As any legal scholar knows, in modern democracies lacking monarchical leaders, no individual right is absolute. Just as the deeply revered right to freedom of speech does not permit one to threaten bodily harm against another person, the individual freedom of religion does not allow an adherent to infringe unreasonably upon the rights of someone else. In his brief but dense Faith or Fraud: Fortune-Telling, Spirituality, and the Law, Jeremy Patrick examines this tension with regard to the practice of fortune-telling, an example of religious expression “at the margins”: not associated with a recognized sect, but nonetheless practiced within the invocation of spirituality (6). The obvious question raised by the practice: To what extent is it fraudulent to offer (and often ask payment for) services to customers promising accurate results, but with no discernible or measurable basis in reality? Furthermore, does it matter to the question of fraud whether the fortune-teller truly believes in his or her own authenticity and does not have the intent to deceive? In an introduction, seven body chapters, and a conclusion, Patrick offers a history of laws covering fortune-telling in four nations (England, Canada, Australia, and the United States), and he thoroughly investigates the legal position of self-identified “spiritual” practitioners holding no affiliation with organized religious bodies (7).
Chapter 1 provides a concise consideration of fortune-telling in the context of organized religions. As Patrick notes, despite passages in Leviticus and Deuteronomy condemning the practice, its popularity has grown in recent years, most notably with Nancy Reagan’s reliance on psychic advisors while serving as First Lady of the United States (12–14). The next four chapters examine laws regulating the practice, and subsequent court rulings, in England, Canada, Australia, and the United States. English laws on fortune-telling, which provided the template for the other three nations, emerged as early as the 1500s, and banned the practice not on the basis of fraud but because it looked too much like witchcraft, and also served as a public nuisance. Punishments included imprisonment and also possibly the death penalty. Laws passed in the 1700s upheld bans on fortune-telling, but reduced the severity of penalties for violations.
In Canada, the 1892 Criminal Code banned the use of “occult” methods to find lost objects, regardless of situational context (47–48). A 1954 update to the law tried to tighten the language but instead created ambiguity: It made the criminality of fortune-telling contingent upon its “fraudulent” character or lack thereof, and while some Canadian courts have taken the defendant’s sincerity into consideration, others have concluded that fortune-telling is inherently “fraudulent” by nature (51–52). The Supreme Court of Canada has yet to resolve the tension.
In Australia, the English laws of the 1700s and 1800s strictly banning fortune-telling were in effect for much of the country’s history, and Australian courts reliably convicted defendants well into the twentieth century. However, in the early twenty-first century, a federal human rights report criticizing such laws as a threat to religious freedom led lawmakers in many local and regional jurisdictions to overturn bans against fortune-telling. As Patrick notes, relief for fortune-tellers in Australia ultimately came “not from the courts but, rather, from the legislatures” (73).
In the United States, the early history of laws regarding fortune-telling mirrored that of the other three nations. However, by the second half of the twentieth century, courts at various levels were willing to allow fortune-telling as a permitted exercise within the constitutional right to freedom of religion, although they generally put the onus on the defendant to prove that their religious interest in fortune-telling was authentic and sincere. A federal district court, for example, rejected the arguments of one twentieth-century Virginia psychic, as a review of her website revealed religious proclamations so jumbled and incoherent that they could not possibly constitute “a religion that can be manifested in practice” (112).
In chapter 6, Patrick offers a detailed consideration of the wisdom of various legislatures regulating fortune-telling, raising many complicating factors in the process. Among many difficult considerations is how to make a legal distinction between “fortune-telling” and “prophecy”: although both involve predictions about the future, one is viewed by the public as much more legitimate than the other (see 119–20). Ultimately, Patrick comes down on the side of permitting fortune-telling, for various reasons: Chief among them, proving fraud is a fool’s errand in most cases, as it is nearly impossible to demonstrate the non-sincerity of a practitioner. Furthermore, for Patrick, such laws exemplify a type of paternalism by the government—if most fortune-telling clients are satisfied with the product they have received for the money, then what business does the state have in getting involved (142)?
Chapter 7 asks whether fortune-telling should and does enjoy protection under constitutional and statutory religious freedom guarantees. Patrick argues that “spiritual counsellors can and do have a legitimate claim for their activities to be protected” by guarantees of freedom of religion (178). “[A]lthough unorthodox and more mutable than mainstream religious” beliefs, says Patrick, they “are no less sincere and no less worthy of protection than anyone else’s” (178). In his brief conclusion to the volume, Patrick provides some bullet-point summaries of the issues discussed in the book, offers suggestions for further research, and encourages legal scholars to become more up-to-date with an understanding of how the idea of religion itself has changed in recent years—becoming more individualized and less tied to established faith traditions.
Patrick’s book should enjoy wide reading. It is clear, concise, and raises a large number of interesting questions related to trenchant legal issues, namely the interpretation of protections for constitutionally and statutorily guaranteed rights. The comparative framework of considering four different nations shows how each initially relied on English law, but how Canada, Australia, and the United States pursued slightly different avenues toward regulation of fortune-telling as their respective histories unfolded. The scholarship is strong, and the occasional insertion of Patrick’s own voice and opinions should stimulate serious discussion. As Patrick points out in his conclusion, the book provides fertile ground for further research: he admits that he has considered only a handful of selected statutes, cases, and rulings in each of these nations, and there is a much more vast body of jurisprudence left untouched here. But there is also room to go further: What about, for example, predominantly Islamic countries? In 2007, news reports emerged from Iran that a growing number of its citizens, concerned about growing tensions with Israel and the United States, were consulting soothsayers about what to expect next. Presumably the citizens and governments of predominantly Islamic nations accept the previously referenced passages in Leviticus and Deuteronomy prohibiting fortune-telling, but do not rely on the English legal tradition emphasized so heavily in Patrick’s volume. Clearly, the opportunities for scholars to debate and build on the contributions here are numerous.
