Ἀχιλεὺς ἔλεον μὲν ἀπώλεσεν, οὐδέ οἱ αἰδὼς
γίγνεται, ἥ τ᾽ ἄνδρας μέγα σίνεται ἠδ᾽ ὀνίνησι.
Achilleus has destroyed pity, and there is not in him
any shame [awe]; which does much harm to men but profits them also.
Hom. Il. XXIV.44f. (tr. Lattimore, my gloss)Introduction: A Case for Shame
Plato's Gorgias might as well have been named On Shame. The word appears sixty-nine times in the course of the dialogue with a lion's share of references to shame being made by Socrates’ character. Callicles comes in second in his use of the term. Cairns notes that in the corpus of the lyric poet Theognis of Megara (sixth century BC) we have ‘the first instance of the noun aischunē.’Footnote 1 Cairns goes on to comment on Theognis’ use of αἰσχύνη and says that ‘[h]ere it appears in the objective sense, but later it will also be found in a subjective sense, as the reaction to or mental picture of disgrace and so as equivalent of aidōs.’Footnote 2 Although it is important to differentiate αἰσχύνη and αἰδώς, the terms, as Cairns suggests, are capable of expressing interchangeable meanings. Hence, in our comparative study of shame in the Gorgias and in the Clouds, we pay close attention to and examine the context in which a given term appears. The central role that shame plays in the Gorgias is the subject matter of analyses by Race, Bensen Cain, McKim, and Dodds.Footnote 3 Race is confident that ‘of all the motifs running through the work, the most insistent is that of shame, for the word aischyne (along with verbal forms of aischynomai and the adjective aischros) occurs over 75 times.’Footnote 4 In line with the view that shame is central in the Gorgias, we offer a further contribution, which focuses on the affinity between the treatment of shame in that dialogue and in Aristophanes’ Clouds. We argue that either the ostensible subject of the Gorgias, which is usually identified as rhetoric,Footnote 5 is not the dialogue's true concern or the explicit subject matter cannot be understood without its accompanying element, which is shame.Footnote 6 To support this thesis, we undertake a comparative analysis of the thematic, heuristic, and conceptual use of shame in the Gorgias in view of Aristophanes’ play. We argue that the characters in the Clouds portray the same perennial attitudes to life as do the interlocutors in the Gorgias and, what is more, the characters in both works evoke with more than incidental clarity certain historical figures (Alcibiades and Pericles). Thus, both works, as we claim, are commenting on and, even though the Clouds is a comedy, serve as the ground for our philosophical reflection on the political, educational, and cultural ideals of ancient Greece. Moreover, the Clouds makes light of, instead of endorsing, such distinctions as shameful/laudable, natural/conventional, old/new, education/didacticism, and moral/prudish. We draw on the humor of the Clouds, which allows us to withhold immediate judgment about these dichotomies in order to then examine these same notions which are problematized in the Gorgias.
The myth (μῦθος, 523a) about the afterlife with which the Gorgias concludes (523a–7e) confirms the central role that shame plays in the dialogue. The image through which the sense of shame is conveyed is nakedness. The soul, as Socrates explains, no longer has the luxury of being covered in the outer trappings that glamorize the body (e.g., riches and good looks, 524d). Both the shameful and the admirable deeds are revealed when that which is unseen—the inner moral worth of a person—is made visible in Hades. There, only the souls that lived morally worthy lives do not feel shame. The rest of the souls, which stand before the judges, are ashamed. The unworthy actions which these souls committed during their lives have warped and misshapen them (524e–5a). The psychological ugliness, which is concealed from the eyes of others on earth, is evinced in the underworld in the nakedness of a misshapen soul. It is, then, this appearance of what one can conceal in life, but not in death, over which the dead feel shame.
In life, the only thing that can be made quite literally naked, in the same sense that Socrates’ myth relates, is the body. However, unless we, like some ancient Greeks, are comfortable with naked exercise and naked competitions, bodily nakedness revealed before others, let alone others who judge, is a matter of shame.Footnote 7 Or, at least, it is a matter of modesty that causes even the well-endowed to cover up in the agora and in public (i.e., outside of the gymnasium and when not engaged in athletic contests).Footnote 8 The dialogue makes use of our opinions about different kinds of shameful things attributed to bodies. Thus, Socrates hinges his points about oratory (460c–1a), directed against Gorgias’ views, on an analysis of vicious use of physical strength. Socrates’ win against Polus rests on an analogy between the corrupt states of the body and of the soul (477b–e). Callicles, who notes that Socrates uses shame against the other two interlocutors (482c––3c), nonetheless does not notice what the body has to do with Socrates’ claims about shame. It is instructive that Plato frames Callicles’ defeat, most vividly, in terms of shameful, albeit pleasant, erotic acts attributed to the body (494e––5b).
In the Gorgias, Plato uses the theme of bodily shame as the ground from which Socrates’ arguments and myths grow. In Aristophanes’ comedy, shame is a fecund vein that bears puns, delivers punches, and even furthers plot. All of Aristophanes’ comedies bet on our propensity to react to the shameful images not so much with indignation or a desire to recoil, but rather with laughter. The Clouds, being ‘Aristophanes’ ‘wisest’ comedy’,Footnote 9 not only welcomes levity, but also lends itself to philosophical examination. The scenes that depict the characters’ shameful discomfort appear throughout the play (ex.: 170–5, 191–4, 387–91, 709–30, 1083–102). If we consider its philosophical import, the play presents shame (αἰσχύνη) as reverence or awe (αἰδώς) in the face of desecrating that which ought not be transgressed. Thus the Clouds, for all its gayety, is concerned with a very serious question: What makes us human? The resolute correlate of the Clouds' message in the Gorgias regards ‘the way we're supposed to live’ (500c). Examining these questions with which the dialogue and the comedy are concerned, we are well advised to disrobe, so to speak, and to look at ourselves.
A study of shame in the Clouds and in the Gorgias will help disclose the parts of both in which shame is used to chastise lustful characters or, on the contrary, where shamelessness runs rampant in celebration of licentious freedom. Thus, the analysis of shame tracks, also, the suppression and eruption of eros in its grotesque (either sterilized or violently excessive) permutations. Instead of buying into the moralistic or the libertine attitudes toward that which is considered shameful—the attitudes on which both the dialogue and the play draw—we are well advised to examine our own views of the relationship between eros and shame.
By way of a preliminary remark, we posit that a number of ethical and moral precepts deal with this matter, i.e., the erotic life of a human being. The close connection of shame and our erotic nature is something that we all experience from early on in life. There are particular erotic acts we ought not do in public. There are words we ought not say but to our lovers. We call those who are not ashamed of their eroticism and who put it on display, ‘unabashed’ or ‘shameless’. From there on, the line is thin between a person's shameless erotic escapades and what is seen as ‘perversion’ or ‘transgression’. Displays of public nudity, for example, in most countries are regulated by law and are not tolerated, unless in specially designated places. Certain sexual acts, no matter how erotically tantalizing an individual might find them, are deemed to be crimes. Therefore, eroticism (one's own as well as a given culture's attitude to it) is a good indicator of an individual or a societal perversion. We argue that the attitude toward eros can err in both the direction of deficiency (prudishness) and excess (licentiousness). We carry out this analysis as we interpret the tripartite relationship that obtains between shame, eros, and transgression in the Gorgias and in the Clouds.
Shame and Eros in the Clouds
The Clouds is uniquely pertinent to a study of the Gorgias. The way in which the comedy aligns the relationship between its characters and situates the theme of the agon is almost mirrored in the arguments of the dialogue. The rest of our analysis purports to show how this is the case. We also argue that the conversation between the dialogue and comedy goes past the literary structure of the two texts to illuminate their respective meanings in the light of a common milieu and historical context.Footnote 10
The rhetorical tools, internal to the play, are best represented by the battle of the two speeches (889–1104); shame is one such implement.Footnote 11 Thus, the Δίκαιος Λόγος or the Just Speech, at the beginning of the agon between the two speeches, labels the Unjust Speech (Ἄδικος Λόγος) as ‘shameless’ (ἀναίσχυντος, 909). The Unjust Speech earns this telling title, which stands as a shorthand for the basis of a counter-argument that the Just Speech will mount, for its suggestion that either justice does not exist or that even Zeus acts unjustly (when he castrates Cronus, 904f.). Here, as well as at the end of the Clouds, where Strepsiades berates his son, Pheidippides, after the latter beats his father, shame is connected with reverence, whereas shamelessness (ἀναίσχυντος, 1380) signals sacrilege.Footnote 12 Shame indicates a boundary that marks out the human realm and distinguishes it from the deeds and the desires of the gods. Zeus is divine and is revered, despite his history with Cronus and notwithstanding all of his amorous affairs. However, it strikes us as both cruel and distasteful when a human man beats up his aging father. Whatever the rhetorical devices that Pheidippides learns during the time spent as an apprentice at the ‘thinkery’ (φροντιστήριον, 94), his transgressive actions seem unjustified by the rhetoric he uses. If the Unjust Speech's suggestive rhetoric is shameless, then its personification in Pheidippides, who takes on the belief that ‘nothing is shameful’ (νόμιζε μηδὲν αἰσχρόν, 1078), is—shameless actions.
The question of shame and transgression in the Clouds is two-pronged. On the one hand, there is transgressive shamelessness, represented by Pheidippides and the Unjust Speech. On the other, there is shaming to which the Just Speech resorts. The Just Speech crosses the line between decency and overbearing moralizing. The said transgression of the Just Speech makes bare its suspiciously sensitive relationship to shameful matters (972–83, 1001–19). To put it in Strauss's words: ‘When he [the Just Speech] speaks of chastity both demanded and practiced in the ancient times, the Just Speech goes into such details as to make one fear that his abhorrence of unchastity is not altogether chaste.’Footnote 13
From the start, the agon between the Just and the Unjust SpeechesFootnote 14 turns on the question of the opposition between the Old and the New.Footnote 15 These two are represented, on the one hand, by the ‘novel notions’ (γνώμας καινάς, 895) which the Unjust Speech promotes and, on the other hand, by the traditional views of the Just speech. The latter stands accused of being ‘ancient’ (ἀρχαῖος, 915) and an ‘unmusical old fogy’ (τυφογέρων εἶ ἀνάρμοστος, 907). On its surface, the comedy contrasts the debased ideas of the Unjust Speech as well as the unbridled and corrupt sexuality for which it stands (1020, 1040, 1061, 1067–82) with the self-professed uprightness and moral mettle of the Just Speech (985–99, 1057–60, 1083f.).
The Just Speech claims to offer great ‘education[, which] nurtured men who fought at Marathon’ (985). We are led to assume that this education, i.e., in the traditional principles and values, rears men of valor—brave, capable, and victorious—the ones to whom the memory and reputation of Athens’ glory duly belong. Such an exalted reputation is gained by an exercise of self-control, especially in matters of erotic desire. The Just Speech offers several remarks that support this view. It speaks of ‘ancient education…when moderation [σωφροσύνη] was believed in’ (962), when men had ‘knowledge of how to hate the marketplace and keep away from the baths’ (991), because there unsupervised young and experienced old men meet and mingle. The safeguard against promiscuity and dangerous erotic curiosity, says the Just Speech, is to ‘be ashamed of shameful things’ (τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνεσθαι, 992). The Just one teaches ‘not to misbehave toward your own parents; and not to do anything shameful [αἰσχρόν] that would tarnish the statue of Awe [αἰδοῦς]; and not to dart into a dancing girl's house’ (994f.), where the pleasures of heterosexual sex can be enjoyed for a fee.
The reason why neither the eminent Athenian public educators nor Pheidippides are impressed with the rhetoric of the Just Speech is because there is a dissonance between the professed and tacit attitudes toward eros that the Just Speech shows. Freydberg writes about this dissonance that ‘the presentation of Stronger Logos is itself ridiculous…it is hardly less lascivious, and in a sense even more so, than the presentation of Weaker Logos.’Footnote 16 The Just Speech's descriptions of proper sexual conduct turn into suggestive allusions and innuendoes as the veil of shame, which the Just Speech evokes, turns youthful eroticism into the coveted, but forbidden, fruit. We hear its advice to the young and we wonder why a Speech which claims to profess the virtues of proper behavior would put its message in these increasingly suggestive words (Clouds 972–8):
…sitting down at the gymnastic trainer's, it was needful to cover up the sight of their youthful thighs, so as not to show off and be cruel to the onlookers nearby. Then again, while rising up they had to smooth out the ground and not leave open to the lovers’ perception the image of their youth in its prime. No boy anointed himself below the navel and so the dew and gleam of private parts blossomed there like apples.
The Just Speech finds itself in a kind of performative contradiction, i.e., by means of images, emotional states, and associations it evokes, it puts on display precisely what it condemns.
The Unjust Speech stays true to its word. It shows no shame in advocating and practicing the life of corruption. The Unjust Speech has little to offer in terms of the fortification of human character. There is no respect, nor glory that a young man like Pheidippides can hope to gain if he lives his life as the Unjust Speech recommends. However, the Just Speech does not present any particularly good life choice options either. In the aftermath of the devastating plague of 430 BC, Pericles’ death in 429 BC, and under the sway of politicking ploys of such corrupt characters like Cleon, Pheidippides’ Athens is in disarray—politically, economically, as well as in terms of its ethical mores and education. Return to former glory is long overdue, but given the failure of the Just Speech such a retrieval of the past appears to be impossible. The Just Speech fails because it contradicts its own message and betrays its licentious desires. Aristophanes’ innuendoes support this view.
Instead of having the Just Speech deliver its ideas in straightforward terms, the poet has the Just Speech claim one thing, but say another. Hence, the Just is sophistic, even if unbeknownst to itself.Footnote 17 The intended message of the speech is the prohibition against sex. However, this message is undermined by the content of that same speech. The Just Speech betrays its longing for the erotically appealing young boys when it affirms that, in the times bygone, no boy would ‘address the lover, mixing in soft voice, prostituting himself with his eyes, as he approached. In no way was it allowed to feast on the heads of radishes, nor to snatch up fennel stocks or parsley bunches from the old and, certainly, not to eat up relishes, eating out thrash’ (979–83). This gustatory phrasing follows immediately after its own allusion to the blossom of the youths’ private parts and wistfully sees these as if covered in dew and glistening like apples (978). We miss out on Aristophanes’ joke and its meaning if we fail to see in this dining scene, which follows upon the lines that compare testicles to dewy apples, a metaphor for a sex scene.Footnote 18 If the defenders of the moral mettle themselves are tempted by the alluring youth, who are made all the more desirable as their eroticism shines through the coverings of bashful shame, then these educators are, indeed, ‘out of tune’ (ἀνάρμοστος, 907). The Just Speech tips its hand and shows us its warped attitude to erotic matters, which is exceedingly shameful, because it disallows the Just Speech to come out and accept the fact of its own desire for the young. Instead the Speech parades its moralistic prescriptions before Pheidippides’ eyes, but the words that the Just Speech chooses to relate its message tell a different story. The erotic language of the utterances, the innuendoes, and the metaphors are most telling in lines 972–83 (as we have discussed). The language that Aristophanes puts into the words of the Just Speech lets us know about the Speech's fissured conscience. It preaches one thing, but it wants another. Unbeknownst to itself, the Just Speech is faking and Pheidippides sees right through it.
The Just Speech is shortsighted and its dishonesty is skin-thin. The honest depravity of the Unjust Speech is terrifying. No wonder Pheidippides is skeptical about his proposed education (1110–13). No wonder Aristophanes’ comedy does not get the first prize during its initial run. Perhaps it depicts the Athenian problems all too vividly and, thereby, ceases to be lightheartedly entertaining and unassumingly funny. The humor of the Clouds is explosive, precisely because it cuts so close to the skin.
The excess shamelessness, on the one hand, and the excessive shamefulness, on the other, with which the Clouds is concerned arise in the face of desire. Strepsiades desires to be rid of his debts. He wants (βουλόμενος, 239–42) to learn the crafty speeches that would hoodwink his creditors. The reason why Strepsiades is in debt is because Pheidippides and his motherFootnote 19 live beyond their means (14–55); they desire things which squander Strepsiades’ wealth. Because Pheidippides does not want to enroll in the thinkery (124f.), Strepsiades has to become a student himself. The opening of the play, as far as Strepsiades’ and Pheidippides’ characters are concerned, is an inverted image of the ending. At the beginning, Strepsiades does not mind injustice. Pheidippides’ first line reads: ‘Philon, you are unjust; drive in your own course’ (Φίλων ἀδικεῖς· ἔλαυνε τὸν σαυτοῦ δρόμον, 25). The name of the alleged competitor, whom Pheidippides mentions in his sleep, sounds like the noun, ‘φίλος’, which means a friend or a beloved. Thus, when we first meet Pheidippides, he is, at least while asleep, speaking about friendship and is concerned with matters of injustice. This picture is reversed after Pheidippides emerges from Socrates’ tutelage. There are no philial connections that Pheidippides is unwilling to transgress (1410–46). Pheidippides’ desire to change the laws of the family and the city (1395–450) and to ‘set down…a novel law’ (1423f.) produced in consultation with no one but himself is the upshot of his training in shamelessness.
It is instructive that Pheidippides’ initial desire to be a celebrated horseman is replaced with a much more dangerous passion. Pheidippides tells us, 1399f., that he finds it ‘pleasant [ἡδύ] to consort with novel and shrewd matters and to be able to look down on the established laws!’ Pheidippides’ love of public recognition (charioteers’ sport is a publically hailed affair), when run through the mysteries that take place behind the thinkery's closed doors, hardly suffices. It lacks in its grasp of omnipotence. Reformed Pheidippides no longer wants to be admired as a skillful and good-looking rider (Clouds 120), whose victories impress some, but leave others unaffected. He now revels in his power to affect the lives of all. The Clouds witnesses the transformation of a young man, who seeks to be esteemed by some people for his just victories as a skillful athlete, into someone who loves and craves the power to bring anyone over to his side, no matter if that toward which he is turning his newfound public is unjust. In short, Pheidippides’ new favorite sport is power; even if it is gained through corruption.
Polis and Play: Aristophanes’ Prototypes
Coincidentally, corruption is also Alcibiades’ know-how. Nails relates Xenophon's account of Alcibiades, the historical figure, who ‘at about nineteen outwitt[ed]…Pericles I in a conversation about law, persuasion, and force’ but, she goes on, ‘Xenophon points out at great length that Alcibiades III was no student or disciple of Socrates but, like Critias IV, someone who wanted to use Socrates to advance his own ambitions.’Footnote 20 Alcibiades’ ‘advancement’ is very much in step with Pheidippides’ antinomian desires at the end of the Clouds. Vickers makes explicit the connection between historical Alcibiades and Pheidippides’ character when he writes, ‘Alcibiades, who was surely in the audience, would have been very angry, not so much on account of what had been said about Socrates, but because of what had been implied about himself and his real and adoptive families, and about the danger that his extravagance, his violence, and his sophistry presented to Athens.’Footnote 21 Alcibiades’ behavior, desires, and reputation make him a likely candidate for the prototype of Aristophanes’ Pheidippides. Although it can be argued, as Nussbaum and Everitt do, that the Alcibiades of Plato and historical Alcibiades are more complex characters who try but fail to overcome their ethical downfalls, our point here is that precisely the affinity between the ethically corrupt Alcibiades and Pheidippides’ moral failures at the end of Clouds makes Aristophanes’ play a work of not only comedic, but also of serious ethical worth. Aristophanes plays up the viciousness of the young man's character and that makes for good slapstick humor scenes. However, comedic ridicule also brings into focus the depravity of real persons, which otherwise remains largely hidden from our eyes. The point here is not to establish an unbreakable link and identity between Aristophanes’ character and the historical figure. The point is to understand how Aristophanes’ aesthetic presentation of life plays up the corruption which otherwise remains hidden behind a veneer of social status, political power, or riches. The point is to see that Aristophanes’ artful renditions of attitudes, desires, failures, and character flaws, which guide the decisions and actions of some real historical persons such as Alcibiades, are refracted in comedic characters. An artistic image is never an exact copy of the real—be it a real thing, event, or human being. If it were merely a copy, it would not be art. As McCaw puts it, ‘[a]esthetic imaging demands a finer level of seeing.’Footnote 22 Considering Pheidippides at this level, we partially agree with Moorton's recommendation ‘to view Pheidippides as the caricature not of an individual but of a type, the Athenian jeunesse dor é e.’Footnote 23 The reason why our agreement is partial is because Moorton takes it a step too far by moving from a single person to a type or a class of human beings. Instead, we see aesthetic image as an expression of actions, choices, and desires, in short those active states which make such persons as Pheidippides and Alcibiades who they are, while at the same time making them akin to—but not the same as—one another.Footnote 24
As far as actions are concerned, Pheidippides’ fight with Strepsiades breaks out over lines from Euripides, which the former recites at a celebratory dinner. According to Strepsiades, the verses sing about ‘how (defend us from evil!) a brother had intercourse with his sister from the same mother’ (1371). Vickers notes that ‘Alcibiades, too, was rightly or wrongly, accused of incestuous relations with his sister.’Footnote 25 The unseemly father-beating, which is Pheidippides’ response to his father's indignation, also finds a correlate in Alcibiades’ actions. Vickers concurs that ‘the beating of Strepsiades by Pheidippides and the latter's justification of his action.…If [it]…bears any relation to Alcibiades…must refer to his propensity to fisticuffs in general, and his beating up of his father-in-law in particular.’Footnote 26 Also Pheidippides’ love of luxuryFootnote 27 and, most specifically, his love of horsemanship mimic ‘the character of Alcibiades, who had the same love for horses and bore a similar relation to Socrates.’Footnote 28 Pheidippides, unlike Alcibiades, is himself a racer. However, Aristophanes’ choice of Pheidippides’ infatuation with horses, the youth's association with Socrates, his eventual conviction that power can be gained by means of sophistic oratory and machination, and even the peculiar speech defect that Pheidippides’ character shares with Alcibiades,Footnote 29 make it plausible that Aristophanes’ model for Pheidippides is Alcibiades himself.Footnote 30
Another notable similarity between Pheidippides and Alcibiades is that neither shows signs of shame in the face of ancestral, ethical, or religious irreverence. On the contrary, the fictional character scoffs at Zeus to whom his father prays at the end (1466–70). Alcibiades is accused of profaning the Eleusinian mysteries and is implicated in the mutilation of the Hermae.Footnote 31 Pheidippides’ shamelessness is expressed, also, through his curiosity in unsavory erocitism (1371) and in his despicable acts and threats of violence (1375–446). The same kind of erotic and cruel escapades belong to Alcibiades. Vickers cites ‘Alcibiades’ accuser in c.416 B.C.’,Footnote 32 who implores: ‘Were I faced with the task of describing at length [Alcibiades’] career as an adulterer, as a stealer of the wives of others, as a perpetrator of lawless acts in general, the time at my disposal would be all too short.’Footnote 33 Vickers sums up Alcibiades’ career in relation to the narrative arc of the play thusly:
From a spoilt brat, Alcibiades had developed into a thug. It is possible that Socrates had attempted to temper the worst excesses, but he, like Pericles, must take some of the blame for having created a monster. Aristophanes’ Clouds was written with wit, and no little courage; it was perhaps unfortunate for Athens that the judges were less courageous.Footnote 34
Their older guardians help neither Pheidippides, nor Alcibiades. The young men's characters are hardly laudable or steadfast. Strepsiades spearheads Pheidippides’ entry into the thinkery, which speeds along his son's corruption. Alcibiades who, along with his ‘younger brother Clinias IV [was]…made [ward] of Pericles I’,Footnote 35 turns out to be a sacrilegious debauchee and a traitor.Footnote 36 Out of the many parallels that Vickers draws between Pericles and Strepsiades,Footnote 37 the most instructive set of likenesses is comprised of the enumeration that he makes of Pericles’ association with the sophists and the philosophers of his day.Footnote 38 The reason why this point of contact between history and the play interests us the most is because of the thematic continuity sustained between Pericles’ experiments with the kinds of ideas which the inhabitants of the thinkery epitomize and the influence that the said notions have on Pheidippides’ and on Alcibiades’ characters on stage and in life. To reiterate, we are not arguing for an identity between history and art. We only note what continuities there are between Aristophanic characters and historical figures in questions. There are, of course, notable discontinuities. One point at which the character, Strepsiades, and the historical person, Pericles, definitively part ways is social standing. Pericles is an Athenian leader, a well-recognized and reputable man. Thucydides 2.65 celebrates him, placing his character and ethos as a guiding star, which all Athenians would do well to hold as their compass.Footnote 39 However, Strepsiades complains, precisely, about his own lack of aristocratic habits, predilections, and stature (41–52).
Comedy Talks to Philosophy: The Study of Shame and Eros in the Gorgias
Both the Clouds (5f.) and the Gorgias (447a) begin with references to war. The war troubles, the memory of which the comedy evokes explicitly and the dialogue obliquely, are those that spell the fall of Athens during the second stage of the Peloponnesian affair. Both the play and the dialogue draw our attention to the general dissipation of character whereby aggressive militarized expansion serves to satisfy love of gain.Footnote 40 After Pericles’ death and Cleon's ascension to power, particular individuals, such as Cleon himself and, arguably, Alcibiades, also become the target of philosophical and dramatic portrayals of corruption.Footnote 41 Aristophanes’ humor scoffs at both the attempts at sorry and ineffective moralizing as well as at the reign of depravity that the didactic efforts fail to combat.
Plato's Socrates, in the Gorgias, warns against our falling in with the depraved, while he seems to embody the moralizers.Footnote 42 The dramatic date of the Gorgias places it after the Clouds. In what follows, we set out to show that the dialogue would be too heavy-footed if it were meant to be read as a prescription of that same moralizing which the comic play rejects. If we take Socrates’ preaching straightforwardly, if we forget that Socrates is the man who avers his passionate affections for Charmides (Charmides 155c–d), Phaedo (Phaedo 89b), and Alcibiades (Gorgias 481d), if we miss the correspondences between the role that Socrates plays in the Gorgias and the one performed by the Just Speech in the Clouds, then we also have to take the suggestions of the Just Speech in the Clouds as being simply right. However, we have already seen that Aristophanes, in his rendition of the Just Speech and its faults, plays up the subversive elements of moralizing. In the Clouds, sophistically minded SocratesFootnote 43 could stand in for either the prude or the pervert or for both. In the Gorgias, moralistically minded Socrates looks very much like a prude.Footnote 44 He speaks against the perverts.Footnote 45
Socrates opposes Gorgias, who in echoing Strepsiades’ desires and sophistical Socrates’ know-howFootnote 46 argues that there is no greater good for a human being than being able ‘to persuade by speeches judges in a law court, councilors in a council meeting, and assembly men in an assembly or in any other political gathering’ (452e).Footnote 47 Socrates defeats Gorgias’ view of oratory, its purpose, and the benefits it brings (460e–1c).Footnote 48 This is when Polus comes to the rescue of his dialogical father, Gorgias.Footnote 49 Unlike Strepsiades’ son, Pheidippides, who is reluctant to take sides with his father and show any interest in the power of persuasion, Polus is all too eager to learn from Gorgias (448c–d). Polus, whose name means ‘colt’, and who is described as this animal by Socrates at 463e, shares the equestrian imagery with Pheidippides and with Alcibiades, the proud owner of the race horses. A more important similarity between the three is their thirst for unlimited (tyrannical) power (466b–c). The Socrates of the Gorgias succeeds where the Just Speech of the Clouds fails.Footnote 50 The Just Speech does not impart much, if any, of its averred moral standards to Pheidippides, who adopts the amoral views of the Unjust Speech. However, Polus’ perverse view that tyranny is the greatest and most desirable power is put to shame by Socrates (474c–d, 475a–b, 477c–e).Footnote 51
Callicles to the rescue—his entrance at 481b marks another parallel with the Clouds: Although it is Strepsiades (Στρεψιάδης), whose name evokes the images of twisting, turning, and swindling (see above n.12), it is the Unjust Speech who makes a move to win by means of ‘turning things upside down or backwards in its contrarian speeches’ (ἀλλ᾽ ἀνατρέψω γ᾽ αὔτ᾽ ἀντιλέγων, 901). Callicles, the Unjust Speech of the Gorgias, aims to pervert in the very same way: in his tirade against Socrates, he does exactly that of which he accuses his dialogical rival. Callicles’ speeches turn things ‘upside down’ (ἀνατετραμμένος, 481c).Footnote 52 In the Clouds, the Unjust Speech represents the crooked ways of the many powerful public figures in Athens and, hence, its popularity and its unabashed, albeit perverse, actions appear appealing and even right to quite a few. In a similar vein Callicles turns out to be right in terms of history, albeit not in terms of ethics, when he prophesies to Socrates that his determination to ‘practice the true politics’ (521d) will cause him to be ‘brought to court…by some very corrupt and mean man’ (521c). The Clouds and the Gorgias, for all their artful levity, their use of multi-faceted characters, subversive arguments, and jokes, arrive at pessimistic conclusions. Strepsiades burns down the thinkery not in the flames of truth, but by the heat of violent fire. Socrates, aside from Callicles’ final underhanded concession (521b), does not solicit much agreement from his final interlocutor. Callicles’ view is not vindicated in the dialogue. However, we need to consider carefully, why, even in the face of Calliclean defeat, does Socrates find it necessary to tell a spooky story about harsh punishments that tyrants suffer in the afterlife?Footnote 53 Does this mean that the tyrannically minded characters of the dialogue do not actually change their minds and need further evidence against their preferred lifestyles?
Agreeing on the ending, the two works also share imagery and subject matter. Aristophanes’ comedies (and the Clouds is no exception) make use of gastronomy and violence. Another favorite topic is sex and things that have to do with the indecent display of our erotic nature. Out of these three go-to subjects of comedic ridicule, two are explicit in the Gorgias. Benardete observes that in the dialogue, ‘battle and feast…seem to be a formula that embraces Socrates’ way.’Footnote 54 Nothing is actually eaten in the Gorgias and no one is physically harmed. Although, as Benardete points out, Callicles recommends corporeal punishment at 485c, because he believes that he ‘can straighten Socrates about politics, but [to do that]…demands a straightforward beating.’Footnote 55 In comedy, the metaphorical feasting and verbal fighting come to a head and become literal.Footnote 56
Aside from the affinities that indicate a sharing of genre, consider, further, the preliminary concerns that set into motion the events in the Gorgias and in the Clouds—wealth (or lack thereof) and sophistry. Strepsiades’ substance is dried up because of the parasitic life-style that his wife and his son lead. Although Strepsiades is the only one in the family who has real knowledge of things that sustain human beings—he is, after all, a farmer—he is eager to turn to sophistical contrivances. Strepsiades is desperate. Is Gorgias, or Callicles, or Polus? These three sing praises to the power with which they claim persuasive speaking endows those who possess this know-how. In the dialogue, this kind of influence that sophistical oratory has over human affairs is juxtaposed to the benefits of other arts.
In the shortsightedness of the effects of his teaching, Gorgias is akin to Aristophanic Socrates, who creates a monster, Pheidippides and, thereby, incurs Strepsiades’ wrath. Although Gorgias does not suffer the same fiery fate in the dialogue as Socrates does in the Clouds, Gorgias’ pupil, Polus, is awfully interested in the same limitless power that attracts Pheidippides. These two young men, as well as their historical counterpart, Alcibiades, are fascinated by the combination of unaccountability and authority that tyranny promises. History spells a gruesome end both for Socrates’ unprincipled lover as well as for the city that falls in love with gain and with war. The comedy, at least on its surface, follows historical example closely. The teaching of the moralizing Just Speech falls apart and Pheidippides, having no one good to emulate or learn from, ends up villainous and perverted.
Polus is to the Socrates of the Gorgias what Pheidippides is to Socrates of the Clouds, with one exception.Footnote 57 The transformation of Pheidippides is complete: ‘Socrates…succeeded in overcoming Pheidippides’ profound loathing of him by his bewitching power or charm—a charm great enough to disgust Pheidippides for the rest of his days with horsemanship and to convert him into a dedicated lover of speeches.’Footnote 58 We build on Strauss's remark and propose that Pheidippides loves speeches because of what he perceives them to be capable of doing; and that is: bending everyone and all, including all laws, to his desire. Polus retains Pheidippides’ dissipated outlook on things, but, at the end of his conversation with Socrates, Polus lacks Pheidippides’ conviction. Polus’ conversion is incomplete. He knows what he wants, but once Socrates is done with him, he also believes that what he wants is ‘injustice and impiety’ (ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ, 479c) or a ‘very bad thing’ (τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, 479d). Injustice (1400–46) and impiety (1468–70) are exactly Pheidippides’ forte at the end. Polus is what Pheidippides would have been if Pheidippides had bent to the rhetoric of shame mouthed by the Just Speech. Plato's Socrates is a more formidable, that is, less obviously flawed, version of Aristophanes’ moralizer. It is only appropriate that Plato's Socrates’ true challenger is not the older, slower, and less ferocious Gorgias, nor the younger, stormier, and duller Polus, but, rather, the craftier and more dreadful Callicles. If Socrates is an enhanced version of the Just Speech, his dialogical match is Callicles, the Unjust.Footnote 59
The leitmotif of the Speeches’ battle in the Clouds, the Old and the New, and the inversion of the two that is accomplished by means of standing the Just Speech's arguments on their head, is preserved in the Gorgias. Callicles’ concern is that Socrates’ speeches, if adopted as a way of life, would turn that life upside down (481c). As the conversation between Callicles and Socrates unfolds we learn that matters are even worse than Callicles initially suggested. It is not that things could or would be inverted, but that they already are, thanks to the general misunderstanding of that which is ‘admirable…by law and…by nature’ (482e). To set matters straight, Callicles drives the exact same wedge between law and nature that aids the victory of the Unjust Speech in the Clouds. He borrows from Socrates the notion of shame (αἰσχρός, αἰσχύνω, 482d–3d) and pivots it toward the dichotomies of strength and weakness as well as justice and injustice. Callicles grounds these divisions in the difference between nature and law. The basic argument that he gives us (481c–4e) is that Socrates misrepresents natural strength and that which is just by nature, because what Socrates says is just is only so in terms of law, which only benefits the weak. Callicles comes to save the day (for the naturally strong ones among us) as he aims to turn around the wrong that is done to the strong. He swears ‘by Zeus [and], in accordance with the law of nature’ (483e) that education of the young has to be changed from its present, debilitating course. The current law and education, says Callicles, bids that ‘we…mold the best and the most powerful among us, taking them while they're still young, like lion cubs, and with charms and incantations we subdue them into slavery, telling them that one is supposed to get no more than his fair share, and that that's what's admirable and just’ (483e–4a). The reason, as Callicles sees the matter, why Socrates’ contemporaries are successful in the enterprise of twisting and enslaving the best and the strongest of the young is because shame comes to the aid of the law that prescribes moderation. The stronger ones are made to feel ashamed to have and to desire more.
The strict dichotomy that Callicles establishes between law and nature (and its consequent modified form: conventional law and natural law) is spurious. Our customs are informed by and, in return, mold our nature. Convention is subject to change. Callicles proposes to have it be so altered as to bring back the golden age in which the ‘just [is] what is most violent’ (484b). He cites Heracles, son of Zeus and Alcmene, as his example of the best and the strongest. Callicles sees in Heracles an embodiment of someone who successfully lives by the precept ‘might is right’, but forgets to mention Heracles’ crimes, toils, and suffering. Callicles does not tell us that Heracles, driven insane by Hera, kills his own wife and children. Then Apollo advises Heracles that in order to cleanse himself he has to serve the whims of a mortal king for the duration of twelve years. Heracles obliges. Heracles is the worst example Callicles could have picked to make his case, because, if Callicles’ argument is that the strong do what they will, then Heracles, the supremely strong one, uses his might to do the exact opposite.Footnote 60
In the Clouds, the Unjust Speech offers the exact same view of human nature as Callicles. It appeals to stories of gods’ mischief to justify human transgressions. Human beings are desirous; why curb or moderate our desires if the unrestrained exercise thereof is only considered shameful by convention? To be desirous and to hold back is a foolish weakness. To do the opposite is the true, natural strength. Also, if gods succumb to the force of eros, then who are we, mere mortals, to resist that which even overtakes the gods? Aristophanes’ comedy turns to its audience for proof—all public figures that have any power act in accord with their nature, i.e., they do not resist. Once the Just Speech realizes this, it is worsted because it, itself, holds on to the idea that there is a strict division between nature (natural desires) and convention (moral law).
It is hardly as easy to bring down Socrates of the Gorgias. He differs from the Just Speech of the Clouds in that what Callicles hears from Socrates is ‘not Socrates’ opinion’, even though Callicles ‘cannot quite put his finger on the difference between Socrates and Socrates’ argument.’Footnote 61 We said that the Just Speech's words betray its fissured conscience. However amorous Socrates might be, his character's duplicity is different in kind from the Just Speech's. The latter believes that what it teaches is good and right. The locus of the Just Speech is the Just Speech or, more precisely, it is the beliefs that some of Aristophanes’ contemporaries hold and the style of life that they adopt. It was our task to see how the action of the Just Speech contradicts its content. Socrates, on the other hand, does not have to subscribe to the views for which he argues. The locus of Socrates’ character is not Socrates. His speeches are not for the sake of his beliefs. Ultimately, the speeches that Socrates makes are for the sake of eliciting, contextualizing, and presenting for what they are the beliefs of his interlocutors (who, like the Speeches of the Clouds, happen to be individuals that represent types). Instead of betraying Socrates’ true view, exchanges of the Gorgias spur us along to question why and if we should examine and modify ours.
Aristophanes’ comical personae are not copied, but refracted in Socrates and in Callicles. As if to pick up the line of attack that the Unjust Speech uses against the Just, Socrates concentrates his argument on Callicles’ self-image. The Unjust Speech does not care whether it appears shameless or ignoble. Callicles cares very much for having enviable ‘qualities, which the others don't’ have (487b). Socrates takes advantage of Callicles’ care for his self-esteem and sings his praises to ingratiate himself with the opponent (487b–e). On the surface, Callicles is sharp witted, well educated, and perceptive. He is so smart as to see through the trappings of conventional education that preaches moderation and relies on shame. As Socrates portrays him, Callicles is the Unjust Speech. Yet, if he is, then shaming him will do no good whatsoever. It is instructive that despite Socrates’ prelude, the conversation between the two turns on the subject of shame. As it turns out, Callicles is not indifferent to the matter. However, his opinion about that which is shameful hinges on his beliefs about that which is the best and lawful by nature (492b–c). In short, Callicles finds it a shame that tyrants—those who are, according to Callicles, better and stronger by nature—have to restrain themselves by law, whereas they should be ‘free to enjoy good things without any interference’ (492b). It is a good thing, Callicles says, to let the naturally strong man's ‘own appetites to get as large as possible and not to restrain them’ (491e). Socrates tries to, but (as Callicles’ closing remarks show) fails to dissuade Callicles and thus to change his opinion about tyranny. He fails to inculcate in Callicles the notion that tyrants live unjustly and ‘if unjustly, shamefully, and if shamefully, badly’ (521b).Footnote 62 Although not persuaded, Callicles holds back when he is threatened with being put to shame (484e, 495b).Footnote 63
Conclusion
The reason why moralizing fails is not only because of its inherent duplicity. It fails because of its philosophical inadequacy. The shaming and the scaring tactics befit the Callicleses, the Poluses, and the Gorgiases of the world. To some extent, if we subscribe to a life dictated by these educational techniques, then we run the risk of reproducing (contra expectation) just these same kinds of characters whom shaming rhetoric and the retributive moral of the final myth are supposed to yoke.Footnote 64 We cannot teach philosophy like we would teach a set of moral rules.
And yet, have we not just now delivered an interpretive, if not a moral, dictum? Or take a bigger picture—what would a class in ethics look like if we did not admit a somewhat straightforward difference between the bad things and the good? The difference between philosophy and moralizing or between a philosophical and a dogmatic take on Plato's texts—where does it lie? Can it be settled once and for all? We leave these questions open for further consideration, as we intend to follow Aristophanes and Plato, who both weave their speeches into actions, instead of setting up an unquestionable written postulate over our deeds.
