This volume is certainly an ambitious work. It effortlessly clears the bar more recently set by Thomas SchwinnFootnote 2 [2021] for inequality research: namely, to once again contribute, for a change, some novel theoretical propositions to the debate instead of indulging in never-ending slogs across vast data graveyards. Inequality research quite obviously still has great difficulty in doing so. The weight of the data—as incomplete, unreliable or contradictory as it may be—thwarts any intellectual flight of fancy. While it helps prevent speculative false conclusions, it also encourages and rewards adherence to statistics that fail to reflect social reality.
Mike Savage seeks to leave behind this all-too-familiar and tedious accounting business of documenting changes and incorrectly asserting—down to the last Euro—the self-evidence of the causes and effects of inequality dynamics. Proceeding from a long-standing tradition that runs from Karl Marx to Thomas Piketty, Savage considers capitalism, in the sense of a fatal societal path dependency, as the root cause of what we encounter as inequality today—including not only economic marginalisation, but also the numerous other manifestations of discrimination it entails. The effects of capitalism are felt not just in terms of the availability or absence of immediate opportunities on the labour market and corresponding income prospects, but also, and more importantly, with a view to the opportunities for the accumulation of wealth and its transmission through inheritance. Savage seeks to correct a “modernist” reading of history not only in this context, but also concerning the notion that the combined clout of the Left will guarantee long-term social progress through a reduction of inequality. He considers such expectations to be recklessly optimistic, as he expounds in Chapter 10 in a concise discussion of the transformation of the political field, adding a new approach to understanding the phenomenon of Trump.
Given the obvious constraints of this short review, I must limit myself in the following to outlining the general direction of the new perspective Savage proposes and adding a few brief comments. To begin with, in contrast to mainstream inequality research, Savage approaches the matter not from “below”, but from the very “top”. His understanding of how social inequalities shape societal dynamics and individual life chances proceeds not from the struggles of the discriminated and marginalised for recognition and an improvement of their situation, but from the practices applied by the super-rich to perpetually increase their wealth. Over the past century, and more extensively so during more recent decades, they have been able to increase their already exorbitant wealth even further—with no end to this process in sight. To Savage this constitutes not simply a fairness issue—nor a problem arising from alleged envy: “Their selfishness, narrowness, and greed were not a private matter: it damaged social well-being at large.” [7] This is quite a bold assertion, which—and in this regard Savage concurs with mainstream inequality research—apparently requires no further explanation: a dogma. That is not to say that I would not consider this claim valid, at least in the sense of a hypothesis, but it is too unspecific and therefore remains in a moralising tone as opposed to providing sociological analysis.
What exactly constitutes the “damage”, in sociological terms? After all, it can hardly refer to the lifestyle of the super-rich: as they are so few in number, their potential to inflict any greater damage on society through their recreational activities or family life is negligible. Admittedly, they do deprive the general public of access to many of the most idyllic natural surroundings through their villas and parks, and frequently resemble the cliché of self-righteous pests harassing their immediate subordinates. By comparison, however, the suffering that, for instance, the faulty design of the German social benefit system (“Hartz IV”) entails for those affected—which, incidentally, does not go back to the sinister workings of the super-rich—surely must take precedence. Ultimately, the conduct of the super-rich only becomes socially consequential once they engage in irresponsible practices—again and again causing financial market, labour market, or even food crises—at the cost of many or all others, mainly the world’s “ordinary people”. However, we certainly require more precise clarification as to what societal crises can really be attributed predominantly to the super-rich—though we can say with certainty that the resulting list would not include man-made climate change, the Chernobyl disaster, World War II or the coronavirus pandemic. Although there is no question that capitalism represents an important causal factor in each of these scenarios, it is not only made up of the super-rich, but involves many other actors beyond this group, including consumers and trade unions, all of whom have had their fair share in shaping capitalism’s course. I therefore wonder whether Savage’s “turn” and his shift of focus to “those at the very top” is really so revealing of capitalist (or capitalism-induced) dynamics of inequality as he asserts.
The second instance of Savage’s radical abandonment of mainstream inequality research, and of social theory more generally, concerns the temporal dimension. And indeed, the “weight of the past” is already mentioned in the book’s sub-title. Savage challenges the most fundamental self-certainty underlying Western modernity—i.e. the cultural guiding image of malleable social progress. Instead, he diagnoses capitalism’s fatal path dependency: “The debris of the past […] now dominates the social landscape” [98/99]. It is reflected, above all, in what is referred to as the “Matthew effect” on wealth dynamics: a continuous process of wealth concentration in the sense of, “to every one who has will more be given”, displaying an increasingly lop-sided distribution.
While we should abstain from simplistic ideas about the super-rich ruling the world, such reflections nevertheless represent a refreshing impetus for reconsidering an overly optimistic faith in progress. The only question is: who—in the context of public debate or academic social theory—actually still harbours such optimism? Is Savage not kicking at an open door in both domains? Assessing, against this backdrop, his deliberations at the end of the book, when he discusses the question of “What is to be done?”, the flagrant discrepancy between his diagnosis and therapy becomes obvious. All of a sudden he recommends solutions which he himself—along with many others—has exposed as wishful thinking: namely, the transcendence of capitalism’s growth imperative; the progressive taxation of income and particularly of wealth; “rounded conceptions of well-being” [321] that encompass more than just the living standard as such; as well as a type of “sustainable nationalism” that facilitates collective solidarity—indeed one that would also, or primarily, appeal to right-wing populist and far-right parties. If this deplorable, utterly unrealistic and politically dangerous agenda represents the “revival of radicalism” [314], then I, for my part, will vote conservative from now on: it would appear as the lesser evil after all.
Savage’s most theoretically inspiring deviation from the mainstream of inequality research is his assertion that “visceral inequalities” are gaining significance. By this term he refers to mechanisms of exclusion that potentially affect anyone who fails to physically correspond to the standard image of a “one-of-us” person, and who thus exhibits—in the words of Erving GoffmanFootnote 3—a “spoiled identity” instead. Savage’s thought-provoking assessment of “identity politics” continues: “bodily inequality becomes an intensified marker again” [228]. When measured against the normatively hegemonic standard identity of members of Western societies—i.e. “white man”—women and People of Colour as well as some others display a “fundamental lack, which can never be overcome” [203, emphasis omitted]. Given that not even the most prestigious educational degree, the most successful career or the greatest amount of wealth can gloss over these culturally encoded physical shortcomings in being human, Savage is highly sceptical about the adequacy of the demands articulated through “identity politics” for achieving the recognition of those affected as equals. Instead, he sees in these demands little more than a “lamenting [of] the ultimate impossibility of such recognition ever being possible” [203].
He goes on to accurately point out that the common understanding of what constitutes progress—in this case: the universal recognition of the equality of all human beings, irrespective of gender, race or other physical traits—is rather poorly realized in social practice. The continuing denigration of “spoiled identities” persists in all social classes and strata, indeed most palpably so at the very top of society—such as in the case of wealthy People of Colour, women professors, or politicians whose disabilities are seen to disqualify them as candidates for the office of chancellor or prime minister. The real challenge is to overcome deeply entrenched templates for the hierarchical ascription of value to individuals or social groups, which exist to varying extent in all cultures and are anything but a recent by-product of modernity. Given that this challenge has—at least officially—been acknowledged and addressed in many Western countries over the last few decades, those affected are especially dismayed when their claim to equal status is eventually confronted with—largely unarticulated, yet deep-rooted—rather limited acceptance. In these cases, it becomes clear that physicality—and what it signals—may be culturally framed and therefore generally contingent, but it is obviously a frame that cannot simply be changed by a few hours of sensitivity training. From this perspective—one I would never have expected to encounter in this book—I am afraid Savage’s “weight of the past” is highly plausible.
As I have sought to express, I have serious reservations regarding central assertions put forward in this book. And yet, it is undoubtedly a brilliant book by a great scholar in the study of inequality that will inspire discussions in many different areas. Savage himself considers “the juxtaposition of topics rarely considered together” [23] to constitute his book’s most important feature. And I would agree. Unfortunately, I was not able to address some of the other intriguing “topics” here—such as the revision of Bourdieu’s concept of society’s milieu-based structure reflecting 1960s French society; or Savage’s notion that, up until recent decades, modernity was not brought about by the nation state, but was (and, today, is once again being) politically institutionalised through empires extending far beyond the colonial era. I have no doubt that both the central theses and the countless more detailed observations Savage presents in his book will lead to many illuminating moments in the years to come.
