This anthology, published in the summer of 2004, consists of some forty-five short pieces, about one third in English and the rest in French, commissioned by the Paris-based American anthropologist and review editor Kenneth Brown. The contributions are divided into four sections: “Préliminaires,” written either just before the invasion of Iraq or about the preinvasion situation in more general terms; “Analyses,” generally highly critical studies of the course of events during and after the invasion and their probable consequences; “Chroniques…,” extracts from diaries and accounts, which Brown had asked the contributors to this section to keep, and finally, “Récits,” a collection of stories, reminiscences, and poems written about, or in reaction to, the events of 2003 and 2004.
Writing this review just after the second attack by Sunni insurgents on the shrine of Hasan al-Aءskari in Samarra (mid-June 2007), it is difficult not to share the profound frustration expressed by so many of the contributors some three or four years ago. Hamadi Redissi says (p. 91),
La force à elle seule ne peut suffire pour construire l'ordre nouveau prédit par les Américains sans consensus et sans la participation des acteurs [sc locales] pour façonner leur propre destin.
… de même que l'enfer est pavé de bonnes intentions, chacun en Europe mesure le poids de massacres, de misères qui porte en soi la croyance en une mission civilisatrice soutenue par la puissance guerrière.
In a spirited critique of U.S. policy, Robert Mabro (p. 111) makes a point that has come to be almost universally shared outside the Beltway:
Les gouvernements qui ont déclenché la guerre sont coupables d'avoir ordonné des opérations militaires sans se préoccuper de l'après-guerre. Rien n'a été prévu pour prévenir le pillage… Ne savait-on pas, à Washington et à Londres, que l'effondrement d'un régime est pareil à un grand tremblement de terre?
Some contributors consider that American adventurism bodes ill for the future standing of the United States. Philip Golub of Le Monde Diplomatique says (p. 124) that
… even within its own system, the Atlantic alliance, US hegemony is no longer seen as legitimate. By tearing down the institutions of global governance founded in the 1940s and bypassing international law, the Bush administration is overturning world politics. But it is also undermining one of the key “soft” components of US influence and power: its ability to induce behavior changes among actors through consent rather than coercion.
Dominique Vidal considers that what happened in the nine months after the fall of Baghdad shows that Iraq is transforming itself into a real trap (guêpier, or quagmire, as I think one says this side of the Atlantic) for the White House. Others indicate the linkages between Iraq and Palestine: Joel Beinin outlines the extent to which prewar thinking on Iraq reflects that of the pro-Israel lobby, and Kenneth Brown's own contribution, describing a visit to Baghdad in May 2003, ends with the dismal story of his encounter with Wamidh ءUmar Nadhmi, a political scientist with a doctorate from Durham University in the north of England. Nadhmi asks him what he thinks is the Americans' purpose in Iraq. Brown explains that this is not an easy question to answer and that the only way to understand it would be to explain certain features of American society and politics. After a few minutes, Nadhmi interrupts (and how many experiences of this kind have so many of us had over the years) by saying that this is all nonsense—the fact is that the United States is run by Jews, whose greed and support for Israel determine its foreign policy (p. 179). Brown calmly tells him that his analysis is not just racist but also stupid and dangerous. This and other experiences cause Brown to realize the enormity of the obstacles that lie ahead.
On the whole, and properly so, the book makes grim and sobering reading. So many contributors voice their rage and despair at the carnage after the bombardment of Baghdad and Basra, at the growing realization that the Americans never had any coherent plans for the future of Iraq, and that the reasons for the invasion were bogus, or exaggerated, or both. Yitzhak Laor takes refuge in biting irony; Zakia Daoud voices her bitter disillusion (p. 206):
Nous… vivions dans l'illusion d'un monde gouverné par la raison, et qui, armé de ses techniques de point et de son information-consommation mondialisée, deviendrait de plus en plus rationnel. Apparemment, nous avions tout faux.
And here are the liberal and the neoconservative:
NB: Le problème est vaste, il s'agit de savoir si l'on peut exporter par la force une conviction juste et apte à faire le bonheur des peuples.
PP: J'ai la faiblesse de croire au droit des peuples à s'autodéterminer. (pp. 275–81)
There are three Iraqi contributions to this volume: I have mentioned Sami Zubaida's, but there are three moving poems by Saءdi Yusuf, also a longtime resident in London. From “Le tonnerre” (p. 320):
Quelques fois, comme en rêve, un grondement survient…
(est-ce un avion?)
C'est quelque chose qui ne se voit pas mais s'entend; tel le premier coup de
Couteau dans le coeur;
Tel le tonnerre dans le tableau
Balancement de palmiers à Bassorah
Les avions éclair traversaient le tableau
Le tonnerre comme cendre dans l'abîme de mon sang.
On 29 April 2003, the London-based Al-Quds al-ءArabi carried a declaration fulminating against the Anglo-American aggression and signed by 332 individuals—among whom only four were Iraqis. “Did it occur to the signatories to ask themselves who had authorised them to speak in the name of the Iraqi people?” (p. 237). Husayn goes on to discuss the role of the Arab nationalist movement as an obstacle to political development in the Arab world (the French is arriération, which does not translate easily), in rational rather than “self-hating” terms, focusing on the fact that the “deterioration of the Arab regional system is due to the undemocratic and indeed anti-democratic foundation on which it has been constructed” (quoted from an article by the al-Ahram foundation, p. 237).
Randi Deguilhem's article reminded me that part of her intellectual/geographical odyssey resembles my own. She left Manhattan for Syria on a Fulbright in 1981: I left Cambridge for the summer Arabic course in Shemlan in 1965. I come from a secular leftish but not especially politicized Jewish–Anglican home, so that my family was more mystified than appalled (as I imagine were Dr. Deguilhem's more observant relatives) by my subsequent decision to study Middle Eastern history. The turbulence of 1968, which happened while I was a graduate student at Oxford, passed me by almost completely. A few years later, a combination of academic and personal reasons oriented me toward the modern history of Iraq, which has been the main focus of my research and writing ever since.
On many occasions since late 2002 and early 2003 I have had to defend the position I took vis-à-vis the invasion of Iraq at the time, to the general effect that the world would be a better place and Iraq would be able to get back on its feet only if Saddam Hussein and his regime ceased to be in power. Given that opposition from within Iraq itself could not bring about this highly desirable end and also because I was very much influenced by the kind of thinking adumbrated in Abd al-Khaliq Husayn's article (I don't think we have ever met, but I am very familiar with these arguments), I could see no way that this long-sought goal could be accomplished other than by force from outside. Thus, although Sonia Beresford may well be right about Serbia, I don't think she is right about Afghanistan or Iraq (p. 308):
The Serbs got rid of Milošević not because NATO bombed them for three months, but because it was time to stop tolerating a corrupt dictator. It was time to try to introduce democracy. The [Afghans] and Iraqis would have done the same. In their own time.
I now find myself reluctantly agreeing with the words put by T. S. Eliot into the mouth of Archbishop Becket in Murder in the Cathedral, that the temptation “to do the right deed for the wrong reason” is, if perhaps not quite “the greatest treason,” nevertheless likely to open a Pandora's box of moral uncertainty. Alas, although it would be true for the archbishop, shortly to face death at the hand of Henry II's soldiers, it is most unlikely that Becket's previous line will have any echo with the current American administration: “Temptation shall not come in this kind again.” It certainly will, and this book makes a sober, cautionary, and often moving contribution to our vision of the world after 2003.
