I want to thank Frank Jankunis for his interest in and attention to my decades-long debate with Robert Larmer about the significance of alleged miracles.Footnote 1
I should first emphasize that I do not, in fact, think that a miracle has ever occurred. It is hard to tell whether Jankunis understands that this is my view. In his footnote 17 he notes that “whether the miracles described in the Bible have actually occurred is a bone of contention” between Larmer and me.Footnote 2 But later he claims that I “agreed” to assume, in my debate with Larmer, that a miracle has occurred.Footnote 3 Since my debate with Larmer is spread over a series of articles that began in 1985 and ended in 2006, it is possible that I have at times failed to be completely clear about this. I certainly agree that there are standard reports of miracles, notably in the Bible. But at no point, during our debate, did I ever affirm that a miracle, whether in my sense or in Larmer’s, has indeed actually taken place. Instead, my approach is counter-factually hypothetical: What would be the significance of a miracle, were one to occur? I argue that, if a miracle were to occur, it would not be evidence for the existence of the perfect God of the Judeo-Christian tradition but rather evidence against the existence of such a God.
In this commentary I shall focus primarily on Jankunis’s arguments about what he takes to be errors in my work, referring to Larmer’s views where necessary to clarify my assessment of Jankunis’s. I will divide my discussion into two sections, the first on the definition of ‘miracle’ and the second on Jankunis’s ‘Lettie and Mac’ thought experiment.
The Concept of Miracle
I suggest that the definition of the term ‘miracle’ needs to meet two requirements. First, the definition should capture what is unique and significant about supposed miraculous events—that by their very nature, they cannot be explained naturalistically; and second, the definition should not foreclose on the answer to the question about miracles’ significance by including precisely what is at issue: the relationship of these events to a perfect God.
Because of the first requirement, I define ‘miracle’ as a break in the space-time causal sequenceFootnote 4 or a violation of natural law.Footnote 5 I therefore cannot accept Jankunis’s version of R.H. Holland’s suggestion that a miracle could be defined as a “contingent and unexpected but impressive and significant” event in which no law of nature is broken; an event that “didn’t have to” happen.Footnote 6 This definition transforms the issue of miracles into a non-issue, by removing the philosophically interesting challenge that alleged miracles are ordinarily thought to pose. The problem is that an event that is merely unexpected and impressive but nonetheless consistent with empirical laws is potentially fully explicable naturalistically. Its impressiveness and unexpectedness would be simply a function of human beings’ lack of knowledge. It would be not just inappropriate and unnecessary but positively contrary to the norms of good investigation to postulate a perfect God as its cause.
My objection to Larmer’s definition of ‘miracle’ is that it violates my second requirement for defining ‘miracle.’ In his 1988 book, Water into Wine? An Investigation of the Concept of Miracle, Larmer defines the term as “an unusual and religiously significant event beyond the power of nature to produce and caused by an agent who transcends nature.”Footnote 7 In his 1996 book, Questions of Miracle, he is more specific about the cause: There, a miracle is said to be “an objective event that is specially caused by God: it is an event that nature would not have produced had not God intervened to bring it about.”Footnote 8 But if a miracle is by definition caused by the Judeo-Christian God, then one cannot meaningfully ask the following questions: Are miracles produced by a transcendent being? Are miracles evidence of the existence of a perfect God or are they evidence against the existence of a perfect God? Yet those are precisely the questions I want to ask.
Jankunis at first appears to understand my goal, suggesting that Larmer “miss[es] Overall’s point” by insisting that the definition of ‘miracle’ must include divine causation.Footnote 9 Later, however, Jankunis defends Larmer, stating that “defining a category in terms of certain concepts does not presuppose that there are instantiations of those concepts.”Footnote 10 He is of course correct. But my point is that if we come upon a bizarre and surprising event and then label it not just a bizarre and surprising event, and not just a violation of natural law, but rather, as Larmer does, an event caused by the God of monotheism, then there can be no further question as to whether it was caused by a supernatural being, or what kind of entity that supernatural being might be. Larmer’s definition of ‘miracle’ in terms of supernatural causation prevents us from separating the occurrence of an alleged violation of natural law from its cause.
Jankunis points out that Larmer believes it is important to investigate carefully before deciding to call an event a miracle. “Only when,” writes Jankunis, “we know that an event is a miracle do we have evidence for the existence of a supernatural agent or God.”Footnote 11 But surely, according to Larmer’s approach, we do not just have evidence of a supernatural being; we have outright decided that there is a supernatural being. In his discussion of Larmer’s withered arm case, Jankunis states, “Since we have good reason to think the event occurred and was the work of God, then we have—in the arm regrowth—independent evidence that God exists.”Footnote 12 Jankunis may not want to call this approach question-begging; my point is just that naming an event a ‘miracle,’ according to Larmer’s definition of the term, makes the statement ‘God exists’ true by logical implication.
By contrast, my definition enables us to make a distinction between the question of whether a violation of the laws of nature has occurred and the question of what such a violation, if it were to occur, would show, especially about the existence of God. Hence, in my debate with Larmer I wanted to use a neutral definition of ‘miracle’ vis-à-vis the issue of God’s alleged role. I proposed that we consider what the evidentiary status of hypothetical violations of natural law (or breaks in the space-time causal sequence) would be. With Larmer’s definition, as soon as one labels an event a miracle, one has already foreclosed the interesting epistemological, ontological and moral implications of miracles.
A surprising feature of Jankunis’s commentary is that he himself never says explicitly what he means by the word ‘miracle.’ This oversight creates unnecessary confusion. On the one hand, in one of his accounts of Lettie and Mac’s procedures, Jankunis describes them as failing to find a cause for the indentation of the sphere, and then having the “option” of explaining the event in terms of supernatural causation.Footnote 13 In other words, he seems to see them as first deciding, after investigation, to call the event a violation of natural law, and then making the separate step of deciding whether the event had a transcendent cause. This suggests that he does not adopt Larmer’s definition of ‘miracle,’ which combines law-violation and supernatural causation.
On the other hand, there is evidence that he does not adopt my definition either. Jankunis imagines Lettie and Mac as “search[ing] for a cause within the sphere for the violation event [the indentation of the sphere].”Footnote 14 But if the indentation of the sphere genuinely is a “violation event” in the sense that it violates natural law, then by definition there can be no cause for it within the sphere, that is, within the material reality of Lettie and Mac. To say that the event violates natural law is to say that it cannot be explained naturalistically and that it is a miracle in my sense.
Jankunis’s failure to specify his own meaning for ‘miracle’ adds unnecessary ambiguity to his discussion.
The Case of Lettie and Mac
I shall now discuss Jankunis’s “Lettie and Mac” thought experiment. It’s important to note, first, that their imaginary sphere does not accurately represent our physical reality, because the sphere clearly has an inside and an outside. Lettie and Mac are aware of the boundary of the sphere, but are unable to move it, and the sphere is “translucent.”Footnote 15 Thus, what Jankunis appears to have postulated is one space-time continuum inside another. But the real universe in which we find ourselves has no discernible limits; it has no outside. So, from an empirical and scientific point of view, the analogy is inadequate. Yet the analogy also seems inadequate to capture what contemporary theists believe. Most twenty-first century theists do not think that our physical universe is immobilized inside another physical universe. They believe, instead, that human beings live in a space-time continuum that was created and is overseen (and occasionally interfered with) by a non-spatial, non-temporal being.
Notice, too, that Jankunis’s thought experiment, by its very structure, assumes that there is an outside cause for the indentation: The indentation is empirically observed to be initiated from outside the sphere. Jankunis refers to the sphere’s being “interfered with by something external to it.”Footnote 16 Lettie and Mac’s situation is, therefore, significantly different from the situation of ordinary human beings. Lettie and Mac, it seems, make a clear distinction, presumably based upon their empirical observations, between what is within their sphere and what is outside their sphere. (Indeed, if Lettie and Mac were the real scientists Jankunis says they are, then they would realize that the indentation in the sphere is not an indication of something transcending their reality, but is evidence that their reality simply has a greater physical extent than they thought it had.) By contrast, in our human situation, everything we perceive is in our reality. There is no perceivable limit to it, and no detectable ‘outside’ to our material reality.
However, for the sake of argument, I will set aside my doubts about the aptness of Jankunis’s analogy. Jankunis claims that the imagined indentation in the sphere and immobilization of the rock show that a miracle does not inevitably constitute an evil of any sort. Some alleged miracles may be evil, he suggests, but others are not and need not be. Indeed, Jankunis says, of the indentation that Lettie and Mac observe, that it leaves them in “a state of bewilderment” and is “confusing,” but that an event can be “confusing” without constituting an epistemic evil. Jankunis adds, “convincing magic tricks come to mind as examples of events that baffle but aren’t plausibly evil.”Footnote 17
But the reason that magic tricks are not epistemic evils is that, however convincing they may be to the non-cognoscenti, they are entirely explicable within the terms of our natural laws. Such tricks would not be doable if they weren’t. By contrast, the events recounted in biblical miracle stories are much more than confusing and bewildering. The problem with alleged miracles is that by their very nature they contravene natural laws, and permanently and immutably so. They are not a kind of ‘magic trick’ writ large, just waiting for us to attain the status of knowledgeable magicians in order to understand them; they are inherently beyond human comprehension—ever. The alleged miracles would, by both my definition and Larmer’s, not be susceptible to any sort of naturalistic understanding and explanation by human beings. This inaccessibility would be an epistemic evil because it would be a permanent exception to all human knowledge about our reality.
Nonetheless, Jankunis appears unsure about whether or not to say that, in his thought experiment, the laws of the sphere have been violated. He first describes Lettie as being “upset by the failure of the law of the sphere,” and describes the indentation and envelopment of the rock as “a break in the space-time causal sequence.”Footnote 18 Later he appears to forget that he has used these phrases. He writes,
I do not think a cognitive evil has occurred because their [Lettie and Mac’s] understanding of their world isn’t supposed to capture what happens when their world is subject to external influence. … Steve Clarke puts it thus: ‘Laws of nature are of nature; they should not be expected to account for the behavior of things which have been supernaturally interfered with.’ … Mac and Lettie’s laws of the sphere are still perfectly good laws of the sphere—they have not admitted of a counter-instance or violation of which their laws must take account. So their attempt to understand their reality, consisting of the formulation of good laws of the sphere, is intact and unchanged, i.e., not frustrated by the event Lettie witnessed.Footnote 19
Of course natural laws are “of nature,” but the indentation of the sphere and the immobilization of the rock are events that are happening in Lettie and Mac’s sphere and to their natural surroundings, their ‘nature.’ The laws of the sphere could reasonably be expected to govern all events happening within the sphere. The fact that the rock is visibly stopped by something apparently coming from outside the sphere does not change the fact that the rock is no longer behaving like a rock within the sphere, and that the boundary of the sphere has departed from its previous unmoved behaviour. Hence, contrary to Jankunis, Mac and Lettie’s laws of the sphere can no longer be “perfectly good,” for the rock is behaving contrary to rocks’ regular and law-like patterns. The laws within the sphere have been violated by virtue of the indentation’s effect on a material object within the sphere, and that violation, I argue, is an epistemic evil.
The further fact that Lettie and Mac see an indentation in the sphere apparently coming from outside does not help them at all, since they have no (law-like) way of predicting when it will happen again, in whose presence, which rock it will affect, how great the effect it will be, and whether it will immobilize other objects, including themselves. Hence, their understanding of the affected rock—and by extension other rocks, and maybe even much of their material reality—has been severely undermined by the event.
More generally, attributing natural law violations to a divine cause does not assuage the epistemic evil, because human beings cannot possibly know when, if ever, another such violation will occur, under what circumstances, in whose presence, or for what purpose. The attribution of an alleged miracle to God’s handiwork does not protect the witnesses of the alleged miracle from epistemic evil because, as the Lettie and Mac example illustrates all too well, such an attribution can be no more than an ad hoc story.
Jankunis also argues that the indentation in the sphere is not an ontic evil: “[W]hen the sphere is interfered with by something external to it, the order, predictability and regularity of the sphere itself (analogous to what we would ordinarily call ‘nature’) are not called into question.”Footnote 20 In my view, the question of predictability is an epistemic matter rather than an ontic one. But this bizarre, random, unprecedented, unconnected, and apparently pointless event would definitely be an ontic evil. Sudden indentations and immobilized rocks qualify, I suggest, as flaws in the order, regularity, and patterning of the world in which Lettie and Mac live. To assume that external causation saves the event from ontic evil is only to introduce the possibility of yet further evil: If external causation can produce a departure from the patterning of reality in one case, it may do so in many.
Finally, the indentation would also be a moral evil, in several respects. First, Jankunis argues that, in witnessing the event, “Lettie does not stand to gain anything of value which Mac must go without”;Footnote 21 there is, in short, no harm done. But I’m in no way convinced that Jankunis can simply make this stipulation. Because it was vouchsafed only to Lettie, the indentation of the sphere and the immobilization of the rock could very well generate potential harms. The event might cause Lettie to become profoundly insecure or fearful, or alternatively it might secure for Lettie an advantage over Mac because of her presence at the inexplicable event, or maybe instead it might give her a disadvantage because he would now think she is unreliable, delusional, or even crazy. Thus, the event would cause harm without doing any observable good.
Second, Jankunis himself gestures at what I would take to be the triviality and capriciousness of the event when he notes that “whatever was responsible for the largely insignificant event Lettie witnessed could have done something much more significant instead.”Footnote 22
Moreover, because the indentation in the sphere is so clearly arbitrary and without context, Jankunis’s thought experiment is no support to a believer like Larmer, who believes that supposed miracles are always events that happen for a person or persons, to help some, to harm others, to further an agenda, or to make a spiritual statement. Of course, in my view, that very bias and favouritism is also part of what makes them moral evils: Miracles are supposedly vouchsafed only to the chosen few. When they help at all, they solve, as in the water-into-wine story, only a minor or local problem. When alleged miracles purport to make a major change (as in raising Lazarus from the dead), they solve the problems of only a select few, ignoring almost all of the unmet needs, deliberate cruelty, and enormous suffering in both human and non-human beings. No reason is provided to explain why one or a handful of good people gets the benefit of a miracle, when countless billions of innocent non-human animals, along with millions of equally good or possibly better human beings, do not. Because of their triviality, capriciousness, bias, and favouritism, biblical miracles are moral evils.
Conclusion
I conclude that Jankunis has not in any way helped Larmer’s case for the supposed theistic evidentiary value of miracles. Jankunis’s Lettie and Mac thought experiment fails to demonstrate that a violation of natural law is not evil. An event so unpredictable, arbitrary, pointless, context-free, and trivial as that witnessed by Lettie would, despite Jankunis’s defense, be a cognitive, ontic, and moral evil and hence be evidence against the existence of the perfect God of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
But even if Jankunis had been able to invent an example of a non-evil violation of natural law, Jankunis himself points to an example of one that is clearly evil, by Jankunis’s own admission: God’s supposed murder of 250 men by fire.Footnote 23 Therefore even if my assessment of Jankunis’s thought experiment is unconvincing, and even if (contrary to my arguments in earlier papers) the supposed water-into-wine and loaves-and-fishes cases are not evil, we should wonder about the characteristics of a supposedly divine being whose miracles are not only unpredictable, but unpredictably harmful. Hence, I endorse Jankunis’s claim that, whatever Lettie’s observed violation of natural law might show, it cannot be consistent with the existence of the Christian God, if the Christian God is assumed to be omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent, and omni-beneficent.Footnote 24
I am, however, unclear about the reason for Jankunis’s exhortation, at the end of his paper, that “approaching the evidence for or against the explanation of any event with an indefeasible allegiance to … [an atheistic or theistic world-view] is, at best, inappropriate and, at worst, disingenuous.” Jankunis wants us to debate about “whether the evidence warrants the belief that any particular description of an event in the Bible, for instance, actually occurred and is best explained as a miracle.”Footnote 25 (Of course, he can’t literally mean that the debate is about whether a “description” occurred, but rather about whether that which is described occurred.) But the exhortation is misplaced, because none of my arguments have been about the occurrence of miracles. They are all about the significance of such events, if they were to occur.
Thus it seems that Larmer’s theism and my atheism have led us to define the key questions about miracles very differently. For Larmer, the prime question is whether a miracle in his sense (a violation of natural law caused by God) has occurred. For me, however, the key question is about the significance of the occurrence of a miracle in my sense of the term (a violation of natural law): If a violation of natural law were to occur, what would it suggest about the entity that is thought to have caused it? This is a question that Larmer’s definition of ‘miracle’ does not allow him to raise.
Thus, my discussions of miracles have not been about whether or not there is a god, but rather about the counter-factual question of what kind of god there would have to be, if miracles were to occur. And the answer, for aficionados of a perfect God, is not at all encouraging.
