After almost a generation since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the liberal dream of reorganizing the world based upon liberal ideals, such as democracy, human rights, and the market economy has yet to be achieved. Rather the goal seems to have become even more distant than 20 years ago, when the United Nations and other multilateral institutions seemed to have finally begun to function as they had been originally intended. The author of this book, however, does not seem to be daunted. He argues that given the higher level of global connectivity, there are growing demands for global governance. He refers to issue areas such as pandemics, financial instability, cybersecurity, climate changes, and migration as typical examples. Yet, the author warns that if we want to continue to enjoy the fruits of globalization, which he thinks greatly benefits humankind on this planet, governance provided by existing institutions is clearly inadequate.
The author is no romantic advocate for global cooperation, correctly paying attention to the trade-off between legitimacy and efficacy, and the political reality of domestic political pressure (see how powerful agricultural lobbies are in the developed world) that constrains bold political leadership. The resulting short-termism dominating today's world, in addition to well-known difficulties of collective action (free-ride and the lack of knowledge and information), prevents us from taking proactive measures to counter uncertain but potentially devastating long-term problems (typically global climate change). He also does not forget to point out the negative sides of global connectivity. Criminal activities are now transnational, and international terrorist groups are helped by the Internet and cheaper international flights. These anti-social groups now have access to knowledge which was traditionally monopolized by nation states. One well-known result of this was the Aum Shinrikyo cult croup, which produced sarin gas to kill innocent citizens in Tokyo in 1995.
The author's prescription based upon the above diagnosis is the promotion of transgovernmental networks among like-minded experts and civil society groups to overcome the immobility of regular intergovernmental negotiations. At the same time, he argues that existing global institutions need to be improved by the selective inclusion of members depending upon the importance of the members in the issue areas concerned. On a more micro-level, the author makes suggestions based on an interesting insider view, which appears to reflect his first-hand experiences in those organizations. Recruitment must be improved for managers and leadership positions of international organizations to break the group-think of international secretariats and existing international organizations must be streamlined, which involves not only the redefinition but also even the closure of some them (though he does not specify which ones).
The view expressed here is basically a liberal internationalist one. While carefully balancing the merits and demerits of globalization, the utility and inadequacy of existing governance institutions, and the analyses and advocacy of solutions to the problems, the author obviously believes in a growing ‘sense of common awareness of humanity’, and more global connectedness rather than less. In other words, it is an analysis based on the belief in ‘the one globalized world’.
But are we really heading toward ‘one world’? Technological trends clearly point to a more interconnected world which may ultimately dictate the way we will be living in the long run, but similar discourses sounded very persuasive in nineteenth century Britain, where the author is currently based. With hindsight, we now know that human beings ended up fighting two world wars followed by the Cold War in the twentieth century, killing millions with newly developed technologies.
The increasing and irrevocable global connectivity looks evident, and a stronger demand for global governance therefore seems obvious. But this does not guarantee a corresponding increase in the supply of global governance. If the demand and supply do not match, there are only three ways to square the account. One is by increasing the supply by radically reforming global governance institutions, as this book argues. Although not mutually exclusive, the other is reducing demand by controlling the level of connectivity, thereby reducing the burden on existing institutions. If we fail on both accounts, we would have to experience the negative impacts resulting from inadequate governance. These could include many more financial crises or uncontrolled pandemics. We have of course experienced these problems many times in the past. But as the author warns, the scale may be much larger, and if this happens, we could even witness a breakdown of the whole system.
Sovereignty is a traditional institutional device for allowing heterogeneous actors to coexist peacefully, thereby reducing demands for cooperative governance. The utility of sovereignty can be higher if there is a low level of cooperation. Although it can be a major obstacle of collective action, sovereignty can reduce the burden on governance institutions by minimizing the need for collective action. However, to many of its critics, sovereignty is merely an outdated concept if the sense of a global community is strong enough to ‘supply’ more global governance. But can we really count on ‘a stronger sense of common awareness of humanity’ for an increased supply for global governance? Over the last decade or so, we are seeing a higher level of heterogeneity within the global system. Although there are limited signs of the two countries’ value orientations converging to liberalism, the increasing power and influence of nationalistic and assertive China and Russia are a political fact. As of summer 2014, the Arab Spring which started in 2010 has turned into a poor showing. Syria and Iraq have turned into failed states, with no sense of common identity between them, let alone within their own borders. While cyberspace is an increasingly important commons, China is widely believed to be engaged actively in state-sponsored hacking. US citizens are most suspicious of the causality between global warming and human activities, despite the fact that the US is the largest emitter of CO2, next only to China. In fact, this planet ‒ despite its increasing connectivity ‒ may become even more diverse, and the management of the heterogeneity seems to be more important than ever.
Global governance could be provided without a shared sense of community among different agents. Typically, it is through political bargaining that differences among actors are overcome, forcing them to cooperate. But it is these very political processes that this book fails to analyze in full. Civil-society groups and a small number of experts in different governments are indeed important, but they cannot be completely value neutral. Influential non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and vocal advocacy groups are located mainly in a small number of countries in the Western World, whose liberal voices are easily reflected in the liberal, Western, and internationally influential mass media. International experts are mostly fluent English speakers who are educated in a small number of elite Western universities where liberal values are predominant.
Liberals tend to see their value system as universal and apolitical. Respect for the dignity of individual liberty and belief in human progress through reason, though attractive, are not the only values driving humankind on this planet. Respect for tradition, obligations to family and clan, faith toward divinities, pride in one's community, and (alas!) a shared sense of humiliation and anger are also powerful drivers of one's behavior. In addition, those who have better access to knowledge, voices, and resources to organize themselves tend to fail to see these resources as a source of power. But things look very different for those who have less ready access to those resources.
If liberal political forces are not universally powerful enough in an increasingly interconnected but heterogeneous world, we may need to find a way to reduce the need for collective action to avoid a general break-down of the system. States with different faiths, priorities, and ways of living can still cooperate in many ways. And yet, the best way to organize coordination is bound to differ from one issue area to another, depending upon various levels of convergence of world views. If so, I would have liked to read more about analyses related to the management of heterogeneity within the system, rather than diagnoses based on the assumed emergence of a community of humanity.
