We live in nonviolent revolutionary times. From Egypt to Moscow, New York to Manama, 2011 saw millions of peaceful protestors take to the streets to demand change. Under what conditions do civilian-based struggles achieve their goals without resort to violence?
Sharon Erickson Nepstad's timely monograph takes up this question through an examination of six nonviolent revolutions that peaked from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. Three paired comparisons analyze, respectively, one failed and one successful revolution against socialist regimes (China and East Germany), against military regimes (Panama and Chile), and against personal dictatorships (Kenya and the Philippines). Application of John Stuart Mill's method of difference offers a strong basis for differentiating factors that helped uprisings remove an existing regime or ruler from those that enabled incumbents to survive grassroots challenges. This qualitative approach is further grounded and clarified by a thoughtful justification of case selection, data sources, and terminology.
An introductory chapter considers the causes of revolutions, the structural conditions affecting revolutionary outcomes, the strategic logic of both violent and nonviolent struggles, and key factors that shape revolutionary dynamics. This discussion introduces a breadth of variables that come into play in nonviolent revolutions in their various stages, though it is not always clear if their causal role is necessary, sufficient, or contributing. To probe those factors that appear most critical, Nepstad articulates a number of guiding questions: Which of Gene Sharp's six civilian resistance techniques (The Politics of Nonviolent Action, 1973) are most effective? What strategies do rulers use to preserve power? And what factors derail well-planed revolts? She also investigates two factors that Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan find to be significant in Why Civil Resistance Works (2011). To this end, Nepstad asks why international sanctions rarely benefit civil resisters, and what drives security force defections. This array of questions creates a framework for empirical analysis that puts human agency at the forefront, captures the dynamism of strategic interaction, and weighs the relative role of both purposeful techniques and unintended consequences.
Six empirical chapters expertly synthesize secondary sources. In each, a concise, reader-friendly parallel structure offers historical context, a summary explanation of outcomes, and an unfolding narrative of actions by the opposition movement, regime, and other key domestic and international parties. The narratives not only highlight the identified causal factors but also bring to life the drama of civil resistance. Nepstad shows how, again and again, protestors genuinely feared repression and had ample reason to doubt their chances of success. This itself is an important contribution. Years after an uprising triumphs with minimal bloodshed, it is tempting to see such an outcome as inevitable. The author instead reminds us of the courage and uncertainty that constitute these extraordinary feats.
The highlight of Nonviolent Revolutions is the final chapter, which presents useful tables comparing the cases and offers conclusions. Noting the presence of structural factors across all cases, Nepstad argues that favorable circumstances cannot explain success but “appear to be necessary for mobilization” (p. 126). The former claim is solid, but the latter stands on shakier inferential ground. To substantiate it, the research design would have required comparative analysis of cases in which movements did and did not emerge. In its absence, we are left to wonder whether the same structural conditions might exist in places that experienced no mobilization at all.
Moving to strategy, Nepstad finds that all six movements refused to obey, legitimize, and cooperate with authoritarian regimes (p. 127). They withheld skills and material resources in some successful and failed cases, but not others. What distinguished victorious from thwarted revolutions most consistently, however, was their ability to undermine states' sanctioning power. Every case of regime change experienced significant defections by security forces, whereas every case of regime survival did not. Defections were variously driven from the bottom up (East Germany), from the top down (Chile), or by the interaction between a military's higher and lower ranks (the Philippines). Soldiers were more likely to mutiny when they were aware of others doing so and when protest movements remained strictly nonviolent. They were more likely to remain loyal when they derived direct benefits from the regime (Panama) and did not share an identity with protestors (Kenya, China).
These are important findings, and ones that remarkably predict many stunning events in the Middle East. Nonetheless, given that Chenoweth and Stephan already established that security-force defections are important, the value-added of Nepstad's analysis rests in elucidating how. That discussion, summarized in just 2.5 pages (pp. 128–30), generates new questions even as it answers others.
First, Nepstad introduces defections as a strategic factor, meaning that they are attributable to movements' purposeful actions. Yet she also indicates that they are rooted in preexisting regime institutions, as is argued in other recent studies (e.g., see Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring,” Comparative Politics 44 [January 2012]: 127–49; Joshua Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria, 2012). What, then, explains variation in security forces' reactions to mass nonviolent protest? Nepstad identifies some patterns, but a succinct explanation for this puzzle remains elusive.
Second, the consideration of just two options—troops desert or remain loyal—disguises other outcomes on this critical variable. In the 2011 Arab uprisings alone, militaries also divided into factions (Yemen), splintered along multiple social cleavages (Libya), or saw the top brass defend the regime while lower ranks defected to a rebel force (Syria). In some cases, regimes supplement their sanctioning power through use of plain-clothes thugs (Egypt, Syria), foreign mercenaries (Libya), or the intervention of another state's army (Bahrain). Even where militaries definitively abandoned a ruler, their actions either served to safeguard their entrenched prerogatives (Egypt) or enabled a democratic transition (Tunisia). This array of outcomes calls for a fuller exploration of the ways in which security force loyalty varies and the conditions under which this variation occurs. It also suggests how outcomes are affected by the professionalization and institutional coherence of a coercive apparatus, the type and extent of its political and economic interests, and its autonomy from the regime and/or its head of state.
Nepstad's arguments about security force defections suggest a certain analytical ambiguity in the conceptualization of factors as strategic, structural, or a third option not developed in the book: contingent. This ambiguity surfaces elsewhere in the analysis as well. For example, a lengthy discussion convincingly demonstrates how mass emigration contributed to the collapse of the East German state. Less convincing is Nepstad's claim that emigration constituted part of a nonviolent strategy (p. 45). On the one hand, she states that emigration was a tactic of “exiting.” On the other hand, it was “unintentional withdrawal” of skills, labor, and resources. How can behavior be tactical, strategic, and unintended at the same time? Emigration is primarily the decision of citizens to leave a political system, not to take purposeful action to change it. To classify emigration as nonviolent strategy arguably risks stretching the concept too thin. This has implications for the book as a whole insofar as it points to uncertainty regarding what does or does not “count” as a facet of nonviolent revolution and, likewise, where to place the line between structure and strategy.
The final argument developed in the conclusion is perhaps the book's most provocative one: International sanctions imposed to help civil revolutions can inadvertently undermine them (pp. 133–35). Illustrating mechanisms behind Chenoweth and Stephan's statistical finding, Nepstad discusses two pathways. First, when one state imposes sanctions, other states antagonistic to it may have new incentive to assist a beleaguered autocrat. Such was the case when the United States took action against Panama's Manuel Noriega, and Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya came to its aid. Second, the threat of sanctions can give international actors undue power that they do not necessarily exercise for the benefit of the movement. Such occurred in Kenya, where donor countries endorsed a flawed election and thereby effectively deflated the pro-democracy struggle and legitimized a personal dictatorship. Nepstad rightfully concludes that this evidence does not show that sanctions always backfire, but should motivate sanguine thinking about the conditions under which they do.
A few other questions remain. First, how might the revolutions considered here have been influenced by one another, or by still other cases? Nepstad briefly mentions that East Germans were inspired by protests in Poland and Czechoslovakia (p. 52), but the factor of cross-national diffusion remains largely unexamined. Second, are there conditions under which nonviolent revolutions are unlikely to succeed even if they avert what the author identifies as key pitfalls, namely, internal divisions and lack of nonviolent discipline? She attributes much of the failure of the Chinese pro-democracy movement to those factors. Still, one wonders if it would have forced the Communist Party from power, even had it been more united and strictly nonviolent. Third, what is the line between success and failure, and between a nonviolent revolution and a military coup? In Chile, a nonviolent movement generated grassroots pressure, but ultimately it was intervention by military leaders that toppled the regime. The same occurred in Egypt in 2011, where some skeptics now doubt whether it can genuinely be considered either a revolution or a success. Furthermore, the basic dynamic driving these two cases was not completely unlike that in Panama, where a nonviolent movement generated pressure, but intervention by a foreign military toppled the regime. While the Panamanian case involved external forces and considerable bloodshed, it was still a regime collapse that arguably would not have happened were it not for a series of events put in motion by a nonviolent revolution from below. Nepstad is clear in justifying her judgment that Panama represents a failed revolution (p. 71), but questions remain about analytical boundaries that are worth considering beyond the confines of this study.
Taken as a whole, Nonviolent Revolutions demonstrates exemplary skill in dissecting how factors operate in diverse and multifaceted settings. Nonetheless, the reader might wonder if it could have packed a bigger theory-building punch, given the author's mastery of the topic. The book does not offer a powerful, parsimonious argument as much as a series of inductive insights. These can teach us a tremendous amount, but they encompass what might be conceptualized as some dozen independent variables. They also speak to secondary dependent variables of revolutionary emergence and trajectories, in addition to the primary variable of outcomes. The comprehensiveness of this research has the advantage of offering an exhaustive exploration of complexity. Yet it risks obscuring the more precise and unique analytical contribution.
The latter might have become sharper had the book contained a more robust engagement with alternative explanations for the phenomena under consideration. Nepstad makes only brief mention of one scholarly debate. She claims that some, mainly practitioners, attribute movement outcomes to strategy, whereas others, mostly social scientists, attribute outcomes to structural conditions (p. xii). Many social movement scholars will disagree with this characterization. For example, much of the field regards political opportunity structures as contextual shifts that expand or reduce possibilities for mobilization. Structural conditions are thus not purported to account fully for movement emergence, no less success. Here and elsewhere, Nepstad's analysis might have been better situated in existing literature and, more specifically, in pointed identification of the claims against which it seeks to argue.
Nevertheless, these criticisms and outstanding queries are a reflection of only the ambition of this admirable and important work. Its lively style, empirical breadth, and thorough analysis make it excellent for courses on social movements and civil conflict. Nepstad's skilled tracing of causal patterns both helps us understand six important cases and constitutes an analytical tool kit that can benefit and inspire future research. Moreover, the author is to be commended for going beyond theory to articulate usable lessons for those who would launch nonviolent revolutions and their international supporters (e.g., see pp. 109; 135–37). At a time when this topic of academic significance is being enacted on streets around the world, it is no small contribution.
