The preponderant power in a unipolar world is not compelled by weakness to seek multilateral support for its use of force. How then do we explain its resort to, and changing preferences for, multilateral security cooperation? Sarah E. Kreps addresses these general puzzles, and helps us to understand why the United States pursued different forms of security cooperation in different post–Cold War interventions. The book combines conceptual and theoretical elegance, empirical richness, clever use of qualitative methods, and evenhanded treatment of theoretical alternatives in order to sharpen our understanding of the motives for security cooperation, the meanings of multilateralism, and the forms of intervention in a unipolar world.
Kreps argues that the fact and form of security cooperation in an intervention reflects the “lead state's” preferences, which can be deduced from a model with two main variables. The first is the lead state's time horizon for acting. Direct and immediate threats create short time horizons and a need to decide and act quickly. A posse of kibitzing allies maneuvering for a payoff only gets in the way (p. 27). More distant, indirect, and diffused challenges lengthen the lead state's time horizons. Then, it can tolerate the hassle and costs of multilateralism and expect to reap the long-run gains of legitimacy and burden sharing. The second variable reflects expectations about the operational commitment that intervention will entail. When a low level of effort and expense is expected, incentives to share the burden are weak. When a lengthy and costly commitment is anticipated, those incentives increase. These time-horizon and operational commitment variables combine into four contingencies, each pointing to a preference for a different kind of security cooperation (p. 35).
The author defines these forms of security cooperation in a 2 × 2 typology (p. 20). First, there is uni-/bi-/minilateralism, with few partners and no formal multilateral mandate (e.g., from the United Nations Security Council) to legitimize the enterprise. Next comes participatory multilateralism, with many partners but no institutional mandate. Then, there is formal multilateralism, with a formal mandate but narrow participation. Finally, there is full multilateralism, with both a formal mandate and broad participation.
Thus, in a short time-horizon/low operational commitment contingency, the lead state will choose uni- or minilateralism; with pressure to act fast and a light burden expected, the costs of multilateralism are too high and the burden-shifting benefits negligible. When time is short but the operational commitment is expected to be heavy, however, the lead state will seek participatory multilateralism. In both long time-horizon contingencies, legitimizing mandates will be preferred. If the lead state expects a small operational commitment, it will pursue formal multilateralism. If it expects a large operational commitment, it will pursue full multilateralism.
Kreps's theory is tested in four well-structured case studies. Because three of these cases contain a marked shift in the values of explanatory variables, U.S. preferences, and security cooperation outcomes, they provide at least six observations that support the theory. In the first case, the 1990–91 Gulf War, the United States reacted initially on a minilateral basis to deploy defensive forces to deter Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia. Then, the United States shifted to seeking full multilateralism to support the longer-term goal of forcing Iraq out of Kuwait. In the second case, that of intervention in Haiti in 1994–95, the United States opted first for formal multilateralism—a virtually unilateral intervention, under a Security Council mandate—because there was little urgency to act, and the initial coercive diplomacy, to remove the junta and return Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power, would not require a significant force commitment. Once basic stability was achieved, however, the United States chose to bring “in the more robust multilateral [UN] peacekeeping force to assume responsibility in what was expected to be a long-enduring postconflict phase” (p. 83). Similarly, after 9/11, the first U.S. response to the Al Qaeda threat in Afghanistan was a nearly unilateral intervention. Once the immediate threat had been reduced through “small footprint” combat operations, the George W. Bush administration shifted to full multilateralism for postconflict reconstruction and stability operations, bolstered by a Security Council mandate and an influx of burden-sharing allies. Finally, in the fourth case, the 2003 Iraq War decisions, only the first half of the sequence appears. Kreps argues that the Bush administration's perceptions of urgency and expectations of a “reasonably quick, inexpensive, and manageable” (p. 133) regime change “determined” its minilateral approach to intervention.
Although the author states that her focus is “decision[s] to pursue a particular cooperation strategy, rather than the success of that strategy” (p. 44), the case narratives sometimes lean toward conflating U.S. preferences with security cooperation outcomes. The use of identical terms to code both the form of cooperation that actually occurred in cases and the form of cooperation the United States tried to achieve (see Figure 2.1, p. 20; Table 2.1, p. 22) points in the same direction. Kreps's model and hypotheses (pp. 35–36), in any case, predict preferences. She recognizes that this “demand side” theorizing is only half the story, but then suggests that “supply side” questions are not that important: “With enough time and compromise some form of multilateral consensus is almost always possible” (p. 43), because the lead state can use its power and leverage to produce it. Indeed, she argues that US power in the post–Cold War period “allowed it to dominate its allies, as well as UN decision-making outcomes” in this way (p. 90; also see pp. 21, 84). This muddles the crucial issue of whether the form of multilateralism that proved possible in a specific case, after all the haggling and compromises (p. 28), was what the United States really wanted.
The problem here becomes evident in the 2003 Iraq War case, which exposed the limits of Washington's ability to obtain the allied cooperation and multilateral mandates it sought. The Bush administration tried to go to war in Iraq in 2003 with a formal UN mandate—that is, with a “second” Security Council resolution (subsequent to Resolution 1441)—but abandoned this diplomatic drive toward formal multilateralism once it became clear that it could not obtain the support of allies France and Germany, let alone Russia and China (pp. 118–19). Kreps describes this maneuver as “barely nodding in the direction of the UN” (p. 145). It is worth noting, however, that the same contingent approach to the United Nations was adopted by George H. W. Bush in 1991; on that occasion, however, the United States did not have to bail out of the Security Council process because it found the votes to prevail (see James A. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 1995, p. 304). In another contrast with 1991, Turkey's refusal in 2003 to actively cooperate in return for “lucrative” (p. 145) rewards further revealed Washington's inability to get the kind of security cooperation it wanted.
Kreps argues that the minilateral security cooperation the United States got in 2003 was what the Bush administration really wanted all along (pp. 119, 133, 138, 147–48). The UN detour was a half-hearted charade to please Tony Blair and domestic public opinion (pp. 138, 144). The implication is that if the UN route had somehow borne fruit in a timely fashion—and the United States and UK were able to attack Iraq with a formal multilateral mandate—it would have been seen by the White House as a less than optimal outcome. A simpler interpretation would be that the sense of urgency and cakewalk expectations pointed to by Kreps made the Bush administration determined to go ahead with minilateral cooperation if it could not procure the UN mandate when and on the terms it wanted.
The book does not address analytically “the more onerous stabilization phase” (p. 119) of the Iraq War, but given the structure of the first three cases (which observed both initial and midstream decisions), it is clearly relevant. Once the United States was mired in the draining and lengthy occupation, it was again not able to manipulate UN and allied decisions in a way that would allow it to hand off the heavy lifting (p. 167). This reflects an important larger political truth that Kreps's lucid account of time-horizon trade-offs helps to drive home (p. 29): One of the costs of choosing to go it alone (or nearly alone) at the start of an intervention is that options to go it with others at a later date may be foreclosed.
Coalitions of Convenience makes significant conceptual and theoretical contributions. It sharpens our understanding of the political range and shifting bases of multilateral interventions in today's world and the one ahead. It articulates a realist statecraft calculus for these forms of multilateral intervention, as well as insightful critiques of explanations that overemphasize norms of “appropriateness” or domestic political incentives. Overall, it provides a timely and revealing account of how the United States makes—or tries to make—multilateral intervention work.
