Igor Shoikhedbrod's Revisiting Marx's Critique of Liberalism is an engaging and worthy effort to reconstruct a Marxist account of legal rights that goes beyond a critique of liberal formalism and lays the groundwork for a positive theory of communist legality.
Shoikhedbrod takes as his target the widespread belief that Marx saw rights only as an index of the absence of real human freedom. Against “this prevailing orthodoxy” (1), Shoikhedbrod proposes that “a classless communist society would still need a system of legal justice that would mediate among the diverse and potentially conflicting projects pursued by socialized individuals” (7). This proposition is valuable, both in polemicizing against the legal skepticism prevalent within Marxism and in arguing that any passage from domination to freedom must call forth new legal procedures and new legal rights.
After a brief introduction, Shoikhedbrod lays out the account of law and rights that Marx took over from German civil law and from Hegel's understanding thereof (chapter 2). He then reconstructs Marx's critique of liberal rights theory (chapter 3), before turning to the heart of the argument, the defense of communist legality against the Soviet legal theorist Evgeny Pashukanis (chapter 4). Pashukanis argued that law was an expression of commodity exchange relations, and that law and rights would therefore disappear under developed communism. Shoikhedbrod not only attacks this argument, he also suggests that social and political theory since the middle of the twentieth century has been indebted to a Pashukanist reading of Marx (chapter 5). Reconstructing Marx's legal and constitutional thought, therefore, demonstrates that his critiques of capitalism and liberalism are still pertinent (chapter 6), precisely because the theoretical efforts to answer or supersede Marx have responded to a fictional legal nihilist.
There is much to recommend Shoikhedbrod's book. There are also lacunae. Shoikhedbrod claims that communist legality is “rooted in” a “commitment to the free development of individuals” (7). I am sure this is true, descriptively, of both Shoikhedbrod and Marx. A commitment to free self-development is the ethical lodestone of Marx's writings. This psychological link between wanting a world in which everyone is free to develop their powers and being committed to legal procedures for mediating among competing projects of self-development is insufficient, however, for specifying the legal rights of individuals under communism or for coping with the problem of transition.
Shoikhedbrod is aware of these gaps, and tries to fill them. He goes further in trying to specify the legal rights of individuals under communism. The class of political rights—“freedom of expression, assembly, and association, equality before the law, and suffrage”—are never questioned by Marx and must remain among the rights guaranteed by any communist society (77). “The real controversy,” he maintains, “concerns the fate of ‘the so-called rights of man’—liberty, equality, security, and property” (77). These, Shoikhedbrod argues, would undergo a dialectical transformation in which their form would be given a new content.
This is formulaic, however, and Shoikhedbrod does not do much to flesh out the formula. For instance, he argues for the right to be free of “direct (personal) as well as objective (impersonal) forms of dependence” (84). Personal independence is guaranteed by the political rights enumerated above, though, and about objective independence Shoikhedbrod says only that people must be “in a position to consciously regulate production in accordance with self-chosen plans” (84). It is hard to see what this could mean, however, for each and every member of a collectively managed factory in a communist society.
Let us say that a worker has the above-specified political rights, but the plan approved by the majority consistently goes against this individual's preferences. Is this worker in a position to consciously regulate production in accordance with self-chosen plans? What if the plans of a local factory-council are overruled by a regional soviet of deputies? Should persistent minorities in a factory have a right to leave and establish a new factory where their preferences can determine the plan? Should consistently overruled factory-councils have a right of exit from the regional soviet of deputies? Similar questions could be raised about each of the other classes of rights.
The question of transition is at least as serious. Shoikhedbrod argues that “a social revolution is always marked by a temporary period of extralegality in which rights cannot be secured because a legitimate constitutional framework is no longer in place to secure them” (74). This does not appreciate the force of the question, which seeks not an extraconstitutional guarantee of rights but a promise that communists will, as far as it is in their power, secure certain rights from day one of any revolutionary government.
It is one thing to say, as Marx did in 1848, that the struggle between the Prussian Crown and the National Assembly was “a matter for history,” not for the lawcourts. It is another thing to say that “a new legality can come into being only after a social revolution has been consummated” (75). Marx maintains that the constitutional authority of a new regime cannot rest on a legal claim against the authority of the old regime. Shoikhedbrod inflates this into a general principle according to which every revolutionary interregnum is a state of nature.
The revolutionary “Provisorium,” claims Shoikhedbrod, can only be guided by right in the future perfect sense: the emergency measures taken will have been right when the new mode of production gives rise to its own “set of constitutionally guaranteed rights” (76). But future perfect justice does nothing to assure anyone that a revolutionary government will recognize and use its power to secure certain rights at every point during the Provisorium.
Shoikhedbrod conflates the absence of sovereignty and a developed communist mode of production with the absence of any basis for recognizing and securing rights, and thereby turns the revolutionary project into a leap of faith. The promise that we will eventually make it to the other side, where a new legality and a better set of rights await us, does nothing to indicate why we should step out into the void. We need a bridge, not just a promise of better things on the other shore.
Shoikhedbrod argues, cogently, that “juridical considerations cannot be expunged from the normative horizon of communism because they stem from the reality of social being, a reality that necessitates value-laden choices between alternatives” (127). But surely the same argument indicates the need for thinking through the legal and normative ramifications of revolution.
In the final chapter, Shoikhedbrod argues that, for Marx, “the rule of law and the struggle over the constitution offer protections against abuses of public and private power,” and that the rule of law and constitutionalism are, to this extent, “weapons in anti-capitalist struggles” and “necessary components in the quest for human emancipation” (201). He does not connect this argument to his earlier discussion of rights in a time of revolution. However, if “the rule of law and constitutionalism depend upon the extension and deepening of democracy” (182), then democratic movements might plausibly guarantee legal rights beyond the rights recognized by the existing state. If this line of thought were expanded upon, it might weave reform and revolution together into a rope extended across the abyss.
