Kahn undertakes a rereading of early modern texts—or rather, a reading of modern readings of early modern texts—to shore up the sufficiency of “secular values” vis-à-vis the challenges of modern politics. The project takes her through the oeuvres of several early twentieth-century thinkers in their engagements with early modern political philosophy to address what they saw as the crisis of the liberal state. She highlights the broadly aesthetic dimensions of these engagements. She considers these aesthetic dimensions to be manifestations of the common theme of poeisis, glossed as the idea that “we can only know what we make ourselves,” and linked to “secular conceptions of agency.”
Kahn begins by considering Carl Schmitt's Hamlet or Hecuba, contending that Hamlet represented, on Schmitt's (mis)reading, an alternative myth to Hobbes's Leviathan—and that Schmitt's reading of Hamlet, with its blurring of the aesthetic and the theological, ultimately constituted a kind of apologia for his own support of the Nazi regime. Contrasting Schmitt's reading of Hamlet with Kantorowicz's reading of Richard II and Dante's Inferno, she next turns to Kantorowicz's interest in the rehabilitation of myth for a cosmopolitan politics; Kantorowicz looked to literature, and especially the self-consciousness of fiction, to “reoccupy” (to use Hans Blumenberg's language) the function of political theology. Her third chapter takes up Schmitt's and Strauss's disagreement over Machiavelli: was he a protoliberal insofar as he propounded a vision of politics cordoned off from questions of ultimate value (Strauss), or an opponent of liberalism insofar as he espoused a view of human nature as fundamentally evil (Schmitt)? In contrast to both views, Kahn claims Machiavelli for modern politics by emphasizing his instrumental conception of religion and his emphasis on human agency.
Many of Kahn's themes are crystallized in her chapter on the twentieth-century renaissance of interest in Spinoza, particularly in connection with the “Jewish question.” Looking at Schmitt's, Strauss's, and Arendt's engagement with Spinoza, she demonstrates the way Spinoza's famous scriptural hermeneutics ends in a defense of democracy. Her final chapter pertains to Freud's interest in Spinoza's work for the project of securing the triumph of secular reason over religion via the substitution of art for religion (a project in which Freud's confidence declined as his career went on, Kahn argues).
The book is less a single overarching argument than a constellation of readings of texts around the theme of “political theology.” Kahn's readings are always erudite, often provocative, and sometimes unconvincing (particularly her recourse to tenuously connecting between intellectual production and the biographies of its producers). The arguments of individual chapters are dazzling and bewildering by turns; one never knows where Kierkegaard or Althusser might crop up. Occasionally what seems to be substantiated is not any claim about early modernity in relation to either its later readers or “political theology” so much as Kahn's creativity as a reader.
Though Kahn does not take up directly the extension of the term “political theology,” she generally does her reader the favor of defining it when she uses it. Her definitions, though, range wildly. In the introduction it seems she means to contrast a premodern construction of political theology as “the theological legitimation of the state” with what she deems the early modern period's understanding of political theology as “the problem of the relationship between politics and religion once this theological legitimation is no longer convincing” (2–3). It is not clear what is to be gained by bringing the latter under the mantle of “political theology,” but this is in fact only the beginning. A few pages later the problematic expands to include “the relationship of politics, religion, and culture” (17). In discussing Machiavelli, she suggests that “political theology” and “civil religion” are interchangeable, writing, “Machiavelli's view of religion elaborates a political theology in the specific sense that it makes religion a contested political instrument” (84). Politics conventionally understood seems to fall out of her next claim, that “Freud elaborates a psychoanalytic account of political theology, that is of the role of fiction and fantasy in the constitution of religion” (169). Finally, in light of the narrative of Moses and Monotheism about the murder of the father at the foundation of civilization, she writes that for Freud “political theology is a principle of psychic life because religion reenacts in communal and … neurotic form the oedipal conflict of the individual” (176).
Though several of her uses of the term have precursors—in late antiquity as much as in the early modern period—the range of her uses of “political theology” might suggest that the center of Kahn's interest actually lies elsewhere. The common thread seems to be poeisis, which is (implicitly) connected to political theology through something like the Blumenberg claim: poeisis is a source for thinking about secular politics insofar as it insists that the world around us is of our own making, and thus does not require theological legitimation.
In her advancement of poeisis, Kahn is most directly engaging those who would suggest that there is an intrinsically theological dimension of politics (usually, an intrinsically theological dimension of sovereignty). But there are other, nonmetaphysical registers in which politics and theology might be related, and indeed, the nature of her argument more plausibly contests the existence of a historical relation between politics and theology. Kahn casts her lot with Blumenberg, who mounted an important critique of Carl Schmitt's famous thesis in Political Theology that “all the concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological ideas.” Blumenberg points out a grave problem with Schmitt's claim: we cannot make sense of the most obvious construction of the thesis without attributing a quiddity to “concepts” that they do not possess. Concepts are simply not the sort of thing that can be secularized. Blumenberg's argument on this point is meant to clear the field for his broader argument that modernity with its “self-assertion” represents a true rupture with what came before it. Having eviscerated the construction of Schmitt's claim that would rely on “historical substantialism,” Blumenberg contends that modernity was no one's bastard child: thus his title, Legitimacy of the Modern Age.
Blumenberg frequently takes modernity's imagination of itself as self-created (and its complementary valorization of human agency) as evidence of self-creation. But that modernity often installed a rupture between itself and its precursors, in its historical (antihistorical?) imagination, does not suggest that such a rupture existed. I have argued (History of European Ideas 37 [2011]: 337–43) that there is a construction of Schmitt's claim that is not just coherent but also (in at least some cases) true: the viability of the claim depends on construing what Schmitt calls “concepts” as argumentative logics. When we understand the thesis this way, it becomes clear that what Schmitt calls “secularization” is not in fact a loss (or what Charles Taylor has called a “subtraction story”) but a certain sort of sedimentation of the past: the (theological) arguments we encounter for, say, the legitimacy of authority shape our senses of what an argument for the legitimacy of authority looks like, such that when we are called upon to legitimize authority—even if the authority is “political” rather than “theological”—we redeploy the logics of arguments we already know, in what might be termed a “secularization” of the argument.
If this deflates Blumenberg's characterization of modernity as utterly self-birthed, I do not think it is similarly threatening to Future of Illusion. For though the premise underwriting the book is that various early moderns—particularly Machiavelli and Spinoza—hold promise insofar as they suggest alternative configurations of the politics-religion relation, Kahn's central purpose (I take it) is to argue for the viability of a purely secular politics. But this presses the question of how Kahn's intellectual-historical work—which comprises the bulk of Future of Illusion and makes a convincing case for the centrality of the notions of poeisis and homo faber to early modern political philosophy and the reaction of important early twentieth-century political philosophers to those notions—is meant to support her prescriptive vision. Do we need for Spinoza and Machiavelli to be secularists in order to make it possible for us to replace the God-like agency of the sovereign with a human-made agency of “the people”? Does Kahn's claim that we ought to replace theology with poeisis require historical credentials of any sort? Kahn wants to argue for the possibility of legitimating authority without appealing to transcendence; it is unclear what she imagines she gains in appealing to history to do so.
