Reinoud Leenders has written an extremely well-researched study of corruption in postwar Lebanon. It features numerous case studies of alleged “high corruption” within the Lebanese state, ranging from fraudulent activities in the healthcare system, to shady deals in the oil and gas sector, to the rampant and environmentally destructive corruption in the quarrying sector, to the lucrative accumulations associated with the waste management sector, to corruption linked to the broader reconstruction program. The breadth and depth of Leenders’ research is impressive, particularly given the sensitive nature of his subject and the obvious difficulties in obtaining fully reliable data. The study places these case studies in the broader context of postwar Lebanon, linking them to the dynamics of the postwar political settlement and the processes of state-formation that it unleashed. Hence, rather than focus on the consequences of corruption—as is so common in literature on the subject—this study focuses on the more analytically satisfying examination of its causes.
In addition to its importance for our understanding of contemporary Lebanese politics, Leenders’ study makes three broad analytical contributions: the first, which is the most developed of the three, is to methodological debates surrounding the study of corruption; the second is to debates about the analytical relevance of the Lebanese state; and the third is to discussions about the consequences of promoting consociational democracy in deeply divided postconflict states. This review will examine each of these in turn.
Leenders makes many useful points about the state of the field of “corruptology,” and his study is an excellent example of the kind of hard work and critical analysis that is necessary to overcome the problems he so poignantly identifies. For example, he effectively critiques “aggregate” approaches to the study of corruption, which draw upon such tools as opinion poles, surveys, and indices to reach “grand” conclusions about the extent of corruption in particular contexts. In Leenders’ view, these approaches provide little insight into the heterogeneous nature of corruption, including the diverse range of corrupt practices and the varying institutional and political settings within which they take place. Leenders is equally critical of studies that use overarching interpretative lenses to analyze corruption, including those grounded in modernization theory, which link endemic corruption to “behavioral” deficiencies in countries of the Global South; those grounded in neoliberal theory, which seek to dismantle statist approaches to economic development that, in their authors’ view, create embedded incentives for corrupt behavior; and those grounded in “governance” approaches associated with the global aid industry, which in their “illusory quest” for administrative reform do not address the difficult and salient questions of the political underpinnings of bureaucratic performance. In their stead, Leenders adopts a contextualized, “bottom-up,” “disaggregated approach” to the study of corruption in postwar Lebanon, arguing that only by revealing common features across case studies can one move to a higher level of abstraction. Moreover, if abstractions are going to be attempted, they should be based upon “structural” approaches that ultimately treat corruption as a political phenomenon. Even here, however, Leenders is cautious, arguing that any causal relationships need to be thought about in “probalistic terms.”
This leads us to his study of “high” corruption in postwar Lebanon and the structural political dynamics that have underpinned it. After devoting the first few chapters of his book to a series of disaggregated case studies of corruption (some of which are listed above), Leenders turns his attention to a broader analysis of the consequences of the postwar “political settlement” in Lebanon. It is here that one finds one of the most thorough and analytically convincing accounts to date of postwar political dynamics in Lebanon. Leenders highlights five crucial and debilitating features: the settlement's highly inclusive nature, which resulted in an extreme dispersal of power; the predominance of the personalistic and distributive (muḥāṣṣa) politics of the troika that was directly connected to the imprecise legal underpinnings of new rules concerning executive power sharing; the resulting tendency on the part of these political leaders to build extra-institutional forms of power and authority; the weakness of Lebanon's postwar political elite class, epitomized by their increasing reliance on the instrumentalization of sectarian and clientelist dynamics to build some modicum of legitimacy; and the Syrian presence, which added a centralized coercive dynamic to Lebanese politics, intensifying its already augmented level of postwar political factionalism. Together, these various dynamics created a political context of stalemate and paralysis within which the Weberian “rational-legal” features of the Lebanese state—that is, clear rules governing the operation of state agencies, the existence of control and audit mechanisms, and the strict separation between public and private interests—became impossible to enforce.
Having constructed a generalized argument concerning high corruption in Lebanon from his “disaggregated” case studies, Leenders raises two further analytical points that resonated with this reader but left him wanting more. First, Leenders emphasizes the analytical importance of the Lebanese state itself, countering those who focus instead on the hegemonic dynamics of clientelism and sectarianism. According to Leenders, the state constituted “a major ingredient” in postwar elites’ self-enriching calculations. He also proceeds to classify the Lebanese state as a muḥāṣṣa (allotment) state. However, this conceptualization, and especially its relationship with the Weberian framework for statehood on which Leenders draws, remains undeveloped in the text.
This need for unpacking also applies to Leenders’ generalized critique at the end of the book concerning the use of liberal strategies of power sharing and consociationalism in postconflict societies. For example, are all power-sharing agreements and the states that they spawn the same? Leenders himself makes the interesting assertion that there were profound differences between the nature of corruption in pre- and postwar Lebanon, an assertion that suggests that not all power sharing formulas are equally debilitating. Had Leenders been able to develop this historical comparison between Lebanon's pre- and postwar period more fully, his excellent book would also have made a significant contribution to this broader debate.
