In different but complementary ways, these two books excellently show how Roman exempla demanded interpretation, remediation and contestation from readers. Roman exempla were not to be ‘slavishly imitated’, as the poet Martial joked in his epigram about the gladiator Mucius (Ep. 10.25): ‘Recently on display in the morning arena, Mucius, who placed his own hand on the hearth. If he seemed to you steadfast and hard and brave, you have the soul of an Abderitian peasant. For when, with the instruments of torture close by, the command is “Burn your hand!” it is more impressive to say: “I won't do it”.’ (translation by Rebecca Langlands; 152). As L. argues (151–4), the gladiator exactly re-enacts the deed of Mucius Scaevola, who famously incinerated his hand as a terrifying demonstration to the Etruscan king Porsenna of Roman imperturbability — but such mimicry, literally an act of slavish imitation, is a failed reinstantiation of a Roman exemplum.
Matthew Roller's book seeks to illustrate the logic of Roman exemplarity by reference to four operations. In his model (2–8), there is first an action (a Roman performs a virtuous deed embodying the values of the wider community); second, an evaluation, as the audience reflects on the deed and marks it for special attention; third, a commemoration in which the community monumentalises the deed and transmits its moral value to posterity; and finally, the exemplum sets a normative standard, becoming part of the mos maiorum and prescribing and inspiring future moral behaviour. R. discusses the inter-relationships between these operations through seven case-studies handled in separate chapters: Horatius Cocles, Cloelia, Appius Claudius Caecus, Gaius Duilius, Fabius Cunctator, Cornelia mother of the Gracchi, and Cicero's De Domo Sua. While R. has published on many of these figures previously, his discussion of Cornelia is new, and his studies of Appius Claudius Caecus and Gaius Duilius are significantly augmented.
R.’s model is not a rigid framework. In fact, the value of the model is shown most clearly when it breaks down. Exemplary actions may never have happened; they may have been retrospectively conjectured from monuments no longer legible or intelligible (such as the putative statue of Cloelia), a phenomenon also discussed very incisively by L. (ch. 9). Alternatively, an action may initially be perceived negatively but later be reappraised positively (Fabius Cunctator). Exemplary figures may also innovate within exemplary paradigms (Appius Claudius Caecus inventing a notion of urban virtue, Duilius credited with the first naval victory); conversely, negative traditions can surround figures as changes over time render their actions less comprehensible (Appius’ supposed blindness due to religious transgression, Duilius’ use of a torch-and-flute escort). Finally, the application of past exempla to present circumstances can involve rhetorical struggle as different Romans seek to use positive and negative exempla to justify their own behaviour or damn others (see his discussion of Cicero and Clodius). The exceptions to R.’s model prove the rule: exemplarity demands an act, even if none happened, and monuments need exemplary value even when their erstwhile values are obsolete or obscure.
R.’s study of Cornelia (ch. 6) is illustrative of the tensions within the model. In Plutarch's life of Tiberius Gracchus, Cornelia reproaches her sons because she is not yet addressed as ‘mother of the Gracchi’ (8.6–10). R. argues that this honorific name makes sense in the narrative only retrospectively for readers who know the futures of the Gracchi. Exempla are already aware of their exemplary futures. R. then discusses the extant statue base of Cornelia, which he argues is a case of mistaken identity, the misattribution of an earlier cult statue of a goddess to Cornelia with an Augustan-era inscription. The statue is retrospectively interpreted as a commemoration of Cornelia, possibly as an exemplary precedent of maternal and uxorial piety for Octavia. Exempla and their monuments, their origins and their meanings, are the products of different regimes of memory.
One major exception to the four-operation model of exemplarity comes in R.’s concluding discussion of Seneca the Younger (specifically, Ep. 94 and Ep. 120). Seneca argues that individuals need a Stoic sage in their moral development to offer precepts and corrections. He warns Lucilius not to trust uncritically in the exemplarity of military commanders (Ep. 94.61–5): the crowd has failed to recognise the vices motivating ‘great’ men like Alexander and Pompey. Seneca says explicitly: ‘Omnia ista exempla quae oculis atque auribus nostris ingeruntur retexenda sunt’ (‘All such exempla that are forced into our eyes and ears must be unwoven’, Ep. 94.68, translation by R., 272). In Ep. 120, Seneca develops a similar critique: readers of exempla not only miscategorise the actions of so-called exemplary figures as virtuous but actually do not have sufficient evidence to judge them by. As R. himself notes in his final pages (288–9), Seneca vitiates the four-operation logic of Roman exemplarity. First, only the Stoic praeceptor/monitor is qualified to judge moral character; second, single actions do not prove moral character, only a lifetime does; and consequently, third, longer narrative texts rather than physical monuments better convey moral character, as readers see the broader life of an historical person.
In contrast, L. (102–7) sees Seneca's Ep. 120 as illustrative rather than exceptional for how Romans would have learnt from exempla: initially reading exempla to develop an imperfect notion of the virtues, the reader would then discerningly compare with other exempla to acquire an intuition for situational differences. L. is much more interested in this cognitive and pedagogical aspect of exemplarity. At the outset, she stresses the role of affect in Roman exemplarity: ‘The encounter with exempla was the process by which Roman heroes were made; it was a process of awe and wonder, of ardour, self-scrutiny and revelation that transcends the rational and the logical’ (3). Second, an important part of the affective experience of learning from exempla was their moral equivocality. In ch. 2, drawing on discussions of comparative Buddhist material and scholarship on fables, L. argues that exempla always have multiple, conflicting lessons and are never straightforward — this is what prompts moral reflection. Indeed, as she argues in ch. 3, exempla were not a means of ethical indoctrination; over ages they served diverse communities which through story-telling creatively engaged with the ‘functional ambiguity’ of exempla.
Similarly, ch. 5 argues that exempla require critical thought rather than impersonation. The son of Manlius Torquatus who imitates his father by heroically challenging a Gaul to single combat invokes the precedent of his father, but does so without permission from his father, who is also his general, and the son is therefore executed. The son misapplies the lesson of his father. Moreover, not only are exempla complex, but they ought to be. In chs 6 and 7, L. examines the story of Mucius Scaevola burning his hand (later in ch. 10 she also notes this may have been invented at some point in the early imperial period). While there was a clear consensus around its exemplary status, its meaning provoked controversy (Was the strategy to intimidate Porsenna into a treaty? Was he motivated by rage or a desire for glory?). L. then discusses various comparable exempla (grouped together by Valerius Maximus in 3.3) to show the indeterminate moral of this story and its equivocal lesson on the ethics of pain.
Ch. 11 is perhaps one of the most important and polemical sections of this book. L. argues forcefully that there is no reason to think that the character of exemplarity changed between the late republican and imperial periods: scholars have often labelled this period ‘dead, inert, ossified, fossilised, lapidary’ (235), but L. responds that imperial exemplarity was no less complex. Even in codifying exempla under moral rubrics, Valerius Maximus’ use of exempla, for example, is ‘often internally inconsistent and open-ended’ (236). Exempla are cited multiple times with different moral interpretations. Continuing this logic in ch. 12, L. argues that exempla are always controversial and this is the key to their efficacy: in Cicero's De officiis, Lucius and Cicero contest whether Manlius Torquatus’ combat with a Gaul was actually brave or just a selfish pursuit of glory, using his exemplum as a platform for high-level philosophical inquiry. Readers are meant to struggle with exempla and debate their value; exempla provide ‘adventures’ for moral reasoning, rather than exact templates to model behaviour on.
Both monographs stress the essential complexity of Roman exemplarity, but sometimes reach slightly different conclusions. In his ch. 5, R. sees Fabius Maximus Cunctator as a case of how norms must be revised in the light of new exempla: while his contemporaries dispute the courage of delaying, Fabius is eventually vindicated as a positive exemplum, establishing precedent for a new kind of military virtue, one of prudential delay. Citing R.’s earlier work on Fabius, however, L. (ch. 13) sees the dissenting appraisals of delay as valid critiques and genuine illustrations of the indeterminacy of exempla. Silius Italicus, for example, reaffirms the controversy of this exemplum by showing Scipio afterwards evaluating and rejecting the new Fabian paradigm (Pun. 16.672–4). While largely commending R.’s earlier work here, L. sees the exemplum as a broader, ‘meta-exemplary’ lesson about the indeterminacy, situational variability and moral epistemology of exempla.
Ultimately, R.’s discussion of Seneca, Ep. 94 does prompt a broader question for both books about the fundamental moral good of exemplarity. The logic of exemplarity was clearly problematic for some Romans: for example, blaming the Gracchi for licensing civil strife, Velleius Paterculus (cited in passing by R., 16 n. 28) warns: ‘For exempla do not stay where they began but, however narrow a path they have withdrawn into, they make a way of wandering very far away and, once they have erred from the right course, they fall headlong and no one thinks something is terrible for himself which was profitable for another’ (2.3, translation my own). For Seneca, exemplarity can legitimate immoral men; for Velleius, exemplarity can legitimate immoral actions. Pliny the Younger (Ep. 7.29, 8.6) also complains of the vicious risk of perverse exempla being monumentalised in his time (see L., 246–8). There is an unease in Velleius and Pliny about the normalising power of exempla along with their potential to wander, to inadvertently justify future crimes — Romans were perhaps just as aware of the toxic logic of exemplarity as well as its ethical and rhetorical utility. For all their effective power to establish norms and educate a citizenry in moral thinking, weren't exempla also dangerous?
