Plato used to ask whether the discussion was proceeding from or leading up to fundamental principles” (Nicomachean Ethics 1095a), and it seems clear that Plato is asking us that question here.
(D) The guardians are said to need stoical indifference to both good and bad fortune. In addition to the guardians not being allowed to enact “women overwhelmed by grief or misfortune,” they are also not to enact a woman “boasting of a happiness that she images can rival the gods” (395d8-e2).
(E) Corresponding to the fact that the guardians should not portray women or bad people overwhelmed by bad fortune, Socrates and Glaucon need a musical mode to express the feelings of brave people, who, when they fail in an activity, “either meeting wounds or death, or falling into some other mishap, in all these conditions confront fortune with steadfast perseverance and repel her strokes” (399a8-b3). And, corresponding to the fact that the guardians should not portray women or bad men who are proud of their good fortune, they need a musical mode to express “not bearing oneself arrogantly, but rather acting modestly and moderately and being content with the outcome” (399b7-c1) when circumstances work out as they had desired. The ideal seems to be to take things as they come, or perhaps (like Horatio or Hammarskjöld) even to take Fortune’s buffets and rewards with equal thanks.
(Theme 2) Plato also seems genuinely concerned with the idea that we sin against ourselves, for, as we have seen, the same idea occurs at 416e4-417a1 where Socrates says that it would be impious for the guardians to sully the divine nature they have received from the gods by mixing it with mortal gold.
As far as this article is concerned, the significance of the second theme is that it confirms that Plato is purposely employing the literary device of developing themes. The mere fact that he is doing so in the midst of illogical arguments for sophomoric ideas indicates that these themes are his true concern. Moreover the ideal of stoical indifference is in accord with ideas Plato develops elsewhere. It corresponds to Socrates’ teaching at Apology 28b6-d4 and Crito 48d3-4 that, when we do something, we should not think of whether we will die or any other possible consequence of our action, but only of whether we are acting justly. The indifference to whether our present situation is good follows from the fact that we care about nothing except how we respond to what is before us.
As we have been seeing, Thomas Jefferson is quite correct when he observes that Plato puts into Socrates’ mouth “such paralogisms, such quibbles on words, and sophisms as a schoolboy would be ashamed of.”Footnote 36 For a philosopher (rather than a historian), it is foolish to treat the results of Socrates’ arguments as being what Plato is truly trying to convey. If Plato is making these mistakes inadvertently, then he is not a good enough philosopher to merit serious philosophical study. If Plato is making these mistakes on purpose, we can take his results seriously only if we detach them from the specious reasoning through which they are derived, and thus we fail to be genuine philosophers ourselves. When we see the stupidity of the steps, the conclusions they lead to become irrelevant. But careful exegesis of those steps leads to the recognition of themes, the development of which is Plato’s true concern.
Scholars, in their concern with Plato’s ostensible conclusions, have tried to reconcile our section of the dialogue with Republic 595a1-5 where Socrates claims that what they excluded from their state was imitative poetry, when they really excluded merely poetry that has more than a little imitation in it.Footnote 37 It is as if these scholars have not noticed that our entire section is completely fallacious on the surface. The Socrates who has made all the mistakes we have been finding is quite capable of incorrectly characterizing what he has said before. If he is not making this last mistake on purpose, then he has allowed himself to be confused by his own change of trichotomy, taking the pure narration of the first trichotomy (the trichotomy of styles of narrative) to be the narration with a small amount of imitation of the second trichotomy (the trichotomy of forms of style and narrative). On the other hand, if he is making mistakes on purpose, then we have, opening up before us, the possibility of a subtext. Indeed it is possible that “if you open up his arguments, and really get under the skin of them [i.e., when you read them with distinct judgments], you’ll find that they are the only arguments in the world that have any sense at all, and that nobody else’s are so godlike, so rich in images of virtue, or so peculiarly, so entirely pertinent to those inquiries that help the seeker on his way to the goal of true nobility” (Symposium 222a). Being as indifferent as possible to whatever fortune sends one’s way certainly does seem nobler than being such a stiff that one would rather not hear dialogue, thank you. We ought to be paying attention to the thematic development of real ideas, rather than skating across the empty arguments on the surface of the dialogue.
The implications for the study of Plato are huge. We cannot believe that Plato holds a position merely because he has Socrates state it. If we believe it on this basis, we are at great risk of being like the readers of nonplayful written words: “Your readers will read many things without instruction and will therefore seem to know much, when they are for the most part ignorant” (Phaedrus 275a7-b1). Only when he leaves behind a trail of clues that leads us to such conclusions can we take them as seriously as we can take the claim that a good person is the person who is least disturbed by good or bad fortune.
