Candidate Donald J. Trump was famous for charging that his opponents lacked the energy required to execute the office of the president effectively. Although it is unlikely that Trump was channeling Hamilton’s discussion of presidential energy in Federalist 70, the question of how much power the president needs to be effective has long cast a shadow over scholarly and public debate. In The Unitary Executive Theory: A Danger to Constitutional Government, Jeffrey Crouch, Mark J. Rozell, and Mitchel A. Sollenberger suggest that those advancing a strong view of presidential power “take Hamilton’s ‘energy’ thesis and run with it” (p. 26). As a result, presidents often claim a degree of power more similar to the Hobbesian sovereign than a constitutional president. The authors compellingly respond that the United States might do better by concentrating on presidential limits rather than presidential energy.

The authors’ critique focuses on the development of the unitary executive theory and its role in expanding presidential power. Despite differences, unitary executive theorists share a commitment to “providing a rationale for broad, even unchecked presidential power” (p. 49). Unitary executive theorists claim “that the unitary executive theory can be traced back to the dawn of the presidency” (p. 18). In the authors’ view, it is a “recent invention” that is focused not only on “hierarchical control of the executive branch…[but also] on the extent of presidential power” (p. 18).

The Unitary Executive Theory ably traces the expansion of presidential powers through history and across several domestic and foreign policy areas, including appointment and removal power, signing statements, and war powers. One of the book’s strengths lies in its deft weaving of history, theory, and case law to tell a detailed story of how presidents—beginning in earnest with the Reagan administration—have expanded their power. In the authors’ view, that vision of power that places “the government under the direction of a single person” (p. 52) and is “indivisible and therefore cannot be infringed upon by Congress or by the Courts” (p. 40) is misguided because such unified power is at odds with constitutional principles and is “exactly what the framers…sought to avoid” (p. 52). Such a view is also dangerous because “it may embolden a president to use expanded and concentrated executive power in a risky manner that could harm the nation” (p. 12).

The book’s discussion of presidential signing statements provides one of the many examples of how contemporary administrations have weakened the separation of powers and the protection it offers. Illustratively, the authors highlight President Obama’s 2011 signing statement on funding for White House czars that served to “effectively excis[e] a provision of the legislation…just signed” (p. 48). As the authors emphasize, such unilateral power weakens legislation that “passed through both houses of Congress and received the president’s signature, [and] was the outcome of a series of compromises between parties” (p. 48).

Although signing statements might seem a benign example in a book that treats presidential overreach on issues including torture and war powers, the example is telling for two reasons. First, it emphasizes the authors’ core claim concerning the pervasiveness of unitary executive theory and illustrates how it violates the separation of powers. Second, an example highlighting a recent Democratic president showcases the argument’s structural rather than partisan nature. To this point, the authors note that all presidents, regardless of their political party, aim to grow their power. To be sure, it would be understandable to suggest that the overreach of presidential power is unique to the Trump administration. Indeed, the authors stress that even John Yoo, one of the most vigorous defenders of the unitary executive theory, took issue with President Trump’s approach (p. 7). As the authors rightly note, recent history largely roots the unitary executive theory in the Reagan administration and suggests it received its most full-throated embrace in the George W. Bush administration, which “received significant scholarly attention for its explicit reliance on the unitary executive theory” (p. 88). But they suggest that no president is immune to the unitary executive theory’s siren call of power. Indeed, all presidents, “[w]hether Democrat or Republican…wan[t] to have as much flexibility as possible….” (p. 150).

Illustratively, the authors note in their discussion of White House czars that candidate Obama was critical of the Bush administration’s general expansion of presidential powers and use of czars who take on powers ordinarily reserved for cabinet members subject to Senate confirmation (p. 90). But as president, Obama increased both the “number and…spheres of influence [of czars]” (p. 90). Moreover, although Obama somewhat limited presidential power in areas such as the use of military commissions (pp. 132–133), Bush-era policies grounded in unitary executive theory continued in many others, including the president’s ability “to act unilaterally” in foreign conflicts in the context of strikes in Libya (p. 112). Consequently, they suggest, we must resist the desire to critique presidential power only when we dislike the president’s party.

The book’s successful critique of the unitary executive theory’s constitutional and practical problems primes future work on normative responses to the problem. The authors note that they aim to expose “a serious constitutional issue” rather than “propose a set of ‘solutions’” (p. 162). Nevertheless, they provide important resources for future consideration by first suggesting that “there is no permanent solution” (p. 162). Presidential power has expanded “not only because presidents have aggressively pursued power upgrades…but also because other American institutions (Congress, the press, the public) have failed to adequately push back against executive power grabs” (p. 158). Second, they note that the Constitution itself provides resources for unwinding the problem. In their view, the Constitution suggests that we should emphasize a republican solution that properly “link[s]…citizens and their elected representatives…[in order to create] accountability” (p. 160) and reinvigorate the Madisonian separation of powers that insists that “each branch [must] defend itself against encroachments by the others….” (p. 161).

What is striking, given the authors’ persuasive argument and our current political moment, is the paucity of hope that Congress and citizens are up to the task—a point that, significantly, the authors recognize (p. 161). As Gordon Silverstein noted in a discussion of Federalist 51 and war powers, Congress often lacks the will to curb presidential power. As he puts it, “members of Congress actually are quite pleased with the ability to delegate power (and responsibility) for hard choices in war and emergency powers to the executive” (“U.S. War and Emergency Powers: The Virtues of Constitutional Ambiguity,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 2011, p. 262). Combined with Republican Party members’ embrace of a singular presidential vision, as evidenced by the lack of a new party platform in the 2020 election, this point speaks to the concern that Madisonian or republican solutions might fail.

The problem’s depth and the difficulty in finding easy solutions highlight the importance and timeliness of The Unitary Executive Theory and suggest that it deserves wide readership and discussion.