The majority of Cormac Burke's book, The Theology of Marriage, is valuable for scholars. This collection of essays weaves together an argument that canon law supports a personalist understanding of marriage, not a legalistic one. Burke's argument should garner attention both because of his service as judge on the Roman Rota from 1986 to 1999, and because of his expertise on church law.
Burke begins by arguing that a sacramental marriage does not depend on an ecclesiastical official judging a couple's “conscious and ‘active’ Christian faith” (2). Rather, a sacramental marriage results from both parties being baptized and consenting to the marriage. It is not an action of a priest, but of a couple, and so can be sacramental whether it is contracted in a civil or ecclesial setting.
Burke continues by noting that a sacramental marriage “does not create new obligations substantially distinct from those characterizing non-Christian marriage” (42). Instead, the sacramental aspect brings marriage to greater perfection by providing “the spouses with help and strength to fulfill their natural conjugal obligations and achieve their Christian goal” (42).
Burke laments that the Catholic tradition has “lagged behind” (37) studying these sanctifying effects, having more thoroughly explored canonical aspects of marriage. Theologians and canonists have focused on the “ethical aspects of physical sexuality” (51), primarily procreation and secondarily as a remedy for concupiscence. Burke argues that this focus began to shift with Casti Connubii, was expanded by Gaudium et Spes, and came to prominence under the pontificate of John Paul II. Theologians and canonists adopted a personalist perspective, particularly distinguished by a movement away from viewing marriage as a remedium concupiscentiae. This trajectory guided the 1983 revision of the Code of Canon Law, as clearly seen in the Code's emphasis on the “good of the spouses” presented along with procreation and education of children as ends of marriage (57), and the inseparability of the ends of marriage rather than prioritizing procreation above all the other ends (67).
It is when Burke moves out of his expertise in canon law and to a theology of marriage that his book becomes less valuable. In the last third of the book, he builds a theology out of Saint Augustine's understanding of marriage and John Paul II's theology of the body. While the argument is explicitly about the indivisibility of the procreative and unitive ends of sex, it results in a perspective that subordinates the unitive aspect of sex to the procreative aspect and, more troubling, subordinates women to men. While it is not typical to quote at length in a book review, the key to Burke's argument is best read in his own words. He writes, “The greatest expression of a person's desire to give himself is to give the seed of himself. Giving one's seed is much more significant, and in particular is much more real, than giving one's heart. ‘I am yours, I give you my heart’ remains mere poetry to which no physical gesture can give true body. But, ‘I am yours; I give you my seed’ is not poetry, it is love” (168). I do not believe that most married couples or theologians would find this theology compelling. Moreover, it is difficult for me to find pastoral value in suggesting that the depositing of the male seed is the greatest expression of self-giving love.
Thus, the book is valuable when Burke speaks from his area of expertise. When he does, scholars will find a personalist interpretation of the Code of Canon Law that is good to know.
