The launching of a war in Iraq in 2003 by the administration of George W. Bush was an extraordinary departure in US foreign policy. The first major offensive war that the United States had initiated in more than a century, it defies any straightforward explanation in terms of a national decision-making structure pursuing national interests. No such structure was engaged in the run up to the war, and there was no policy process that addressed the question of whether invading Iraq was a good idea. Although a combination of circumstances made the war possible, the invasion was the culmination of a prolonged and concerted effort by a network of committed ideologues known as neoconservatives. Many subsequent commentaries and books about the war have failed to capture the essence of what the war was about, and instead have been trapped in a framework established by the neocons themselves in selling the war to the public.
Understanding why this war was launched is not primarily a matter of beliefs about unconventional weapons programs or about chimerical ties to notorious terrorist groups, although obviously such beliefs were involved in mustering enough public and political support to take such an extraordinary step. Understanding how and why the United States got on the road to war in Iraq instead requires an understanding of what drove the neocons and how they were able to build on previous endeavors and the relationships among themselves to take over enough of the national security apparatus to be able to bring their project to fruition. Such understanding is largely an exercise in sociology. Muhammad Idrees Ahmad, a sociologist, has provided a valuable aid to such understanding. The Road to Iraq is one of the most insightful and instructive books for anyone wanting to know why the United States launched the Iraq War, one of the biggest blunders in the history of US foreign policy.
The book provides a history of the neoconservative movement that is concise yet thorough, and follows the unbroken progression of neoconservatism from its emergence during the Cold War and focus on hard-line stances toward the Soviet Union to the more concentrated militarism and unilateralism in the Middle East that characterizes it today. The story is partly one of ideas, and the author argues that ideological coherence is one of the advantages that the neocons have used to stay ahead of their adversaries. But the story is also one of personal and professional relationships, weaving a web that has extended from the classroom of Leo Strauss to corridors in the Pentagon and the Executive Office Building in Washington. Included in that web are think tanks, letterhead organizations, wealthy financiers, and individuals who have at different times promoted the neocon agenda from seats either inside or outside government. The book is especially detailed in descriptions of how the careers of those who would become prominent neoconservatives have interwoven, often with one of these individuals being instrumental in advancing the career of another of them. The overall result has been cohesion of personal relationships at least as much as of ideas, again working in the neocons' favor.
The network does not respect lines on any government organization chart. Inside the George W. Bush administration during the run up to the Iraq War, the lines of communication and responsibility that mattered were not found on any chart but instead were those that the neoconservatives created for themselves, often exploiting whatever official positions they had been able to secure. The author borrows Janine Wedel's concept of a “flex net” in describing the neocon approach of having no allegiance to institutions, of valuing personal relations over bureaucratic chains of command, and of unapologetically putting public information to private use and using private information to influence public policy. The Road to Iraq convincingly brings the story of neoconservatism, and its successful exploitation of its assets both inside and outside government, to the launching of the war in a way that corroborates Tom Friedman's observation that he could name twenty-five people whose existence and presence in Washington were critical to the Iraq War taking place.
While this well-researched book accurately explains the war as a neocon project, it does not overstate this part of its case. It takes proper note of the other political circumstances, including the suddenly increased militancy of the American people in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which made the war possible. It correctly describes how some of the key figures in making the war—especially President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld—were not neoconservatives themselves but had other objectives that meshed with those of the neocons. The book does not get right some of the details of what was going on elsewhere in the US government, but that is not the area of its main contribution.
The book explains the neoconservative objectives at work chiefly in terms of supporting the objectives of Israel and especially of the rightists who have dominated Israeli politics in recent times. A substantial appendix about the Israel lobby functions as a sort of update to the work on the subject by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. Unquestionably there is a huge overlap, in terms of agendas and leading persons, between the Israel lobby and the neoconservative enterprise. There also have been blatant neocon moves that have served Benjamin Netanyahu's objectives rather than US interests, as when some neocons who later would become leading promoters of the Iraq war advised the Israeli prime minister on how to discard the Oslo peace process while staving off any contrary US pressure. Idrees Ahmad is probably most correct about the Israel dimension of the Iraq War story when he argues that neoconservatives were able to ride their extensive ties with the Israel lobby to gain greater financial and political clout, and with it greater influence over policy, to pursue their Iraq project.
The heavy emphasis on Israel leads the author to go a bit too far in dismissing other objectives underlying the Iraq War. Most of his dismissals are accurate and persuasive, but he understates the extent to which the spread of democracy and free enterprise, in a region that has been comparatively short on both, was a genuine objective. At least this was the case for many neoconservatives, even if less important for some others who were more interested in supporting the objectives of Likud.
It also would have been useful had the book analyzed how, if the rosy neocon scenarios for Iraq had materialized, this would or would not have served the purposes of the Israeli right wing. It would not have served those purposes if a peaceful and democratic Iraq—the image the neocons were selling, and in which many of them seemed genuinely to believe—had actually emerged and become a major Middle Eastern partner of the United States, and as such a competitor in that role to Israel. Perhaps this possibility could be explained away (although the book does not address this) by saying that the emergence of such an Iraq would have cleared the playing field for more focused enmity toward Iran. And it is with regard to Iran, including more recent efforts to torpedo any agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, that neoconservatives and the Israel lobby have been in lockstep.
The Road to Iraq is an illuminating read about one of the most disturbing episodes in recent US history. What the neocons did in hijacking US policy was the closest thing to a coup that the United States ever experienced, and this book does an excellent job of explaining how the coup-plotters pulled it off.
