In The Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace, Cheryl A. Rubenberg examines how and why the Oslo process ultimately failed, arguing that it directly and inevitably led to the al-Aqsa intifada. She attributes this failure to four major factors: the flawed nature of the Oslo Accords themselves; Israeli policies that, in practice, made life for Palestinians much harder during the Oslo period; virtually unconditional American support for Israel; and the corrupt and oppressive nature of the Palestinian leadership. Regarding the last, a major portion of her argument centers on the contention that, far from being orchestrated by Yasir Arafat or the Palestinian Authority, the intifada was in fact an uprising against the Palestinian Authority as much as against the Israeli occupation (p. 276). Ultimately, however, Rubenberg lays the failure of the process at the feet of successive Israeli administrations that, in her assessment, were never committed to the creation of a Palestinian state through the Oslo process. Rubenberg contends that Israel instead saw the Oslo Accords as a means to extend Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza, while placating the Palestinians with the symbols, rather than the substance, of statehood and that Israel viewed the Palestinian Authority as a mechanism for enforcing Israeli security.
The book's greatest strength is Rubenberg's meticulous research; she includes a great many first-person accounts and quotations from those involved in the Oslo process and the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, on both sides. This finding is particularly true of chapter 4, in which Rubenberg examines the city of Hebron as a microcosm of the Palestinian experience of the occupation. The sheer volume of information the author presents on life in the West Bank and Gaza during the Oslo years is a valuable contribution; Rubenberg paints a detailed picture of the hardships suffered by Palestinians under the occupation, including curfews, closures, and settler violence. However, her work suffers from a certain bibliographic narrowness: she draws very heavily on a limited range of sources from the Israeli left, particularly Bءtselem and Haءaretz, lending a certain bias to her account.
There are several additional themes that reoccur throughout the book: Israeli strength in contrast with Palestinian weakness; the corruption of the Palestinian Authority, Fatah, and Yasir Arafat; and, perhaps most significantly, the Palestinians' assumption that, by recognizing Israel at all and reducing their ultimate goal from a state encompassing all of historic Palestine to a state in the West Bank and Gaza, they had made all of the concessions that could reasonably be expected of them. Although what may or may not have been “reasonable” to expect of the Palestinians, the Palestinian Authority, or Yasir Arafat is ultimately a subjective judgment, in Rubenberg's account, the eruption of the intifada was directly connected to a sense of betrayal on the part of average Palestinians at being denied, through the Oslo process, what they believed they had already settled for. Rubenberg herself is clearly sympathetic to this formulation of the Palestinian position. However, what does not make its way into her account is any Palestinian argument dissenting from this perspective. There are, for example, Palestinians (albeit a definite minority) who advocate for a secular, single-state solution; the Palestinian political discourse is somewhat more varied in reality than Rubenberg portrays it as being.
Although Rubenberg states plainly at the outset that she is interested only in the Palestinian narrative, the lack of an in-depth analysis of the Israeli government's underlying motivations leaves the Israelis in her narrative as mere straw men to be knocked over. This is not to suggest that she flatly demonizes Israel, but rather that her argument would have benefited from a more complex exploration of the motives behind Israeli actions and Israel's participation in Oslo. Because Rubenberg concedes that she is engaged in writing an “account of Palestinian history and politics” (p. 31), this approach is perhaps forgivable. However, given this goal, there is a more serious gap in her account, namely her homogenization of the Palestinian political spectrum. Although Rubenberg does differentiate between the “Tunisians” (that segment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization that returned to the occupied territories from exile in Tunis) and “the locals,” she fails to examine in any greater detail the variation across the Palestinian political spectrum. The most problematic example of this finding is the absence of any serious discussion of Hamas and Islamic Jihad as political actors in the occupied territories. This absence is in marked contrast with her discussion of the importance of nongovernmental organizations in the Palestinian political and social arena both before and after the return of the Palestinian Liberation Organization leadership from Tunisia.
Ultimately, The Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace is less an analysis of the failure of the Oslo Accords than it is an examination of the Palestinian experience of the Oslo process. Although not an impartial examination of the failure of Oslo, as a resource for information on the realities of Palestinian life in the West Bank and Gaza during the Oslo years, this book is recommended.
