Postwar Japan was one of the “uncommon democracies” in which government alternations hardly occurred. Frances McCall Rosenbluth and Michael F. Thies apply a rational-institutionalist framework in the attempt to explain why the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the predominant party in this uncommon democracy, was able to control Japan's political economy for over half a century but was toppled recently. Focusing on the interplay between political institutions and material forces, the authors claim that the new majoritarian rules introduced in the 1994 electoral reform altered the incentive structures of Japanese politicians and the public policies they devised, and consequently transformed the Japanese political economy in a neoliberal direction.
According to Rosenbluth and Thies, Japan's postwar political economy was “convoy capitalism,” characterized by closed and cartelized markets, heavy subsidies, and costly personalistic elections, behind which a coalition of big firms and small farmers, that is, a coalition of “Steel and Rice,” supported the predominant party. The LDP counted on votes from farmers and small businesses in exchange for protectionist regulations, government subsidies, and tax breaks. The party also relied on huge campaign contributions from big business, and thus needed to maintain a favorable investment environment such as secure bank loans, low interest rates, and undervalued currency. One of the groups left out of the bargain, the authors argue, was consumers, who faced high prices and limited choice in the market; another outsider was unionized workers who expressed their dissatisfaction by supporting the LDP's rival parties.
Where did this system emerge from? The authors go back to 1925 to show that it derived from a particular electoral system. The leading parties reached a compromise in making multimember-district electoral rules that enabled each party to win a seat in each district. Electoral rules brought about corruption as an unintended byproduct of this strategy. Rosenbluth and Thies argue that the political parties failed to develop party platforms that reflected the public's interests and instead sold regulation to corporate conglomerates in exchange for campaign money (46–47). The heavy industrialists lobbied the LDP to back their investments, which led to protectionist regulation, budget subsidies, and tax deals that placed Japan on a particular growth route that helped exports while discouraging competing imports.
According to the authors, the Japanese model required a tightly regulated domestic market. When the waves of globalization swallowed the government's ability to control its political economy, “the house of cards collapsed” (97). The old political system that depended on uncompetitive domestic forces proved unworkable, and the changed electoral rules brought about a new regulatory structure that was more compatible with globalization and that had enormous policy consequences.
Rosenbluth and Thies investigate economic policy after electoral reform. According to them, banking and stock market regulation have shifted toward the interests of the average consumers and taxpayers. They argue that Japan's version of neoliberalism is the result of electoral reform, which allowed the government to unwind the protection of economically inefficient sectors, including agriculture and parts of the service sector such as distribution. They also point out that income inequality looms large. The new electoral rules, in which two large parties compete for the median voter, weaken the political power of labor unions and minimize the possibility for Japan to grapple with income inequality through employment guarantees and unemployment compensation, as was attempted in Europe.
The fundamental logic on which the authors base their thinking throughout the book is that the institutional arrangements governing political competition shape the economy. Parties under majoritarian electoral systems tend to seek median voters' support by emphasizing lower taxes and consumer protections over redistribution. Rosenbluth and Thies claim that the 1994 electoral reform eliminated intraparty competition, weakened factions, enhanced authority within parties and in the prime minister's office, and changed the direction of policy.
The success and collapse of LDP politics is well explained. The book also provides useful information on the thick substance of the electoral reform. Readers will recognize what the 1994 electoral reform consisted of and how it changed Japanese party politics. In this sense, the first half of the book's subtitle, “Political Change,” succinctly describes the issues. It is particularly significant that the authors pay close attention to the problems of democratic accountability by pointing out the essential defects of the old LDP-led politics that lacked government alternations. The authors ask an important question: “How different is Japan from soft authoritarian regimes that operate through dominant parties and retain office through extensive corruption?” (175). They consider accountability as the key to democracy and suggest that postwar Japan might look a little suspicious if the definition of democracy required actual alternation in government (69–70).
The book contains certain shortcomings, however. First, the authors should have incorporated more comparison into the book in assessing Japan's political economic transformation in order to generalize their thesis. They might have, at least, referred to the Italian case, another “uncommon democracy” in which similar electoral reform took place in the same period (T. J. Pempel, Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy [Cornell University Press, 1998]). Postwar Italy had an electoral system similar to Japan's “single nontransferrable vote” in the sense that candidates of the same parties competed with each other within the same districts. One puzzle concerns why Japan took a good fifteen years to achieve the first government alternation of 2009, unlike Italy which has been switching parties rhythmically from the right to the left and vice versa since the electoral reform of the mid-1990s and altered its electoral system again in 2005. Similar electoral reforms in the 1990s generated a different outcome in Japan. What factors led to such a different result? Did Japan's thickly coordinated market economy hinder politicians from moving quickly to a new form of politics? Do varieties of capitalism, then, affect electoral results and eventual policy outcomes? Why, in the first place, did Japan decide to shift its electoral system from semiproportional representation (SNTV) to majoritarianism? According to the authors, Japan took this step because its unionized workers were so weak that they chose to stay away from the decision-making table. Is a majoritarian electoral system, rather, an intervening variable of public policy? Is weak labor the real independent variable that explains Japan's neoliberal policy outcomes in the 1990s and 2000s?
As for “Economic Restructuring,” the second half of the book's subtitle, readers may feel frustrated. While chapter 5, on Japan's postwar political economy, is excellent, chapter 7, on the new political economy, does not provide “substantive” analyses of how new legal changes in the most decisive policy fields of neoliberal economic restructuring, such as the Workers Dispatch Law and Company Law, had different impacts upon various sectors of voters.
The book does not succeed in convincing readers that the authors' rational-institutionalist hypothesis is more persuasive than any rival approach, such as the “policy diffusion” hypothesis. In the 1990s and early 2000s, neoliberalism swept the world. Regardless of electoral system, be it PR or majoritarianism, most countries adopted neoliberal policies. Did not American soft power play a crucial role in Japan's neoliberal policy turn? One very persuasive explanation is that the young elite bureaucrats sent by ministries to the United States for MBAs and PhDs, and similarly trained economists who sit on government committees, influenced the neoliberal policy shift in Japan (Ronald Dore, “Japan's Reform Debate: Patriotic Concern or Class Interest? Or Both?” Journal of Japanese Studies 25, no. 1 [1999]: 65–89). Nor does the book analyze the Japanese bureaucracy, the key player in postwar “convoy capitalism.” It is very difficult indeed to draw conclusions about Japan's transformation without assessing whether the role and the position of elite bureaucrats have changed. As Guillermo O'Donnell argues (Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, ed. Diamond et al. [Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997], chap. 4), bureaucracy is the dimension that is least affected by electoral accountability.
