On a daily basis, an average English reader can easily become exposed to a handful of commentaries and op-ed pieces about Iran's foreign policy. The supply of analysis is high in the market, which is not surprising given the fluid situation in Iran and the rapidly changing dynamism in the Middle East. New factors and actors are incessantly being added to the region's theatrical scene, bothering the analysts to provide a constant update. Yet, it is hard to find a well-researched academic work that not only is engaged with the theory but also is concerned with contributing to and enriching it. In this view, Thomas Juneau's book, based on his doctoral thesis, is a commendable attempt to understand Iran's regional and, to a lesser extent, international behavior.
Using neoclassical realism as a framework, Juneau examines Iran's foreign policy during 2001–9. He proposes that in 2001, following the US invasion of Afghanistan, Iran faced a “window of opportunity” (p. 7), or “a favorable strategic environment” to fulfill its ambitions and “establish itself as the dominant regional power in the Persian Gulf and as an indispensable player in the Middle East” (p. 203). Suggesting, however, that the Islamic Republic failed to do so, Juneau modifies and applies neoclassical realism “to explain why, how, and with what consequences Iran's foreign policy has been suboptimal” (p. 7).
The author provides a compelling argument about why neoclassical realism can better and more comprehensively explain Iran's performance compared to other schools of thought such as constructivism and liberalism as well as other branches of realism. None of these theories can account for Iran's “failure to seize the opportunity it faced or for the consequences it suffers as a result” (p. 3). The advantage of neoclassical realism, as a theory of mistakes, is that it can differentiate between “ideal, optimal foreign policy” and “actual, suboptimal choices” (p. 5). Moreover, it tries to surpass the limits of traditional power politics by focusing on the role of domestic factors as an intervening variable that shapes foreign policy. As the author demonstrates throughout the book, these domestic factors can offer an interesting explanation of why Iran's performance has been suboptimal.
The book is structured into seven chapters, in addition to an introduction and conclusion. In the dense, yet, inclusive introduction, Juneau delivers a summary of his argument and explains the hypotheses and methodology. One of the weaknesses of neoclassical realism, as the author rightly asserts, is that “there have been few efforts to develop its internal logic, as the literature is dominated by case studies” (p. 5). In the first chapter the author attempts to enrich the theory and develop a functioning yet consistent logic for it. One virtue of neoclassical realism is humility; it does not believe in universal laws, but rather offers “limited, contingent generalizations . . . in the context of detailed explanations of individual episodes with unique features” (p. 33). Juneau continues outlining the theoretical framework in the second chapter as he conceptualizes the causal chain of Iran's foreign policy.
The following two chapters operationalize this causal chain. Chapter 3 examines the independent variable (Iran's relative position in the regional and international distribution of power) while Chapter 4 studies the domestic pathologies (p. 81) or the intervening variables (status, regime identity, and factional politics) that ultimately affect the outcome of the country's foreign policy. In short, the author argues that Iran is a revisionist state (p. 85) that suffers from a “status discrepancy as a result of the differential between its aspirations and the status it perceives the international community ascribes to it” (p. 81). The Iranian regime “has built its identity as the champion of the resistance to, and rejection of, the U.S.-dominated order” (p. 85). And as the balance of factional power during 2001–9 shifted toward the right and “reformists and moderates were marginalized,” Iran became more assertive in its rejectionist and revisionist foreign policy (p. 92). Yet Iran has restricted the scope of its influence due to its unbalanced investment in elements of power. The country has maximized its “unconventional capabilities, which allow it to adopt policies of deterrence, denial, interdiction, and spoiling” (p. 58). These capabilities can only “negatively influence regional developments” (p. 12). But the stagnation of conventional means has limited Iran's ability to positively shape outcomes (p. 204) and to “reach more constructive goals, let alone to defeat an enemy on the battlefield” (p. 80).
Chapters 5–7 provide a rich and detailed examination of three important issue-areas of Iran's foreign policy: Iraq, the Arab–Israeli conflict, and the nuclear program. Given that the book is heavily invested in examining the domestic nuances and trajectories that affect Iran's foreign policy, one would expect the author to have used original primary source material in Persian; yet, the majority of citations are from secondary sources and all are in English.
Juneau believes that in all three issue-areas Iran's performance has been generally suboptimal. Comparatively put, Iran's worst performance was in the Arab–Israeli conflict where “lower structural pressures allowed domestic processes to hijack policy-making, leading to a highly suboptimal outcome: major consequences and limited gains” (p. 198). In Iraq, due to strong structural pressures, Iran had a relatively more optimal manner with important gains. The nuclear case situates itself in between: “the consequences of its nuclear policy have been severe and are set to worsen, but the potential benefits are significant” (p. 12).
The most debatable aspect of the book is not the narrative that the author provides for Iran's performance; rather, it is hidden in its supposition. Juneau assumes that a window of opportunity was opened for Iran after 2001 as its two hostile neighbors collapsed one after another. As a result, Iran “faced an unusually high degree of choice” (p. 220). However, this is not how Iranian politicians and statesmen perceive the situation. They see a window of threat that opened after 2001 when the United States declared Iran a member of the axis of evil. Iran's attempt to reach a grand bargain with the United States was rejected by the Bush Administration and the country faced a persistent and imminent threat of attack by the United States and Israel. Concerned with survival, Iran had limited choices. Considering this alternative perspective could affect our judgment and evaluation of Iran's performance. In reality countries are rarely faced with windows of pure opportunity; rather, they have to deal with a complicated and interrelated combination of advantages and disadvantages that also relentlessly affect one another.
The book was in the process of publication while nuclear negotiations between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany were ongoing. It was released almost two months before the historic accord was reached, leading especially to a rapid economic rapprochement between Iran and many European countries. The situation in the Middle East is very fluid as it has rapidly faced new developments since the publication of Juneau's book. Yet, he does not hesitate to predict that the “overall situation will worsen, not improve, for the Islamic Republic: its power is likely to decrease in coming years” (p. 12).
The book has a wide potential audience. It could provide a good methodological example for students of international relations who are interested in using neoclassical realism as a framework for any case study. Neoclassical realism has usually been applied for studying far and long historical cases. But Juneau's book is a courageous attempt to use this theory for understanding the “important day-to-day aspects of state behavior” (p. 5). Scholars of Iran and Middle East politics can also benefit from reading the book. Policymakers, nonacademic professionals, and lay readers who are interested in the region can skip the two theoretical chapters of the book and yet gain insight from the detailed accounts of Iran's foreign policy that Juneau offers.
