As an academic and editor of a theoretical journal on Austrian economics it is understandable that Christopher J. Coyne fails to grasp what is at stake on the ground. Like Dambisa Momo, Coyne has a dogmatic and unflinching belief in the markets and naively thinks that poor countries coming out war or chaos can do it on their own.

Regrettably, rather than focusing his criticism on what Rebuilding War-Torn States is all about, he focuses on what he calls the “development expert approach” followed in “peaceful developing countries.” By contrast, I argue that development challenges—poverty alleviation and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals—are long-term propositions. I focus on the short-run economic reconstruction challenges that should be targeted primarily toward achieving national reconciliation and the reactivation of basic services, infrastructure, and production without which peace will not be long lasting (p. 304).

Reconstruction amid complex political, security, and social change is fundamentally different from “normal development.” In fact, I attribute failures ranging from Afghanistan to Iraq, from Kosovo to several countries in Africa, to the “development as usual” approach followed in those cases. I also provide “convincing evidence that aid policies are in disarray” (p. 308).

In fact, I am not making a statement at all on how good development policies have been. I am saying that reconstruction is a “development plus challenge” since these countries need to carry out “additional” activities that are a condition sine qua non for avoiding a relapse into conflict. Hence, Coyne's criticism that I “accept development as usual as an effective foundation for my development plus approach” is hard to justify.

I argue that aid has led to inefficiencies, waste, corruption, and large distortions. Despite all these problems, aid is needed and the issue is how to improve its effectiveness and transparency. For this, I recommend institutional and personnel changes at the United Nations and at the government level in order to improve aid utilization.

Coyne's criticism that I believe that “a small group of elites can somehow formulate and implement” a reconstruction strategy is unfounded. In contrast, I argue that “for an effective war-to-peace transition … sovereign countries need to take responsibility or ownership of reconstruction policies as a basis for their sustainability.” International organizations or donors cannot impose their vision of reconstruction, but neither can a few government officials—without the support of others or of the population at large—impose their own vision. There should be a participatory process in setting national priorities (p. 230). In fact, I have been a champion of ownership since our 1994 Foreign Policy article with Alvaro de Soto, entitled “Obstacles to Peacebuilding.”

Precisely for this reason, the book does not provide a “proposed strategy” as mentioned by Coyne. As I make it clear, “Each country will end up with a different strategy, depending on factors that are peculiar to its own situation and on the level of international support that it can manage to attract” (p. 221). I simply discuss a number of issues, lessons, and best practices that can help policymakers in war-torn countries prepare a strategy for reconstruction that would best fit their needs.