Some time ago, students of Thucydides engaged in a vigorous debate about the unity of his History of the Peloponnesian War. That debate turned in considerable part on the question of the composition of the work. Could we discern in the History evidence that different parts had been written at different times, some during the course of the war, some after its conclusion and with the advantage of hindsight? This question of compositional complexity intersected with issues of thematic unity. Indeed, the eventual turn away from the question of composition rested in part upon an assertion of the basic theoretical unity of Thucydides's work, regardless of when particular parts of it may have been written.
These old debates are called to mind by Mary Nichols's important new book. Nichols aims to convince her readers of “the extent to which freedom was a central theme for Thucydides” (1). This is not quite the same as saying that freedom is the central theme of the History, though on Nichols's reading a concern with freedom undergirds—unifies—much of Thucydides's account of the war. Freedom here is not simply an analytical tool; it is a “cause,” and Nichols sets out to “explore Thucydides' commitment” to it (1).
The exploration begins and in many ways turns upon Thucydides's presentation of Pericles as a “model of freedom” (27). Pericles's freedom resides, first, in his relationship with the Athenians. Thucydides famously writes that Pericles “controlled the people with freedom” (2.65.9). For Nichols, this points toward Pericles's success in balancing freedom and rule, a balance crafted and nurtured through speech. Such balance in political life is reflected, too, in Pericles's vision of Athenian imperial politics, which meshes Athenian freedom to choose and act in the world with the recognition of limits on Athenian power.
Freedom, to borrow from one of Nichols's chapter titles, always thus hangs “in the balance.” As is common in readings that emphasize Pericles as model or exception, in Nichols's account much of the rest of the History traces the failure of others to strike this delicate balance. In the Mytilenean debate, for example, Diodotus aims to preserve freedom by defending the kind of deliberation that allows the city to change its course; but Cleon promotes an understanding of justice as compulsion that would jettison speech and so rob the city of its freedom. We similarly see the erosion of freedom at Plataea and Melos, in the Athenian debate over whether to sail for Sicily and, in a different way, in the Spartan Brasidas's campaign to “liberate” cities from Athenian rule.
The career and fate of Brasidas point toward the most intriguing implications of Nichols's approach, which concern the relationship between freedom and home. Brasidas ultimately fails because his efforts to bring liberation are not rooted in the politics of his home city. When Brasidas makes promises to the cities he seeks to make free, he does so on the basis of a Spartan “commitment to freedom for cities that are liberated from Athens” that is itself “suspect” (94). “Brasidas's dependence on what he cannot control [i.e., Sparta itself],” Nichols concludes, “makes the liberation of Hellas impossible” (98). The campaign for liberation is rootless, just as Brasidas himself—unable to speak for, in, or to Sparta—in effect has no “home.”
Nichols builds on this insightful reading of Brasidas to explore the relationship of familiar Athenian figures to their home city. Alcibiades and Nicias provide a striking contrast here. The former is too independent of Athens, the latter altogether too dependent on it. Because neither has a secure sense of home, neither can locate freedom “in the balance.” Other Athenians fare better. Pericles is fully at home in Athens, neither too dependent nor too independent. He can “control the people with freedom” and in doing so lead them to and through freedom. Balancing dependence and independence, freedom and control, both at home and abroad, Pericles is, Nichols concludes, a “better political realist” than other Athenian leaders (and better, too, than Brasidas).
Two other Athenian figures manage their own, distinctive relationships to the home city. There is, first, Themistocles, who possesses a “genius” that “belongs to him, and goes with him wherever he goes,” including to the court of Persia (177). And yet Themistocles's very independence, preserved even while in Persia, yields to him a freedom to return home, in burial and then in commemoration as “worthy of wonder” (178). In this, Themistocles is something like the historian himself who in exile finds a kind of freedom that allows him, by recording “what is worthy of enduring,” to fashion a home in his “written memory of Athens” (184).
These reflections on home indicate the value of Nichols's focus on freedom. Nichols would have us think about freedom as requiring a deep rooting in the particularities of a political home. The final two chapters of her book are quite brilliant on Athens as a home for freedom and on some Athenians as homeless and so fundamentally unfree. Though its account of Brasidas is crucial and revelatory, the book does not offer such an in-depth account of Sparta as home. This is no doubt partly due to the History's focus on the historian's home city but partly, too, to Nichols's focus on freedom, which is simply better suited to understanding Athens than Sparta.
Indeed, as revelatory as the focus on freedom is, it does have its limitations. Given that Nichols closely associates speech with freedom, it is perhaps not surprising that the book dwells most often on the speeches Thucydides records and so less on his narrative of events. This approach does risk understating the sense of necessity that attends the inexorable flow of the narrative. Along these lines, we might consider the possibility that the History gives us in the speeches moments or episodes of freedom (or attempts to assert freedom) in the midst of vast stretches in which necessity or compulsion rules.
A focus on freedom also risks downplaying the significance of other Thucydidean concerns such as justice or humanity. Nichols is of course attuned to these concerns as well. They inevitably emerge, for example, in her treatment of the affairs of Mytilene, Plataea, and Melos. Indeed, at times, the connections with freedom come to seem distant, as the reader waits for the drawing of links back to the book's central concern. On one level, both the possibility that some things will be left out and the possibility that some of what is included may seem only tenuously connected are inevitable consequences of any attempt to find and make interpretive use of a unifying theme in a work like the History. On another level, the fact that the complexity of the History can only imperfectly be captured by a singular theme like freedom may tell us something about the limits on the freedom of the historian himself, as he struggled simultaneously to produce an accurate account of the war and to record “what is worthy of enduring.”
