Egypt's eighteen-day, youth-led revolt against the Mubarak regime brought immediate new attention to opposition politics in the Arab world, as a variety of political transitions began unfolding in the Middle East and North Africa. The outcome of the 25 January revolution remains wholly uncertain, but Dina Shehata's clear and informative analysis of the Sadat and Mubarak eras sheds valuable light on many of the political parties, movements, and organizations that have become central to the story. Published in late 2009, the book is framed in terms of an empirical puzzle that no longer resonates as it once did: the persistence of authoritarianism in Egypt and the larger region. It is, nonetheless, a welcome addition to the literature in its emphasis on how the shortsighted strategies, weaknesses, and failings of regime opponents helped to perpetuate authoritarianism in Egypt and beyond for so many years.
Readers concerned that the emerging transition in Egypt has made the book outdated might consider the timing of its publication a strength as much as a weakness, albeit in unexpected ways. Although it is tempting to view the Mubarak era as irrelevant to current analysis, doing so would be as mistaken as dismissing Egypt's nascent democracy with a plus-ça-change emphasis on elements of continuity, such as the abiding significance of the Egyptian military or the country's ongoing economic travails. The best accounts of political change must accommodate both the enduring influences of the past and the contingencies of the present and future. Careful attention to the major players in the organized opposition itself makes sense because they remain on the scene today, whether the decades-old Muslim Brotherhood or newer parties, groups, and movements.
This book contributes to an understanding of Egyptian opposition politics in at least two ways. First, it maps out the terrain of political opposition in the Sadat and Mubarak eras, just before the country's leap into today's new circumstances. To do this, it draws on a range of sources in Arabic and English, including the transitions literature in political science, think-tank analyses, personal interviews, and excerpts from party and movement programs. The account deals with the full range of Islamist, liberal, and leftist parties, movements, nongovernmental organizations, and informally organized groups. Second, and more ambitiously, it offers a coherent framework for explaining regime–opposition dynamics that takes the latter seriously, both analytically and as a potent political force. The core argument emphasizes the disabling effects of the opposition's recurrent fragmentation, which the author attributes to three variables: ideological division, mobilizational asymmetry, and the disparate political opportunities created by the Sadat and Mubarak regimes. Together these variables explain the difficulties opposition groups had in pressing for democratic change and moving beyond the “state-sanctioned pluralist order” of recent decades (p. 79).
The book is organized into six chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 set the stage with a well-conceived theoretical introduction and a focused review of Egyptian politics “from hegemonic or full-scale authoritarianism under Nasser to liberalized autocracy under Sadat and Mubarak” (p. 48). Chapter 3 surveys the varied forms of political opposition in Egypt, which are divided not only between Islamist and secularist camps but also along what Shehata rightly identifies as important generational, organizational, and ideological lines. Chapter 4 examines the many attempts at cooperation and alliance building between Islamists and secularists, whether during parliamentary elections, over foreign policy, or within the professional syndicates. Chapter 5 probes these cooperative efforts more deeply, tracing the process by which conflict and cooperation within the opposition proved cyclical. The concluding chapter assesses the prospects for breaking out of this longstanding cycle in Egypt and then applies the book's core theoretical argument to Jordan, Morocco, and Yemen.
Shehata tests her claims by looking at specific differences between the 1980s and 2000 to 2005, on the one hand, compared with the 1990s and after the 2005 elections, on the other hand. She holds, in particular, that opposition politics in the former periods were marked by relative ideological consensus, mobilizational symmetry, and the Mubarak regime's creation of significant political opportunities. Together these factors facilitated cooperation, whether in parliamentary elections or on specific issues of shared concern. Over time, however, cooperation proved tactical more than strategic or transformative, eventually collapsing in the face of successful regime efforts to divide opponents with selective incentives and differential treatment under the law. Unable to overcome their various differences to form a lasting and united front, the opposition movements’ fragmentation perpetuated the status quo as much as the elites and regimes they challenged.
Ongoing developments in Egypt will help us to evaluate and refine these claims, though within certain limits. Although it makes great sense to bring the opposition and its shortcomings back into the analysis, events since 25 January confirm what the author, no doubt, already knows: ideological and structural issues are not the whole story in determining the opposition's relative success and failure. Cycles of conflict and cooperation within the opposition, and the collective action problems at their core, can be overcome in unpredictable ways that take regimes (among others) by surprise. Such cycles need not last forever, as dictators get old, winning political strategies fail, and human creativity presses forward—witness the small but significant place of communications technology and social networking in the Egyptian case. At a time when attention has shifted to the forces shaping institutional choice and change in a new Egypt, Shehata's account is relatively silent on these contingencies because of its emphasis on continuities. That said, even if the Mubarak regime is finished and a return to the status quo ante is not possible, a fundamental transformation of Egyptian politics will not happen without the organized opposition playing a vibrant new role in governing the country. Constitutional and electoral reforms inhibiting the tendencies described in Dina Shehata's insightful book would help move Egypt closer to achieving that objective.
