Successive Ottoman governments excluded the religious colleges (medreses) from the ambitious educational policies they pursued beginning in the 19th century. Many historians and contemporary observers have seen this trend as an anomaly, because this was a period characterized by governmental activism and broad changes imposed from the top, including in the field of education. The inactivity of the government during the long reign of Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) appears particularly intriguing. The Hamidian regime enunciated the ideological, social, and political importance of Islam and extended its patronage to the religious establishment and its institutions. Nevertheless, the Hamidian government kept medrese education outside the fold of its educational project. The medreses were left unchanged in terms of administration, pedagogy, and curricula, even as the Hamidian regime impressively expanded the state school system, initiated a series of educational reforms, and promoted state education as a vanguard of progress and modernity.1
Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 93–111; Selçuk Akşin Somel, Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839–1908 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001), 179–202; Benjamin Fortna, Imperial Classroom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 43–129; Elizabeth B. Frierson, “Women in Late Ottoman Intellectual History,” in Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 143–51; Eugene L. Rogan, “Aşiret mektebi: Abdülhamid II's School for Tribes (1892–1907),” International Journal of Middle East Studies 28 (1996): 83–107; Mehmet Alkan, “Modernization from Empire to Republic and Education in the Process of Nationalism,” in Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000), 47–132.
Indira Falk Gesink, “Beyond Modernisms: Opposition and Negotiation in the Azhar Reform Debate in Egypt, 1870–1911” (Ph.D. diss., Washington University, 2000), 268–381; Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 68–74; Ahmet Kanlidere, Reform Within Islam: The Tajdid and Jadid Movement Among the Kazan Tatars (Istanbul: Eren, 1997), 86–97.
Historians have generally agreed that the stagnation of medrese education during the Hamidian period was fateful for the ulema and their institutions, but they have offered various contrasting explanations to account for that neglect. Some scholars argue that the collective opposition or inertia of the ulema prevented Abdülhamid II from initiating changes in medrese education, even as he invested in developing the state schools and pursued benign policies toward the religious establishment.3
Kemal H. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 101.
Şerif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1989), 112.
Zeki Salih Zengin, II. Abdülhamit Dönemi Örgün Eğ itim Kurumlarinda din Eğ itimi ve Öğ retimi, 1876–1908 (Adana: Baki Kitabevi, 2003), 175–76; Alkan, “Modernization from Empire to Republic,” 66.
In this essay, I argue that the Hamidian government adopted a policy of benign neglect toward medrese education only in the aftermath of a dramatic debacle in 1892, in a hitherto overlooked initiative regarding the medreses of Istanbul. I show that political, military, and educational considerations built a burgeoning momentum toward changes in the status quo in medrese education in the early 1890s. The failed government initiative of 1892 ended this trend. Thereafter, Abdülhamid II resolved that his political interests justified maintenance of the status quo, despite the urgings of quite a few ulema and state officials to the contrary. Furthermore, he even eased the government's control over the medreses by suspending restrictions on the exemption of medrese students from military conscription after 1892. This policy was highly controversial even within the Hamidian administration and helped galvanize negative attitudes toward the medreses and the ulema in broad circles within the military and civil bureaucracy. The Constitutional Revolution brought an abrupt end to the Hamidian policy of benign neglect of medrese education, but the repercussions of the Hamidian policies had an adverse impact on the trajectory of medrese education during the closing years of the Ottoman Empire. The Hamidian government's policies toward the medreses shed a light on the regime's multifaceted concerns and priorities in its general effort to harness the religious establishment and its institutions to the aims and policies of the state. This trend of the late Ottoman period culminated in the move by the Turkish Republic to nationalize religious education and Islamic institutions.
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDRESES OF ISTANBUL IN THE LATE 19TH CENTURY
The Ottoman government's stance was crucial in determining the prospect of changes in medrese education in Istanbul. The medreses of the capital operated under the authority of the state, exercised primarily through its religious establishment (İlmiye). These relations had centuries-long roots, but they were reaffirmed and expanded from the early 19th century, as part of an ongoing integration of the religious establishment into the state's administrative system.6
Madeline C. Zilfi, The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Post-Classical Age (1600–1800) (Minneapolis, Minn.: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988), 227–35; Ahmet Cihan, Reform Çağinda Osmanli İlmiyye Sinifi (Istanbul: Birey, 2004), 63–274.
Yaşar Sarikaya, Medreseler ve Modernleşme (Istanbul: İz Yayincilik, 1997), 32–46, 80–81, 91–92.
Although the government had the authority to effect changes in the medreses, its actual influence on the form and content of medrese education was limited. This situation was particularly notable in comparison with the new state schools. There, the government established a coordinated bureaucratic control over the appointment of teachers, designation of curricula, examinations, graduation procedures, and so on. The educational philosophy implemented in these schools required a “strict functional organization of time and space for the activities of prayer, instruction, the rehearsing of lessons, nourishment, and sleeping.”8
Somel, Modernization of Public Education, 262–77. See also Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 145–52.
Official examination and accreditation, administered by the office of the Sheikh ül-Islam, was required only for employment as a medrese professor in Istanbul or as a judge in the state's courts. For detailed information on medrese education on the eve of the Hamidian period, see Zeki Salih Zengin, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanli Örgün Eğ itim Kurumlarinda Din Eğ itimi ve Öğ retimi (1839–1876) (Istanbul: M.E.B., 2004), 105–72.
Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 73.
Some circles among the ulema advocated readjustments and introduction of stricter regulations in the medreses already prior to the Hamidian period. A fourteen-member committee of prominent ulema indeed prepared a detailed proposal for changes in this vein in 1873. This committee was composed of senior medrese professors and top-level officials in the Office of the Sheikh ül-Islam, including the Commissioner of Medrese Education (Ders Vekili). The committee's recommendations included the introduction of a regulated program of study and a comprehensive mandatory curriculum. These proposals remained dormant. Although the committee's report was published in the Official Gazette of the state, Takvim-i Vekayi

, the initiative was rendered stillborn by the rapid drift of the empire into intertwined economic, political, and international crises, in the mid 1870s.
11Zengin, Tanzimat Dönemi, 136–40.
Somel, Modernization of Public Education, 120–21.
The Ottoman government did take steps to regulate one important issue pertaining to medrese education, namely the exemption of students from military conscription. The Ottoman authorities sought, from the 1840s onward, to gradually establish a universal conscription for Ottoman subjects as the basis for a modern military that could withstand European and regional challenges and serve as a unifying factor within the empire. In reality, the draft was not evenly implemented throughout the Ottoman lands and was limited virtually only to Muslim males prior to the Constitutional Revolution. Moreover, some Muslim populations and groups, including the medrese students, were also exempted from military conscription. Native residents of Istanbul, for instance, were generally exempted until after the Constitutional Revolution, per traditions set in earlier centuries. Historically, the ulema and their students had also been relieved from involuntary service in Ottoman armies. The new conscription regulations of the 19th century maintained that tradition.
13Erik Jan Zürcher, “The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice, 1844–1918,” in Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia, 1775–1925, ed. Erik J. Zürcher (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1999), 79–94.

a imtihanlari) were administered orally by military chaplains, under the inspection of military and civil officials in the provinces.
14Kur

a Kanunname-yi Hümayunu (1871), articles 12, 19–22, 49.
Zengin, Tanzimat Dönemi, 159–61.
The Ottoman capital boasted of dozens of medreses and thousands of students in the early 1890s, but these institutions were increasingly considered academically and administratively outmoded.16
Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archives (henceforth BOA)-Y.PRK.MŞ 3/40 (19 September 1892).
THE BUDDING MOMENTUM TOWARD CHANGES IN MEDRESE EDUCATION IN ISTANBUL
The Ottoman government often implemented new policies in Istanbul before gradually extending them to the rest of the empire. The establishment of the state schools followed this pattern, and a similar path was eventually taken, after the Constitutional Revolution, in the reform of the medreses. Advocates of changes in the status quo in medrese education often proposed such a plan already during the Hamidian period. The convergence of three separate yet interrelated considerations—educational, military, and political—eventually convinced the Ottoman government to contemplate such a program of action in the early 1890s.
Appeals for government initiative to reform various aspects of medrese education were addressed to Abdülhamid II from various quarters, including from state officials, intellectuals, ulema, and medrese students. Some advocates of reform stressed the desirability of adding new subjects to the curriculum, including modern sciences. Others emphasized the need for standardization, regularization, and administrative reorganization. However, proponents mostly argued for the adoption of a new policy of reform without much elaboration of specific details. The reason for this nonspecific nature of many appeals for reforms in medrese education was the reluctance of advocates to endorse specific changes before they were legitimized by the regime. All but a few of these appeals were in the form of petitions. Heavy censorship and limitations on free expression generally kept calls for reform in medrese education away from the public sphere during the Hamidian period. In contrast to the situation in Egypt of the late 19th century,17
Falk Gesink, “Beyond Modernisms,” 268–338.
The former Grand Vizier, Safvet Pasha, reflected the thinking in some government circles that the medreses should be reorganized according to the needs of the state. A proposal he submitted, in 1880, emphasized that the medreses should be transformed administratively and pedagogically into useful modern educational institutions, which would produce graduates qualified to serve in the state's educational and legal branches.18
Atilla Çetin, “Medreselerin Islahina Dair Safvet Paşa

nin Düşünceleri ve bir Arizasi,” Türk Dünyasi Tarih Dergisi 95 (1994): 16–18.
Said Paşa

nin Hatirati, 3 vols. (Istanbul: Sabah Matbaasi, 1912), 1:217.
Similar utilitarian reasoning led some intellectuals to urge the government to modernize medrese education as part of the regeneration of the Ottoman state and society. Murad Bey, for instance, argued for such a course of action in articles he published in his popular newspaper, Mizan, in 1890. He was a prominent journalist and author who believed that the government ought to hasten the pace and expand the scope of its policies to reform the Ottoman state and its majority Muslim population. For a short while in the latter 1890s, he emerged as a leading figure in the opposition to the Hamidian regime.20
On the opposition to Abdülhamid II in general and the role played in it by Murad Bey in particular, see M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 33–212.
“Medrese-i İslamiye ve Medaris-i Mevcüde,” Mizan, 29 May 1890, 1350–51; “Medreseler Hakkinda Birkaç Söz Daha,” Mizan, 7 August 1890, 1394–95.
Proponents of reforms in medrese education often urged the Sheikh ül-Islam to support the transformation of the medreses into modern institutions of learning. They expected the sanctioning of changes that would introduce to the medreses the administrative and academic standards current in the new schools. Ulema were deeply involved, after all, in the design and implementation of educational reforms in the state schools in the late 1880s.22
Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 13, 208–19; Somel, Modernization of Public Education, 273.
Mehmed Sabit Efendi, a high-ranking cleric who held various senior judgships during the Hamidian period, petitioned the Sultan in 1890 to endorse the supporters of reforms in medrese education. He emphasized that, although the committee of top-level ulema had recognized the need for changes two decades earlier, none of their recommendations had been implemented. In consequence, Mehmed Sabit lamented, the medrese students remained completely ignorant of modern sciences and quite backward even in traditional Islamic sciences. He suggested rectifying this situation through a complete overhaul of medrese education, including the establishment of regulated programs of study directed toward specific ulema vocations. This change would first be implemented in Istanbul and extend later to the provinces. Mehmed Sabit urged the Sultan that intervention was necessary because appeals to the responsible officials in the religious establishment had gone unheeded.23
BOA-Y.PRK.MŞ 3/6 (6 November 1890); Sadik Albayrak, Son Devir Osmanli Ulemasi, 5 Vols. (Istanbul: Milli Gazete Yayinlari, 1981), 4:67–68.
Some medrese students aired similar concerns and requested improvements in the quality of medrese education, but they also added specific criticisms against their professors. Ninety-two students from all major medreses of Istanbul signed a petition in that vein in 1889. “Our request,” the students explained in an apparent reference to the state schools, “is that this important profession with which we are affiliated should also be graced with an orderly method of administration and instruction, just as has been done in other beneficial institutions of this age of education.” The students offered few examples of deficiencies in need of reform. One subject of complaint was the lack of a comprehensive and rigorous program of study, which purportedly resulted in a substantial lengthening of the period of study and a decrease in the rates of graduation. A second subject of complaint was the lack of scrutiny of the content of medrese education. The petitioners faulted their professors for teaching subjects of their own personal interest, rather than useful languages and sciences that could benefit their students. The authorities were requested to devise a reform program that “would abolish the currently existing shameful and negative conditions, … salvage the students from their present deterioration and destitution,” and render them “useful to the state and the nation (millet).”24
BOA-Y.PRK.MŞ 2/41 (2 February 1889).
Although the students and other proponents of medrese reforms did not always agree on specific changes, they shared the view that the state should be the agency of change. Perhaps even more than advocacy for specific changes, the immediate aim of all of them was to urge the government to include the medreses within the scope of its general educational policies. They all requested a paradigm change that would entail an extension of the ongoing intermixing of the state and religious institutions to include the medreses and put them on par with the state schools. Detailed deliberations and public discussion on the specific characteristics of the required reform could take place only after an official sanction of the desirability of medrese reform.
Proponents of changes in the status quo often cited military considerations to boost their advocacy of the reorganization of medrese education. They argued that insufficient state scrutiny allowed the medreses of Istanbul to become safe havens for draft dodgers. This argument touched upon a sensitive issue. The strengthening and expansion of the armed forces had become a top priority for the Ottoman government, particularly in the wake of the disastrous Ottoman–Russian war of 1877–78. Accordingly, the government initiated a series of military reforms, including the overhauling of the conscription regulations in 1886. These new regulations entailed a certain tightening of the procedures of exemption for medrese students in the provinces, but no corresponding changes in Istanbul. The ensuing years saw a rapid hike in the number of provincial medrese students in the capital. This trend was often explained, in government circles, as mainly the result of spurious enrollment by conscription dodgers, who sought to take advantage of the less demanding exemption procedures in the capital.25
BOA-Y.PRK.BŞK 13/85; Zengin, II. Abdülhamit Dönemi, 161–69.
Proponents of changes in the medreses did not shy away from arguing that reforms could include measures to end this unnecessary loss of precious manpower for the military units in the provinces. In his petition of 1890, Mehmed Sabit Efendi took this position and linked his advocacy of reforms in the medreses of Istanbul to criticism of the unsatisfactory exemption procedures. “In the last two or three years,” he claimed, “individuals who wish to escape the sacred duty of military service have been arriving in the capital of the Caliphate. Concealing their true intentions under the guise of ‘medrese students,’ they are filling the medreses and learning places to the brim.” Mehmed Sabit insisted that these unpatriotic machinations were facilitated by the lenient registration procedures and by the “improper and corrupt” administration of the exemption examinations in the Office of the Sheikh ül-Islam. He explained that the examiners awarded exemptions liberally after only a short oral examination, and, at times, simply by virtue of their prior acquaintance with students or their professors. Mehmed Sabit lamented that this situation both heralded a decline in the quality of students in the medreses and tainted medrese education as a safe haven for draft dodgers.26
BOA-Y.PRK.MŞ 3/6 (6 November 1890).
The increase in the number of medrese students in Istanbul appeared to give credence to concerns that the military might be losing manpower to the medreses. The number of students in the capital increased from approximately 3,000 in the early 19th century, to over 5,700 in 1869, and rose still further to above 7,000 on the eve of the military reforms of 1886. Six years later (1892) the authorities estimated that the number of medrese students in the capital had soared to approximately 12,000.27
Zengin, II. Abdülhamit Dönemi, 157; BOA-Y.PRK.MŞ 2/1 (2 May 1886); BOA-Y.PRK.MŞ 3/40 (19 September 1892).
BOA-Y.PRK.ZB 10/65 (25 September 1892).
The dramatic increase in the number of medrese students in the capital touched a particularly raw political nerve with Abdülhamid II. He vividly recalled the pivotal role played by medrese students in street demonstrations that threatened to destabilize his regime in early 1877. Similar shows of opposition a few months earlier foreshadowed the dethronement of Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861–76). Abdülhamid II sought to woo the ulema and medrese students through patronage and benign policies in the years that followed. However, in the late 1880s, he became increasingly anxious that his political rivals might find in the students flocking to Istanbul a fertile ground for subversive activities. Consequently, his policies toward medrese education were influenced by his fears of plots involving the ulema and medrese students.29
Hâ tirat-i Sadr-i Esbek Kâ mil Paşa (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Ebüzziya, 1911), 123–25; Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), 325–27.
Incessant rumors of a plot brewing for a coup d'état in the style of 1876, involving ulema and medrese students, seriously alarmed Abdülhamid II in the early 1890s. At times, the rumors found their way into the European press. The Times of London, for instance, published a report from Istanbul, in June 1890, about “agitation” among the ulema and medrese students in preparation for the overthrow of Abdülhamid II.30
“Discontent in Constantinople,” Times (London), 21 June 1890, 7.
Mahmud Kemal İnal, Osmanli Devrinde son Sadriazamlar, 14 vols. (Milli Eğitim Basimevi, 1965), 9:1363–67.
The appointment of a new Sheikh ül-Islam appeared as an opportune moment for changes in the status quo in medrese education. The new Sheikh ül-Islam, Mehmed Cemaleddin Efendi, was a career bureaucrat in his early forties who never took office outside his native Istanbul. In contrast, his three predecessors in office under Abdülhamid II had been elderly judges and medrese professors whose careers were well established before the Hamidian period. Abdülhamid II expected from the new Sheikh ül-Islam more loyalty, cooperation, and efficiency in administrating the religious establishment. He was not disappointed. Mehmed Cemaleddin Efendi indeed proved to be very adept at avoiding pitfalls and satisfying Abdülhamid II's wishes. He remained in office for more than seventeen years, until after the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, which was the longest uninterrupted term in office held by any Sheikh ül-Islam since the 16th century.32
Abdülkadir Altunsu, Osmanli Şeyhülislamlari (Ankara: Akyildiz Matbaasi, 1972), 212–19.
Abdülhamid II resolved to sanction changes in the status quo in the medreses of Istanbul, in 1892, with the cooperation of the new Sheikh ül-Islam. Accordingly, he initiated an operation to begin addressing various concerns regarding medrese education. The proximate cause of the initiative was the Sultan's apprehension that medrese students might be lured into participating in opposition activities. Consequently, the operation's primary goal was to reduce the number of medrese students in Istanbul and introduce stricter regulations for future registrations. However, Abdülhamid II resolved to seize the opportunity to begin addressing military and pedagogical concerns regarding medrese education, thus heeding appeals he had received from various quarters in the preceding years. The significance of the initiative of 1892 was in its aim of breaking with the status quo and preparing the ground for stricter government regulation of medrese education, in accordance with the general educational policies of the state.
A DRAMATIC GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE AND ITS FOUNDERING IN SEPTEMBER 1892
Abdülhamid II launched his dramatic initiative with an imperial decree issued on 18 September 1892. The first stage of the scheme involved the forced removal of provincial students within the age range for military conscription (twenty to twenty-five years) to their hometowns. The plan was to thereby reduce the number of medrese students in the capital significantly, from more than 10,000 down to a few thousands in a fortnight. The second stage of the plan involved setting more rigorous criteria for enrollment in the medreses of Istanbul and imposing stricter government supervision of the registered students. These changes included a gradual introduction of new regulations to overhaul administrative and pedagogical aspects of medrese education. The authorities estimated that these new measures would minimize the openings for spurious registrations intended only to escape military conscription. There was reason for concern that some students and ulema would oppose the initiative. The government therefore kept the deliberations secret prior to enacting the decree, and included some concessions to potential critics. Notable among these concessions was the general suspension of the conscription examinations for one year, which granted all medrese students throughout the empire a temporary unconditional exemption from military conscription. Additionally, each of the students who were sent away from Istanbul was awarded a one-time fixed sum to defray travel expenses and sweeten the bitter pill of deportation.33
BOA-Y.PRK.MŞ 3/40 (21 September 1892).
The operation began in earnest upon the promulgation of the imperial decree, but it was hampered from the outset by logistical and administrative problems as well as by complaints of police misconduct. The gathering and dispatch of the medrese students involved several state agencies. The Office of the Sheikh ül-Islam was responsible for the identification, summoning, and registration of the deportees, as well as for awarding them their due compensation. The police were entrusted with actually gathering the students from medreses, inns, and public spaces and transferring them to specially assigned steamships and earmarked train cars. Finally, the navy, railway administration, and local authorities at the destination ports and railroad stations were responsible for dispatching the students to their hometowns. There were difficulties on virtually every level. On the first day, for instance, it transpired that the steamships were not ready for boarding. Consequently, more than 700 students had to spend the night on the docks before boarding the following day. Meanwhile, in the Office of the Sheikh ül-Islam, there were difficulties and delays in the identification and registration process. Although such logistical and bureaucratic problems slowed down the operation, police brutality and overzealous interpretation of the orders risked creating the unwanted impression that the government wanted to punish the medrese students.34
BOA-Y.PRK.MŞ 3/40 (19 September 1892).
BOA-Y.PRK.ZB 10/63 (26 September 1892).
BOA-Y.MTV 67/89 (18 September 1892).
The recollections of medrese students who witnessed the events convey the horror felt by many during the operation, as well as the negative reaction of some residents of Istanbul. In the absence of any prior public notice or explanation, rumors filled the information void once the gathering and dispatching of students began. Hüseyin Kâmil [Ertur] recalled that “an imperial decree was promulgated one day, ordering that all medrese students in Istanbul were to be apprehended and banished.” Rumors circulated in the city, according to which students “were taken aboard ships and thrown overboard into the Sea of Marmara with stones tied to their feet.” Some students, including Hüseyin Kâmil, “hid in several locations and houses and succeeded in escaping deportation.” Many others were less fortunate.37
Esat K. Ertur, Tamu Yelleri (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1994), 31–32, 44.
Mehmed Fahreddin, “İkinci Hata,” Sirat-i Müstakim 6 (27 April 1910), 119.
Ali Nazmi, “Makale-i Mahsusa,” Beyan

ül-hak 17 (25 January 1909), 380.
Ertur, Tamu Yelleri, 32.
Reports of the negative public reaction so unnerved Abdülhamid II that he ordered the immediate cessation of the deportations on the third day of the operation. Less than 2,000 students had been dispatched from Istanbul by then. The Sultan feared that a measure aimed at strengthening his hold over the capital could easily produce the opposite result as well as tarnish his image as a patron of the religious establishment. Rather than press on, Abdülhamid II decided on immediate damage control, launching an inquiry into the causes of the unexpected derailing of the operation. The internal inquiry led to a blame game with trading of accusations between the Ministry of Police and the Office of the Sheikh ül-Islam. This left the Sultan little alternative but to reprimand officials from both ministries. No senior official was dismissed, however, possibly because the Sultan sought to stabilize the situation.41
BOA-Y.PRK.ZB 10/63 (26 September 1892).
The fiasco of the deportations notwithstanding, Abdülhamid II was initially determined to proceed with the implementation of at least some new regulations regarding medrese education. A note addressed to the Sheikh ül-Islam commented that “the instruction of students in the medreses is not administered along regulated and orderly principles.” Echoing the language of many petitioners in the preceding years, the note listed as examples the lack of oversight of the attendance of professors and students, the long recesses during each school year, and the excessive length of time required for graduation.42
BOA-Y.PRK.MŞ 3/40 (20 September 1892).
BOA-Y.PRK.ZB 10/65 (25 September 1892).
Shortly afterward, however, the government decided to withdraw these instructions due to fears of public backlash and damage to the image of the Sultan abroad. A memorandum written in the Office of the Sheikh ül-Islam warned that “some simple-minded professors and students who cannot tell right from wrong might reach false conclusions.” The Sultan was therefore advised to opt for “a gradual implementation of the desired regulation and reform of the medreses” at a later time.44
BOA-Y.PRK.MŞ 4/72.
BOA-Y.MTV 68/52 (6 October 1892).
See, for instance, “al-Softa (al-talaba) wa-dar al-sa

ada,” al-Ahram, 26 September 1892, 2–3; “Istanbul,” Tercüman (Crimea) 17 (29) September 1892; “Turkish Students Arrested,” New York Times 22 September 1892, 4.
“Izgnanie soft iz Konstantinopolia,” Russkie vedomosti 18 (30) September 1892, 3; “Turtsiia,” Moskovskie vedomosti 19 September (1 October) 1892, 4.
Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, 135–49.
The Hamidian regime took pains to disseminate public reassurances that Abdülhamid II had not abandoned his policy of supporting the ulema and their institutions. A formal explanation was distributed to all the provinces, as well as to the local and international press. The official version was that public health concerns had led the government to evacuate provincial students from the capital. The authorities explained that the Sultan wanted to relieve the destitution and overcrowding from which the provincial students had suffered in Istanbul, and at the same time reduce the risk of the spread of cholera from Europe.49
The plague actually reached the Ottoman lands already several months earlier. Ş. Kâmil, “Kolera Hakkinda Tedabir-i Sihhiye,” Maarif, 14 July 1892, 5–10.
The quotes are from the official statement as carried by Reuters and published in “Turkey,” Times (London), 23 September 1892, 3. See also, BOA-Y.PRK.ZB 10/65 (5 October 1892); “Turkish Students Sent Home,” New York Times, 22 September 1892, 3; “Türkei,” Das Vaterland (Vienna), 23 September 1892, 3; “Turquie,” Le Temps (Paris), 25 September 1892.
BOA-Y.PRK.MŞ 3/40 (21 September 1892).
The debacle of 1892 convinced Abdülhamid II that initiating changes in medrese education was politically imprudent, because it entailed a credible risk of discord with some circles of the religious establishment. He did not like the status quo in medrese education and was aware that quite a few ulema supported the introduction of reforms. Nevertheless, he estimated that maintenance of the status quo had less potential to inflame antigovernment sentiments. Aware that opposition activists were intent on recruiting disgruntled ulema and medrese students to their ranks, he brought an end to the deportations and annulled the new regulations that followed the operation.52
On the cooperation of opposition organizations with the ulema, see İsmail Kara, “Turban and Fez: Ulema as Opposition,” in Late Ottoman Society, ed. Özdalga, 165–79.
The fallout from the initiative of 1892 cemented a policy of benign neglect toward the medreses, and reinforced their status as an anomaly in a reformist and modernizing state. The only durable change that came out of the reform initiative had the effect of bolstering one of the most damaging criticisms directed at medrese education. Overruling military considerations, Abdülhamid II decided to extend indefinitely the temporary suspension of the conscription examinations for medrese students. All medrese students thereby were awarded a virtually unrestricted exemption from the draft. Abdülhamid II calculated that this benevolent policy would assuage ill feeling created by the deportations and enhance his image as a patron of the religious establishment. In addition, the Sultan expected that the ending of conscription in the provinces would undercut an important push factor that, he believed, had driven many students to enroll in medreses in Istanbul prior to 1892. The new policy was maintained through annual imperial decrees, rather than by changing the conscription regulations. This made it clear that the Sultan personally had the power to conscript or provide exemptions. However, he never did reinstitute the conscription examinations, even though the general exemption of the medrese students ran counter to the state's efforts to expand its recruitment base and establish a citizen army. Consequently, the general exemption of the medrese students became particularly controversial and was damaging to the standing of medrese education after 1892, even as the state schools further consolidated their public status as the loci of educational progress and modernity.
THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF A POLICY OF BENIGN NEGLECT AND SOME OF ITS REPERCUSSIONS
The crystallization of the Hamidian policy of benign neglect eliminated any prospect of changes in medrese education after 1892. To the dismay of many ulema, the authorities stifled any public debate on the desirability of reforms in the medreses. Meanwhile, the general exemption of the medrese students from military conscription aroused strong resentment toward medrese education within the military and civil bureaucracy. Abdülhamid II was well aware of these misgivings but nevertheless was unwilling to sanction any meaningful change in the post-1892 status quo for fear of again damaging his image as a patron of Islamic institutions. Although he continued to worry about the number of medrese students in the capital after 1892, he sought to limit the size of the student body without resorting to crude coercion. The Hamidian policies meant that meaningful changes in medrese education would not occur until after the Constitutional Revolution. By then, however, the men who were to dominate the new government had grown impatient with both the religious establishment and the policy of benign neglect toward medrese education.
Many ulema were critical of the maintenance of the status quo by the Hamidian government, fearing that it would lead to the marginalization of the medreses. Some continued in vain to petition the Sultan for curricular, pedagogical, and administrative reforms in the medreses.53
Zengin, II. Abdülhamit Dönemi, 125–29; BOA-Y.EE 81/44 (May 1898); BOA-Y.PRK.MŞ 7/77 (3 February 1903).
The proclamation was issued to the mutinous soldiers in Istanbul during the counterrevolution of April 1909. Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i İslamiye, “Asker Evladlarimiza Hitabimiz,” Beyan

ül-hak 29 (19 April 1909), 672.
İsmail Kara, İslâmcilarin Siyasî Görüşleri (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayinlari, 2001), 128–40; M. Safvet, “Medreselerimiz,” Beyan

ül-hak 87 (28 November 1910), 1642–45.
The consequent damage to the public standing of the medreses was augmented by the increasing stigmatization of medrese education as a safe haven for draft dodgers. Some ulema even objected to the general exemption of the medrese students for that reason. For instance, Hoca Muhiddin, an important activist in the opposition, cautioned in 1896 that the exemption policy was part of a cynical ploy by Abdülhamid II to seduce the religious establishment into cooperation and, at the same time, to tarnish the public image and reputation of the ulema.56
Hoca Muhiddin, “Zat-i Şahane

ye Takdim Kilinan Arizadan,” Kanun-i Esasi 2 (28 December 1896), 5. On His Role in the Opposition, see Kara, “Turban and Fez,” 166–72.
“Islah-i Medaris,” Beyan

ül-hak 12 (21 December 1908), 250; Mehmed Fatin, “Tedrisat ve Medaristen: Imtihanlar,” Beyan

ül-hak 16 (18 January 1909), 359–61.
Kara, İslâmcilarin Siyasî Görüşleri, 50–57.
Opposition publications contrasted the guaranteed exemption of the medrese students from military conscription with the demanding academic requirements that the students in the state schools had to fulfill before becoming eligible for the same privilege. “Nowadays,” opined the important opposition journal, Şura-yi Ümmet, “everybody observes that—in comparison to other professions—the most ignorant individuals are within the ranks of the ulema. The education of the medrese students is so limited,” continued the article, “that currently they cannot be of any use for any important purpose. Why, then, are they being generally exempted from military service?” The article argued that the medreses could become worthy of appreciation and special privileges only after comprehensive reforms in medrese education.59
“Şundan Bundan,” Şura-yi Ümmet 46 (2 February 1904), 3–4; For information on the opposition during the closing years of the Hamidian period, see M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Takvim-i Vekayi 306 (19 August 1909).
However, the general exemption of the medrese students faced objections and generated resentment even within the Hamidian government. As might be expected, no official dared to criticize Abdülhamid II's policy overtly. Instead, officials either indicated their expectation that the “temporary” suspension of the exemption procedures would be discontinued or pointed out that the current policy was widely abused and, thus, in need of overhauling. The Ministry of War, for instance, forwarded to the Palace repeated requests from the commanders of several Army Corps for instructions to reinstitute the conscription examination in the mid-1890s. These appeals came to naught.61
BOA-Y.MTV 95/12 (1 May 1894); BOA-Y.MTV 97/41 (10 June 1894).
BOA-Y.PRK.MŞ 7/16. For additional information on the situation in Trabzon and its environs, see Michael E. Meeker, A Nation of Empire (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2002), 266–82.
Abdülhamid II was opposed to any new restriction on the exemption of medrese students from military conscription, despite the complaints about the significant increase in the number of students in the provinces. Selim Deringil aptly argues that “As the Ottoman Empire found itself increasingly short of usable manpower, the urgent requirements of defense meant that the sultan had to squeeze the population for the last reserves of fighting men.”63
Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, 69.
The government presented its new effort to reduce the number of medrese students in Istanbul as an initiative aiming to revive the dilapidated provincial medreses.64
Osman Ergin, Türkiye Maarif Tarihi, 5 Vols. (Istanbul: Osman Bey Matbaasi, 1939–1943), 3:679.
BOA-İrade İlmiye 1320.Ş.26, no. 3.
BOA-Y.PRK.BŞK 66/105 (21 June 1902); BOA-Y.MTV 238/25 (12 August 1902).
BOA-Y.MTV 232/24 (9 July 1902).
BOA-Y.MTV 298/139 (8 June 1907); Zengin, II. Abdülhamit Dönemi, 155–60.
The simmering resentment against the purported preferential treatment of the medrese students surfaced in the wake of the Constitutional Revolution of July 1908, and contributed to the poisoning of relations between the emerging new administration and the religious establishment. The new government summarily reinstituted the pre-1892 procedures in November 1908, even before a new parliament was elected.69
BOA-MV 122/10 (28 November 1908).
Arnavut Arif Hikmet, “Geçende talebe-i ulumun Sultanahmed

de akd Ettikleri İctimada İrad Olunan Nutkun Sureti,” Serbesti (16 February 1909), 3; “Talebe-i Ulumun Kura İmtihanlari,”Beyan

ül-hak 26 (29 March 1909), 618.
For detailed information on the events surrounding the rebellion, see Sina Akşin, Şeriatçi bir Ayaklanma: 31 Mart Olayi (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1994).
Once the insurrection was put down in late April, the government reacted swiftly and uncompromisingly against the students' challenge. Rather in the spirit of Abdülhamid II's original plan of 1892, the CUP sought to diminish the potential of the medrese students to be a significant political factor in the capital by reducing their numbers considerably. The military authorities were eager to cooperate. They claimed that the medrese students had participated in the insurrection in Istanbul to obstruct the reinstitution of the military conscription procedures.72
The Ottoman military attaché in Vienna, Hakki Bey (Pasha), expressed a common opinion in CUP and military circles when he “attribute(d) the action of the Softas in the mutiny to the intention of the late Government to make all classes, including the clergy, liable to military service.” “The Young Turks and the Mutineers,” Times (London), 16 April 1909, 3.
Mustafa Sabri, “Talebe-i uluma,” Beyan

ül-hak 33 (12 July 1909), 765; BOA-DH.EUM.THR 15/20 (7 December 1909).
BOA-MV 142/29 (18 July 1910); Zengin, II. Abdülhamit Dönemi, 160.
These dramatic developments completely overshadowed a burgeoning public campaign for reforms in medrese education, which was launched by ulema upon the elimination of Hamidian censorship in July 1908.
75On the effects of the abolition of the Hamidian censorship, see Palmira Brummett, Image & Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908–1911 (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 2000), 3–9 ff.

ül-Hak, the organ of the newly established Ulema Association. They advocated and debated reform plans.
76Zeki Salih Zengin, II. Meşrutiyette Medreseler ve Din Eğitimi (Ankara: Akçağ Yayinlari, 2002), 29–36.
The Ottoman government adopted the reform of the medreses as an official policy goal only after it had reduced the number of the medrese students and politically neutralized them. The first fruit of the new policy was the promulgation of a limited reorganization program in Istanbul, in early 1910. A more significant reform followed four years later, when the government comprehensively restructured medrese education in the capital. Similar schemes were subsequently implemented in several provincial centers during World War I.77
Ibid., 90–149.
Ibid., 154–58; Ceride-i İlmiye 40 (May 1918), 1184.
Mustafa Sabri, al-Nakir

ala munkiri al-ni

ma min al-Din wa-l-khilafa wa-l-umma (Beirut: al-Matba

a al-

Abbasiyya, 1342H [1924]), 143–44, n. 1.
CONCLUSION
The Ottoman Empire came into its own as an “educator state” in the late 19th century, which included the implementation of a systematic program of education with a view to molding the population into disciplined citizens.80
Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, 93.
“Tevhid-i Tedrisat Neticesinde Medreseler,” İleri, 13 March 1924, 1.
Prior to 1892, the Hamidian regime's adoption of a policy of benign neglect toward medrese education was not a forgone conclusion. The crystallization of this policy was the result of a pragmatic political decision taken by Abdülhamid II in the wake of the failure of a preliminary government initiative to extend the state's scrutiny over medrese education in Istanbul. Neither a dogmatic collective opposition on the part of the ulema nor a malign anti-ulema scheme on the part of the state was behind the inactivity of the Hamidian government. Rather, Abdülhamid II was unwilling to risk public controversies and politically costly confrontations with opposition from within the religious establishment, after the debacle of 1892 threatened to galvanize ill feeling toward his regime among the ulema. Clearly, Abdülhamid II was well aware that many ulema supported changes in the status quo. Indeed, ulema who presided over the reforms in medrese education in the wake of the Constitutional Revolution were all products of the Hamidian period. Nevertheless, Abdülhamid II was reluctant to engage the plausibly divisive issue of medrese reforms, because he believed that the maintenance of the status quo meant less potential for political tensions with the religious establishment.
Political considerations, and to a secondary degree military concerns, played a crucial role in shaping government policies toward medrese education in the late Ottoman Empire. In dealing with the medreses, educational concerns neither topped the list of the priorities of the Hamidian regime nor that of the CUP-dominated administration. The foremost political aim of the authorities in both cases was to neutralize the medrese students' potential to constitute a significant political force in the capital. In addition, the state had an interest in ensuring that the medreses would not become safe havens for draft dodgers. Therefore, the management of the size of the student body and state control over the medreses became central goals of every government plan for reforms in medrese education. Abdülhamid II gave priority to these aims in the failed initiative of 1892. Thereafter, however, he overrode the military concerns and eased the exemption of medrese students from military conscription, in the hope of wooing rather than coercing the religious establishment to support his regime. The CUP, in contrast, resorted to the course of action that Abdülhamid II had planned in 1892, but in a much more determined and coercive way. The CUP was not as concerned as Abdülhamid II to avoid strains with the religious establishment and, thus, had fewer inhibitions in forcing changes related to the religious establishment and its institutions. The policies of the CUP governments gradually but consistently decreased the size of medrese education and eliminated any vestige of autonomy in it, increasingly reshaping the medreses on the model of the state schools.
These efforts by the state to enforce its control over religious education had culminated with the closing down of the medreses in March 1924 and their replacement with new religious schools under the slogan of the unification and standardization of education. Political and ideological considerations, rooted in the Ottoman past, have continued to inform the strict state control over formal religious education that has characterized Turkey ever since, in the face of resistance from some quarters and appeals for relaxation of the state's scrutiny over Islamic learning from others.82
M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 121–29.
Author's note: I thank M. Şükrü Hanioğlu for his thoughtful comments on various drafts of this paper. I am also indebted to Michael Cook and Robert Tignor for their very useful remarks and suggestions. Finally, I thank the four anonymous readers of IJMES for their helpful recommendations.
