The dominant approach to the study of contemporary Chinese politics seems to be that the Chinese political system can best be understood from the perspective of authoritarianism. Important early works within this paradigm by Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg (Policy Making in China, 1988) and Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton (Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, 1992) stressed the fragmented nature of Chinese authoritarianism. Andrew Nathan coined the concept “resilient authoritarianism” in his article of that title (Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2003), stressing that not only was China an authoritarian political system, but it was also resilient and not about to wither away. In a forthcoming article in The China Quarterly I argue that the Chinese system is characterized by “integrated fragmentation.” The concept denotes that the system is fragmented, yet it is holding together by mechanisms and measures of integration (appointment system, rotation, etc.).
Pierre Landry, in this excellent book, is also informed by the notion of authoritarianism, coining the concept of “decentralized authoritarianism.” The key argument of the book is that although the Chinese reform process has resulted in extensive decentralization, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still maintains ultimate control. The resilience and durability of the authoritarian system are rooted in the institutions of the CCP, specifically its organization and personnel system. At the core of this system we find elaborate rules and regulations concerning the appointment, promotion and training of Chinese officials or cadres (ganbu). This is the nomenklatura system which functions at all levels of the Chinese power system. The CCP controls the nomenklatura system. In practice it means that all leaders in Chinese state and Party offices and organs from the central level down to the township level are appointed or approved by party committees. In this way the Party manages and controls all leadership appointments in China. Landry investigates political control at selected levels of government, in particular cities, counties and villages. Of particular interest is his analysis of the career patterns of the mayors of over 300 prefectural-level municipalities. As the nomenklatura system is a one-level-down appointment system, these mayors are managed by the Party committees at the provincial level. Landry shows that the Party encourages particularly able officials to rise in the system. At the same time, less able officials are not sidelined, in order to avoid dissatisfaction and obstruction in the cadre corps. In the case of mayors, those who have performed poorly in terms of economic development are not simply fired. Instead their career advancement is slowed down and they will reach a lower bureaucratic position than their more successful colleagues.
Landry also addresses personnel control at the lowest level of China's local government, the village. The village committee chairman does not belong to the local Party-state bureaucracy, but is instead directly elected by the village residents. The aim is to ensure the elections of village heads with high local support. The head of the local Party branch, on the other hand, is not elected by the village residents, but appointed by the Party committee. In some villages, the village heads are co-opted by the Party to become Party secretary. However, Landry hypothesized that village elections involve a degree of uncertainty which may affect the stability of the local Party branch in case village heads are promoted as Party branch secretaries. The main concern for the Party leaders is to maintain control and not to bring about higher popularity for the CCP.
From Landry's impressive study emerges a picture of a revitalized and rejuvenated political system which is surprisingly resilient. Landry argues that authoritarian regimes can and often do design a range of institutional arrangements that affect their durability. In China's case, “the key to understanding this durability lies … with the internal institutions of the Communist Party, specifically its organization and personnel system” (p. 16). Landry concludes his book with the important observation that under these specific circumstances decentralization and authoritarianism are compatible in China, “even though the broad cross-national evidence suggests that such combination is rare” (p. 267).
Landry's book helps us to understand why the CCP has not withered away and the political system not broken down as anticipated in Western scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s. He has also broken new ground by basing his findings on rigorous quantitative methods in the form of technical and complex regression analyses. For the benefit of the reader the technical aspects of these analyses are explained in a number of appendices to the main chapters.
For anyone interested in understanding China's enduring authoritarianism and the mechanisms that hold the system together and yet create mobility among key political actors, this book is a must read. It represents a major contribution to the field of China studies, but will also be of interest to neighbouring social science disciplines. For readers without training in quantitative research methodology, however, the book represents heavy reading.
