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Evidence on the interjurisdictional competition for polluted industries within China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 February 2010

HIROYUKI TAGUCHI
Affiliation:
Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Government of Japan, 3-1-1 Kasumigaseki Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8940, Japan. Tel: 813-3597-0464. Fax: 813-5251-2114. Email: hiroyuki.taguchi@mof.go.jp
HARUTAKA MUROFUSHI
Affiliation:
Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Japan. Email: harutaka.murofushi@cao.go.jp
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Abstract

This study examines, with a focus on regional environmental states in China, whether regional latecomers suffer the domestically created ‘pollution haven’ effect through the interjurisdictional competition for polluted industries within China, or enjoy the spillover effect of nationwide progress in environmental management and technology, using the analytical framework of the environmental Kuznets curve. The study found that the regional latecomer's advantage was verified in the case of wastewater, while its disadvantage was identified in waste gas and solid waste. We speculate that the contrasting result on regional latecomer's effects between wastewater, waste gas, and solid waste comes from the difference in policy performances: the well-designed water pollution control may have regional latecomer's enjoy the spillover effect of nationwide progress, while the ineffective control of air and solid waste pollution may cause a ‘pollution haven’ effect through the interjurisdictional competition for polluted industries on regional latecomers.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010
Figure 0

Figure 1. The EK curve on wastewater, waste gas, and solid waste in main provinces

Figure 1

Figure 2. The EK curve and latecomer's effects

Figure 2

Table 1. Estimation results using provincial panel data